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Abstract	
If	 I	 take	my	umbrella,	having	 seen	 that	 it’s	 raining	outside,	we	might	 say	 that	my	 reason	 for	
taking	my	umbrella	was	that	it	was	raining.	However,	if	I’d	believed	that	it	was	raining	when	it	
wasn’t,	we	might	 say	 that	my	 reason	 for	 taking	my	umbrella	was	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 it	was	
raining.	In	the	first	case,	my	reason	for	acting	seems	to	be	a	feature	of	the	world,	whilst	in	the	
second	it	seems	to	be	a	feature	of	my	psychology.		
According	to	most	theories	of	reasons,	we	are	mistaken	about	what	my	reason	for	acting	was	
in	one	of	these	cases.	However,	I	argue,	these	theories	all	entail	several	awkward	claims.		
I	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	 theory	 of	 reasons	 that	 can	 reconcile	 these	 two	 accounts	 of	what	my	
reason	for	acting	was	without	entailing	such	awkward	claims.	I	argue	that	what	the	fact	that	it	
is	raining	and	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	have	in	common	is	that,	in	their	respective	
cases,	 they	 each	 explain	why	 it	was	 rational	 for	me	 to	 take	my	 umbrella	 and	why	 I	 took	 it.	
More	generally,	I	argue	that	there	is	at	least	a	sense	in	which	all	practical	reasons	explain	why	
it	is,	in	some	respect,	rational	for	the	agent	to	do	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	
The	major	challenge	for	this	account	 is	 the	claim	that	only	 features	of	an	agent’s	psychology	
can	explain	why	they	act	or	why	it	 is	rational	for	them	to	act.	 I	provide	a	formal	construal	of	
this	challenge	and	argue	that	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	can	explain	why	I	take	my	umbrella	and	
why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	do	so,	by	explaining	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	
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Introduction	
If	 I	 take	my	umbrella,	having	 seen	 that	 it’s	 raining	outside,	we	might	 say	 that	my	 reason	 for	
taking	 my	 umbrella	 was	 that	 it	 was	 raining.	 However,	 if	 it	 hadn’t	 been	 raining,	 but	 I’d	
mistakenly	believed	that	 it	had,	we	might	 instead	say	that	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	
was	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.		
In	the	first	case,	my	reason	for	acting	seems	to	be	a	feature	of	the	world,	whilst	in	the	second	
it	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 feature	 of	 my	 psychology.	 Can	 these	 two	 different	 accounts	 of	 what	 my	
reason	for	acting	was	be	reconciled	within	a	single	theory	of	what	 it	 is	to	be	a	reason?	Most	
theorists	 think	not;	most	 theorists	 think	 that	 in	 one	or	 the	other	 of	 these	 cases	we	 are	 just	
wrong	about	what	my	reason	for	acting	was.	
First,	there	are	those	theorists	who	take	what	happens	when	I	am	mistaken	to	be	indicative	of	
what	happens	when	I’m	not.	They	insist	that,	irrespective	of	whether	or	not	it	was	raining,	my	
reason	 for	 taking	 my	 umbrella	 was	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 (and	 not	 that	 it	 was	
raining).	Theorists	of	this	sort,	so-called	‘psychologists’,	suggest	that	our	reasons	for	acting	can	
only	be	features	of	our	psychology.	
Second,	 and	 in	 contrast,	 there	 are	 those	 theorists	 who	 take	 what	 happens	 when	 I’m	 not	
mistaken	 to	 be	 indicative	 of	 what	 happens	 when	 I	 am.	 They	 insist	 that,	 in	 both	 cases	 (i.e.	
regardless	of	whether	or	not	it	was	raining),	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	was	that	it	was	
raining	 (and	 not	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 raining).	 These	 theorists,	 whom	 I	 call	
‘deliberativists’,	insist	that	the	consideration	in	light	of	which	an	agent	acts	is	their	reason	for	
acting.	
Third,	there	are	those	theorists,	whom	I	call	 ‘favourists’,	who	do	not	seek	to	learn	something	
from	one	case	about	the	other;	 instead,	they	 insist	that	our	reasons	for	acting	must	count	 in	
favour	of	our	actions.	Like	deliberativists,	favourists	argue	that,	when	it	was	raining,	my	reason	
for	taking	my	umbrella	was	that	it	was	raining.	However,	unlike	deliberativists,	favourists	insist	
that	if	I	take	my	umbrella	because	of	a	mistaken	belief	that	it	is	raining	then	I	don’t	take	it	for	a	
reason.	
In	contrast	to	all	of	these	theorists,	I	think	that	the	two	different	accounts	of	what	my	reason	
for	 taking	my	umbrella	was	can	be	 reconciled	within	a	 single	 theory	of	 reasons.	 I	 argue	 that	
what	the	fact	that	 it	 is	raining	and	the	fact	that	 I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining	have	 in	common	is	
that,	 in	 their	 respective	 cases,	 they	 each	 explain	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	
umbrella	 and	 why	 I	 took	 it.	 I	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 in	 virtue	 of	 standing	 in	 those	 explanatory	
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relations	to	my	action	that	those	facts	were,	in	their	respective	cases,	my	reason	for	taking	my	
umbrella.	More	generally,	I	argue	that	there	is	a	clear	sense	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	there	is	
for	 one	 to	 act,	 or	 a	 reason	 one	 has	 to	 act,	 or	 a	 reason	 for	 acting,	 according	 to	which	 such	
reasons	explain	why	it	is,	in	a	certain	sense,	rational	for	the	agent	to	do	the	actions	for	which	
they	are	reasons.	I	call	this	account	‘explanatory	rationalism’.	
1 Why	do	we	need	a	new	theory	of	reasons?	
If	 there	 are	 already	 three,	 distinct,	 and	popular	 theories	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 an	 agent’s	
reason	for	acting	and	their	action,	why	go	looking	for	a	fourth?	Why	do	we	need	a	new	theory	
of	reasons?	
We	need	a	new	theory	of	reasons	because	the	existing	theories	are,	as	Jonathan	Dancy	puts	it,	
‘awkward	in	the	sort	of	way	that	is	usually	due	to	bad	theory.	As	Aristotle	said,	they	leave	one	
saying	things	that	nobody	would	say	unless	defending	a	theory.’	(2008a,	267)	For	instance,	it	is	
awkward	to	say,	as	the	psychologist	must,	that	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	could	never	
be	that	it	was	raining.	And	it	is	awkward	to	say,	as	the	deliberativist	must,	that	I	could	take	my	
umbrella	for	the	reason	that	it	was	raining,	even	though	it	wasn’t.	And	it	is	likewise	awkward	
to	say,	as	the	favourist	must,	that	although	I	take	my	umbrella	deliberately,	purposefully	and	
intentionally,	 I	 don’t	 take	 it	 for	 a	 reason.	 And	 indeed,	 as	 I	 will	 show,	 these	 theories	 are	
awkward	in	yet	other	ways	still.	
I	stress	the	awkwardness	of	these	theories	not	because	I	take	that	to	be	the	last	word	on	their	
plausibility;	clearly,	one	could	just	accept	this	awkwardness	as	a	price	that	is	worth	paying	for	
an	otherwise	convenient	account	of	what	it	 is	to	be	a	reason.	My	aim	is	rather	to	make	clear	
that	 for	each	of	 these	theories	 there	 is	a	price	 that	must	be	paid,	and	that	 the	price	of	each	
theory	is	sufficient	to	motivate	the	search	for	less	costly	alternatives.	As	Maria	Alvarez	puts	it:	
prima	 facie	paradoxical	 claims	are	not,	 ‘a	decisive	argument	against	 the	views	 that	generate	
them	but	[they]	seem	to	favour	considering	whether	there	is	a	plausible	alternative	view	that	
does	not	commit	one	to	such	claims.’	(2016b,	11)	So	is	there?	
2 Pluralism	about	reasons	
Well,	here	is	an	alternative	that	some	theorists	favour:	perhaps	there	are	just	different	senses	
of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason.	For	instance,	perhaps	there	is	a	sense	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	in	
which	reasons	are	what	psychologism	says	they	are,	and	perhaps	there	is	a	different	sense	of	
what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	in	which	reasons	are	what	favourism	says	they	are.	According	to	such	
an	 account,	 if	 I	 take	my	 umbrella	 because	 I	 mistakenly	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	 there	 is	 a	
(psychologistic)	 sense	 in	which	 I	 take	 it	 for	a	 reason	and	a	 (favourist)	 sense	 in	which	 I	don’t;	
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likewise	 (to	pick	a	different	expression),	 there	 is	a	 sense	 in	which	 I	had	 a	 reason	 to	 take	my	
umbrella	 and	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 I	 didn’t.	 According	 to	 this	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reasons,	 the	
awkwardness	 that	 univocal	 theories	 of	 reasons	 face	 is	 merely	 the	 result	 of	 conflating	 two	
different	senses	of	a	single	expression;	pluralist	theories	thus	purport	to	be	exactly	the	sort	of	
plausible	alternative	that	we	are	looking	for.	But	are	they?	
Well,	I	agree	that	when	I	mistakenly	believe	that	it	is	raining	there	is	a	sense	in	which	I	take	my	
umbrella	for	a	reason	and	a	sense	in	which	I	don’t;	so,	to	that	extent,	I	am	persuaded	that	our	
eventual	theory	of	reasons	ought	to	be	pluralist.	However,	I	am	not	persuaded	that	we	should	
rely	on	pluralism	as	a	means	of	avoiding	the	problems	that	univocal	theories	of	reasons	face.	In	
particular,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 to	me	 that	whenever	 a	 univocal	 theory	 ends	 up	 entailing	 an	
awkward	claim	it	is	because	it	has	conflated	two	different	senses	of	a	single	expression.	And,	in	
the	 light	 of	 that	 scepticism,	 pluralism	 seems	 less	 like	 a	 way	 of	 avoiding	 awkwardness,	 and	
more	like	a	capitulation	to	it.		
3 Explanatory	rationalism	
Where	does	all	this	leave	me?	It	leaves	me	searching	for	a	univocal	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	
reason	that	doesn’t	force	me	to	say	awkward	things	(or,	more	modestly,	that	doesn’t	force	me	
to	say	 the	same	awkward	things	as	 these	other	 theories).	To	 that	end,	 I	present	explanatory	
rationalism:	
Reason	expression	 Explanatory	rationalism	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	p	makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	explains	(in	the	right	way)	why	A	φ’d.	
Table	1:	Explanatory	rationalism1	
I	 will	 eventually	 argue	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 avoids	 all	 the	 problems	 that	 face	 other	
theories	 because	 it	 is	 able	 to	 reconcile	 the	 idea	 that	 agents	 always	 act	 for	 psychological	
reasons	with	 the	 idea	 that	 they	may	 sometimes	 also	 act	 for	 non-psychological	 reasons.	 But	
																																								 																				
1	Two	points	are	worth	noting:	First,	I	say	that	an	action	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	if	and	only	if	A	takes	it	
to	 be,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing.	 See	 §	(VI)1	 for	 further	 discussion.	 Second,	 the	 categorisation	
schema	used	in	Table	1	is	unusual	in	so	far	as	it	allows	for	the	possibility	of	distinguishing	between	each	
of	 the	 expressions	 listed	 (it	 is	 conventional	 to	 take	 at	 least	 some	 of	 these	 expressions	 to	 be	 co-
extensive).	I	defend	this	approach,	at	length,	in	§	(I).	
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before	I	reach	that	conclusion,	I	address	what	I	take	to	be	the	major	problem	for	explanatory	
rationalism.	3.1 The	problem	for	explanatory	rationalism	
Explanatory	rationalism	claims,	amongst	other	things,	that	an	agent	acts	for	the	reason	that	p	
only	if	p	explains	both	why	they	acted	and	why	it	was	(pro	tanto)	rational	for	them	to	so	act.	
This	means	that	 if	explanatory	rationalism	is	to	be	consistent	with	the	claim	that	when	I	saw	
that	 it	was	raining	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	was	that	 it	was	raining	(as	I	 intend	it	to	
be),	 then	 it	must	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	 raining	 to	 explain	both	why	 I	 took	my	
umbrella	and	why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella.		
There	is,	however,	a	well-rehearsed	argument	against	this	possibility.	This	argument	says	that	
facts	 about	 things	 that	 are	 external	 to	 an	 agent’s	mind	 (e.g.	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining)	 can’t	
explain	why	they	did	something	or	why	it	was	rational	for	them	to	do	it,	since	what	an	agent	
does,	or	what	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do,	only	depends	on	their	mind.		
For	 instance,	notice	that	even	if	 it	 isn’t	raining,	so	 long	as	 I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining	I	will	still	
take	my	 umbrella;	 and	 I	will	 take	 it	because	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 Further,	 notice	 that,	
given	 that	 I	need	 to	believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 in	order	 to	 take	my	umbrella,	even	 if	 I	 take	my	
umbrella	 when	 it	 is	 raining	 I	must	 still	 take	 it	 because	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 Thus,	 the	
argument	goes,	 if	 the	fact	that	 I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining	can	explain	why	I	took	my	umbrella	
whether	or	not	it	is	raining,	then	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	does	no	real	work	in	explaining	why	I	
took	my	umbrella,	and,	therefore,	it	does	not	explain	why	I	took	it.2	
This	argument	is	a	problem	for	any	theory	that	says	that	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	could	be	
something	other	than	a	feature	of	their	psychology	(as	explanatory	rationalism,	favourism	and	
deliberativism	all	do),	 and	 is	 thus	probably	 the	motivating	argument	 for	psychologism	about	
agents’	reasons	for	acting.	Thus,	in	order	to	save	explanatory	rationalism,	I	need	to	say	how	it	
is	that	(in	spite	of	the	argument	above)	the	fact	that	 it	 is	raining	can	explain	both	why	I	took	
my	umbrella,	and	why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	take	it.	3.2 My	response	to	the	problem	
My	 response	 to	 this	problem	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	explains	why	 I	 took	my	
umbrella	by	explaining	why	I	believed	that	it	was	raining,	which	in	turn	explains	why	I	took	my	
umbrella.	Likewise,	I	suggest,	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	explains	why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	
take	my	umbrella	by	explaining	why	I	believed	that	it	was	raining,	which	in	turn	explains	why	it	
																																								 																				
2	This	 argument	 can	 likewise	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	why	 it	was	 rational	 for	me	 to	 take	my	
umbrella.	
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was	 rational	 for	me	 to	 take	my	umbrella.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	mistake	 in	 the	argument	above	 is	
that	it	rejects	the	possibility	of	such	distal	explanations.	
This	response	relies	on	the	transitivity	of	the	explanatory	relations	involved:	if	the	explanatory	
relations	between	the	fact	that	it	was	raining,	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining,	and	
the	fact	that	I	took	my	umbrella	weren’t	transitive,	then	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	would	not	
explain	why	I	took	it.		
However,	explanatory	 relations	are	not	always	 transitive.	For	example,	 if	 I	mistake	 the	spray	
from	 a	 sprinkler	 for	 rain,	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 sprinkler	 is	 spraying	 in	 front	 of	my	window	
explains	why	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	which	 explains	why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	me	 to	 take	my	
umbrella.	But,	the	fact	that	a	sprinkler	is	spraying	in	front	of	my	window	does	not	explain	why	
it	is	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella,	in	spite	of	the	explanatory	chain	connecting	the	two	
facts.	So,	the	explanatory	relations	involved	aren’t	transitive	with	one	another.	
Why	is	it	that	the	transitivity	of	explanation	fails	in	this	case,	but	apparently	succeeds	when	I	
actually	 see	 rain?	 That	 is,	 given	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 sprinkler	was	 spraying	 in	 front	 of	my	
window	and	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	both	(in	their	respective	cases)	explain	why	I	believed	
that	 it	 was	 raining,	 why	 is	 it	 that	 (as	 I	 have	 suggested)	 only	 the	 latter	 explains	 why	 it	 was	
rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella?	It	is	because,	I	will	argue,	the	explanatory	relationships	in	
the	case	of	the	latter,	unlike	the	former,	are	all	of	a	certain,	transitive	sort.	In	particular,	I	argue	
that	there	is	a	mysterious,	non-causal	explanatory	relation	that	obtains,	inter	alia,	between	the	
fact	that	p	and	the	fact	that	an	agent	believes	that	p	when	an	agent	knows	that	p.		
I	thus	argue	that,	in	the	case	when	I	saw	rain,	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	explains	why	it	was	
rational	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 (which	 in	 turn	 explains	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	
umbrella).	And	I	argue	that,	conversely,	in	the	case	in	which	I	was	mistaken,	the	fact	that	the	
sprinkler	was	spraying	 in	 front	of	my	window	does	not	explain	why	 it	was	rational	 for	me	to	
take	my	umbrella	because	it	 is	not	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	
raining	(it	 is	merely	causally	related	to	 it).	 	Moreover,	 I	argue,	 in	both	of	these	cases	the	fact	
that	 it	 appeared	 to	 me	 as	 though	 it	 was	 raining	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	 it	was	raining,	so	that	 in	both	of	these	cases	the	fact	that	 it	appeared	to	me	as	
though	 it	was	 raining	explains	why	 it	was	 rational	 for	me	 to	 take	my	umbrella	 (and,	 indeed,	
explains	why	I	took	it).	
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4 My	theory	of	reasons	
Thus,	 according	 to	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 when	 I	 saw	 that	 it	 was	 raining,	 my	 reasons	 for	
taking	my	 umbrella	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 appeared	 to	me	 as	
though	it	was	raining,	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	In	contrast,	when	I	merely	
saw	the	spray	of	the	sprinkler,	my	reasons	for	taking	my	umbrella	do	not	include	the	‘fact’	that	
it	 was	 raining	 (not	 least	 because	 it	 wasn’t	 raining)	 nor	 do	 they	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
sprinkler	was	 spraying	 in	 front	 of	my	window,	 but	 they	 nonetheless	 include	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
appeared	to	me	as	though	it	was	raining,	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	
Unlike	 any	other	 univocal	 theory	of	 reasons,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 thus	 consistent	 both	
with	 the	claim	that	agents	always	act	 for	psychological	 reasons	and	with	 the	claim	that	 they	
sometimes	act	for	non-psychological	reasons.	And,	indeed,	it	is	precisely	this	that	means	that	
explanatory	 rationalism	 avoids	 the	 particular	 awkward	 claims	 that	 other	 theories	 face,	 and	
which,	more	generally,	makes	it	 immune	to	many	of	the	challenges	one	would	normally	 level	
against	 such	 theories.	 Thus,	 I	 argue,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 the	 best	 univocal	 theory	 of	
reasons.		
However,	 since,	 as	 I	 noted,	 I	 am	 persuaded	 that	 there	may	 be	 two	 distinct	 senses	 to	 each	
reason	expression,	my	own	theory	of	reasons	is	what	I	call	‘new	pluralism’.	New	pluralism	says	
that	one	sense	of	every	reason	expression	 is	explanatory	rationalist,	while	the	other	sense	 is	
favourist;	 and	 this	 allows	me	 to	 say	 that,	 for	 instance,	 when	 I	 take	my	 umbrella	 because	 I	
mistakenly	believe	that	it	is	raining,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	my	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	
is	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining,	and	there	is	a	sense	in	which	I	take	my	umbrella	for	no	reason.	
The	 virtue	 of	 new	 pluralism	 over	 existing	 pluralist	 theories	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 the	
plurality	 of	 senses	 to	 avoid	 the	 awkwardness	 that	 univocal	 theories	 face	 –	 explanatory	
rationalism	already	avoids	that	awkwardness	on	its	own.	
5 That	which	I	pass	over	in	silence	
There	are	 a	 few	 topics	 about	which	 this	 discussion	makes	no	 claim.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 is	 the	
ontology	 of	 reasons.	 For	 the	most	 part	 I	will	 talk	 as	 though	 reasons	 are	 propositions,	 if	 not	
facts,	however,	 this	 is	mostly	 for	 convenience.	Whilst	 there	has	been	some	debate	between	
those	 who	 take	 reasons	 to	 be	 facts	 (or	 states	 of	 affairs)	 and	 those	 who	 take	 them	 to	 be	
psychological	 states,	 I	 make	 no	 particular	 claim	 about	 that.	 My	 theory	 is	 not	 about	 what	
reasons	are;	 it	 is	about	the	relation	 in	which	reasons	stand	to	the	actions	for	which	they	are	
reasons.	Since	I	take	reasons	to	stand	in	explanatory	relations	to	the	actions	for	which	they	are	
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reasons,	if	you	accept	my	account	then	it	will	be	(at	least	in	part)	your	view	on	the	ontology	of	
explanantia	that	determines	what	the	ontology	of	reasons	is.	And	about	that	I	make	no	claim.	
This	 leads	me	to	the	second	topic	about	which	 I	make	no	claim:	what	the	correct	analysis	of	
explanation	is.	Whilst	I	discuss	explanation	in	some	depth,	I	make	no	claims	about	the	specific	
relations	that	underpin	explanatory	relations,	and	what	the	conditions	for	them	are.	However,	
it	may	be	that	some	of	the	purported	instances	of	explanation	that	I	cite	are	incompatible	with	
some	 accounts	 of	 explanation.	 To	 my	 knowledge,	 there	 are	 no	 instances	 of	 this	 kind	 that	
would	be	of	serious	concern	for	my	argument,	and	it	is	my	belief	that	an	alternative	construal	
of	 my	 argument	 could	 be	 made	 whatever	 one’s	 theory	 of	 explanation.	 However,	 I	 may	 be	
wrong;	there	may	be	accounts	of	explanation	that	are	inconsistent	with	what	I	want	from	my	
theory	of	reasons,	in	which	case,	so	be	it.	
Thirdly,	 I	 will	 also	 leave	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 desires	 are	 reasons	 well	 alone.	 Of	
course,	we	regularly	say	things	like:	‘my	reason	for	going	to	the	gym	is	that	I	want	to	get	fit’;	
and,	 ‘my	 reason	 for	 going	 to	 the	 shops	 is	 to	 buy	 eggs’.	 Whilst	 I	 think	 that	 explanatory	
rationalism	has	something	 to	say	about	how	we	 interpret	 these	sentences,	 I	won’t	discuss	 it	
here,	and	I	won’t	mention	such	sentences	further.	
Finally,	 I	 will	 not	 discuss	 reasons	 for	 belief.	 Many	 hold	 that	 reasons	 for	 belief	 should	 be	
analysable	in	the	same	sort	of	way	as	practical	reasons,	and	this	is	a	view	that	I	share.	It	would	
be	 tempting,	 then,	 to	 extend	 explanatory	 rationalism	 into	 an	 analysis	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	
reason	to	believe	something,	and,	 indeed,	 I	think	that	such	an	account	could	be	 illuminating.	
However,	I	don’t	discuss	that	here.	
6 An	overview	of	this	discussion	
The	 structure	of	 this	discussion	 is	 as	 follows.	 In	§	(I),	 I	 set	out	my	approach	 to	 talking	about	
theories	of	reasons.	In	particular	I	categorise	theories	of	reasons	according	to	the	claims	they	
make	 about	 each	 of	 the	 following	 expressions:	 ‘the	 reasons	 there	 are	 for	 one	 to	 act’;	 ‘the	
reasons	for	or	against	acting’;	‘the	reasons	one	has	to	act’;	and	‘one’s	reason	for	acting’.	This	is	
at	 odds	 with	 the	 prevailing	 tendency	 to	 sort	 reasons	 into	 ‘normative’	 and	 ‘motivating’;	
however,	 for	 reasons	 that	 I	 will	 make	 clear,	 I	 prefer	 to	 eschew	 that	 terminology	 in	 my	
categorisation	schema.	
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The	discussion	of	§	(I)	highlights	three	claims	about	reasons	that	are	probably	the	most	widely	
held	(though	not	necessarily	by	the	same	theorists).	These	are:		
Favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act:	 For	 any	p,	 p	 is	 a	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ	 if	 and	 only	 if	p	
makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
Psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act:	For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	which	A	
φ’d	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology	that	rationalises	φing	and	explains	(in	
the	right	way)	why	A	φ’d.	
Deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act:	For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	which	A	
φ’d	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	φs.	
In	§§	(II),	 (III)	and	(IV),	 respectively,	 I	show	that	each	of	 these	accounts	 is	 inconsistent	with	a	
number	of	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.	The	problems	set	out	 in	these	chapters	are	mostly	
alternative	 construals	 of	 arguments	 that	 have	 already	 been	 made	 against	 each	 of	 these	
accounts,	and	they	form	the	basis	of	my	claim	that	all	existing	theories	of	reasons	are,	in	some	
sense,	awkward.	
In	§	(V),	I	consider	whether	we	should	just	adopt	pluralism	as	a	solution	to	the	awkwardness	of	
univocal	 theories.	 I	conclude	that	we	should	not:	pluralism,	at	 least	of	the	conventional	sort,	
falls	short	of	what	we	need	from	a	new	theory	of	reasons.	
In	 §	(VI),	 I	 set	 the	 agenda	 for	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 discussion.	 I	 introduce	 explanatory	
rationalism,	 and	 I	 give	an	overview	of	 the	main	problem	 for	 it	 (highlighted	 in	 the	discussion	
above),	which	I	call	‘The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem’.	I	provide	an	outline	of	my	approach	
to	discussing,	and,	ultimately,	solving	this	problem,	which	is	as	follows.	
In	 §	(VII),	 I	make	 some	 assumptions	 about	 the	 structural	 principles	 and	 logical	 properties	 of	
explanation.	While	my	discussion	relies	on	characterising	explanation	in	this	way,	I	do	not	think	
that	either	my	solution	to	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem,	or	my	theory	of	reasons	more	
generally,	depends	on	explanatory	relations	being	so	characterisable.	
In	§	(VIII),	I	use	the	assumptions	of	the	preceding	chapter	to	provide	a	formal	construal	of	The	
Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem.	 In	particular,	 I	 show	how	 its	 conclusion	 (that	 facts	about	 the	
world	external	to	an	agent’s	mind	cannot	explain	the	agent’s	actions)	can	be	arrived	at	 from	
two	seemingly	trivial	claims	about	what	explains	an	agent’s	action	when	they	act	in	error	or	in	
ignorance,	together	with	five	seemingly	plausible	principles	of	explanation.		
In	§	(IX),	 I	show	how	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	can	also	be	used	to	argue	that	facts	
about	the	world	external	to	an	agent’s	mind	cannot	explain	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	act.	
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In	§	(X),	I	consider	two	popular	accounts	of	how,	for	instance,	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	explains	
why	I	took	my	umbrella.	The	first	of	these	accounts	says	that	it	does	so	elliptically;	the	second	
says	that	it	does	so	directly.	I	argue	that	both	of	these	accounts	are	flawed.	
In	§§	(XI)	&	(XII),	I	develop	my	account	of	how	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	explains	why	I	took	my	
umbrella;	I	say	that	it	explains	it	indirectly.	My	argument	proceeds	in	two	stages.	First,	in	§	(XI),	
I	argue	that	we	should	reject	the	conclusion	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	because	it	is	
based	 on	 a	 false	 principle	 of	 explanation,	 the	 exclusion	 principle.	 The	 exclusion	 principle	
implies	 that	 only	 the	most	proximal	 explanations	 of	 some	 explananda	 explain	 it;	 but	 this	 is	
mistaken	 –	 I	 argue	 that	most	 of	 the	 explanations	we	 are	 interested	 in	 are,	 to	 some	 extent,	
distal	explanations.	Then,	 in	§	(XII),	 I	show	how	that	 insight	helps	 inform	the	account	of	how	
the	fact	that	it	is	raining	can	explain	why	I	took	my	umbrella.	Specifically,	I	suggest	that	the	fact	
that	 it	 is	 raining	 is	 a	distal	 explanation	 of	my	 action;	 it	 explains	why	 I	 took	my	 umbrella	 by	
explaining	 a	more	 proximal	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 took	my	 umbrella	 (namely,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	it	was	raining).	
In	§	(XIII),	I	suggest	that	the	same	account	explains	how	it	is	that,	for	instance,	the	fact	that	it	is	
raining	can	also	explain	why	it	is	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella.	That	is,	the	fact	that	it	is	
raining	explains	why	I	believe	that	it	is	raining,	which	in	turn	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	me	
to	take	my	umbrella.		
However,	I	note,	this	does	not	mean	that	if	an	agent’s	belief	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	them	
to	do	some	action,	then	anything	that	explains	why	they	have	that	belief	will	also	explain	why	
it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 that	 action.	 That	 is,	 I	 note,	 not	 all	 explanatory	 relations	 are	
transitive.	I	then	set	the	stage	for	the	remainder	of	the	discussion,	which	seeks	to	provide	an	
account	of	when	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are,	and	when	they	aren’t,	transitive.	
My	account	proceeds	 in	 two	stages.	First,	 in	§	(XIV),	 I	 introduce	the	mystery	 relation.	 I	argue	
that	the	mystery	relation	is	a	non-causal,	transitive,	explanatory	relation	that	relates:	the	belief	
that	p	to	some	justification	for	it	when	that	belief	is	justified;	the	belief	that	p	to	the	fact	that	p	
when	the	belief	that	p	 is	knowledgeable;	a	justification	for	the	belief	that	p	to	the	fact	that	p	
when	 that	 justification	 affords	 the	opportunity	 for	 knowledge;	 and	 an	 action	 to	 some	belief	
that	explains	why	that	action	is	rational	when	that	action	is	done	intentionally.	Then,	in	§	(XV),	
I	argue	that	the	mystery	relation	is	transitive	with	the	non-causal	explanatory	relation	involved	
in	explaining	why	some	action	is	rational,	whereas	merely	causal	explanatory	relations	are	not.	
This	is	why	facts	that	merely	causally	explain	our	beliefs	(such	as	the	fact	that	the	sprinkler	is	
	 19	
spraying	in	front	of	my	window,	or	facts	that	deviantly	cause	our	beliefs)	do	not	explain	why	it	
is	rational	for	us	to	act.	
Finally,	 in	 §	(XVI),	 I	 revisit	 explanatory	 rationalism.	 I	 show	 how	 it	 responds	 to	 the	 problems	
faced	 by	 other	 theories.	 I	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 immune	 from	 the	 conventional	
procedures	for	generating	problems	for	theories	of	reasons	because	it	is	consistent	both	with	
the	 claim	 that	 agents	 always	 act	 for	 psychological	 reasons	 and	 with	 the	 claim	 that	 they	
sometimes	 act	 for	 non-psychological	 reasons.	 In	 light	 of	 these	 arguments,	 I	 suggest	 that	
explanatory	rationalism	is	the	best	univocal	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason.	
I	conclude	by	returning	to	the	 intuition	that,	when	someone	acts	on	a	 false	belief,	 there	 is	a	
sense	 in	 which	 they	 act	 for	 a	 reason	 and	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 they	 don’t.	 Since	 I	 share	 this	
intuition,	I	advocate	new	pluralism,	which	says	that	explanatory	rationalism	tells	us	one	sense	
of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason,	whilst	favourism	tells	us	the	other.	I	show	that	new	pluralism	does	
not	face	the	same	weaknesses	as	other	forms	of	pluralism	because	whenever	an	agent	acts	for	
a	reason	in	the	favourist	sense,	they	also	act	for	a	reason	in	the	explanatory	rationalist	sense.	
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Chapter	Summary	
(I)	ON	THEORIES	OF	REASONS	
In	which	I	say	how	we	should	categorise	theories	of	reasons.	I	argue	that,	if	our	categorisation	
schema	 is	 to	 capture	 at	 least	 the	main	 theories	 of	 reasons,	 then	 it	 should	 by	 allow	 for	 the	
possibility	 of	 as	many	 kinds	 of	 reason	 as	 there	 are	 reason	 expressions.	 I	 say	 that	 instead	 of	
distinguishing	 between	 psychological	 and	 anti-psychological	 theories	 we	 should	 categorise	
theories	of	reasons	according	to	what	they	say,	for	each	reason	expression,	about	the	relation	
between	the	reasons	picked	out	by	that	expression	and	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	
And	 I	 say	 that	we	should	eschew	the	 terminology	of	 ‘normative’	and	 ‘motivating’	 reasons	 in	
our	categorisation	schema	and	in	our	theorising,	because,	as	they	are	standardly	defined,	they	
make	substantive	claims	about	what	 it	 is	 to	be	a	 reason	 that	 it	 is	properly	 the	business	of	a	
theory	of	reasons	to	determine,	and	that,	moreover,	those	claims	systematically	disadvantage	
‘psychological’	 theories	 of	 reasons.	 To	 frame	 the	 discussion	 of	 practical	 reasons	 in	 terms	
‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	is,	I	suggest,	a	Trojan	horse	that	earnest	theorising	ought	
to	reject.	
(II)	REASONS	TO	ACT	THAT	MAKE	ACTIONS	WORTH	DOING	
In	which	 I	 show	what	 it	 costs	 to	 think	 that	 if	 there	 is	 a	 reason	 to	do	 some	action	 then	 that	
action	 is,	 in	 some	respect,	worth	doing.	 I	 show	how	 ‘favourism	about	 reasons	 to	act’	 (which	
entails	 that	 reasons	 to	 act	 make	 actions	 worth	 doing)	 clashes	 with	 some	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	about	a	case	in	which	someone	acts	on	a	false	belief.	I	set	out	which	claims	
the	 proponent	 of	 this	 view	 must	 choose	 between	 rejecting	 and	 I	 categorise	 the	 common	
choices	from	the	literature.	
(III)	ACTING	FOR	PSYCHOLOGICAL	REASONS	
In	 which	 I	 show	what	 it	 costs	 to	 think	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 which	 an	 agent	 acts	 is	 always	 a	
feature	 of	 their	 psychology.	 I	 show	how	 ‘psychologism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	which	we	 act’	
clashes	with	some	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.	In	particular,	I	show	that	is	inconsistent	with	
the	idea	that	we	are	often	able	to	act	for	reasons	that	make	our	actions	morally	worthy	and,	
more	generally,	worth	doing.	
(IV)	ACTING	FOR	WHAT	YOU	BELIEVE	
In	which	I	show	what	it	costs	to	think	that	a	reason	for	which	an	agent	acts	is	the	content	of	
the	 belief	 they	 acted	 on.	 I	 show	 how	 ‘deliberativism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act’	
clashes	 with	 some	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 about	 the	 factivity	 of	 reasons,	 the	
explanatory	power	of	 the	reasons	 for	which	we	act,	 the	factivity	of	explanation	and	what	an	
agent’s	 reasons	 for	 acting	 are	 in	Gettier	 cases.	 I	 set	 out	which	 claims	 the	 proponent	 of	 this	
view	must	choose	between	rejecting.	
(V)	ON	THE	PLURALITY	OF	REASONS	
In	which	I	explain	what	a	pluralist	theory	of	reasons	is	and	why	‘going	plural’	is	not	a	panacea.	I	
suggest	that	a	given	reason	expression	could	have	more	than	one	sense,	and	I	show	how	we	
can	accommodate	theories	of	reasons	that	accept	that	idea,	i.e.	pluralist	theories	of	reasons,	in	
our	categorisation	schema.	I	discuss	some	examples	of	pluralist	theories	from	the	literature.	I	
show	 how	 pluralist	 theories	 can	 solve	 some	 of	 the	 problems	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapters.	I	explain	why	pluralism	is	not,	however,	enough,	and	I	suggest	that	our	investigation	
should	go	beyond	favourism,	psychologism	and	deliberativism.	
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(VI)	A	NEW	FAMILY	OF	CLAIMS	ABOUT	REASONS	
In	which	I	set	out	a	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons,	and	introduce	the	major	challenge	to	
it.	 I	define	 ‘pro	 tanto	 rational’	actions	as	actions	 that	an	agent	 takes	 to	be,	 in	 some	respect,	
worth	doing.	 I	 set	 out	 a	 new	 family	 of	 claims	 about	 reasons,	 explanatory	 rationalism,	which	
says	that	all	practical	reasons	explain	why	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons	are	pro	tanto	
rational.	I	introduce	the	major	challenge	for	explanatory	rationalism,	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	
Problem,	which	argues	 that	only	 features	of	 an	 agent’s	 psychology	 could	explain	either	why	
they	 do	 something	 or	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 it.	 I	 set	 out	 the	 program	 for	 the	
forthcoming	chapters.	
(VII)	WE	NEED	TO	TALK	ABOUT	EXPLANATION	
In	which	 I	make	 some	assumptions	 about	explanation.	 I	 say	what	 I	mean	by	 ‘explains’	 and	 I	
state	that	I	will	talk	as	though	explananda	are	facts	and	explanantia	are	propositions	(whether	
or	not	 they	are).	 I	 distinguish	 two	 sorts	of	 explanatory	 relation,	 ‘fully	 explains’	 and	 ‘partially	
explains’,	where	a	 full	explanation	 is	sufficient	 for	 the	truth	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	explains	and	a	
partial	 explanation	 is	 an	 element	 (or	 subset)	 of	 a	 full	 explanation,	 and	 I	 make	 some	
assumptions	 about	 the	 logical	 properties	 of	 these	 relations.	 Lastly,	 I	 say	 that	 some	 fact	 is	
‘overexplained’	just	in	case	there	are	two	genuinely	different	full	explanations	of	that	fact.	
(VIII)	THE	EXPLANATORY	EXCLUSION	PROBLEM	
In	which	I	set	out	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem,	which	is,	 in	some	form	or	another,	the	
motivating	argument	for	psychologistic	theories	of	reasons.	I	provide	a	formal	construal	of	the	
Problem,	 showing	 how	 it	 results	 from	 two	 seemingly	 trivial	 claims	 about	 what	 explains	 an	
agent’s	 action	 when	 they	 act	 from	 error	 and	 from	 ignorance	 together	 with	 five	 seemingly	
plausible	principles	of	explanation.	I	show	how	the	Problem	implies	that	I	did	not	congratulate	
my	friend	because	she	had	won	an	award,	but	only	because	I	thought	she	had.	
(IX)	OTHER	USES	FOR	THE	EXPLANATORY	EXCLUSION	PROBLEM	
In	which	I	show	how	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	can	be	used	to	arrive	at	some	other	
conclusions	that	are	inconvenient	for	explanatory	rationalism.	I	set	out	the	general	form	of	the	
Problem,	followed	by	the	general	form	of	the	argument	for	the	first	premise	of	the	Problem.	I	
show	the	Problem	can	be	used	to	argue	that	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 read	that	my	 friend	had	won	an	
award	does	not	explain	why	 I	congratulated	her,	and	that	neither	that	fact,	nor	the	fact	that	
she	had	won	an	award,	can	explain	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	
(X)	HOW	NORMATIVE	REASONS	DON’T	EXPLAIN	
In	 which	 I	 reject	 two	 accounts	 of	 how	 normative	 reasons	 explain.	 I	 re-introduce	 talk	 of	
normative	reasons,	defining	them	as	things	that	make	actions,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	I	
ask	how	it	is	that	we	manage	to	explain	our	actions	when	we	say	that	we	acted	because	of	a	
normative	reason	there	was	to	act;	for	instance:	how	is	it	that	I	explain	why	I	took	my	umbrella	
when	 I	 say	 that	 I	 took	 it	 because	 it	 was	 raining?	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining	
explains	why	I	took	my	umbrella	either	‘elliptically’,	 ‘directly’	or	‘indirectly’.	 I	note	that	which	
answer	 one	 accepts	 will	 depend	 on	 one’s	 response	 to	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem:	
elliptical	 theorists	 accept	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Problem,	 direct	 theorists	 reject	 the	 first	
premise,	 and	 indirect	 theorists	 reject	 the	 second.	 I	 set	 out	 the	 problems	with	 elliptical	 and	
direct	theories.	
(XI)	THE	EXCLUSION	PRINCIPLE	IS	FALSE	
In	 which	 I	 show	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 false.	 I	 provide	 two	 counterexamples	 to	 the	
exclusion	 principle,	 one	 involving	 causal	 explanation	 and	 another	 involving	 non-causal	
explanation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 they	 are	 counterexamples	 because	 in	 each	 case	 the	 purportedly	
excluded	 fact	 explains	 the	 explanandum	 by	 explaining	 something	 that,	 in	 turn,	 explains	 the	
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explanandum.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	problem	with	 the	exclusion	principle	 is	 that	 it	discriminates	
against	 all	 but	 the	 most	 proximal	 explanations	 of	 any	 given	 explanandum,	 and	 that	 this	 is	
problematic	 at	 least	partly	because	we	are	 typically	 interested	 in	more	distal	 explanations.	 I	
explain	where	our	 reasoning	went	wrong	and	which	 full	 explanation	an	apparently	excluded	
fact	is	part	of.	
(XII)	EXPLAINING	WHY	WE	ACT	
In	which	 I	 say	 how	 normative	 reasons	 (and	 the	 appearance	 of	 them)	 explain	why	we	 act.	 I	
suggest	 that	 normative	 reasons	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 by	 explaining	 their	 belief	 that,	 in	
turn,	explains	the	agent’s	action.	I	suggest	that	they	explain	an	agent’s	belief	by	explaining	the	
appearance	of	them	that,	in	turn,	explains	the	agent’s	belief.	I	set	out	the	implications	of	this	
view	for	explanatory	rationalism	and	for	anti-psychological	theories	of	reasons	more	generally.	
(XIII)	EXPLAINING	WHY	IT	IS	RATIONAL	TO	ACT	
In	which	I	say	when	something	explains	why	it’s	rational	to	act,	and	when	it	doesn’t.	I	suggest	
that	 normative	 reasons	 or	 appearances	 explain	why	 it	 is	 rational	 to	 act	 only	 if	 they	 explain	
those	beliefs	that	in	turn	explain	why	it	is	rational	to	act.	I	note	that	it	is	tempting	to	infer	that	
if	 an	 agent’s	 belief	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 some	 action	 then	 whatever	
explains	that	belief	also	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	that	action.	I	show	how	that	
inference	 leads	 to	 an	 apparent	 dilemma	 for	 explanatory	 rationalism.	 I	 counsel	 against	 that	
inference,	 by	 noting	 that	 different	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relations	may	 not	 be	 transitive	with	
each	other.	 I	 then	set	out	 the	 task	ahead:	 showing	 that	 the	explanatory	 relations	concerned	
are	transitive	when,	and	only	when,	explanatory	rationalism	needs	them	to	be.	
(XIV)	THE	MYSTERY	RELATION	
In	 which	 I	 introduce	 the	 mystery	 relation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 a	 mysterious,	 non-causal	 relation	
obtains	between	a	belief	and	the	justification	that	it	is	based	on	when	that	belief	is	justified.	I	
argue	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 must	 be	 non-causal,	 because,	 as	 deviant	 causal	 chains	
demonstrate,	 a	 merely	 causal	 relation	 between	 a	 belief	 and	 some	 justification	 for	 it	 is	 not	
sufficient	 for	 that	 belief	 to	 be	 justified.	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	 exact	 same	 mysterious	 relation	
relates:	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 when	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 is	 knowledgeable;	 a	
justification	 for	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 when	 that	 justification	 affords	 the	
opportunity	for	knowledge;	and	an	action	to	some	belief	that	explains	why	it	is	rational	when	
that	action	is	done	intentionally.	I	argue,	furthermore,	that	this	mystery	relation	is	a	transitive,	
explanatory	relation.	
(XV)	MYSTERY	RELATIONS	AND	WHY	IT	IS	RATIONAL	TO	ACT	
In	which	 I	 say	 that	mystery	 relations	 are	 transitive	with	 the	 explanatory	 relation	 involved	 in	
explaining	why	it	is	rational.	I	label	the	sort	of	explanatory	relation	that	obtains	between	(i)	the	
fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	and	(ii)	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	an	
umbrella,	the	‘E’-relation’.	I	argue	that	the	mystery	relation	is	transitive	with	the	E’-relation.	I	
show	how	this	accords	with	our	intuitions	in	some	of	the	examples	already	considered.	
(XVI)	A	NEW	THEORY	OF	REASONS	
In	which	I	set	out	my	theory	of	reasons.	I	discuss	what	explanatory	rationalism	says	about	the	
application	of	each	reason	expression	to	the	case	where	I	take	my	umbrella	having	seen	that	it	
is	 raining.	 I	show	how	explanatory	rationalism	solves	the	problems	faced	by	other	theories.	 I	
suggest	 that	 the	 best	 theory	 of	 reasons	 is	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reason	 that	 combines	
explanatory	 rationalism	 and	 favourism;	 I	 call	 this	 theory	 ‘new	 pluralism’.	 I	 show	 how	
explanatory	 rationalism	 enables	 new	 pluralism	 to	 meet	 the	 main	 challenge	 to	 pluralist	
theories.	
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(I)		On	Theories	of	Reasons	
In	which	I	say	how	we	should	categorise	theories	of	reasons.	I	argue	that,	if	our	
categorisation	schema	is	to	capture	at	least	the	main	theories	of	reasons,	then	
it	 should	 by	 allow	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 as	many	 kinds	 of	 reason	 as	 there	 are	
reason	expressions.	 I	 say	 that	 instead	of	 distinguishing	between	psychological	
and	 anti-psychological	 theories	 we	 should	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	
according	 to	 what	 they	 say,	 for	 each	 reason	 expression,	 about	 the	 relation	
between	 the	 reasons	 picked	 out	 by	 that	 expression	 and	 the	 actions	 for	which	
they	 are	 reasons.	 And	 I	 say	 that	 we	 should	 eschew	 the	 terminology	 of	
‘normative’	 and	 ‘motivating’	 reasons	 in	 our	 categorisation	 schema	and	 in	 our	
theorising,	 because,	 as	 they	 are	 standardly	 defined,	 they	 make	 substantive	
claims	about	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	that	it	is	properly	the	business	of	a	theory	
of	 reasons	 to	 determine,	 and	 that,	 moreover,	 those	 claims	 systematically	
disadvantage	 ‘psychological’	 theories	 of	 reasons.	 To	 frame	 the	 discussion	 of	
practical	reasons	 in	terms	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	 is,	 I	suggest,	a	
Trojan	horse	that	earnest	theorising	ought	to	reject.	
Within	 the	 domain	 of	 practical	 reasons,	 it	 is	 common	 to	 distinguish	 two	 kinds	 of	 reason:	
normative	 and	 motivating.	 It	 is	 typical1	to	 then	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	 according	 to	
whether	 or	 not	 they	 take	 reasons	 of	 each	 kind	 to	 be	 (exclusively)	 features	 of	 the	 agent’s	
psychology.	If	we	say	that	a	theory	is	‘psychological’	with	respect	to	a	given	kind	of	reason	if	it	
says	 that	 a	 reason	 of	 that	 kind	 is	 always	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 agent’s	 psychology,	 and	 ‘anti-
psychological’	 if	 it	 denies	 that	 view,	 we	 have	 the	 following,	 ‘standard’	 categorisation	 of	
theories	of	reasons:	
Theory	 Normative	reasons	 Motivating	reasons	
‘The	Received	View’2	 Anti-psychological	 Psychological	
‘Anti-psychologism’	 Anti-psychological	 Anti-psychological	
‘Extreme	psychologism’3	 Psychological	 Psychological	
Table	I-1:	The	‘standard’	categorisation	of	theories	of	reasons	
Despite	 its	 ubiquity,	 this	 categorisation	 schema	 is,	 as	 I	 will	 argue,	 only	 useful	 within	 the	
confines	of	a	fairly	narrow	theoretical	framework.	In	particular,	it	is	not	well	suited	to	the	task	
(for	which	it	may	well	not	have	been	intended)	of	distinguishing	many	of	the	main	theories	of	
																																								 																				
1	(E.g.	Dancy	2000;	Sandis	2013;	O’Brien	2015)	
2	This	view	is	the	target	of	Dancy’s	criticism	in	his	Practical	Reality	and	 is	what	Mitova	(2015)	calls	the	
‘Standard	 Story’.	 It	 is	 typically	 attributed	 to	 Smith	 (1987),	 however,	 in	 §	(V)	 I	 will	 challenge	 this	
attribution.	
3	‘Extreme	psychologism’	is	a	name	that	I	have	borrowed	from	Mitova	(2015),	who	defends	that	view.	
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reasons	 from	one	another,	because:	 (i)	 it	only	allows	for	 two	kinds	of	practical	 reason,	while	
some	prominent	theories	allow	for	more;	(ii)	the	categorisation	of	theories	into	psychological	
and	 anti-psychological	 cannot	 discriminate	 between	 distinct	 anti-psychological	 theories;	 and	
(iii)	 given	 the	 way	 that	 ‘normative’	 and	 ‘motivating’	 reasons	 are	 now	 standardly	 defined,	
assuming	 that	 they	 are	 picked	 out	 by	 any	 given	 reason	 expression	 involves	 a	 theoretical	
commitment	that	at	least	some	theories	of	reasons	would	and	should	reject.	
In	criticising	this	categorisation	schema	I	mean	to	criticise	no	work	in	particular.	It	may	be	that	
the	 schema,	 so	 represented,	 is	a	 straw	man	 in	 so	 far	as	no	one	holds	 it	 in	 its	entirety	 (or	at	
least	not	 for	 the	purpose	of	sorting	different	theories	of	 reasons).	Nonetheless,	 I	 take	 it	 that	
everything	that	I	critique	is	held	by	at	least	some,	and	some	of	that	which	I	critique	is	held	by	
many	–	so,	since	my	discussion	is	of	the	constituent	parts	of	the	schema,	whether	or	not	the	
complex	 is	generally	endorsed	 is	neither	here	nor	 there.	 If	 it	 turns	out	 that	everyone	agrees	
that	the	standard	schema	is	of	no	use	in	categorising	distinct	theories	of	reasons	then	what	the	
discussion	that	follows	will	have	done	is	demonstrate	why	that	is	the	case,	as	well	as	offering	
an	alternative	that	is	better	suited	to	that	end.	
To	re-iterate,	my	aim,	in	what	follows,	is	to	demonstrate	that	what	I	have	called	the	‘standard’	
schema	is	not	well	suited	to	the	task	of	discriminating	between	different	theories	of	reasons,	
and	to	propose	an	alternate	categorisation	schema	that	is	better	suited	to	that	task.	
1 How	many	kinds	of	reason	are	there?	
In	general,	if	we	use	one	expression	to	refer	to	one	thing	and	a	different	expression	to	refer	to	
something	else,	we	have	a	prima	 facie	basis	 for	 thinking	 that	 the	 two	things	are	of	different	
kinds.	Of	course,	it	may	turn	out	that	two	different	expressions	are	used	to	pick	out	the	same	
kind	of	thing	(e.g.	‘a	bachelor’	and	‘a	single	man’),	but	before	we	determine	what	kind	of	thing	
they	pick	out,	a	difference	in	the	form	of	any	two	expressions	gives	us	a	prima	facie	basis	for	
thinking	that	they	pick	out	different	kinds	of	thing.		
Conversely,	 if	we	use	 the	same	expression	 to	 refer	 to	 two	different	 things,	we	have	a	prima	
facie	basis	for	thinking	that	the	different	things	are	of	a	common	kind.	Of	course,	it	may	turn	
out	that	the	same	expression	can	be	used	to	pick	out	different	kinds	of	thing	(as	in	the	case	of	
homonyms	like	‘a	bat’	(an	animal)	and	‘a	bat’	(an	item	of	sports	paraphernalia)),	but	before	we	
determine	that	that	is	the	case,	the	sameness	of	the	expression	gives	us	a	prima	facie	basis	for	
thinking	that	the	things	that	it	picks	out	are	all	of	a	common	kind.	
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So,	when	we	want	to	work	out	how	many	kinds	of	reason	there	are,	a	good	way	to	start	is	to	
look	at	the	different	expressions	that	we	use	to	pick	out	things	that	we	call	‘reasons’.	Here	are	
what	I	will	take	to	be	the	main	ones:	- Reasons	there	are	to	act;	- Reasons	for	and	reasons	against	acting;	- Reasons	one	has	to	act;	- One’s	reason	for	acting;	and	- Reasons	why.	
All	 of	 these	 expressions	 pick	 out	 reasons	 of	 one	 kind	 or	 another.	 Each	 expression	 has	 a	
different	form,	so,	I	suggest,	at	least	before	we	determine	what	kind	of	reason	they	each	pick	
out,	we	have	a	prima	facie	basis	for	thinking	that	they	each	pick	out	different	kinds	of	reason.	
Moreover,	because	homonyms	are	the	exception,	not	the	rule,	we	have	a	prima	facie	basis	for	
believing	that	they	each	pick	out	only	one	kind	of	reason.	Of	course,	further	analysis	may	yield	
the	finding	that	some	of	these	expressions	pick	out	the	same	kind	of	reason,	or	that	some	pick	
out	more	 than	one	kind	of	 reason,	but	 that	should	be	a	conclusion	of	our	 theorising,	not	an	
assumption	with	which	we	begin.	So,	since	we	have	five	different	reason	expressions,	we	have	
a	 prima	 facie	 basis	 for	 thinking	 that	 there	 are	 five	 different	 kinds	 of	 reason	 –	 one	
corresponding	to	each	reason	expression.		
Some	clarifications,	for	the	avoidance	of	doubt:	firstly,	 I	take	two	kinds	of	reason,	kind	A	and	
kind	B,	to	be	different	kinds	of	reason	if	and	only	if	the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	of	kind	A	
differ	 from	 the	 conditions	 for	 being	 a	 reason	 of	 kind	 B.	 Secondly,	 saying	 that	 there	 are	
different	kinds	of	 reason	does	not	mean	that	one	and	the	same	thing	cannot	be	a	reason	of	
each	 kind,	 but	 nor	 does	 it	 mean	 that	 they	 can.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 for	 your	 theory	 of	 reasons	 to	
determine	whether	or	not	reasons	of	one	kind	can	also	be	reasons	of	another	kind;	and	it	will	
do	so	by	telling	you	what	the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	of	each	of	those	kinds	are.	Lastly,	
two	reason	expressions	pick	out	reasons	of	the	same	kind	if	and	only	if	they	are	co-extensive.	1.1 Reason	expressions	in	the	standard	schema	
The	standard	schema	assumes	that	there	are	just	two	kinds	of	reason	–	this	is	the	assumption	I	
wish	 to	 criticise	 in	 this	 section.	 The	 standard	 schema	 also	 makes	 assumptions	 about	 the	
conditions	 under	 which	 something	 is	 a	 reason	 of	 either	 kind,	 which	 further	 restricts	 its	
usefulness,	but	I	will	return	to	that	issue	in	§	4.	
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Given	that	each	reason	expression	picks	out	reasons	of	one	kind	or	another,	in	assuming	that	
there	 are	 only	 two	 kinds	 of	 reason,	 the	 standard	 schema	must	 assume	 that	 several	 of	 the	
reason	expressions	considered	pick	out	 reasons	of	 the	same	kind.	And	that	 is	 indeed	so:	 the	
standard	 schema	 typically	 assumes	 (either	 implicitly	 or	 explicitly)	 that	 the	 first	 three	 reason	
expressions	 (‘reasons	 there	are	 to	act’;	 ‘reasons	 for/against	 acting’;	 and	 ‘reasons	one	has	 to	
act’)	all	pick	out	reasons	of	one	kind,	while	the	latter	two	expressions	(‘one’s	reason	for	acting’	
and	‘reasons	why	one	acts’)	pick	out	reasons	of	the	other	kind.	
The	 standard	 schema	 may	 well	 be	 correct	 about	 the	 co-extensivity	 of	 some	 of	 these	
expressions	 –	 but	 that	 is	 a	 conclusion	 to	 be	 argued	 for,	 it	 is	 not	 something	 to	 be	 assumed	
before	one	has	begun	theorising	in	earnest.	One	reason	not	to	make	this	assumption	from	the	
outset	is	that	we	have	a	prima	facie	basis	for	thinking	that	the	different	expressions	aren’t	co-
extensive	–	namely,	the	fact	that	they	are	different	expressions.		
However,	the	differences	between	the	expressions	notwithstanding,	assumptions	of	their	co-
extensivity	might	be	tolerable	if	the	equivalence	between	particular	expressions	were	obvious,	
or	at	least	un-contentious	–	but	that	is	certainly	not	the	case.	Indeed,	as	we	shall	see,	several	
theories	of	reasons	already	distinguish	between	expressions	that	the	standard	schema	takes	to	
be	co-extensive,	and	those	theories	consequently	escape	categorisation	within	that	schema.	
I	 want	 to	 make	 the	 case	 for	 a	 categorisation	 schema	 that	 allows	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	
distinguishing	between	each	of	the	reason	expressions	I	list.	I	also	want	to	make	clear	where	a	
theory	of	reasons	is	required	to	draw	a	distinction	between	different	expressions.	And,	lastly,	I	
want	to	say	which	of	these	reason	expressions	we	should	and	which	we	should	not	include	in	
our	 categorisation	 schema.	 The	 following	 sections	 discuss	 each	 expression,	 with	 a	 view	 to	
achieving	each	of	these	aims.	1.2 Reasons	there	are	to	act	
There	is	a	reason	for	me	to	go	for	a	swim.	To	avoid	controversy	I	won’t	say	what	 it	 is	–	but	I	
take	it	to	be	uncontroversial	to	say	that	if	(and	only	if)	there	is	a	reason	for	me	to	swim	then	
something4	is	 the	 reason	 that	 there	 is.	 I	 take	 it	 to	 be	 likewise	 uncontroversial	 to	 say	 that	 if	
something	is	a	reason	there	is	for	me	to	swim	then	it	is	a	reason	for	me	to	swim.5		
																																								 																				
4	I	make	no	assumption	(yet)	about	the	ontology	of	that	something	–	it	could	be	a	fact,	a	state	of	affairs,	
a	mental	state	or	whatever	you	like.	
5	These	 remarks	 are	 obviously	 intended	 to	 generalise	 beyond	 me	 and	 my	 swimming.	 But,	 for	 the	
avoidance	of	doubt,	 I	 take	 the	statement	 that	 ‘something	 is	 reason	there	 is	 for	A	 to	φ’	 to	be	 logically	
equivalent	 to	 ‘that	 same	 thing	 is	 a	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ’	 and	 ‘there	 is	 a	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ’.	 I	 take	 the	
difference	 in	 the	 forms	 of	 words	 here	 to	 be	 so	 slight	 as	 to	 preclude	 effective	 distinction	 –	 so	 our	
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Here	is	a	seemingly	‘pre-theoretic’	observation	we	can	make	about	the	kind	of	reason	picked	
out	by	the	expression	‘the	reasons	there	are	to	act’:	something	can	be	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	even	
if	A	does	not	φ.	For	instance,	there	can	be	a	reason	for	me	to	swim	even	if	I	don’t	swim.	That	
is,	it	does	not	impinge	on	the	reason-hood	of	a	reason	to	act	if	one	does	not	do	the	action	that	
it	was	a	reason	to	do.		
I	suggest	we	say	that	if	the	reason-hood	of	reasons	of	a	certain	kind	is	not	dependent	on	the	
occurrence	 of	 the	 action	 for	 which	 they	 are	 a	 reason,	 then	 reasons	 of	 that	 kind	 are	
‘independent’	of	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.6	Thus,	reasons	to	act	are	independent	
of	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	1.3 Reasons	for	and	reasons	against	acting	
I’m	debating	whether	or	not	to	swim:	there	are	reasons	for	and	reasons	against	my	swimming7	
–	don’t	worry	about	what	they	are.	Like	reasons	there	are	to	act,	reasons	for	or	against	acting	
are	 independent	 of	 the	 actions	 for	 which	 they	 are	 reasons:	 something	 can	 be	 a	 reason	 for	
swimming	(or	a	reason	against	swimming)	even	if	I	don’t	(or	do)	swim.		
While	 they	 differ	 in	 their	 form,	 I	 have	 grouped	 ‘reasons	 for’	 and	 ‘reasons	 against’	 because	
there	seems	to	be	a	clear	sense	in	which	their	meanings	are	inter-related	–	they	are	opposites.	
So	whatever	we	learn	about	the	kind	of	reason	picked	out	by	one	will	tell	us	something	about	
the	 kind	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 other.	 As	 is	 typical	 in	 the	 literature,	 I	 will	 mostly	 restrict	 my	
discussion	to	the	‘reasons	for’	expression.	
As	we	noted	 in	 §	1.1,	 it	 is	 typically	 assumed	 that	 ‘reasons	 there	 are	 to	 act’	 and	 ‘reasons	 for	
acting’	are	co-extensive	expressions	(it	 is	also	typical	 to	assume	that	 ‘reasons	not	to	act’	and	
‘reasons	against	 acting’	are	 likewise	co-extensive).	 I	 think	 this	 is	 a	mistake	–	 I	 think	 that	 the	
prepositions	matter	to	the	meaning,	and	that	the	two	expressions	pick	out	different	kinds	of	
reason.	However,	I	am	not	arguing	for	this	claim	at	this	stage;	for	now,	I	am	only	arguing	that	
our	categorisation	schema	should	allow	for	the	possibility	of	difference	between	them.		
That	is,	at	this	stage	I	neither	accept	nor	deny	that	‘reasons	there	are	to	act’	and	‘reasons	for	
acting’	always	pick	out	the	same	kind	of	reason:	all	that	I	am	saying	is	that,	in	spite	of	the	fact	
that	they	are	both	independent	of	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons,	the	difference	in	the	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
categorisation	 schema	 need	 not	 distinguish	 between	 them.	 Nonetheless,	 I	 state	 these	 assumed	
equivalences	with	a	view	to	making	my	assumptions	clear.	
6 	This	 will	 contrast	 them	 with	 those	 kinds	 of	 reason	 (introduced	 in	 §	1.5)	 whose	 reason-hood	 is	
dependent	on	the	occurrence	of	the	action	for	which	they	are	reasons,	which	I	call	‘dependent’	reasons.	
7	Again,	 if	 there	are	 reasons	 for	 swimming	 then	something	 is	a	 reason	 for	 swimming,	and	 if	 there	are	
reasons	against	swimming	then	something	is	a	reason	against	swimming.	And	again,	these	equivalences	
generalise	beyond	me	swimming.	
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form	 of	 these	 reason	 expressions	 gives	 a	 prima	 facie	 basis	 for	 thinking	 that	 they	 pick	 out	
different	 kinds	 of	 reason.	Moreover,	 since	 I	 eventually	want	 to	 advocate	 a	 theory	 that	does	
distinguish	 between	 the	 reasons	 picked	 out	 by	 these	 expressions,	 if	 my	 theory	 is	 to	 be	
represented	 within	my	 own	 categorisation	 schema,	 I	 had	 better	 allow	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	
such	a	distinction.	1.4 Reasons	one	has	to	act	
I	have	a	reason	to	swim.	Again,	I	take	it	to	be	uncontroversial	to	say	that	if	I	have	a	reason	to	
swim	then	something	is	the	reason	that	I	have	to	swim.8	And,	like	reasons	there	are	for	me	to	
swim	(and	reasons	for	swimming),	reasons	that	I	have	to	swim	are	independent	of	the	actions	
for	which	they	are	reasons:	one	can	have	a	reason	to	swim	(or	eat,	or	go	to	the	shops)	without	
doing	so.		
As	we	 have	 seen,	 it	 is	 typical	 to	 take	 the	 expressions	 ‘the	 reasons	 one	 has	 to	 act’	 and	 ‘the	
reasons	 there	 are	 to	 act’	 to	 be	 co-extensive.	 As	 it	 happens,	 I	 share	 this	 view,	 but	 we	
nonetheless	 should	 not	 start	 with	 this	 assumption,	 much	 less	 incorporate	 it	 into	 our	
categorisation	schema,	for	the	following	reasons:	firstly,	as	I’ve	already	stressed,	the	difference	
between	the	forms	of	the	expressions	gives	us	a	prima	facie	basis	 for	thinking	that	they	pick	
out	different	kinds	of	reason,	so	it	 is	odd,	 if	not	counter-productive,	to	start	(as	the	standard	
categorisation	 schema	 does)	 by	 assuming	 that	 they	 don’t.	 Secondly,	 and	more	 importantly,	
several	authors	(e.g.	Hornsby	2008;	Schroeder	2008;	Comesaña	and	McGrath	2014)	reject	the	
view	 that	 these	 expressions	 are	 co-extensive;	 and	 their	 theories	 consequently	 escape	
categorisation	within	the	standard	schema.	And	thirdly,	as	we	shall	see,	assuming	that	there	is	
no	 distinction	 between	 the	 kinds	 of	 reasons	 picked	 out	 by	 these	 expressions	 conceals	 a	
possible	solution	to	one	of	the	main	problems	for	the	dominant	account	of	the	reasons	there	
are	to	act.9					
So,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	kinds	of	reason	picked	out	by	the	expressions,	‘reasons	one	has	
to	act’	and	‘reasons	there	are	to	act’,	are	both	independent	of	the	reasons	for	which	they	are	
actions,	we	nonetheless	have	good	grounds	 for	using	a	categorisation	schema	that	allows	at	
least	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 the	 kinds	 of	 reason	 picked	 out	 by	 these	
expressions.	
																																								 																				
8	This	makes	no	assumption	about	the	ontology	of	that	thing	(in	particular	–	saying	that	something	is	the	
reason	 I	have	to	swim	does	not	assume	that	that	thing	need	be	a	fact	rather	than,	say,	an	 intentional	
object).	
9	See	the	discussion	of	the	‘The	Rational	Action	Problem’	in	§	(II)4.1.	
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1.5 One’s	reason	for	acting	
I	think	about	how	swimming	will	improve	my	mood,	how	I	will	sleep	better	if	I	swim,	and	other	
things	besides	and,	after	some	deliberation,	I	decide	to	swim.	I	head	off	and	do	it:	I	swim	for	a	
reason.	As	ever,	I	won’t	say	what	my	reason	for	swimming	was.10	
Some,	 hopefully,	 un-contentious	 equivalences:	 I	 swam	 for	 a	 reason	 if	 and	 only	 if	 something	
was	my	reason	for	swimming,	and	something	was	my	reason	for	swimming	 if	and	only	 if	 (i)	 I	
swam	for	that	reason	and	(ii)	it	was	the	reason	for	which	I	swam.11	The	latter	remark	is	perhaps	
the	most	contentious	(but	hopefully	not	especially	so)	of	the	equivalences	I	have	drawn,	in	so	
far	as	I	take	‘my	reason	for	swimming’	to	be	equivalent	to	‘the	reason	for	which	I	ran’	in	spite	
of	the	obvious	difference	in	the	form	of	these	expressions.	It	is	certainly	in	principle	possible	to	
distinguish	between	them,	however,	I	have	elected	not	to	on	the	basis	that	I	know	of	no	theory	
that	 does	 (so	 the	 equivalence	 is	 seemingly	 uncontentious)	 and	 so,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 brevity,	 I	
assume	no	distinction	 from	the	outset.	Perhaps	 I	am	not	 following	my	own	 instruction	–	but	
my	 assumption	 is	 at	 least	 plain,	 so	 that	 those	 who	 disagree	 with	 it	 may	 revise	my	 schema	
knowing	as	much.	
While	 the	 standard	 categorisation	 schema	 draws	 no	 distinction	 between	 the	 reason	
expressions	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 three	 sections,	 it	 does,	 as	 I	 have	 noted,	 distinguish	
between	those	reason	expressions	and	‘the	agent’s	reason	for	acting’.	Now,	while	I	want	us	to	
abandon	 the	 standard	 categorisation	 schema,	 I	 agree	with	 its	 implicit	 verdict	 that	 there	 are	
unequivocal	grounds	for	differentiating	the	kinds	of	reason	picked	out	by	‘the	reason	for	which	
the	 agent	 acts’	 from	 the	 kinds	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 expressions	 already	 considered,	 which	 go	
beyond	a	mere	difference	in	form.12	What	do	I	take	those	grounds	to	be?	
Consider	this:	something	cannot	be	one’s	reason	for	φing	unless	one	φs.	That	is,	I	can’t	swim	
for	 a	 reason	unless	 I	 swim,	 so	 something	 can’t	 be	 the	 reason	 for	which	 I	 swam	unless	 I	 did	
indeed	swim.	And	this	is	true	even	if	the	action	is	in	the	future:	something	might	now	be	the	
reason	for	which	I	will	swim,	but	it	is	only	so	if	I	do	indeed	swim	(if	I	don’t	go	on	to	swim	then	it	
isn’t	 now	 the	 reason	 for	 which	 I	 will	 swim).	 So,	 unlike	 the	 reason	 expressions	 already	
considered,	the	reason-hood	of	the	reasons	picked	out	by	this	expression	are	not	independent	
																																								 																				
10	In	 particular,	 the	 story	 of	 my	 deliberative	 process	 need	 lead	 us	 to	 no	 conclusions	 about	 what	 my	
reason	for	swimming	was.	
11	Again,	 these	 remarks	 should	 generalise	 beyond	 me	 and	 my	 swimming,	 but,	 for	 the	 avoidance	 of	
doubt,	I	take	the	statement	that	‘something	was	A’s	reason	for	φing’	to	be	logically	equivalent	to	‘that	
same	thing	is	a	reason	for	which	A	φ’d’	and	‘A	φ’d	for	a	reason’.		
12	I	call	this	its	‘implicit	verdict’	only	because	the	standard	approach	does	not	generally	take	a	difference	
in	form	to	be	sufficient	grounds	for	allowing	the	possibility	of	a	distinction	–	as	the	failure	to	distinguish	
between	the	reason	expressions	already	considered	demonstrates.	
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of	 the	actions	 for	which	they	are	reasons	–	they	are,	 let	us	say,	 ‘dependent’	on	them,	 in	the	
sense	that	the	reason-hood	of	such	reasons	depends	on	the	occurrence	of	the	action	for	which	
it	is	a	reason.	
So,	the	kind	of	reason	picked	out	by	the	expression	‘the	reasons	for	which	A	φs’	is	distinct	from	
the	 kind(s)13	picked	 out	 by	 the	 reason	 expressions	 of	 the	 previous	 sections	 (because	 the	
conditions	for	being	a	reason	of	the	former	kind	differ	from	the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	
of	the	latter	kind(s)).14	This	means	that	not	only	must	our	categorisation	schema	allow	for	the	
possibility	of	distinguishing	this	sort	of	reason	from	those	already	considered,	but	any	theory	
of	 reasons	 should	 also	make	 clear	 that	 this	 expression	does	 pick	 out	 a	 reason	of	 a	different	
kind.	1.6 Reasons	why	
There	was	 a	 reason	why	 I	 swam.	 Like	my	 reasons	 for	 swimming	 (or	 the	 reasons	 for	which	 I	
swam),	the	reasons	why	I	swam	are	dependent	on	that	which	they	are	a	reason	for:	if	there	is	a	
reason	why	I	swam	then	I	must	have	swum.		
As	we	have	noted,	the	standard	schema	does	not	systematically	distinguish	between	the	kinds	
of	 reason	picked	out	by	 ‘the	 reason	why	someone	acts’	and	 ‘the	 reason	 for	which	 they	act.’	
Nonetheless,	the	difference	in	their	forms	still	gives	us	a	prima	facie	basis	for	distinguishing	the	
two	expressions,	and	 this	 is	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	both	pick	out	a	kind	of	 reason	 that	 is	
dependent	on	that	which	it	is	a	reason	for.	Moreover,	recent	scholarship	has	forcefully	made	a	
case	 for	 distinguishing	 between	 the	 kinds	 of	 reason	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 two	 expressions	 that	
goes	beyond	the	mere	difference	in	their	form.15	
Firstly,	we	can	readily	observe	that,	in	spite	of	their	both	being	dependent	reasons,	something	
can	be	a	reason	why	an	agent	acts	without	being	their	reason	for	acting.	For	example,	the	fact	
that	I’m	chopping	onions	may	be	a	reason	why	I’m	crying	without	being	my	reason	for	crying	(I	
am	not	crying	for	a	reason,	though	there	is	a	reason	why	I	am	crying).	Likewise,	the	fact	that	
Anthony	 was	 given	 a	 posthypnotic	 suggestion	 might	 be	 a	 reason	 why	 he	 drinks	 vinegar,	
without	being	his	 reason	 for	drinking	 it,	 and	 that	 is	 so	even	 if	he	drinks	 it	 for	a	 reason.	One	
																																								 																				
13	The	 parenthetical	 pluralisation	 is	 to	 note	 that	 these	 reason	 expressions	 may	 or	 may	 not	 pick	 out	
different	kinds	of	reason.	
14	We	should	note	that	this	is	not	to	say	that	one	and	the	same	thing	cannot	be	a	reason	of	each	kind	(as	
I	already	remarked	in	the	clarifications	at	the	end	of	§	1.1);	it	is	just	to	note	that	the	expressions	pick	out	
reasons	of	different	kinds.	That	is,	to	the	extent	that	a	single	reason	can	be	picked	out	by	the	expression	
‘the	 reason	 for	 which	 they	 acted’	 and,	 for	 instance,	 ‘a	 reason	 they	 had	 to	 act’	 (and,	 at	 this	 stage,	 I	
assume	 nothing	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 can)	 it	 is	 because	 that	 which	 is	 picked	 out	 is	 both	 a	
dependent	and	an	independent	reason	–	it	is	two	different	kinds	of	reason.	
15	See,	in	particular,	Alvarez	(2010)	but	also	Audi	(2001),	Dancy	(2000)	and	Hieronymi	(2011).	
	 31	
need	not,	I	think,	accept	any	particular	theory	of	reasons	in	order	to	accept	the	truth	of	these	
claims	and,	moreover,	their	truth	already	provides	a	basis	for	distinguishing	between	the	kinds	
of	 reason	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 expressions	 ‘the	 reasons	 why	 one	 acted’	 and	 ‘the	 reasons	 for	
which	one	acted,’	that	goes	beyond	a	mere	difference	in	form.	
Secondly,	and	more	generally,	the	kind	of	reason	picked	out	by	the	‘reason	why’	expression	is	
different	 to	 those	picked	out	by	all	of	 the	reason	expressions	already	considered	because	 its	
relata	 are	 different.	 While	 all	 the	 reasons	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 reason	 expressions	 already	
considered	 relate	 to	actions,	a	 reason	why	 is	 related	 to	a	 fact	 (or	proposition).	 For	 instance,	
compare	 the	 relata	 of	 these	 expressions:	 ‘my	 reason	 for	 swimming’;	 and	 ‘the	 reason	why	 I	
swam’	–	while	swimming	is	an	action,	‘I	swam’	is	a	sentence.	
The	difference	 in	 relata	 is	 also	of	 some	 relevance	 to	our	 third	observation:	because	 reasons	
why	 relate	 to	 facts,	 the	 sorts	 of	 things	 they	 are	 reasons	 for	 need	 not	 be	 in	 any	way	 agent	
involving.	For	instance,	there	are	reasons	why	the	Earth	orbits	the	Sun	and	there	are	reasons	
why	the	Dawlish	sea	wall	collapsed	in	2014.	Neither	of	these	is	an	agent-involving	occurrence;	
the	Earth	and	the	Dawlish	sea	wall	aren’t/weren’t	agents	and	they	didn’t	do	what	they	‘did’	for	
reasons.		
If	we	say	that	reasons	that	are	essentially	agent-involving	are	‘practical’	kinds	of	reasons,	then	
the	kind	of	reasons	picked	out	by	the	‘reason	why’	expression	is	not	a	practical	kind	of	reason.	
This	 does	 not	 mean	 ‘reasons	 why’	 never	 relate	 to	 agent-involving	 activities,	 that	 is,	 for	
instance,	it	does	not	mean	that	there	can’t	be	reasons	why	agents	do	things;	it	just	means	that	
‘reasons	 why’	 are	 not	 exclusively	 agent-involving	 (because	 they	 sometimes	 don’t	 involve	
agents).	
In	 contrast,	 there	 are	 no	 reasons	 for	 the	 Earth	 to	 orbit	 the	 Sun	 (or	 reasons	 for	 the	 Earth’s	
orbiting	the	Sun,	or	reasons	the	Earth	has	to	orbit	the	Sun),	and	there	is	nothing	that	could	be	
called	‘the	Earth’s	reason	for	orbiting	the	Sun’	because	the	kinds	of	reason	picked	out	by	these	
expressions	are	practical;	so	they	don’t	apply	to	things	that	aren’t	agents,	like	the	Earth.	Unlike	
the	‘reason	why’	expression,	then,	all	the	reason	expressions	of	the	previous	sections	pick	out	
practical	kinds	of	reason.16	
So,	the	kind	of	reason	picked	out	by	the	‘reason	why’	expression	is	distinct	from	the	kinds	of	
reason	picked	out	by	the	expressions	already	considered	(because	it	has	different	relata	and	it	
isn’t	practical).	This	 isn’t	 to	say	 that	something	 that	 is	a	 reason	of	a	practical	kind	can	never	
																																								 																				
16	Of	course	these	remarks	do	not	amount	to	a	proof	that	the	kinds	of	reason	picked	out	by	the	previous	
expressions	are	practical	–	but	I	take	that	to	be	clear	enough	that	we	can	assume	it	without	controversy.	
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also	be	a	reason	why	someone	does	something17;	it	is	just	to	acknowledge	that	the	conditions	
for	 being	 a	 practical	 reason	 differ	 from	 the	 conditions	 for	 being	 a	 reason	why.	 That	 is,	 the	
conditions	for	being	a	reason	of	the	kind	picked	out	by	the	‘reason	why’	expression	differ	from	
the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	of	the	kind	picked	out	by	any	of	the	other	expressions;	the	
‘reason	why’	expression	picks	out	a	different	kind	of	reason	to	the	reason	expressions	already	
considered.		1.7 A	summary	of	reason	expressions	
I	said	that	two	kinds	of	reason	are	different	kinds	of	reason	 if,	and	only	 if,	 the	conditions	for	
being	a	reason	of	one	kind	differ	from	being	a	reason	of	the	other	kind.18		The	discussion	of	the	
previous	sections	has	established	that	there	are	at	least	three	kinds	of	reason:	independent	&	
practical	 reasons;	 dependent	 &	 practical	 reasons;	 and	 independent	 &	 non-practical	 reasons	
(see	Table	I-2).		
Reason	expression	 Dependent/Independent	 Practical/Non-practical	
Reasons	there	are	to	act	 Independent	 Practical	
Reasons	for	acting	 Independent	 Practical	
Reasons	one	has	to	act	 Independent	 Practical	
One’s	reason	for	acting	 Dependent	 Practical	
Reasons	why		 Dependent	 Non-practical	
Table	I-2:	Reason	expressions	and	the	kinds	of	reason	they	pick	out	
In	 addition,	 I	 have	 argued	 that,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 standard	 categorisation	 schema	
ordinarily	draws	no	distinction	between	the	reasons	there	are	to	act,	 reasons	for	acting,	and	
the	reasons	one	has	to	act	(that	is,	the	expressions	that	pick	out	independent	kinds	of	reason)	
or	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	and	the	reasons	why	they	act	(that	is,	the	expressions	that	pick	
out	dependent	kinds	of	reason)	we	should	nonetheless	use	a	categorisation	schema	that	allows	
for	 the	possibility	of	distinguishing	between	 them,	 in	 particular,	 so	 that	we	 can	discriminate	
between	already	existing	theories.19		
																																								 																				
17	Indeed,	 it	 is	 common	 to	assume	 that	 reasons	of	 the	kind	picked	out	by	 the	expression	 ‘the	agent’s	
reason	 for	 acting’	 are	 always	 reasons	why	 the	 agent	 acts	 (see	 §	(IV)1.2	 for	 further	 discussion	 of	 this	
point).	
18	To	stress	a	point	 I	have	already	made:	this	definition	 is	not	meant	to	preclude	the	possibility	of	one	
and	the	same	thing	being	a	reason	of	two	different	kinds.	
19	My	arguments	were,	in	brief,	that	the	difference	in	form	provides	a	prima	facie	basis	for	believing	that	
they	 pick	 out	 different	 kinds	 of	 reason,	 that	 some	 theories	 already	 distinguish	 between	 the	 reasons	
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Thus,	I	propose	the	following,	provisional	categorisation	schema:	
	 Reasons	
there	are	to	
act	
Reasons	
for	acting	
Reasons	
one	has	to	
act	
Reasons	for	
which	one	acts	
Reasons	why	
one	acts	
Theory	of	reasons	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	
Table	I-3:	A	provisional	categorisation	schema	
In	 the	 next	 section	 I	 will	 consider	 the	 character	 of	 the	 claims	 that	 differentiate	 theories	 of	
reasons.	Having	done	so,	I	will	suggest	a	revision	to	this	provisional	schema	that	omits	the	non-
practical	kind	of	reason,	reasons	why.	
2 Claims	about	reasons	
What	I	have	called	the	‘standard	schema’	categorises	theories	on	the	basis	of	whether	or	not	
they	 take	 reasons	 of	 a	 given	 kind	 to	 be	 exclusively	 psychological.	 In	 doing	 so,	 however,	 this	
schema	obscures	 the	many	 differences	 between	distinct	 anti-psychological	 theories.	 Indeed,	
what	the	standard	schema	calls	‘anti-psychologism’	is	not	so	much	a	theory	of	reasons	as	it	is	a	
collection	of	different	theories	of	reasons	that,	despite	sharing	a	commitment	to	the	falsity	of	
the	psychological	view	of	any	kind	of	reason,	vary	in	many	other	respects.		
For	 instance,	different	versions	of	anti-psychologism	disagree	on	whether	or	not	reasons	can	
be	false,	and	whether	or	not	the	existence	of	a	reason	depends	on	an	agent’s	perspective	–	but	
the	 standard	 schema	 is	 incapable	 of	 recognising	 such	 disagreement.	 That	 is,	 of	 course,	
perfectly	 fine	 so	 long	 as	 one’s	 focus	 is	 on	 psychologism	 and	 its	 discontents,	 but	 it	 becomes	
quite	 inappropriate	when	 one	wants	 to	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	 from	 a	more	 general	
perspective.		
Furthermore,	 although	 there	 are	 alternatives	 to	 the	 psychological	 vs.	 anti-psychological	
categorisation	 that	 can	 differentiate	 between	 different	 forms	 of	 anti-psychologism,	 they,	 in	
contrast,	obscure	the	differences	between	psychological	theories	and	the	different	variants	of	
anti-psychologism.	For	instance,	Turri	(2009)	categorises	theories	of	reasons	according	to	their	
ontology	–	separating	theories	that	take	reasons	to	be	facts,	from	those	that	take	them	to	be	
mental	 states	 and	 again	 from	 those	 that	 take	 them	 to	 be	 intentional	 objects	 (that	 is,	 the	
contents	 of	 mental	 states).	 However,	 a	 strict 20 	ontology-based	 categorisation	 is	 no	 less	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
there	are	to	act	and	the	reasons	one	has	to	act,	and	that	I	wish	to	distinguish	between	the	reasons	there	
are	to	act	and	reasons	for	acting.	
20	I	say	‘strict’	because	many	take	‘factualism’	to	be	the	view	that	reasons	are	facts	and	that	they	are	not	
exclusively	 psychological	 (indeed,	 it’s	 common	 to	 use	 ‘factualism’	 to	 name	 the	 view	 that	 reasons	 are	
facts	 that	 favour	 actions	 that	 are	 consequently	 typically	 non-psychological).	 This,	 of	 course,	 is	 not	 a	
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problematic	 than	 the	 standard	 schema’s	 approach,	 because	 (as	 Alvarez	 (2016b,	 3)	 notes)	 it	
cannot	discriminate	between	a	psychological	theory	that	says	that	reasons	are	all	facts	(about	
an	agent’s	mind)	and	an	anti-psychological	theory	that	similarly	says	that	reasons	are	all	facts	
(about	all	kinds	of	things),	since	both	theories	have	a	common,	factualist	ontology.21	
Alternatively,	 Lord	 (2015),	 Alvarez	 (2016a)	 and	 Way	 and	 Whiting	 (2017)	 divide	 theories	
according	to	whether	or	not	they	take	the	existence	of	a	given	kind	of	reason	to	depend	on	an	
agent’s	 perspective.	 However,	 the	 categorisation	 of	 theories	 into	 ‘perspectivist’	 and	
‘objectivist’	similarly	fails	to	distinguish	perspectivist	anti-psychological	theories	from	(equally	
perspectivist)	psychological	theories.	
One	could,	perhaps,	surmount	these	problems	by	categorising	the	different	theories	on	several	
or	 all	 of	 these	 aspects,22	but	 I	 think	 that	 such	 a	 response	 would	 be	 to	 miss	 the	 point.	 The	
problem	with	all	of	these	approaches	is	not	that	they	each	only	capture	one	aspect	of	variation	
between	theories.	Rather,	 I	suggest,	 it	 is	that	they	put	the	cart	before	the	horse	in	the	sense	
that	 they	 classify	 theories	 of	 reasons	 according	 to	 their	 stance	 on	 a	 particular	 topic,	 rather	
than	what	determines	that	stance,	which	is,	I	suggest,	what	the	theory	actually	is	about.	
To	wit,	the	answers	to	the	questions	of	whether	or	not	reasons	are	psychological,	of	what	their	
ontology	 is	 and	of	whether	or	not	 their	 existence	depends	on	an	agent’s	perspective	 are	 all	
determined	 by	 the	 answer	 to	 this,	 more	 fundamental	 question:	 for	 a	 given	 kind	 of	 reason,	
what	is	the	relation	between	reasons	of	that	kind	and	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons?		
Let	us	call	 this	 relation	 the	 ‘reason-relation’:	 if	 you	 think	 that	 the	 reason-relation	 for	a	given	
kind	of	reason	is	such	that	 it	can	relate	non-psychological	things	to	actions,	then	your	theory	
will	come	out	anti-psychological	for	that	kind	of	reason,	or	if	you	think	that	the	reason-relation	
for	 a	 given	 kind	 of	 reason	 is	 such	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 factive	 relation,	 then	 you	 will,	 perhaps,	
conclude	 that	 reasons	 of	 that	 kind	 are	 not	 facts	 (perhaps	 they	 are	 intentional	 objects	 –	 but	
that	will	depend	on	what	you	think	the	reason-relation	is…).	In	this	way,	what	a	theory	takes	
the	reason-relation	to	be	just	determines	its	answer	to	these	other	questions.	
The	job	of	a	theory	of	reasons	is,	inter	alia,	to	say	how	many	kinds	of	reason	there	are	and	to	
then	 explain	what	 the	 reason-relation	 is	 for	 each	 kind	 of	 reason.	 The	 standard	 approach	 to	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
strictly	ontological	classification	–	an	ontological	classification	is	one	that	classifies	theories	on	the	basis	
of	their	ontology	alone.		
21	The	question	of	what	they	are	facts	about	is	not	an	ontological	one,	and	so	cannot	feature	in	a	strictly	
ontological	classification.	
22 	For	 instance,	 one	 could	 differentiate	 between	 theories	 that	 are	 perspectivist	 &	 psychological;	
perspectivist	&	anti-psychological;	and	objectivist	&	anti-psychological.	
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categorising	 theories	 puts	 the	 cart	 before	 the	 horse	 because	 rather	 than	 categorising	 them	
according	to	their	claims	about	the	reason-relation	(which	is	the	substance	of	the	theories),	it	
categorises	them	according	to	the	consequences	of	their	claims	about	the	reason-relation.	Of	
course,	this	may	well	be	fine	for	the	purposes	to	which	the	categorisation	is	habitually	put	(e.g.	
discussing	 the	 merits	 of	 psychological	 vs.	 anti-psychological	 or	 perspectivist	 vs.	 objectivist	
theories),	 but	 it	 is	 not	 fine	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 actually	 categorising	 the	 different	 theories	 of	
reasons.23	To	 do	 that,	 we	 should	 put	 the	 horse	 before	 the	 cart	 and	 categorise	 theories	 of	
reasons	according	to	what	they	say	about	the	reason-relation	for	each	reason	expression.	2.1 Families	of	claims	
So	what	do	they	say?	For	any	given	reason	expression,	most	theories	of	reasons	subscribe	to	a	
view	that	belongs	 to	one	of	 three	 families:	 ‘favourism’,	 ‘deliberativism’	and	 ‘psychologism’.24	
These	three	families	do	not	exhaust	the	available	claims	about	any	given	reason	expression,25	
however,	 they	 cover,	 between	 them,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 claims	 made	 about	 each	 reason	
expression	 (both	 considered	 and	de	 facto),	 and	 they	 are	 the	 focus	of	my	discussion	 in	what	
follows.		
What	the	members	of	each	of	these	families	have	in	common	is	a	view	of	what	it	takes	to	be	a	
reason	of	any	given	kind:	claims	in	the	favourism	family	require	that	a	reason	of	any	given	kind	
must	 make	 an	 action,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing;26	claims	 in	 the	 deliberativism	 family	
require	that	a	reason	of	any	given	kind	must	be	something	the	agent	took	to	make	their	action,	
in	some	respect,	worth	doing;	and	claims	in	the	psychologism	family	require	that	a	reason	of	
any	given	kind	must	be	a	feature	of	the	agent’s	psychology	that	rationalises	their	action.	Table	
I-4	sets	out	the	claims	for	each	reason	expression	in	each	family	(at	this	stage	I	will	 leave	the	
																																								 																				
23	Nor,	indeed,	is	it	fine	for	really	getting	to	grips	with	everything	that	is	wrong	with	a	particular	theory	–	
since	it	means	concentrating	on	just	one	aspect	of	the	theory.	
24	The	name	‘psychologism’	I	take	from	Dancy	(2000),	the	others	are	my	own	invention.	
25	A	 noteworthy	 omission	 is	 Kearns	 and	 Star’s	 (2008,	 2009)	 account	 according	 to	 which	 reasons	 are	
evidence	that	one	ought	to	act	in	a	certain	way.		
26	I	have	taken	some	liberties	in	representing	a	view	that	is	typically	rendered	as	‘reasons	count	in	favour	
of	actions’	as	‘reasons	make	actions	worth	doing’.	I	do	so	because	leaving	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour’	
of	an	action	un-interpreted	leaves	the	theory	of	reasons	under-determined.	I	want	‘favourism’	to	reflect	
the	widely	held	interpretation	of	the	‘counting	in	favour	of’	relation	that	takes	it	to	either	be	the	relation	
of	‘making,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing’	or	at	least	entailing	that	the	action	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	 I	 specify	 favourist	 claims	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘making,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing’	 rather	 than	
‘favouring’	 because	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 relation	 abound	 –	 for	
instance,	Kearns	and	Star	(2008)	interpret	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour’	of	acting	as	‘being	evidence	that	
one	 ought	 to	 so	 act’,	 which	 is	 clearly	 different	 from	what	makes	 an	 action	 worth	 doing.	Meanwhile	
Mitova	 (2016)	 advocates	 an	 alternative,	 if	 unspecified,	 construal	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 ‘count	 in	 favour’	 of	
action,	that	is	certainly	not	the	idea	of	‘making	it	worth	doing’.	I	return	to	this	in	§	4.3.	
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right-hand-side	conditions	of	each	account	unexplained;	they	will	be	explained	in	subsequent	
chapters).	
	 Family	
Reason	expression	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	 Psychologism	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	
reason	for	A	to	φ…	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	
A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	
worth	doing.	
…if	and	only	if	A	takes	p	to	
make	A’s	φing,	in	some	
respect,	worth	doing.	
…if	and	only	if	p	is	a	
feature	of	A’s	psychology	
that	rationalises	φing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	
reason	for	A’s	φing…	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	
A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	
worth	doing.	
…if	and	only	if	A	takes	p	to	
make	A’s	φing,	in	some	
respect,	worth	doing.	
…if	and	only	if	p	is	a	
feature	of	A’s	psychology	
that	rationalises	φing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	
reason	A	has	to	φ…	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	
A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	
worth	doing.	
…if	and	only	if	A	takes	p	to	
make	A’s	φing,	in	some	
respect,	worth	doing.	
…if	and	only	if	p	is	a	
feature	of	A’s	psychology	
that	rationalises	φing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	
reason	for	φing…	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	
A’s	φing,	all	things	
considered,	worth	doing	
and	explains	(in	the	right	
way)	why	A	φ’d.27	
…if	and	only	if	p	is	a	
consideration	in	light	of	
which	A	φs.	
…if	and	only	if	p	is	a	
feature	of	A’s	psychology	
that	rationalises	φing	
and	explains	(in	the	right	
way)	why	A	φ’d.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	
reason	why	A	φ’d…	
…if	and	only	if	p	explains	
why	A	φ’d.	
…if	and	only	if	p	explains	
why	A	φ’d.	
…if	and	only	if	p	explains	
why	A	φ’d.	
Table	I-4:	The	main	claims	about	each	reason	expression	
Favourism,	 deliberativism	 and	 psychologism	 are,	 as	 I	 have	 said,	 families	 of	 claims	 about	
reasons;	they	are	not	theories	of	reasons.	Instead,	a	theory	of	reasons	can	be	constructed	by	
selecting	one	claim	from	one	of	the	three	families	for	each	reason	expression.		
Within	each	family	the	conditions	for	being	‘a	reason	there	is	to	act’;	‘a	reason	for	acting’	and	
‘a	reason	one	has	to	act’	are	the	same28	–	so	a	theory	that	holds	the	same	view	for	any	two	of	
those	expressions	(say,	favourism	about	reasons	there	are	to	act	and	favourism	about	reasons	
one	has	 to	act)	 takes	 them	to	pick	out	 the	same	kind	of	 reason.	But,	of	 course,	 the	point	of	
separating	out	the	different	reason	expressions	 in	our	categorisation	schema	is	that	a	theory	
need	not	always	select	a	claim	from	the	same	family	for	each	reason	expression.	That	is,	one	
could	hold	(as	some	do)	favourism	about	the	reasons	there	are	to	act	and	deliberativism	about	
the	 reasons	one	has	 to	act	–	and	 to	do	so	 is	 to	say	 that	 those	expressions	pick	out	different	
kinds	of	reason.	
																																								 																				
27	It’s	worth	noting	 that	 a	part	of	what	 is	 implicitly	 required	 for	 some	p	 that	makes	an	agent’s	 action	
worth	doing	to	explain	their	action	in	the	right	way	is	for	it	to	be	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	they	
act.			
28	They	differ	for	‘the	agent’s	reason	for	acting’,	as	we	noted	they	should,	because	we	already	know	that	
that	expression	picks	out	a	different	kind	of	reason.	
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2.2 Revised	categorisation	schema	
Finally,	note	 that	 in	Table	 I-4	 there	 is	no	disagreement	between	different	 families	about	 the	
conditions	 for	 being	 a	 reason	why.	 As	 I	 have	 noted,	 what	 sets	 the	 ‘reason	why’	 expression	
apart	from	the	other	reason	expressions	considered	is	that	it	doesn’t	pick	out	a	practical	kind	
of	reason.	Instead,	as	the	claims	in	Table	I-4	make	clear:	reasons	why	are	just	explanations	(of	
why	someone	does	something,	of	why	something	is	a	certain	way,	of	why	something	occurred,	
etc.).29		They	may	be	causal	explanations	(such	as	the	reasons	why	the	Earth	orbits	the	Sun	or	
the	reasons	why	the	Dawlish	sea	wall	collapsed)	but	they	equally	may	not	be:	the	reasons	why	
it	 is	wrong	 to	 torture	animals	 seemingly	do	not	cause	 it	 to	be	wrong	and	 the	 reasons	why	 a	
football	player	is	offside	seemingly	do	not	cause	her	to	be	offside	–	but	they	are	reasons	why	it	
is	wrong	 or	 reasons	why	 she	 is	 offside	 all	 the	 same.	 Simply	 put:	 something	 is	 a	 reason	why	
some	other	 thing	 is	 the	 case	 if	 and	only	 if	 it	 explains	 (causally	or	otherwise)	why	 that	other	
thing	is	the	case.30		
Of	course,	 there	 is	scope	for	disagreement	about	what	the	proper	account	of	explanation	 is,	
and,	 acknowledging	 that,	we	 could	 further	 analyse	 the	 ‘explains’	 relation	 itself	 –	 this	would	
create	 the	 possibility	 of	 more	 discriminating	 categorisations.	 However,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 we	
should	 seek	 to	 categorise	 theories	 of	 reasons	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 preferred	 accounts	 of	
explanation	–	that	is	just	a	separate	subject.	
None	of	 this	 is	 to	 say	 that	explanation	 is	not	 relevant	 to	 the	discussion	of	practical	 reasons;	
indeed,	some	defend	accounts	according	to	which	reason-relations	just	are	a	particular	sort	of	
explanatory	 relation.31	My	point	 is	 only	 that	we	 can	omit	 the	 ‘reasons	why’	 expression	 from	
our	 categorisation	 schema,	 since	 whatever	 dispute	 there	 is	 about	 it	 is	 properly	 a	 part	 of	 a	
separate	discussion.32	
																																								 																				
29	See,	for	instance,	Raz	(2009)	and	Alvarez	(2010)	for	this	view.	
30	On	this	analysis,	‘p	is	a	reason	why	q’	and	‘p	explains	why	q’	and	‘q	because	p’	are	logically	equivalent.		
31	For	 instance,	 Broome	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 a	 reason	 to	 act	 is	 a	 reason	 why	 someone	 ought	 to	 do	
something	(see	§	(II)3	for	further	discussion	of	this).	And	indeed,	I	will	eventually	defend	the	view	that	
practical	reasons	are	all	reasons	why	an	action	is	pro	tanto	rational.	
32 	As	 Raz	 notes:	 ‘Whatever	 one	 can	 say	 about	 [reasons	 why]	 is	 better	 explored	 when	 studying	
explanations,	a	voluminous	philosophical	subject.’	(2009,	186)	
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Those	 remarks	having	been	made,	 the	 revised	 framework	 for	 the	 schema	 I	 am	proposing	 is,	
thus,	as	follows:	
	 Reasons	there	
are	to	act	
Reasons	for	
acting	
Reasons	one	
has	to	act	
Reasons	for	
which	one	acts	
Theory	of	reasons	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	 Claim…	
Table	I-5:	A	revised	categorisation	schema		
3 Categorising	theories	of	reasons	
For	the	mathematically	inclined:	within	my	categorisation	schema,	a	theory	of	reasons	can	be	
specified	as	a	4-tuple,	with	each	member	of	the	tuple	being	a	claim	about	a	reason	expression	
from	 a	 particular	 family,	 ordered	 as	 follows:	 ‘reasons	 there	 are	 to	 act’;	 ‘reasons	 for	 acting’;	
‘reasons	one	has	to	act’;	‘reasons	for	which	one	acts’.	If	we	let	F,	D,	and	P	denote	Favourism,	
Deliberativism	and	Psychologism	about	the	relevant	reason	expression,	respectively,	then,	for	
instance,	we	can	specify	some	distinct	theories	of	reasons	as	follows:	(F,	F,	F,	F);	(P,	P,	P,	P);	(F,	
F,	D,	D);	(F,	F,	D,	F).	By	way	of	 interpretation:	the	first	and	second	of	these	theories	make	no	
distinction	 between	 any	 independent	 kinds	 of	 reason,	while	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 distinguish	
between	‘the	reasons	there	are	to	act’	and	‘the	reasons	one	has	to	act’.	
I	have	set	out	the	reason	expressions	that	are	to	be	included	in	our	categorisation	schema	and	
I	 have	 set	 out	 the	 main	 claims	 that	 different	 theories	 of	 reasons	 make	 about	 each	 reason	
expression,	as	well	as	a	(formal)	way	of	describing	theories	of	reasons	in	terms	of	these	claims.	
Using	this	framework,	in	Table	I-6,	I	categorise	different	theories	of	reasons.	
This	 categorisation	 is	 far	 from	exhaustive.33	Moreover,	 the	 theories	 of	 some	of	 the	 theorists	
that	 I	 have	 grouped	 together	 differ	 in	 some	 of	 their	 intricacies;	 more	 discriminating	
characterisations	 of	 the	 different	 families	 of	 claims	 could,	 perhaps,	 separate	 out	 those	
intricacies	–	but	that	level	of	discrimination	does	not	alter	the	main	criticisms	that	the	theories	
are	 subject	 to.34	Since	 I	 only	 need	 the	 categorisation	 to	 be	 fine-grained	 enough	 to	 sort	
between	what	arguments	apply	 to	which	 theories,	 this	will	do,	and,	 in	particular,	 it	 supports	
that	end	far	better	than	the	standard	schema.	
	
																																								 																				
33	Noteworthy	omissions	 include	John	Broome	and	Thomas	Scanlon,	whom	I	struggled	to	place.	 I	have	
also	 omitted	 Michael	 Smith	 from	 this	 categorization,	 whose	 work	 is	 typically	 associated	 with	 ‘The	
Received	View’,	 because,	 as	 I	will	 argue	 in	 §	(V)4.1,	 he	advocates	 a	pluralist	 theory	of	 reasons,	which	
evades	categorisation	within	this	schema.	
34	See	§	(II)3.3	for	more	on	this.	
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Theories	of	reasons	 4-tuple	
description	
Reasons	there	
are	to	act	
Reasons	for	
acting	
Reasons	one	
has	to	act	
Reasons	for	
which	one	acts	
‘The	Received	View’	 (F,	F,	F,	P)	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Psychologism	
Stout	(2009),	
Alvarez	(2010),	
Parfit	(2011),	
Littlejohn	(2012)	
(F,	F,	F,	F)	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Favourism	
Dancy	(2000,	2014),	
Davis	(2005),	
Sandis	(2009)	
(F,	F,	F,	D)	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	
Schroeder	(2008),	
Comesaña	&	
McGrath	(2014)	
(F,	F,	D,	D)	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	 Deliberativism	
Hornsby	(2008)	 (F,	F,	D,	D)	 Favourism	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	 Favourism	
Turri	(2009),	
Gibbons	(2010),	
Mitova	(2015)	
(P,	P,	P,	P)	 Psychologism	 Psychologism	 Psychologism	 Psychologism	
Table	I-6:	Prominent	theories	of	reasons,	categorised	in	my	proposed	schema	
4 Normative	and	motivating	reasons	
The	terminology	of	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	is	common	throughout	the	literature	
on	practical	reasons,	and,	as	I	have	noted,	the	standard	schema	typically	categorises	theories	
according	to	what	 they	say	about	each.	We	are	now	 in	a	position	to	see	what	 is	wrong	with	
this	terminology.		
As	 I	will	 argue,	 common	definitions	 of	 these	 terms	 covertly	 import	 a	 theory	 of	 reasons	 into	
one’s	 categorisation	 schema	 that	 leaves	 little	 scope	 for	 disagreement.	 Indeed,	 I	 argue	 that,	
from	 a	 rhetorical	 standpoint,	 we	 ought	 to	 see	 these	 definitions	 less	 as	 terminological	
housekeeping	and	more	as	a	Trojan	horse	left	by	the	anti-psychologists	for	the	psychologists.	
So,	 I	 suggest,	when	working	towards	a	theory	of	reasons	 in	earnest,	we	should	abandon	this	
terminology,	at	least	as	it	is	standardly	defined.			4.1 Terminology	or	Trojan	horse?	
The	 de	 facto	 distinction	 between	 normative	 (or	 justifying)	 reasons	 and	 motivating	 (or	
explanatory)	reasons	is	probably	as	follows:	normative	reasons	explain	why	an	agent	ought	to	
do	 something	 whereas	motivating	 reasons	 explain	why	 they	 did	 it.	While	 this	 distinction	 is	
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itself	 problematic, 35 	my	 focus	 in	 this	 section	 is	 on	 the	 following,	 increasingly	 typical	
characterisations	of	these	terms36:	- For	any	p,	p	 is	 a	normative	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ	 if	 and	only	 if	p	 counts	 in	 favour	of	A’s	
φing.	- For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	motivating	reason	for	φing	only	if	p	is	something	A	took	to	count	in	
favour	of	φing.37	
These	characterisations	are	 innocuous	as	 they	are:	one	can	define	one’s	 terms	however	one	
wishes.	However,	what	makes	their	use	in	theorising	problematic	is	that	their	definitions	aren’t	
typically	restricted	to	these	innocuous	statements,	but	also	include	the	following	claims38:	- For	any	p,	p	is	a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.	- For	any	p,	p	is	a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing.	- For	any	p,	p	is	a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ.	- For	any	p,	p	 is	A’s	motivating	reason	for	φing	 if	and	only	 if	p	 is	a	 reason	for	which	A	
φ’d.	
I	 call	 these	 latter	 remarks	 ‘claims’	 because,	 by	 associating	 these	 terms	 also	 with	 reason	
expressions,	 these	 additional	 remarks	 go	 beyond	 mere	 definitions	 and	 well	 into	 what	 it	 is	
properly	the	business	of	a	theory	of	reasons	to	determine.		
																																								 																				
35	For	instance:	not	everything	that	explains	an	agent’s	action	is	the	sort	of	thing	we	would	want	to	call	a	
‘motivating	reason’	(see	Alvarez	2010).	
36	For	instance:	‘Most	contemporary	philosophers	start	by	distinguishing	two	types	of	reason	for	action:	
“normative”	 reasons	–	 that	 is,	 reasons	which,	very	 roughly,	 favour	or	 justify	an	action,	as	 judged	by	a	
well-informed,	 impartial	 observer;	 and	 “motivating”	 reasons	 –	 which,	 again	 roughly,	 are	 reasons	 the	
“agent”	(that	is,	the	person	acting)	takes	to	favour	and	justify	her	action	and	that	guides	her	in	acting.’	
(Alvarez	 2016a,	 1)	 It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 this	 is	 not	 how	motivating	 reasons	were	 always	 defined,	 in	
particular,	Michael	Smith	(1987)	has	quite	a	different	notion	in	mind,	as	Darwall	(2003)	observes	–	see	
§	(V)4	for	further	discussion	of	this	point.	
37	Note	 that	 this	 is	 only	 a	 necessary	 condition,	 not	 a	 sufficient	 one.	As	 I	 have	noted,	 it	 is	 common	 to	
assume	 that	motivating	 reasons	 (so	 defined)	 also	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 –	 although	 not	 everyone	
takes	that	view	(e.g.	Davis	2005).	
38	For	instance:	‘There	are	normative	reasons:	reasons	that	there	are	for	people	to	act	–	as	it	is	often	put,	
reasons	that	‘favour’	doing	something;	and	motivating	reasons:	reasons	for	which	an	agent	acts,	that	is,	
the	reasons	that	an	agent	takes	(perhaps	rightly)	to	favour	acting	as	she	does	and	for	which	she	acts.’	
(Alvarez	2016b,	4–5	emphasis	added)	Similarly:	 ‘Normative	 reasons	are	considerations	which	count	 in	
favour	of,	or	against,	an	action.	What	you	ought	to	do	is	determined	by	how	the	normative	reasons	for	
and	against	acting	weigh	up	–	roughly,	you	ought	to	do	what	the	balance	of	such	reasons	supports.	For	
instance,	if	there	is	a	reason	for	you	to	take	an	umbrella	[i.e.	a	normative	reason	to	take	an	umbrella],	
and	no	stronger	reason	not	to	do	so,	you	ought	to	take	an	umbrella.	Normative	reasons	contrast	with	
motivating	reasons	–	the	reasons	for	which	you	act.	In	some	cases,	the	reasons	for	which	you	act	are,	or	
correspond	 to,	 reasons	 for	 acting.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 in	 some	 cases,	 your	 motivating	 reasons	 are,	 or	
correspond	 to,	 normative	 reasons.	 For	 instance,	 that	 it	 is	 raining	might	 speak	 in	 favour	 of	 taking	 an	
umbrella	and	be	the	reason	for	which	you	do	so.’	(Way	and	Whiting	2017,	2–3	emphasis	added)	
	 41	
In	particular,	as	well	as	precluding	the	possibility	of	distinguishing	between	the	kinds	of	reason	
picked	out	by	the	expressions	‘the	reasons	there	are	to	act’,	 ‘the	reasons	for	acting’	and	‘the	
reasons	 one	 has	 to	 act’	 (the	 issues	 with	 which	 I	 have	 already	 discussed	 at	 length),	 these	
‘definitions’	go	some	way	to	setting	out	what	the	reason-relation	for	each	reason	expression	is,	
which	is	to	say	that	they	go	some	way	to	setting	out	a	theory	of	reasons.	That	 is,	behind	the	
standard	schema’s	seemingly	innocuous	definitions	of	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	is	
the	‘assumed	theory’	of	reasons	set	out	in	Table	I-7.		
The	problem	is	that	if	we	start	our	theorising	with	the	‘assumed	theory’	in	mind	then	all	that	is	
really	 left	 to	debate	 is	 how	 to	 interpret	 the	 relation	of	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	of’,	which,	 as	we	
shall	 see,	 gives	 anti-psychological	 theories	 a	 significant	 advantage.	 And	 it	 is	 precisely	 this	
advantage	that	makes	me	suggest	that	this	act	of	seeming	terminological	housekeeping	ought	
to	be	seen	as	a	Trojan	horse,	as	the	next	section	discusses.	
Reason	expression	 The	assumed	theory	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	counts	in	favour	of	φing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	counts	in	favour	of	φing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	counts	in	favour	of	φing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	A’s	reason	for	φing…	 …only	if	A	took	p	to	count	in	favour	φing.39	
Table	I-7:	The	‘assumed	theory’	of	reasons		4.2 Why	it	is	a	Trojan	horse	
When	it	 is	raining	and	I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining,	what	 is	 it	 that	counts	 in	favour	of	taking	an	
umbrella	–	 is	 it	the	fact	that	 it	 is	raining	or	the	fact	that	 I	believe	that	 it	 is	raining?	The	most	
natural	interpretation	seems	to	be	that,	in	ordinary	circumstances,	it	is	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	
that	counts	in	favour	of	taking	my	umbrella,	and	not	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining.		
A	 classic40	sort	 of	 example	 illustrates	 this	 well:	 suppose	 that	 Sam	 believes	 that	 the	 security	
services	are	 trying	 to	 read	her	mind.	 If	 it	were	 true	 that	 the	 security	 services	were	 trying	 to	
read	her	mind,	then	the	fact	that	they	were	trying	to	read	her	mind	would	count	in	favour	of	
her	wearing	a	foil	hat.41	However,	the	fact	that	she	believes	that	the	security	services	are	trying	
																																								 																				
39	It’s	worth	noting	 that	because	 this	doesn’t	provide	sufficient	conditions	 for	being	an	agent’s	 reason	
for	acting,	 the	assumed	theory	 is	not	a	complete	 theory	of	 reasons	–	 there	 is,	as	 I	will	 later	note,	still	
some	room	for	disagreement,	albeit	modest.	
40	Alvarez	 (2016b)	attributes	this	example	to	Anscombe	(1957);	Hyman	(1999);	Raz	 (1999b)	and	Dancy	
(2000).	
41	Because,	 inter	 alia,	 foil	 hats	 block	 the	 radiofrequency	 electromagnetic	 radiation	 that	 the	 security	
services	use	to	read	minds	(or	would,	if	they	did).	
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to	read	her	mind	does	not	favour	wearing	a	foil	hat	–	it	favours	going	to	see	a	doctor.42	What	
this	example	shows	is	that	the	circumstances	in	which	a	psychological	fact	‘counts	in	favour’	of	
an	action	in	the	same	way	as	the	(non-psychological)	fact	that	it	is	raining	‘counts	in	favour’	of	
taking	an	umbrella	 are	unusual	 –	 it	 is	 typically	 features	of	 the	world	 that	 count	 in	 favour	of	
doing	things,	not	 features	of	our	psychology.	That	 is,	 if	a	well-informed	observer	were	to	 list	
the	things	that	count	in	favour	or	count	against	some	action,	they	would	rarely	list	facts	about	
the	agent’s	beliefs	as	things	that	count	in	favour	(or	against)	their	action	(however	much	those	
facts	are	likely	to	affect	what	the	agent	actually	does).		
We	 can	 press	 the	 point	 about	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 relation	 by	
considering	what	it	is	that	an	agent	takes	to	count	in	favour	of	their	actions.43	Seemingly,	what	
Sam	takes	to	count	in	favour	of	wearing	a	foil	hat	is	that	the	security	services	are	trying	to	read	
her	mind	(and	this	 is	so	even	if	they	aren’t),	 in	contrast,	what	she	takes	to	count	in	favour	of	
going	 to	 see	 the	 doctor	 is	 that	 she	 believes	 that	 the	 security	 services	 are	 trying	 to	 read	 her	
mind.	Sam	is	deliberating	both	about	the	way	she	takes	the	world	to	be	and	the	fact	that	she	
takes	 it	 to	 be	 that	 way.	 	 Again,	 what	 the	 story	 about	 Sam’s	 deliberation	 shows	 is	 the	
unusualness	of	deliberating	about	features	of	one’s	own	psychology	–	we	don’t	normally	take	
features	of	our	psychology	to	favour	a	given	course	of	action	–	it	is	normally	only	the	contents	
of	our	mental	states	that	feature	in	our	deliberation.	
This	 line	 of	 reasoning	 leads	 us	 rather	 quickly	 from	 ‘the	 assumed	 theory’	 to	 the	 following	
conclusions:	firstly,	since	the	things	that	count	in	favour	of	actions	(and	are	taken	to	count	in	
favour	of	actions)	are	usually	not	psychological,	all	the	claims	in	the	psychologism	family	must	
be	false	(since	they	only	allow	for	psychological	reasons).	So	whatever	our	theory	of	reasons	is,	
it	must	be	anti-psychological	with	respect	to	every	reason	expression.	
Secondly,	since	something	only	counts	in	favour	of	an	action	if	the	action	is,	in	some	respect,	
worth	doing	(the	fact	that	 it’s	raining	doesn’t	count	 in	 favour	of	taking	my	umbrella	 if	 taking	
my	umbrella	 is,	 to	no	extent,	worth	doing	 (if	 I	 actually	want	 to	get	wet,	 say)),	and	since	 it	 is	
seemingly	worth	doing	in	virtue	of	that	which	counts	in	favour	of	it,	the	natural	interpretation	
of	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour	of’	an	action	seems	to	be	this:	
																																								 																				
42	Because,	in	Sam’s	case,	her	belief	that	the	security	services	are	trying	to	read	her	mind	is	the	product	
of	a	delusional	disorder.	
43	Noting	that	(which,	as	Table	I-7	makes	clear)	being	something	that	the	agent	takes	to	count	in	favour	
of	an	action	is	a	necessary	condition	on	being	the	reason	for	which	an	agent	does	that	action.	
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- For	 any	 p,	 p	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	 A’s	 φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	 p	makes	 A’s	 φing,	 in	 some	
respect,	worth	doing.44	
By	 now	 we	 should	 smell	 a	 rat;	 substituting	 the	 above,	 which	 I	 have	 suggested	 is	 the	 most	
natural	interpretation	of	the	‘counting	in	favour	of’	relation,	into	Table	I-7,	yields	the	following	
theory:		
Reason	expression	 The	assumed	theory	–	conventionally	interpreted	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing…	 …only	if	A	took	p	to	make	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
Table	I-8:	The	conventional	interpretation	of	the	assumed	theory	
The	theory	set	out	in	Table	I-8	should	look	familiar;	the	claims	of	the	re-interpreted	assumed	
theory	 for	 the	 first	 three	 reason	 expressions	 just	 are	 the	 claims	 of	 favourism	 about	 those	
reason	expressions.		
So,	my	concern	is	this:	the	terminology	of	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	amounts	to	a	
Trojan	horse	because	once	you	accept	 it,	 the	most	natural	 interpretation	of	 the	 ‘counting	 in	
favour	of’	relation	then	fixes	your	theory	for	the	first	three	reason	expressions	(that	is,	it	forces	
you	 to	 accept	 favourism	 about	 those	 reason	 expressions).	 Having	 accepted	 the	 assumed	
theory	all	that	is	left	to	debate	is	then	whether	to	endorse	favourism	or	deliberativism	about	
the	reasons	for	which	we	act	(which	are	both	consistent	with	the	final	row	of	Table	I-845).	That	
is,	what	makes	 the	 terminology	a	Trojan	horse	 is	 that	 it	 forces	many	theorists46	to	accept	an	
account	 of	 the	 reason-relation	 for	 each	 reason	 expression	 that	 puts	 them	 at	 a	 systematic	
disadvantage	 –	 the	 only	 way	 to	 advocate	 their	 theory	 is	 for	 them	 to	 adopt	 an	 unnatural	
interpretation	of	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour	of’	an	action.	4.3 The	Trojan	horse	rejected	
The	Trojans	ought	to	have	left	that	damned	horse	alone,	and	so	too	should	we,	if	we	are	to	do	
our	 theorising	 in	earnest.	That	 is,	 rather	 than	accommodating	different	 theories	by	adopting	
																																								 																				
44	I	 say	 this	 without	 meaning	 to	 undermine	 the	 view	 that	 the	 relation	 of	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 is	
somehow	primitive.	 It	 is,	 I	think,	still	possible	that	the	favouring	relation	is	the	more	fundamental	one	
even	if	this	is	the	case	–	see	§	(II)3.1	for	further	discussion	of	this	point.	
45	As	 fn.	39	records	–	the	final	row	omits	a	sufficient	condition	for	being	a	reason	for	which	the	agent	
acts,	so	the	assumed	theory	falls	short	of	a	full	theory	of	reasons.	
46	That	is,	theories	of	reasons	other	than	(F,	F,	F,	F)	or	(F,	F,	F,	D).	
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an	unnatural	interpretation	of	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour	of	an	action’,	47	the	best	response	is	
to	reject	the	horse	by	refusing	to	accept	the	assumed	theory	as	the	starting	point	of	theorising.	
And	once	one	does	that,	the	oft-repeated	argument	against	psychologistic	theories48	becomes	
question-begging:	it	starts	off	by	assuming	the	truth	of	a	position49	that	psychologistic	theories	
should	reject.50		4.4 Is	it	a	Trojan	horse	or	is	it	just	the	truth?	
But	is	it	really	a	Trojan	horse?	Isn’t	counting	in	favour	of	acting	just	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason?	
This	is,	after	all,	a	well-established	view,	brought	to	the	fore	in	the	following	remarks:	
I	will	take	the	idea	of	a	reason	as	primitive.	Any	attempt	to	explain	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	for	
something	seems	to	me	to	lead	back	to	the	same	idea:	a	consideration	that	counts	in	favor	of	
it.	 ‘Counts	 in	 favor	 how?’	 one	might	 ask.	 ‘By	 providing	 a	 reason	 for	 it’	 seems	 to	 be	 the	only	
answer.	(Scanlon	1998,	17)	
If	we	are	asked	what	reasons	are,	it	is	hard	to	give	a	helpful	answer.	Facts	give	us	reasons,	we	
might	 say,	when	 they	 count	 in	 favour	of	 our	having	 some	belief	 or	desire,	 or	 acting	 in	 some	
way.	But	‘counts	in	favour	of’	means	‘is	a	reason	for’.	Like	some	other	fundamental	concepts,	
such	as	 those	of	 reality,	necessity,	 and	 time,	 the	 concept	of	 a	 reason	cannot	be	explained	 in	
other	terms.	(Parfit	2001,	18)	
The	 suggestion	 is	 that	 ‘being	 a	 reason	 for’	 and	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 are	 interchangeable	
expressions.	Now,	were	that	view	immediately	obvious	then	what	I	have	called	a	‘Trojan	horse’	
would	 be	 less	 of	 a	 covert	 assault	 on	 psychologistic	 theories	 and	more	 just	 the	 inconvenient	
truth	 for	 them.	 I	 don’t,	 however,	 think	 that	 this	 view	 is	 immediately	 obvious,	 particularly	
because	I	think	it	is	actually	false.		
While	I	agree	with	Scanlon	and	Parfit	that	whenever	something	is	a	reason	for	acting	it	must	
count	in	favour	of	so	acting,	51	I	disagree	with	them	in	so	far	as	I	think	that	it	counts	in	favour	
so	acting	as	a	consequence	of	its	being	a	reason	for	acting,	and	not	a	consequence	of	its	being	
a	reason.	In	particular,	I	do	not	think	it	follows	that	anything	that	counts	in	favour	of	an	action	
is	a	reason	for	doing	it,	nor	that	all	reasons	count	in	favour	of	actions.52	What	I	want	to	argue	
																																								 																				
47	According	to	which	the	fact	that	Sam	believes	that	the	security	services	are	trying	to	read	her	mind	
counts	in	favour	of	wearing	a	tin	foil	hat.	I	think	that	Mitova	(2016)	prefers	that	option.		
48	By	which	I	mean	the	argument	set	out	in	§	4.2,	which	one	could	put	succinctly	as	follows:	what	counts	
in	favour	of	actions	is	often	not	psychological	(as	shown	by	Sam’s	case)	and	that	which	counts	in	favour	
of	an	action	is	a	reason	to	do	it,	so	reasons	can	be	things	other	than	features	of	an	agent’s	psychology,	
so	psychologism	(which	says	that	they	can’t)	is	false.	
49	I.e.	that	something	is	a	reason	just	in	case	it	counts	in	favour	of	an	action.	
50	This	is,	I	think,	precisely	Gibbons’s	(2010,	354)	objection	to	the	use	of	this	line	of	reasoning	against	his	
‘psychologistic’	theory.	
51	And	that	whenever	something	is	a	reason	against	acting	it	must	count	against	doing	it.	
52	That	is,	while	I	agree	that	if	p	 is	a	reason	for	φing	then	p	counts	in	favour	of	φing.	I	don’t	agree	that	
the	right-to-left	reading	(if	p	counts	in	favour	of	φing	then	p	is	a	reason	for	φing)	is	true,	nor	do	I	agree	
that	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	then	p	counts	in	favour	of	φing.	
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for	 now,	 however,	 is	 not	 the	 view	 that	 ‘being	 a	 reason’	 and	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 aren’t	
interchangeable	expressions	–	but	just	that	the	view	that	they	are	is	not	immediately	obvious.	
My	argument	 is	 this:	 it	 seems	more	 likely	 that	 the	meaning	of	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	of’	 comes	
from	the	fact	that	something	is	a	reason	for	acting	than	that	it	is	a	reason	for	acting.		
The	Oxford	English	Dictionary	defines	the	‘for’	preposition	(inter	alia)	as	follows:	
	‘In	 defence	or	 support	 of;	 in	 favour	 of,	 on	 the	 side	of.	Opposed	 to	 against.’	 (‘For,	 Prep.	 and	
Conj.’,	n.d.,	7a	emphasis	added)		
Seemingly	anything	that	is	for	something,	in	this	sense	of	the	preposition,	counts	in	favour	of	
it,	 in	virtue	of	 its	being	 for	 it	 (and	not	necessarily	anything	else	about	 it).	So,	 I	 suggest,	what	
makes	a	‘reason	for	acting’	count	in	favour	of	an	action	is	the	fact	that	it	is	for	that	action	(as	
opposed	to	against	it),	and	not	the	fact	that	it	is	a	reason.	That	is,	my	claim	is	that	we	should	
not	 necessarily	 analyse	 ‘being	 a	 reason’	 as	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’,	 rather	we	 have	 stronger	
reasons	for	analysing	‘being	for	something’	as	‘counting	in	favour	of	it’.	
This	 is	 made	 clearer	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ‘for’	 preposition	 lends	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘counts	 in	
favour	 of’	 to	 things	 other	 than	 reasons.	 For	 instance,	 I	 can	 say:	 ‘the	 factors	 for	 and	 against	
acting’;	 ‘the	 things	 for	 and	 against	 acting’;	 ‘the	 considerations	 for	 and	 against	 acting’;	 ‘what	
there	 is	 to	 be	 said	 for	 and	 against	 acting’.	Wherever	 this	 ‘for’	 appears,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	
thing	that	precedes	 it	counts	 in	 favour	of	 that	which	 it	 is	 for,	but	 that	doesn’t	 lead	us	to	say	
that	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	 ‘factor’,	 or	 a	 ‘thing’,	 or	 a	 ‘consideration’,	 or	 ‘something	 to	 be	 said’,	
depends	on	counting	in	favour	of	some	action	independent	of	its	being	a	factor	for,	or	a	thing	
for,	or	a	consideration	for,	or	something	to	be	said	for	doing	an	action.	Likewise,	I	suggest,	the	
fact	that	being	a	reason	for	doing	something	depends	on	counting	in	favour	of	doing	it,	should	
not	lead	us	to	assume	that	being	a	reason	depends	on	counting	in	favour	of	doing	something	–	
instead	we	should	just	admit	that	whenever	anything	is	for	something,	it	counts	in	favour	of	it,	
and	just	because	it	is	for	it.	53	
To	be	clear:	my	aim	with	these	remarks	is	not	to	show	that	some	reasons	don’t	count	in	favour	
of	acting.	My	aim	is	just	to	show	that	it	is	not	a	foregone	conclusion	that	all	reasons	count	in	
favour	 of	 actions,	 and	 it	 is	 certainly	 not	 something	 that	we	 should	 assume	 at	 the	 outset	 of	
theorising.	One’s	theory	might	end	up	arguing	that	the	reason-relations	are	best	understood	in	
terms	of	 the	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	of’	 relation	 (i.e.	 as	 favourists	do)	–	but	 that	 is	 an	argument	
that	must	be	made,	it	is	not	the	default	position.	That	is,	we	should	not	start	off	our	theorising	
																																								 																				
53	What	about	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting?	Doesn’t	that	then	count	in	favour	of	their	action,	since	it	is	
for	 it?	 I	do	not	 think	 it	does,	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	use	of	 ‘for’	appeals	 to	one	of	 the	prepositions	 (many)	
other	meanings;	specifically	‘of	purpose	or	destination.’	(‘For,	Prep.	and	Conj.’,	n.d.,	IV)	The	association	
of	this	expression	with	this	meaning	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	§	(II)1.2.	
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by	assuming	either	that	something	is	a	reason	to	act,	a	reason	for	acting	or	a	reason	one	has	to	
act	just	in	case	it	counts	in	favour	of	acting,	or	that	a	reason	for	which	an	agent	acts	is	always	
something	they	take	to	count	in	favour	of	their	action.	To	start	our	theorising	in	this	manner	is,	
I	submit,	prejudicial	to	our	enquiry.	And	this,	accordingly,	is	why	I	have	rejected	the	standard	
schema	and	why	I	eschew	the	terminology	of	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons.	
5 Conclusion	
I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 standard	 schema	 is	 ill-suited	 to	 the	 task	 of	 categorising	 different	
theories	 of	 reasons	 and	 I	 have	 proposed	 an	 alternative	 categorisation.	 My	 alternative	
categorisation	 distinguishes	 theories	 according	 to	what	 they	 say	 the	 reason-relation	 is	 for	 a	
number	 of	 typical	 reason	 expressions	 and	 it	 eschews	 the	 language	 of	 ‘normative’	 and	
‘motivating’	 reasons	 because	 those	 terms	 (as	 they	 are	 standardly	 defined)	 already	 involve	
substantive	theoretical	commitments.	
In	 the	next	 three	 chapters	 I	 discuss	 the	main	 critiques	of	what	 are	 typically	 taken	 to	be	 the	
strongest	 suits	 of	 each	 of	 the	 three	 families,	 namely	 (and	 I	 discuss	 them	 in	 this	 order):	
favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act;	 psychologism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act;	 and	
deliberativism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act.	 I	 set	 out	 a	 number	 of	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	and	show	how	each	of	these	views	must	reject	some	subset	of	these	claims.	
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(II)		Reasons	to	act	that	make	actions	worth	doing	
In	which	I	show	what	it	costs	to	think	that	if	there	is	a	reason	to	do	some	action	
then	that	action	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	I	show	how	‘favourism	about	
reasons	 to	 act’	 (which	 entails	 that	 reasons	 to	 act	make	 actions	worth	 doing)	
clashes	 with	 some	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 about	 a	 case	 in	 which	
someone	acts	on	a	false	belief.	I	set	out	which	claims	the	proponent	of	this	view	
must	choose	between	rejecting	and	I	categorise	the	common	choices	from	the	
literature.	
While	walking	through	a	forest	that	she	knows	to	contain	bears,	Sally	hears	what	sounds	like	a	
bear	running	towards	her.1	She	runs,	 frantically,	 to	a	nearby	safe-house.	 In	 fact,	no	bear	was	
chasing	her;	it	was	an	odd	rustling	of	the	trees	that	made	the	noise.	Did	Sally	have	a	reason	to	
run?	Of	course	–	she	thought	a	bear	was	chasing	her!	Did	she	run	for	a	reason?	Surely!	What	
was	her	reason	for	running?	She	thought	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	or	perhaps	one	might	
say	this:	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound.	
This	seemingly	straightforward	story	and	these	typical	intuitions	about	it,	create	problems	for	
what	I	have	called	‘favourism	about	reasons	to	act’,	according	to	which	a	reason	for	someone	
to	do	some	action	is	a	fact	that	makes	it,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 set	 out	 a	 series	 of	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 about	
reasons2	and	to	then	show	that	‘favourism	about	reasons	to	act’	must	reject	at	least	some	of	
them.	This	 is	not	meant	to	be	a	conclusive	argument	against	this	view	–	only	to	show	that	 it	
comes	at	the	cost	of	rejecting	some	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.		
1 Sally	and	the	non-existent	bear	1.1 Reasons	and	rationality	
Given	 that	 she	 knew	 that	 safety	 was	 nearby,	 and	 given	 that	 she	 thought	 that	 a	 bear	 was	
chasing	her	 (add	that	she	wants	to	 live,	 if	you	 like),	 it	was	plainly	rational	 for	Sally	to	run,	as	
Stout	notes:		
What	can	be	accepted	without	much	difficulty	is	that	her	having	that	belief	makes	her	running	
away	rationally	 intelligible.	Learning	that	she	thinks	a	bear	 is	chasing	her	 I	can	make	sense	of	
her	running	away;	I	can	see	that	her	behaviour	is	rational.	(Stout	2009,	52)	
																																								 																				
1	This	example	is	adapted	from	Stout	(2009).	
2	Based	both	on	this	story	about	Sally	and	on	more	general	intuitions	about	how	‘the	reasons	there	are	
for	an	agent	to	act’	relate	to	‘the	reasons	they	have	to	act’	and	‘the	reasons	for	which	they	act’.	
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Since	it	was	plainly	rational	for	Sally	to	run,	let’s	say	it	plainly:	
(F1) It	was	rational	for	Sally	to	run.3			
Now,	 I	said	that	Sally	had	a	reason	to	run,	even	though	no	bear	was	chasing	her.	This	seems	
like	a	natural	thing	to	say,	but	why?	I	think	that	it	is	because,	as	Errol	Lord	observes:	
It’s	natural	to	think	that	whenever	it’s	rational	for	me	to	φ,	I	have	reasons	to	φ.	(Lord	2010,	1)4	
It’s	natural	to	say	that	she	has	a	reason	to	run,	and	it	sounds	strange	to	say	that	she	doesn’t	
because	the	fact	that	it	was	rational	for	her	to	do	it	suggests	that	she	had	a	reason	to	do	it.	So,	
here	is	another	prima	facie	reasonable	claim:	
(F2) If	it	is	rational	for	A	to	φ	then	some	p	was	a	reason	A	had	to	φ.	1.2 Acting	for	a	reason	and	acting	intentionally	
I	said	that	Sally	ran	for	a	reason.	To	deny	this	and	say	that	Sally	didn’t	run	for	a	reason,	that	is,	
that	she	was	running	for	no	reason,	seems	to	suggest	that	her	action	was	unconsidered,	that,	
at	best,	she	was	running	for	the	sake	of	running,	or	running	on	a	whim.	 If	we	were	to	say	to	
someone	 that	 Sally	 ran	 for	 no	 reason,	 and	 then	 add	 that,	 by	 the	way,	 she	 ran	 because	 she	
thought	 a	 bear	was	 chasing	her,	 it	would	 seem	 to	 cancel	 the	 sense	 in	which	 she	 ran	 for	 no	
reason:	she	is	certainly	not	running	for	the	sake	of	running	if	she	is	running	because	she	thinks	
that	a	bear	is	chasing	her.		
The	point	is	not	that	there	is	no	way	of	making	the	claim	that	she	ran	for	no	reason	intelligible	
–	it’s	just	that	saying	that	she	ran	for	no	reason	and	that	she	ran	because	she	thought	a	bear	
was	 chasing	 her	 has	 an	 air	 of	 contradiction	 about	 it.	 And	 the	 reason	 it	 has	 an	 air	 of	
contradiction	 about	 it	 is	 that	 saying	 that	 someone	 didn’t	 act	 for	 a	 reason	 implies	 that	 their	
action	lacked	some	sort	of	rational,	intentional,	deliberateness	–	it	makes	it	seem	whimsical	or	
unconsidered,	if	not	entirely	unintentional.	As	Dancy	notes:	
Intentional,	deliberate,	purposeful	action	is	always	done	for	a	reason.	(Dancy	2000,	1)	
Why	 does	 Dancy	 choose	 the	 particular	 string	 of	 adjectives	 (‘intentional,	 deliberate,	
purposeful’)	he	does?	I	think	he	is	trying	to	anticipate	an	objection	to	the	simpler	claim	that	all	
intentional	action	 is	done	for	a	reason.	 In	particular:	one	might	say	that	 if	 I	cross	my	 legs	(to	
use	Dancy’s	example),	I	act	intentionally	but	I	don’t	act	for	a	reason	–	the	sort	of	acts	one	does	
																																								 																				
3	You	could,	of	course,	add	in	defeaters	(she	thought	the	bear	was	between	her	and	the	safe-house;	she	
thinks	that	staying	still	is	the	best	way	to	avoid	a	bear	attack),	but	that	would	be	to	change	my	story	–	
there	are	no	such	defeaters	here;	the	most	rational	thing	for	Sally	to	do	is	run.	
4	For	 similar	 remarks	 on	 the	 ‘naturalness’	 of	 this	 claim,	 from	philosophers	with	 different	 views	 about	
reasons	 see	Unger	 (1978,	 200),	 Alvarez	 (2010,	 13),	 Gibbons	 (2010,	 337)	 and	 Comesaña	 and	McGrath	
(2014,	61).	
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on	 a	 whim	may	 be	 done	 for	 no	 reason,	 but	 they	 aren’t	 unintentional.	 Dancy,	 quite	 rightly,	
doesn’t	want	to	us	to	think	of	such	actions	(which	O’Shaughnessy	(1980)	calls	‘sub-intentional’	
actions),	 as	 actions	 that	 are	 done	 intentionally,	 purposefully	 and	deliberately.5	It	 seems	 that	
there	is	a	clear	class	of	what	we	might	call	sophisticatedly	deliberate	actions	that	we	associate	
with	acting	for	a	reason.6	For	the	sake	of	brevity	 I	will	shorten	Dancy’s	string	of	adjectives	to	
just	deliberate	action	and	formulate	this	prima	facie	reasonable	claim	as	follows:	
(F3) If	A	φs	deliberately	then	A	φs	for	a	reason.	
This	 view	 is	 shared	 by	 philosophers	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 views	 on	what	 reasons	 are,7	and,	
indeed,	Mele	remarks	that	 ‘the	overwhelming	majority	of	ordinary	speakers	of	English	asked	
for	a	gut	reaction	to	[this	claim]	would	find	it	extremely	plausible.’	(Mele	2007,	99)	
Did	Sally	run	deliberately	(intentionally,	purposefully…)?	Of	course	she	did!	She	responded	to	
the	 situation	 as	 she	 took	 it	 to	 be,	 she	 decided	 on	 the	 appropriate	 course	 of	 action	 and	 she	
acted	on	the	decision	she’d	made	(albeit	hurriedly!).8	Thus	we	can	say:	
(F4) Sally	ran	deliberately.	
So	this	is	why	it	sounds	odd	to	say	the	Sally	didn’t	run	for	a	reason:	it	suggests	that	she	didn’t	
run	deliberately	(intentionally,	purposefully…)	–	which	she	plainly	did.		1.3 Sally’s	reasons	for	running	
The	remarks	I	made	about	Sally’s	reasons	for	running	bear	(!)	repeating,	since	I	take	them	to	
be	prima	facie	reasonable.	Firstly,	I	said	that:	
(F5) Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	believed	a	bear	was	chasing	
her.	
																																								 																				
5	Mele	 (2007,	 99)	 considers	 another	 would-be	 counterexample	 to	 claim	 that	 all	 intentional	 action	 is	
done	for	a	reason,	which	Dancy’s	wording	is	seemingly	also	designed	to	avoid.	
6	It’s	worth	noting	 that	 the	 sense	of	 sophistication	here	 is	 purely	 internal	 to	 the	 agent	 –	what	makes	
something	count	as,	in	Dancy’s	terminology,	an	intentional,	deliberate	and	purposeful	action	is	all	about	
the	way	the	agent	reasoned	their	way	to	it,	and	nothing	to	do	with	its	correspondence	to	the	external	
world.	
7	For	 instance,	 it’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 Maria	 Alvarez,	 who	 rejects	 (F3)	 nonetheless	 notes	 that	 ‘The	
suggestion	that	someone	who	acted	motivated	by	a	false	belief	does	not	act	 for	a	reason	might	seem	
prima	facie	wrong.’	(2010,	141)	That	is	all	that	I	am	saying	–	that	it	is	prima	facie	reasonable	to	say	that	
they	do	act	for	a	reason.	(See	also	Anscombe	1957,	9;	Davidson	2001c,	83;	Davis	2005,	68–69;	Gibbons	
2010,	357;	Hieronymi	2011,	410–11)	
8	Sally’s	 circumstances	are	extreme	but	 I	 don’t	 think	 it’s	unreasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 she	deliberates	
about	what	to	do.	She	might	be	torn,	for	instance,	over	whether	it	would	be	better	to	‘play	dead’	–	can	
she	out	run	the	bear?	One	might	well,	 I	submit,	deliberate	even	when	the	stakes	are	high	and	time	 is	
short	 –	 such	 deliberation	 need	 not	 take	 a	 long	 time,	 or	 even	 have	much	 to	 it	 (the	matter	might	 be	
straightforward)	for	one’s	action	to	be	deliberate.	
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It	 flies	 in	 the	 face	of	experience	 to	deny	 that	we	make	such	remarks,	as,	 indeed,	 Joseph	Raz	
notes:	
There	 is	no	denying	that	we	use	 locutions	of	the	form	‘his	reason	for	φing	was	his	belief	that	
p’…	(as	in	‘his	reason	for	not	coming	was	that	he	thought	you	would	not	be	here’).	(Raz	1999b,	
18)	
I	also	said	that:	
(F6) Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound.	
This	seems	to	suggest	that	an	appearance	or	perceptual	experience	could	be	an	agent’s	reason	
for	 acting.	 I	 find	 it	 as	 natural	 to	 say	 this	 as	 saying	 that	 her	 reason	 for	 running	was	 that	 she	
believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	but	 it	 is	perhaps	worth	noting	that	reasons	of	this	kind	
are	 less	 commonly	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature.9	Nonetheless,	 I	 take	 this	 claim	 to	 be,	 equally,	
prima	facie	reasonable.	
2 How	reason	expressions	relate	
In	 §	(I)1,	 I	 discussed	 different	 reason	 expressions,	 but	 made	 no	 mention	 of	 the	 relations	
between	them.	So	how	are	they	related?	Here	is	what	Gibbons	suggests:	
If	you	go	to	the	store	for	milk…	you	will	go	there	for	a	reason.	So	you	must	have	a	reason.	So	
there	must	be	a	reason.	(Gibbons	2010,	343)	
Gibbons’	inference	seems	natural.	That	is,	it	seems	prima	facie	reasonable	to	think	that	if	one	
acts	for	a	reason	one	must	have	had	a	reason	to	act	and	if	one	had	a	reason	to	act	then	there	
must	have	been	a	reason	to	act,	which	one	had.	So:	
(F7) If	A	φs	for	a	reason	then	there	was	a	reason,	p,	for	A	to	φ.	
Denying	 this	means,	 as	 Jennifer	 Hornsby	 notes	 (albeit,	 in	 the	 process	 of	 denying	 it),	 saying	
things	like:	‘there	was	no	reason	to	do	what	he	did,	even	though	he	did	it	for	a	reason,’	(2008,	
249)	 which	 is,	 in	 her	 own	 words,	 ‘prima	 facie	 paradoxical.’	 The	 denial	 of	 a	 prima	 facie	
paradoxical	claim	is,	it	seems	to	me,	at	least	prima	facie	reasonable.	
I	think	that	Gibbons’	inference	permits	of	some	strengthening:	it	is	not	just	that	you	go	to	the	
store	for	a	reason	and	you	have	a	reason	and	there	is	a	reason,	but	that	your	reason	for	going	
there	 is	a	reason	that	you	have	to	go	there	and	 is	a	reason	that	there	 is	 for	you	to	go	there.	
																																								 																				
9Although	Dancy	alludes	to	this	sort	of	reason	for	acting	when	he	notes	that	when	Edmund	stays	away	
from	the	middle	of	an	icy	lake	after	his	friend	had	told	him	that	the	ice	was	thin	there,	‘his	reason	could	
have	been	simply	that	his	friend	had	warned	him	off.’	(Dancy	2014,	88)	Kearns	and	Star	(2008)	defend	
(at	 length)	an	account	that	agrees	with	this	 intuition	and	Whiting	(2014)	also	notes	that	we	often	cite	
perceptual	experiences	as	reasons.	Lord	 (2010,	6)	 is	also	clear	 that	a	reason	to	believe	something	 is	a	
reason	to	do	that	which	the	belief	makes	rational	–	assuming	that	experiences	can	be	reasons	for	belief,	
he	would	seemingly	agree	with	(F6).	
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These	 strengthened	 claims	 provide	 us	 with	 the	 following,	 additional	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	
claims	about	reasons:	
(F8) For	any	p,	if	p	was	a	reason	A	had	to	φ	then	p	was	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.10	
(F9) For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	was	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.11	
Both	of	 these	 claims	are	at	 least	prima	 facie	 reasonable	because	denying	either	amounts	 to	
saying,	 implausibly,	that	something	that	is	a	reason	isn’t	a	reason:	denying	(F8)	means	saying	
that	an	agent	has	a	reason	to	act	that	isn’t	a	reason	to	act;	and	denying	(F9)	means	saying,	as	
Dancy	notes,	‘an	agent	can	act	for	a	reason	that	is	no	reason.’	(2000,	3)		
Indeed,	Mele	finds	it	so	strange	to	say	such	things	that	he	makes	it	an	explicit	constraint	on	a	
satisfactory	theory	of	reasons	that	it	concede	that:	‘anything	that	is	a	reason	is	not	no	reason.’	
(2007,	95)	 I	am	not	going	as	 far	as	Mele	–	 I	note	his	 remarks	only	to	show	that	these	claims	
enjoy	considerable	intuitive	plausibility,	so	they	are	at	least	prima	facie	reasonable,	and	that	if	
a	theory	rejects	them,	it	is	at	some	cost	that	it	does	so.	
3 Favourism	about	reasons	to	act	
Recall	the	following	claim	about	reasons	from	Table	I-4:	
Favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act:	 For	 any	p,	 p	 is	 a	 reason	 for	A	 to	φ	 if	 and	 only	 if	p	
makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
This	is	not	the	standard	way	of	characterising	the	view	of	those	to	whom	I	attribute	it.12	These	
theorists	more	typically	characterise	their	view	as	the	claim	that	a	reason	to	do	some	action	is	
that	which	‘counts	in	favour’	of	doing	it.		
However,	I	characterise	it	in	the	way	that	I	do	because	there	are	differences	of	opinion	about	
what	 it	 is	 to	 ‘count	 in	 favour’	of	an	action,13	so	the	problems	for	 favourism	about	reasons	to	
act	(to	be	discussed	 in	§	4)	do	not	apply	to	everyone	who	holds	the	view	that	reasons	to	act	
count	 in	 favour	 of	 actions.	 My	 aim	 in	 characterising	 the	 view	 in	 this	 way	 is	 thus	 to	 group	
together	those	theorists	(of	which	there	are	many)	who	are	susceptible	to	the	problems	that	
																																								 																				
10	Alvarez	 (2016b,	 11)	 provides	 a	 thorough	 defence	 of	 the	 intuitiveness	 of	 this	 claim.	 It	 is	 also	worth	
noting	that	I	make	no	claim	about	the	truth	or	falsity	of	the	right-to-left	reading	here.	
11	Cf.	 Dancy’s	 (2000)	 normative	 constraint,	 which	 is	 a	weaker	 version	 of	 this	 thesis.	 It	 says	 that	 if	 an	
agent	acts	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	could	have	been	a	reason	there	was	for	them	to	act.	
12	See	Table	I-6	for	the	list	of	those	to	whom	I	attribute	this	view.	
13	For	 instance,	 Kearns	 and	 Star	 suggest	 that	 ‘a	 fact	 counts	 in	 favor	 of	φing	 just	 in	 case	 this	 fact	 is	
evidence	 that	 one	 ought	 to	 φ.’	 (2008,	 44)	 And	 Mitova	 (2016)	 also	 rejects	 the	 conventional	
interpretation,	although	she	leaves	the	work	of	developing	an	alternative	for	another	time.	I	also	think	
Lord	 (2010)	 requires	 another	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 relation	 if	 he	 is	 to	 get	 his	
desired	result	that	that	which	justifies	a	belief	also	counts	 in	favour	of	an	action	that	the	belief	makes	
rational.	
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follow,	acknowledging	that	there	are	subtle	variations	between	their	theories	(more	on	this	to	
come).	
In	what	follows	I	provide	some	context	for	how	I	arrive	at	the	characterisation	that	I	do,	as	well	
as	some	explication	of	what	it	is	for	an	action	to	be,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.		3.1 ‘Counting	in	favour	of’	
As	Gjelsvik	(2007)	notes,	there	are	differing	ways	of	conceiving	of	what	it	is	to	‘count	in	favour	
of’	an	action	that	arrive	at	seemingly	the	same	conclusion	about	when	an	action	is	favoured.	
To	understand	the	first	way,	let	us	revisit	the	following	remarks:	
I	will	take	the	idea	of	a	reason	as	primitive.	Any	attempt	to	explain	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	for	
something	seems	to	me	to	lead	back	to	the	same	idea:	a	consideration	that	counts	in	favor	of	
it.	 ‘Counts	 in	 favor	 how?’	 one	might	 ask.	 ‘By	 providing	 a	 reason	 for	 it’	 seems	 to	 be	 the	only	
answer.	(Scanlon	1998,	17)	
If	we	are	asked	what	reasons	are,	it	is	hard	to	give	a	helpful	answer.	Facts	give	us	reasons,	we	
might	 say,	when	 they	 count	 in	 favour	of	 our	having	 some	belief	 or	desire,	 or	 acting	 in	 some	
way.	But	‘counts	in	favour	of’	means	‘is	a	reason	for’.	Like	some	other	fundamental	concepts,	
such	as	 those	of	 reality,	necessity,	 and	 time,	 the	 concept	of	 a	 reason	cannot	be	explained	 in	
other	terms.	(Parfit	2001,	18)	
I	 first	discussed	these	remarks	 in	§	(I)4.4,	when	I	drew	attention	to	the	fact	that	Scanlon	and	
Parfit	 take	 the	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 relation	 and	 the	 ‘being	 a	 reason	 to’	 relation	 to	 be	
equivalent.	 This	 is	 something	 they	 have	 in	 common	 with,	 I	 think,	 everyone	 who	 endorses	
favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act.	 But	 another	 observation	 that	 we	 can	 make	 about	 these	
remarks,	 and	one	which,	 as	we	 shall	 see,	 separates	 Scanlon	 and	Parfit	 from	 some	others	 to	
whom	 I	 attribute	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act,	 is	 that	 the	 former	 take	 the	 ‘counting	 in	
favour	of’	relation	to	be	primitive.	This	construal,	(‘favouring’	as	a	primitive	relation)	is	the	first	
way	of	conceiving	of	what	it	is	to	count	in	favour	of	an	action.	
The	main	alternative	is	given	its	clearest	exposition	by	John	Broome,	who	states	that	‘to	count	
in	favour	of	φ	is	to	play	a	particular	role	in	an	explanation	of	why	you	ought	to	φ’	(2006,	41).	
John	Hyman	(e.g.	2015,	133–34)	also	seems	to	be	clear	about	the	explanatory	character	of	the	
reason-relation,	and	while	he	less	directly	analyses	the	‘counting	in	favour	of’	relation	in	those	
terms,	I	think	his	position	amounts	to	the	same.		
Others	 are	 less	 explicit,	 but,	 I	 think,	 more	 or	 less	 implicitly	 analyse	 favouring	 as	 such	 an	
explanatory	relation.	For	instance,	some	authors	characterise	‘counting	in	favour	of’	as	making	
good,	or	right	or	valuable:		
A	reason	for	action	is	something	that	favours	or	makes	valuable	an	action	of	the	relevant	kind.	
(Everson	2009,	22	emphasis	added)	
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If	a	person	has	a	reason	for	φing	then	it	follows	that	that	person	ought	to	or	may	(if	only	pro	
tanto)	φ.	This	might	mean	that	the	reason	favours	φing,	or	recommends,	permits,	warrants,	or	
demands,	 etc.	 φing.	 But	 the	 question	 arises	 why	 a	 reason	 for	 φing	 favours,	 warrants,	 or	
demands	φing?	 I	 suggested	 that	 the	answer	 to	 this	question	 is	 that	a	 reason	 for	φing	makes	
φing	right	or	appropriate	(sometimes	merely	pro	tanto	right	or	appropriate).	(Alvarez	2010,	12–
13	emphasis	added)	
When	we	 think	 of	 such	 reasons,	 we	 think	 of	 features	 that	 speak	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 action	 (or	
against	 it)…	 they	make	 actions	 right	 or	 wrong,	 sensible	 or	 unwise.	 (Dancy	 2000,	 1	 emphasis	
added)	
I	think	that	it	is	natural	to	interpret	the	‘making’	relations	invoked	here	(reasons	make	actions	
valuable,	 right,	 sensible…)	 as	 explanatory	 relations.	 I	 find	 it	 odd	 to	 think	 that	 some	 x	 could	
make	some	y	an	F	without	(at	least	partly)	explaining	why	it	is	an	F,	so	I	likewise	find	it	odd	to	
think	 that	 some	 reason	 could	 make	 some	 action	 right	 or	 valuable	 without	 (at	 least	 partly)	
explaining	 why	 it	 was	 right	 or	 valuable.	 Thus,	 I	 take	 accounts	 that	 say	 that	 reasons	 make	
actions	 right,	 valuable	 or	 good	 to	 be,	 albeit	 implicitly,	 of	 the	 same	 explanatory	 view	 as	
Broome.14	If	they	aren’t	then	there	is	perhaps	a	third	way	of	arriving	at	what	is	ultimately	the	
same	conclusion.	
What	is	that	conclusion?	I	think	we	can	put	it,15	as	I	did	in	hopefully	un-contentiously,	thus:		- For	 any	 p,	 p	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	A’s	φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	A’s	 φing	 is,	 in	 some	 respect,	
worth	doing.	
Given	 the	 presumed	 equivalence	 of	 ‘being	 a	 reason	 to’	 and	 ‘counting	 in	 favour	 of’	 amongst	
advocates	of	 favourism	about	reasons	to	act,	we	thus	arrive	at	 the	view,	set	out	above,	 that	
there	 is	a	reason	for	an	agent	to	φ	 if,	and	only	 if,	φing	 is,	 in	some	respect,	 ‘worth	doing’	 for	
that	agent.	But	what	does	it	mean	to	be	for	an	act	to	be,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing?		3.2 What	it	is	for	an	act	to	be,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing	
I	 say	 ‘in	 some	 respect’	worth	doing,	because	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 something	 that	 counts	 in	
favour	 of	 doing	 an	 action	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 it	 is,	 all	 things	 considered	 worth	 doing.	 For	
instance,	 although	 something	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	 having	 a	 doughnut	 every	 day	 (they	 taste	
great!),	so	that	it	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	it	is	probably	not	all	things	considered	worth	
doing	(the	calories!).	In	such	cases	we	can	say	that	the	action	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	
but	not	all	things	considered	worth	doing.	
																																								 																				
14	To	 the	 extent	 that	 ‘in	 virtue	 of’	 relation	 is	 an	 explanatory	 relation,	 Raz	 (perhaps	 against	 his	 own	
judgment)	 is	 so	categorisable,	 cf.	 ‘reasons	are	 facts	 in	virtue	of	which	 those	actions	are	good	 in	 some	
respect.’	(Raz	1999a,	22	emphasis	added)		
15	As	I	did	in	§	(I)4.2.
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When	 is	 an	 act,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing?	 It	 might	 be	 when	 it	 results	 in	 (or	 just	 is)	
something	that	is,	in	some	respect,	good,	right,	valuable,	or	merely	desired.16	For	the	purposes	
of	this	discussion	we	don’t	need	to	decide	which	of	those	it	is	–	all	we	need	note	is	that	an	act	
is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing	if,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	it	would	result	in	something	that	is,	in	
some	respect,	good,	right,	valuable,	desired	or	what	have	you.	
An	 important	 point	 to	 take	 from	 the	 last	 remark	 is	 this:	 whether	 or	 not	 an	 action	 is	 worth	
doing	(in	some	respect,	or	all	things	considered)	for	some	agent	is	an	objective	matter	of	fact	
that	 is,	 in	particular,	 independent	of	 their	perspective.	 So	an	action	 is	 still	worth	doing	 if	 an	
agent	 is	 ignorant	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it’s	worth	doing.	 For	 instance:	 it’s	worth	 taking	 a	 different	
route	home	if	there’s	traffic	on	one’s	usual	route	–	and	that’s	worth	doing	even	if	one	thinks	
one’s	 usual	 route	 is	 all	 clear	 (that	 it’s	 worth	 doing	 doesn’t	mean	 that	 one	will	 do	 it,	 it	 just	
means	that	if	one	did	it,	some	‘good’17	would	come	of	it).18	And	an	action	isn’t	worth	doing	just	
because	you	think	it	is:	you	might	throw	away	some	milk	because	you	assume,	falsely,	that	it’s	
gone	off	–	throwing	away	the	milk	is	not	worth	doing,	although	you	may	think	that	it	is.	So	it’s	
the	way	 the	world	 is	 that	matters	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 some	 action	 is	 worth	 doing	 for	 some	
agent,19	not	the	way	she	takes	it	to	be.		3.3 Favourism	about	reasons	to	act	
So	far	I’ve	said	that,	according	to	this	view,	there	is	a	reason	to	act	if	and	only	if	an	action	is,	in	
some	respect,	worth	doing,	and	 I’ve	explained	what	 it	 is	 for	an	action	to	be	worth	doing.	All	
those	authors	 to	whom	I	attribute	 favourism	about	reasons	to	act	would,	 I	 think,	agree	with	
those	remarks.		
Where	my	 characterisation	 of	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act	 strays	 into	 the	 contentious	 is	
that	 it	 goes	beyond	 these	 remarks	 to	 claim	 that	 reasons	are	actually	what	makes	 the	action	
worth	doing.	This	may	be	unpalatable	to	those	who	take	the	‘counts	in	favour	of’	relation	to	be	
primitive.	 For	 those	 that	 do	 balk	 at	 it	 I	 am	 happy	 for	 them	 to	 shrug	 it	 off	 (along	 with	 my	
																																								 																				
16 	Alvarez	 gives	 what	 she	 describes	 as	 a	 ‘rough’	 characterisation,	 which,	 to	 my	 mind,	 is	 a	 neat	
representation	of	many	of	the	different	views.	She	notes	that	for	there	to	be	a	fact	that	favours	an	agent	
doing	 some	action	 that	 ‘requires	 their	having	 some	motivation	 that	would	be	 served	by	acting	 in	 the	
way	 favoured…	The	motivation	may	be	such	 things	as	desires,	plans,	 long-standing	projects	or	values.	
And	it	may	be	something	the	agent	actually	has,	or	something	she	would	have	if	she	reasoned	properly	
from	her	current	motivations.’	(Alvarez	2016a,	10)	This	is	what	I	mean	by	saying	that	an	act	is	‘favoured’	
if	it	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
17	However	we	choose	to	understand	‘good’…	
18	Cf.	In	a	game	of	chess,	a	good	move	is	a	good	move	regardless	of	whether	or	not	you’ve	spotted	it.	
19	Note	that	according	to	Broome-type	conceptions	of	the	‘counting	in	favour	of’	relation,	acts	are	worth	
doing	because	of	the	way	the	world	is.	
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categorisation	of	their	theories),	although	that	means	leaving	unanalysed	a	relation	that	some	
interpret	differently.20		
What	really	matters	is	that	all	of	the	theorists	to	whom	I	attribute	favourism	about	reasons	to	
act	are	committed	to	the	following	position,	which,	as	I	will	show,	is	what	really	creates	trouble	
for	them:	
(FAV)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	only	 if	A’s	φing,	 is	 in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
This	is	clearly	logically	entailed	by	favourism	about	reasons	to	act.	Moreover,	I	think	all	those	
to	whom	I	attribute	favourism	about	reasons	to	act	who	might	balk	at	my	characterisation	of	it	
(such	as	Parfit	and	Scanlon)	would	nonetheless	agree	with	(FAV).		
To	be	clear:	(FAV)	is	weaker	than	favourism	about	reasons	to	act,	 in	the	sense	that	the	latter	
entails	the	former,	but	the	former	does	not	entail	the	latter.	My	point	is	just	that	that	(FAV)	is	
enough	to	create	trouble	for	favourism	about	reasons	to	act.		
4 The	problems	for	favourism	
To	see	what	the	problems	for	(FAV)	are,	 let’s	return	to	Sally	and	her	non-existent	bear.	Since	
there	isn’t	actually	a	bear	chasing	her,	ex	hypothesi,	running	isn’t	worth	doing	for	Sally.	There	
is	nothing	to	be	gained	(for	anyone)	from	Sally’s	running.	 Indeed,	 it’s	possible	that	she	might	
fall	and	hurt	herself,	or	attract	the	attention	of	actual	bears	by	running.	So	not	running	is	worth	
doing,	but	running	is	really	to	no	extent	worth	doing.21	Thus:		
(F10) Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	
This	 observation,	 combined	with	 the	prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 set	 out	 above,	 results	 in	
three	 distinct	 problems	 for	 the	 favourist	 view:	 The	 Rational	 Action	 Problem;	 The	Deliberate	
Action	Problem;	and	The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Favourism).	4.1 The	Rational	Action	Problem	
The	Rational	Action	Problem	is	this:	it	is	rational	for	Sally	to	run,	so	she	has	a	reason	to	run,	so	
there	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 her	 to	 run,	 so	 her	 running	 is,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing,	 but	 her	
running	is	in	no	respect	worth	doing!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(F1)	 It	was	rational	for	Sally	to	run.			
																																								 																				
20	See	§	(I)	fn.	26	for	different	interpretations	of	the	‘counting	in	favour	of’	relation.	
21	You	could	make	a	story	in	which	running	was,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	if	you	liked	(Sally	needs	to	
lose	a	few	pounds,	say),	but	that’s	not	my	story.	In	my	story	Sally	stands	to	gain	nothing,	and	potentially	
lose	much,	from	running	(and,	likewise,	nothing	of	worth	accrues	to	anyone	else	if	Sally	runs).	
	 56	
(F2)	 If	it	is	rational	for	A	to	φ	then	some	p	was	a	reason	A	had	to	φ.	
(F8)	 For	any	p,	if	p	was	a	reason	A	had	to	φ	then	p	was	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	only	 if	A’s	φing,	 is	 in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	4.2 The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	
The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	is	this:	Sally	ran	deliberately,	so	she	ran	for	a	reason,	so	there	
was	a	reason	for	her	to	run,	so	her	running	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	but	her	running	is	
in	no	respect	worth	doing!22	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(F4)	 Sally	ran	deliberately.	
(F3)	 If	A	φs	deliberately	then	A	φs	for	a	reason.	
(F7)	 If	A	φs	for	a	reason	then	there	was	a	reason,	p,	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	only	 if	A’s	φing,	 is	 in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	4.3 The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Favourism)	
The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Favourism)	is	this:	Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	
alia,	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	so	that	was	a	reason	for	her	to	run,	so	her	
running	was,	 in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	but	her	running	was	to	no	extent	worth	doing!23	
Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(F5)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	believed	a	bear	was	chasing	
her.24	
(F9)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	was	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	only	 if	A’s	φing,	 is	 in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
																																								 																				
22	A	variant	of	this	problem	is	Broome’s	(2013,	71)	‘quick	objection’	to	the	thesis	that	acting	rationally	is	
‘responding	correctly	to	reasons.’	
23	It’s	perhaps	worth	noting	that	this	is	an	argument	used	by	those	who	already	accept	favourism	about	
reasons	to	act	to	show	that	Sally’s	reason	for	running	can’t	be	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	
her	 (as	set	out	 in	§	(I)4.2).	My	point	 is	 that	when	we	start	our	 investigation	of	what	 reasons	are	 from	
prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 about	 them,	 without	 assuming	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act,	 the	
argument	runs	in	the	other	direction	–	against	favourism.	
24	Recall	that	I	assume	that:	for	any	p,	A’s	reason	for	φing	was	that	p	 if	and	only	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	
that	p	(see	§	(I)1.5)	.	
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(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	4.4 The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Favourism)	
The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Favourism)	 is	 this:	Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	was,	 inter	
alia,	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound,	so	that	was	a	reason	for	her	to	run,	so	her	running	was,	
in	 some	 respect,	worth	doing,	 but	her	 running	was	 to	no	extent	worth	doing!	 Explicitly,	 the	
following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(F6)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound.		
(F9)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	was	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	only	 if	A’s	φing,	 is	 in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	
5 Responses	to	the	problems	for	favourism	
How	 can	 a	 proponent	 of	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act	 respond	 to	 these	 problems?	 The	
options	are	limited.	I	don’t	think	one	could	tolerably	reject	either	that	it’s	rational	for	Sally	to	
run,	or	that	Sally	runs	deliberately	–	so	(F1)	and	(F4)	are	off	the	menu	of	potential	responses.		
It	might	be	tempting	to	think	we	could	reject	(F10)	and	kill	three	problems	with	one	rejection.	
We	should	 resist	 this	urge	–	 to	do	so	 is	ultimately	 just	 to	change	 the	notion	of	 ‘being	worth	
doing’	in	a	way	that	amounts	to	no	more	than	a	rejection	of	favourism	about	reasons	to	act	by	
another	name.25	
So,	(F1),	(F4)	and	(F10)	are	off	the	menu.	This	brings	me	to	the	conclusion	of	my	argument:	if	
you	want	to	preserve	(FAV)	then	you	have	to	reject	at	least	one	of	the	prima	facie	reasonable	
																																								 																				
25	Maybe	you	want	 to	say	 that	Sally’s	belief	 that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her	 is	what	 favours	her	action	 (Veli	
Mitova	(2015,	2016)	gives	this	a	good	go).	Well,	we	could	see	how	it	could	make	running	worth	doing.	If,	
for	instance,	Sally	has	a	particularly	odd	constitution	such	that	if	she	believes	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	
and	she	doesn’t	run	then	she	will	have	a	heart	attack	or	suffer	some	other	unpleasantness.	Then,	in	that	
case,	 her	 belief	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	would	make	 running	 (in	 some	 respect)	worth	 doing.	Why?	
Because,	given	that	she	believes	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her,	if	she	doesn’t	run	she’ll	have	a	heart	attack.	
But	 this	 isn’t	 the	 situation	 that	 Sally	 is	 in.	 Sally	 is	 like	 you	 or	 I	 –	 she	 hears	 what	 sounds	 like	 a	 bear	
running,	knows	safety	is	nearby,	so	she	runs.	Perhaps	you	want	to	say	that	something	does	favour	her	
running:	the	fact	that	there	might	be	a	bear	nearby.	But	that	fact	doesn’t	make	running	worth	doing	–	
since	there	isn’t	a	bear	nearby.	The	fact	that	in	close	possible	worlds	a	bear	is	chasing	her	does	not	make	
it	worth	running	in	this	actual	world.	As	it	stands	Sally	has	nothing	to	gain	and	quite	a	bit	to	lose	from	
running.	Running	is	not	worth	doing	for	her,	although	it	is	the	most	rational	thing	to	do	–	and	given	the	
concept	of	favouring	that	we	are	working	with,	this	just	means	that	nothing	favours	her	action.	
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claims	 from	each	of	 the	 following	groups	 (and	possibly	 two	 from	group	3	–	 since	one	of	 the	
disjuncts	is	a	conjunction),	and	accept	the	counterintuitive	consequences	of	doing	so26:	
(F2)	 If	it	is	rational	for	A	to	φ	then	some	p	was	a	reason	A	had	to	φ.	
(F8)	 For	any	p,	if	p	was	a	reason	A	had	to	φ	then	p	was	a	reason	for	A	to	φ.	
(F3)	 If	A	φs	deliberately	then	A	φs	for	a	reason.	
(F7)	 If	A	φs	for	a	reason	then	there	was	a	reason,	p,	for	A	to	φ.	
EITHER:	
(F5)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	believed	a	bear	was	
chasing	her.	And;	
(F6)	 Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	 was,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 she	 heard	 a	 bear-like	
sound.		
OR:	
(F9)	 For	any	p,	 if	A	φs	 for	 the	reason	that	p	 then	p	was	a	 reason	 for	A	 to	
φ.27	
For	 reference,	 here	 is	 a	 very	 much	 non-exhaustive	 account	 of	 which	 of	 these	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	some	different	proponents	of	favourism	about	reasons	to	act	reject	(where:	
û	=	rejects):	
	 Group	1	 Group	2	 Group	3	
	 (F2)	 (F8)	 (F3)	 (F7)	 (F5)&(F6)	 (F9)	
The	Received	View	 û	 	 	 û	 	 û	
Stout	(2009),	Alvarez	(2010),	Parfit	(2011),	
Littlejohn	(2012)	 û	 	 û	 	 û	 	
Hornsby	(2008)28	 	 û	 	 û	 û	 	
Schroeder	(2008),	Comesaña	&	McGrath	(2014)	 	 û	 	 û	 û	 û	
Dancy	(2000,	2014),	Davis	(2005),	Sandis	(2009)	 û	  	 û û û 
Table	II-1:	How	proponents	of	favourism	respond	to	some	problems	for	it	
																																								 																				
26	Groups	1,	2	and	3	consist	of	the	remaining	premises	of	The	Rational	Action	Problem,	The	Deliberate	
Action	 Problem,	 and	 The	 Psychological	 Reason	 Problem	 (for	 Favourism)	 &	 The	 Experiential	 Reason	
Problem	(for	Favourism),	respectively.	
27	It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 (F9)	 entails	 (F7)	 –	 so	 rejecting	 the	 former	 serves	 as	 a	 response	 to	 both	 The	
Deliberate	Action	Problem	and	The	Wrong	Reasons	Problem.		
28	I	think	that	Hornsby’s	(2008)	view	with	respect	to	the	truth	of	(F9)	has	changed.	In	an	earlier	work	she	
states	that	‘p	may	be	the	agent’s	reason	[for	acting]	even	when	it	is	false	that	p.’	(2007,	299)	If	p	were	
false	 it	 could	 not	 have	 been	 a	 reason	 for	 anyone	 to	 act	 because	 falsehoods	 don’t	 count	 in	 favour	 of	
anything	(that	is	not	to	say	that	negations	don’t	favour	anything	–	negations	are	facts	that	favour	some	
things,	but	falsehoods	aren’t	facts	at	all).	Hornsby’s	earlier	view	is	thus	more	closely	aligned	to	the	views	
of	Schroeder	(2008)	and	Comesaña	&	McGrath	(2014).	However	 in	her	 later	work	she	suggests	that	 ‘a	
condition	of	φing	for	the	reason	that	p,	when	one	believes	that	p,	is	that	one	knows	that	p.’	(2008,	251)	I	
think	her	 idea	 in	 this	 later	work	 is	 that	one	may	act	 for	a	 reason	 though	 there	may	be	no	 reason	 for	
which	one	acts	–	this	is	something	that,	in	§	(I)1.5,	I	assumed	could	not	happen.	To	the	extent	that	that	
is	her	view,	its	nuances	are	not	captured	in	my	categorisation	schema.	
Group	1	
Group	2	
Group	3	
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Of	course,	many	of	the	proponents	of	favourism	about	reasons	to	act	have	good	arguments	as	
to	 why	 it	 is	 acceptable	 to	 reject	 these	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims.	 For	 instance,	 Alvarez	
(2010,	142)	defends	her	rejection	of	(F3)	by	noting	that	when	an	agent	acts	on	a	false	belief	we	
might	well	say	that	they	act	for	no	reason	–	someone	who	is	running	to	catch	a	train	might	say,	
on	 discovering	 that	 it	 has	 been	 cancelled,	 ‘You	 mean	 I	 ran	 all	 this	 way	 for	 no	 reason?’29	
Meanwhile	Dancy	(2000)	suggests	that	we	can	explain	away	expressions	like	‘Sally’s	reason	for	
running	was	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her’	as	actually	meaning	‘Sally’s	reason	
for	running	was	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	as	she	believed’	–	where	the	‘as	she	believed’	is	
meant	 to	 be	 understood	 appositionally,	 in	 a	manner	 that	 only	 qualifies	what	 is	 said,	 rather	
than	changing	the	meaning	of	it.		
I	 am	not	 seeking	 to	 refute	 these	arguments	here.	My	point	 is	 not	 that	 these	arguments	 are	
wrong	 or	 that,	 more	 generally,	 there	 is	 no	 way	 to	make	 the	 rejection	 of	 these	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	intelligible	My	point	is	that	rejecting	these	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	is	a	
stance	that	demands	some	explanation	–	because,	in	doing	so	you	are	rejecting	something	that	
on	the	face	of	it	seems	reasonable.	So	that	at	least	counts	in	favour	of	looking	for	a	theory	that	
doesn’t	commit	one	to	such	rejections.	
6 Conclusion	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 was	 to	 show	 the	 costs	 involved	 in	 accepting	 favourism	 about	
reasons	 to	act.	 I	have	argued	 that	 if	one	wants	 to	accept	 that	 view,	one	must	 reject	 several	
prima	facie	reasonable	claims.	This	is	a	price	that	some	are	happy	to	pay;	I	would	rather	not.	
	
																																								 																				
29	Alvarez	put	 this	particular	 example	 to	me	 in	 a	discussion	of	 this	point.	By	way	of	 further	 response,	
Parfit	(2001)	and	Alvarez	(2010)	would	both	suggest	that	we	should	say	that	both	Sally	and	the	person	
whose	train	was	cancelled	run	for	an	apparent	reason	but	not	a	genuine	reason.		
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(III)		Acting	for	psychological	reasons	
In	which	I	show	what	it	costs	to	think	that	the	reason	for	which	an	agent	acts	is	
always	 a	 feature	 of	 their	 psychology.	 I	 show	 how	 ‘psychologism	 about	 the	
reasons	for	which	we	act’	clashes	with	some	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.	 In	
particular,	I	show	that	is	inconsistent	with	the	idea	that	we	are	often	able	to	act	
for	 reasons	 that	make	our	actions	morally	worthy	and,	more	generally,	worth	
doing.	
My	friend	has	won	a	much-coveted	award;	I	read	about	it	in	a	newspaper	so	I	call	her	up	and	
congratulate	her.	 It	seems	natural	 to	say	that	my	reason	for	congratulating	her	was	that	she	
had	won	an	award.	It	also,	I	think,	seems	natural	to	say	that	my	reason	for	congratulating	her	
was	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award.	Another	example:	if	Jonathan	sees	someone	who	is	
alone	and	in	trouble,	he	could,	under	the	right	circumstances,	help	her	for	the	reason	that	she	
was	alone	and	in	trouble.1	
These	fairly	anodyne	observations	create	a	lot	of	difficulty	for	psychologism	about	the	reasons	
for	which	we	act,	which	says	that	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	can	only	ever	be	a	feature	of	her	
psychology,	and	is	probably	the	de	facto	account	of	what	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	is.	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 set	 out	 a	 number	 of	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 that	
psychologism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	 must	 reject.2	This	 is	 not	 meant	 to	 be	 a	
conclusive	 argument	 against	 that	 view	 –	 it	 is	 only	 meant	 to	 show	 that	 accepting	 this	 view	
comes	at	some	cost.		
1 Some	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	1.1 My	reason	for	congratulating	my	friend	
I’ve	 already	 stated	my	 first	prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claim,	 but	 it’s	worth	 re-iterating;	when	 I	
read	in	a	newspaper	of	record	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	and	I	consequently	call	her	up	
to	congratulate	her,	it	is	natural	to	say	that:	
(P1) My	 reason	 for	 congratulating	my	 friend	was,	 inter	alia,	 that	 she	had	won	an	
award.	
It	is,	I	think,	similarly	natural	to	say	that:	
																																								 																				
1	This	example	is	from	Dancy	(2000).	
2	As	the	former	chapter	did	for	favourism	about	reasons	to	act.	
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(P2) My	reason	for	congratulating	my	friend	was,	inter	alia,	that	I	read	that	she	had	
won	an	award.	
We	 should	 add	 to	 this	 observation	 two	 seemingly	 obvious	 remarks,	 whose	 importance	 will	
become	clear	(if	it	is	not	already)	when	we	consider	the	problems	for	psychologism	about	the	
reasons	for	which	we	act:	
(P3) The	fact	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	is	not	a	feature	of	my	psychology.	
(P4) The	 fact	 I	 read	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 a	 feature	 of	 my	
psychology.	1.2 Morally	worthy	actions	
Suppose	that	Jonathan	is	on	his	way	to	the	office	when	he	encounters	someone	who	is	alone	
and	in	trouble.	Taking	all	morally	relevant	features	of	the	situation	into	account,	without	one	
thought	too	many,	without	any	undue	considerations	of	furthering	his	own	ends	or	other	less	
upstanding	concerns,	he	duly	comes	to	her	aid.	I	submit	to	you	that	what	he	does	is	a	morally	
worthy	act:	
(P5) Jonathan’s	act	of	helping	the	woman	is	morally	worthy.	
What	does	the	moral	worth	of	his	action,	and	acts	in	general,	come	down	to?	One	seemingly	
relevant	consideration	is	this:	 if	Jonathan	had	helped	her	only	because	he	knew	that	she	was	
very	rich	and	would	reward	him	amply	for	doing	so,	the	moral	worthiness	of	his	act	dissipates.	
As	Julia	Markovits	notes,	‘when	we	do	the	right	thing	because	it	happens	to	suit	us,	or	happens	
to	be	 in	our	 interest,	our	action	has	no	moral	worth.	This	 is	 intuitive.	Morally	worthy	actions	
must	be	performed	for	the	right	reasons.’3	(2010,	203)		
So,	we	can	do	the	right	thing	without	doing	something	morally	worthy	if	we	don’t	do	it	for	the	
right	reasons.	And	what	are	the	right	reasons?	They	are	the	ones	that	make	the	action	right:	
My	action	is	morally	worthy	if	and	only	if…	I	perform	the	action	I	morally	ought	to	perform,	for	
the	reasons4	why	it	morally	ought	to	be	performed.	(Markovits	2010,	205)	
When	I	do	the	morally	right	thing,	because	it	is	the	right	thing	to	do,	my	reasons	are	the	facts	
that	make	that	action	right.	(Garrard	and	McNaughton	1998,	53)	
I	 take	 this	 to	be	an	 intuitive	view,	and	 it	provides	us	with	 the	basis	 for	our	next	prima	 facie	
reasonable	claim:	
																																								 																				
3	Markovits’	 original	 says	 ‘the	 right	 (motivating)	 reasons’	 –	 I	 omit	 the	 parenthetical	 terminological	
remark	 only	 because	 I	 am	 trying	 to	 avoid	 this	 terminology	 (see	 §	(I)4).	 On	 her	 account	 ‘motivating	
reasons’	are	‘the	reasons	for	which	an	agent	acts’	and	‘normative	reasons’	are	‘the	reasons	for	an	agent	
to	act’.	
4	Here	Markovits’	original	reads	‘the	(normative)	reasons	why’	–	I	omit	it	the	parenthetical	terminology,	
again,	to	avoid	terminological	confusion	(see	fn.	3).		
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(P6) A’s	φing	is	morally	worthy	only	if	A	φs	for	a	reason	that	makes	φing	right.5	
So,	what	Jonathan	does	is	morally	worthy	only	given	that	he	does	it	for	a	reason	that	makes	it	
right.		1.3 What	makes	it	right?	
So	what	makes	it	right	for	Jonathan	to	help	her?	Why	is	it	that	helping	her	is	the	right	thing	to	
do?	As	Dancy	notes,	‘it	is	because	she	is	in	trouble	that	I	ought	to	help	her,	not	because	I	think	
she	is	in	trouble.’	(2000,	52)		
Dancy’s	point	is	that	it	is	the	objective	features	of	the	world	that	determine	whether	or	not	an	
act	is	the	morally	right	thing	to	do,	and	not	features	of	the	agent’s	psychology.	It	is	right	for	me	
to	recycle	because	it	will	help	the	environment	–	and	that	is	so	even	if	I	don’t	know	that	it	will	
help	the	environment.	Likewise,	 it	 is	 right	 for	 Jonathan	to	come	to	the	woman’s	aid	because	
she	is	in	trouble,	and	that	would	be	so	even	if	he	had	no	idea	that	she	was	in	trouble.6	
Of	 course,	 sometimes	 features	 of	 our	 psychology	 might	 enter	 into	 the	 fray	 as	 moral	
considerations:	 you	might	 say	 that	 regardless	of	whether	or	not	 she	 is	 in	 trouble,	given	 that	
Jonathan	thinks	she	is,	the	right	thing	for	him	to	do	is	to	try	and	help	her.	That	is,	you	might	say	
that	not	helping	someone	who	you	believe	to	be	in	trouble	is	wrong,	regardless	of	whether	or	
not	they	are	in	trouble.	And	in	that	case	it	is	a	feature	of	Jonathan’s	psychology	that	makes	his	
action	right.	On	this	account	his	action	is	doubly	right:	both	because	helping	her	will	save	her	
from	trouble	and	because,	if	he	does	so,	he	won’t	be	neglecting	someone	he	believes	to	be	in	
trouble.		
However,	 it’s	 also	 quite	 possible	 that	 Jonathan’s	 act	 is	 made	 right	 only	 by	 the	 objective	
features	of	the	situation.	Even	if	you	think	that	just	believing	that	she	is	in	trouble	could	make	
helping	her	 the	right	 thing	to	do	 (regardless	of	whether	or	not	she’s	 in	trouble),	 it’s	possible	
that	given	the	rest	of	what	he	believes,	believing	that	she	is	in	trouble	doesn’t	make	it	right	for	
him	to	try	to	help	her,	although	the	fact	that	she	is	in	trouble	continues	to	do	so.	For	instance,	
suppose	that	while	he	believes	that	she	is	in	trouble	he	also	(falsely)	believes	that	if	he	were	to	
try	to	help	her	it	would	only	worsen	her	situation	–	in	that	case	his	belief	that	she	is	in	trouble	
																																								 																				
5	This	 is	 entailed	 by	Markovits’	 bi-conditional.	 I	 use	 the	 weaker	 claim	 because	 it	 is	 sufficient	 for	 my	
purposes.	
6	I’m	 not	 doing	 an	 analysis	 of	 what	 it	 is	 for	 an	 action	 to	 be	 ‘right’	 and	 certainly	 not	 of	 what	 ‘ought’	
means.	Even	if	there	is	an	ambiguity	between	objective	and	subjective	‘ought’	claims,	I	think	there	is	a	
clear	 and	 commonplace	 sense	 of	 ‘right’	 actions	 that	 is	 independent	 of	 the	 agent’s	 perspective	 –	 and	
that’s	the	sense	I	am	working	with	–	and	it	is,	importantly,	in	this	sense	of	being	‘right’	that	I	think	(P6)	is	
an	intuitive	claim.	If	it	weren’t	then	it	would,	for	instance,	be	unclear	how	one	could	do	the	right	thing	
for	the	wrong	reasons,	or	the	wrong	thing	for	the	right	reasons.	
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does	not	make	it	right	for	him	to	try	to	help	her	(because	he	thinks	that	by	helping	her	it	would	
make	 her	worse	 off).	 However,	 since	 he	 could,	 in	 fact,	 help	 her	without	worsening	 her	 lot,	
helping	her	is	still,	in	some	obvious	sense,	the	right	thing	to	do.		
While	I	don’t	suppose	that	Jonathan	is	in	the	situation	so	described	(in	particular,	he	does	think	
that	he	could	improve	her	lot	by	helping	her),	since	I	want	to	remove	complicating	factors,	I’m	
going	 to	 suppose	 that	 Jonathan	 is	 in	a	 situation	such	 that	 it	 is	only	objective	 features	of	 the	
circumstance	that	make	his	action	right.	I	take	it	as	a	given	that	that	is	at	least	possible	even	if	
it	is	also	possible	that	features	of	his	psychology	could	make	his	action	right.	
To	 what	 end,	 all	 this	 convoluted	 reasoning?	 It	 is	 to	make	 several	 points:	 objective	 (that	 is,	
worldly,	not	psychological)	features	of	a	situation	can	make	an	action	right;	and	whilst	features	
of	an	agent’s	psychology	may	also	be	able	to	make	an	action	right,	 they	don’t	need	to	–	the	
reasons	why	it	 is	right	for	some	agent	to	do	some	action	could	have	nothing	to	do	with	their	
psychology,	and	 I’m	saying	 that	 that	 is	actually	 the	case	 in	 the	example	of	 Jonathan	and	 the	
troubled	woman,	as	I	construct	it.	Thus,	we	can,	ex	hypothesi,	make	the	following	prima	facie	
reasonable	claim:	
(P7) No	features	of	Jonathan’s	psychology	make	helping	the	woman	right.	1.4 Acting	for	reasons	that	make	it	worth	acting	
If	my	friend	wins	an	award	and	I	congratulate	her	it	will	let	her	know	that	I’ve	thought	of	her	
and	am	pleased	for	her	–	and	she’ll	get	some	joy	from	that	(and	other	things	besides).	Maybe	
I’ll	also	get	some	joy	from	it	too.	In	the	sense	discussed	in	§	(II)3.2,	congratulating	my	friend	is	
something	that	is,	for	me,	worth	doing.	
What	makes	congratulating	my	 friend	an	act	 that	 is,	 for	me,	worth	doing?	 It	 seems	that	 it	 is	
things	 like	 this:	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 won	 an	 award,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 would	 please	 her	 to	 be	
congratulated	(given	that	she	had	the	won	the	award),	and	so	on.	That	is,	facts	about	the	way	
the	world	is	make	my	act	worth	doing	(including	facts	about	my	friend’s	psychology).	Even	if	I	
didn’t	know	these	things,	if	I	had	no	idea	about	her	having	won	the	award,	congratulating	her	
would	still	be	worth	doing	–	I	just	wouldn’t	do	it.	So	let’s	say	this:	
(P8) The	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	makes	congratulating	her	worth	doing.	
Now,	here’s	a	relevant	prima	facie	reasonable	claim	about	reasons	that	I	want	to	put	forward:	
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(P9) For	any	p,	if	p	makes	A’s	φing	worth	doing	then	A	could	φ	for	the	reason	that	
p.7	
A	 note	 on	 ‘could’:	 what	 is	 the	modal	 concept	 we	 are	 working	 with	 here?	 I	 think	 there	 are	
intuitive	grounds	 for	a	quite	 restrictive	one,	however,	 all	 that	 I	 need	 for	 the	purpose	of	 this	
argument	 is	 logical	 possibility:	 that	 is,	 if	 p	 makes	 A’s	 φing	 worth	 doing	 then	 it	 is	 logically	
possible	that	A	could	φ	for	the	reason	that	p.		
This	seems,	to	me,	like	a	claim	that	is	hard	to	deny,	but	if	you	need	some	persuasion	consider	
this:	if	you	aren’t	doing	something	for	reasons	that	make	it	worth	doing,	what	reasons	are	you	
doing	it	for?	The	wrong	ones?	It	 just	seems	odd	to	me	to	think	that	there	could	be	an	action	
that	 is	worth	doing	but	which	one	could	never	do	for	reasons	that	make	it	worth	doing.	It	 is,	
seemingly,	 only	when	 you	 do	 something	 for	 reasons	 that	 actually	make	 it	worth	 doing	 that	
you,	‘do	the	right	action	for	the	right	reason.’	(Lord	2008,	2)	Indeed,	the	very	idea	of	acting	‘for	
the	 right	 reasons’	 seems	 to	 depend	 upon	 the	 logical	 possibility	 (and	 probably	 something	
stronger	than	that)	of	acting	for	reasons	that	make	one’s	action	worth	doing.	The	falsity	of	(P9)	
would	 imply	that	 there	could	be	some	actions	that	are	worth	doing	that	one	could	never	do	
‘for	the	right	reasons’.	I	would	suggest	that	that	is,	at	least,	a	prima	facie	implausible	view,	so	
that	(P9)	is,	at	least,	prima	facie	reasonable.	
2 Psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	
Recall	the	following	claim	about	reasons	from	Table	I-4:	
Psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act:	For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	which	A	
φ’d	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology	that	rationalises	φing	and	explains	(in	
the	right	way)	why	A	φ’d.	
Davidson’s	 ‘Actions,	 Reasons	 and	Causes’	 (2001a)	 is	 probably	 the	progenitor	 of	 this	 view.	 In	
addition,	I	think	that	this	claim	(or	something	sufficiently	similar	to	it)	is	also	advocated	by	Turri	
(2009),	 Gibbons	 (2010)	 and	Mitova	 (2015,	 2016)	 (although	 they	 don’t	 articulate	 it	 in	 these	
terms).	 This	 claim	 is	 also	 perhaps	 most	 commonly	 associated	 with	 what	 I	 have	 called	 the	
‘Received	View’	(of	which	the	former	are	not	advocates	(see	Table	I-6)).	
																																								 																				
7	This	is	closely	related	to	Bernard	Williams’	claim	that:	‘If	there	are	reasons	for	action,	it	must	be	that	
people	 sometimes	 act	 for	 those	 reasons,	 and	 if	 they	 do,	 their	 reasons	 must	 figure	 in	 some	 correct	
explanation	of	their	action.’	(Williams	1981,	102)	(See	also	Dancy	2000,	101;	Smith	2004,	175;	Hornsby	
2007,	301;	Raz	2009,	194;	Hieronymi	2011,	415;	Way	and	Whiting	2016,	214).	I	use	this	version	because	
Williams	(and	others	who	express	this	claim)	take	favourism	about	reasons	to	act	(see	previous	chapter)	
for	 granted	 –	 but	 someone	who	 rejects	 that	 view	 can	 satisfy	Williams’s	 claim	without	 difficulty.	 (P9)	
entails	Williams’	 claim	 (given	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act),	 while	 providing	 a	 claim	 that	 one	who	
rejects	 the	 latter	will	 still	 also	have	 to	 reject	 in	order	 to	endorse	psychologism	about	 the	 reasons	 for	
which	we	act	(see	§	3.2).	
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Why	 would	 anyone	 hold	 this	 view?	 I	 think	 that	 most	 philosophers	 who	 endorse	 it	 do	 so	
because	they,	either	implicitly	or	explicitly,	think	that	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	must	make	
their	 action	 rational	 and	 that	 only	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	 psychology	 can	make	 their	 actions	
rational.	However,	the	focus	of	this	discussion	is	on	the	problems	that	arise	from	psychologism	
about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act,	so	I	leave	aside	the	reasons	why	one	might	endorse	it	for	a	
later	discussion.8	
It	is	possible	that	some	of	those	to	whom	I	have	attributed	psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	
which	we	act	(see	Table	 I-6)	might	balk	at	my	exact	wording	of	 it.9	Nonetheless,	 I	 think	all	of	
those	theorists	share	a	commitment	to	the	following,	which	is	entailed	by	psychologism	about	
the	reasons	for	which	we	act,10	and	which	is	what	really	creates	trouble	for	it:		
(PSY)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology.11	
3 The	problems	for	psychologism	
I	 present	 three	 problems	 for	 (PSY):	 The	 Moral	 Worthiness	 Problem;	 The	 Right	 Reasons	
Problem;	and	The	Non-Psychological	Reason	Problem.	3.1 The	Moral	Worthiness	Problem	
The	 Moral	 Worthiness	 Problem	 is	 this:	 Jonathan’s	 act	 of	 helping	 the	 woman	 was	 morally	
worthy,	so	he	did	it	for	reasons	that	made	it	right,	so	features	of	his	psychology	made	it	right,	
but	 no	 features	of	 his	 psychology	made	 it	 right!	 Explicitly,	 the	 following	 claims	 are	mutually	
inconsistent:	
(P5)	 Jonathan’s	act	of	helping	the	woman	is	morally	worthy.	
(P6)	 A’s	φing	is	morally	worthy	only	if	A	φs	for	a	reason	that	makes	φing	right.	
(PSY)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology.		
(P7)	 No	features	of	Jonathan’s	psychology	make	helping	the	woman	right.	
																																								 																				
8	In	§	(VIII),	I	will	discuss,	at	length,	the	motivating	argument	for	psychologism.	
9	In	the	same	way	that,	say,	Scanlon	and	Parfit	might	have	balked	at	my	characterisation	of	their	views	
as	‘favourism	about	reasons	to	act’	(see	§	(II)3.3).	
10For	the	sake	of	clarity:	(PSY)	is	weaker	than	psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act,	 in	the	
sense	that	the	latter	entails	the	former,	but	the	former	does	not	entail	the	latter.	My	point	is	that	(PSY)	
is	what	causes	psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	to	face	the	problems	it	does.	
11	Cf.	 ‘Psychologism…	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	 are	 psychological	 states	 of	
ourselves.’	(Dancy	2000,	98).	
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3.2 The	Right	Reasons	Problem	
The	 Right	 Reasons	 Problem	 is	 this:	 the	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 has	 won	 an	 award	 makes	
congratulating	 her	 worth	 doing,	 so	 it’s	 logically	 possible	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	 her	 for	 the	
reason	 that	 she	has	won	an	award,	 so	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	has	won	an	award	must	be	a	
feature	of	my	psychology,	but	it	isn’t!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(P8)	 The	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	makes	congratulating	her	worth	doing.	
(P9)	 For	any	p,	if	p	makes	A’s	φing	worth	doing	then	A	could	φ	for	the	reason	that	
p.	
(PSY)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology.		
(P3)	 The	fact	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	is	not	a	feature	of	my	psychology.	3.3 The	Non-Psychological	Reason	Problem	
The	Non-Psychological	 Reason	 Problem	 is	 this:	my	 reason	 for	 congratulating	my	 friend	was,	
inter	alia,	that	she	had	won	an	award,	so	that	must	have	been	a	feature	of	my	psychology,	but	
it	isn’t!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(P1)	 My	 reason	 for	 congratulating	my	 friend	was,	 inter	alia,	 that	 she	had	won	an	
award.	
(PSY)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology.	
(P3)	 The	fact	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	is	not	a	feature	of	my	psychology.	3.4 The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Psychologism)	
The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Psychologism)	 is	 this:	my	 reason	 for	congratulating	my	
friend	was,	 inter	alia,	 that	 I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	in	the	newspaper,	so	that	must	
have	been	a	feature	of	my	psychology,	but	it	isn’t!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	
inconsistent:	
(P2)	 My	reason	for	congratulating	my	friend	was,	inter	alia,	that	I	read	that	she	had	
won	an	award.	
(PSY)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology.	
(P4)	 The	 fact	 I	 read	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 a	 feature	 of	 my	
psychology.	
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4 Responses	to	the	problems	for	psychologism	
What	can	a	proponent	of	psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	do?	It	seems	to	me	
there	is	little	to	no	choice	in	the	matter.	(P3)	and	(P4)	are	undeniable:	of	course	facts	about	my	
friend	or	what	I’ve	read	are	not	features	of	my	psychology.		
We	 constructed	 the	 Jonathan	 example	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 the	 truth	 of	 (P7)	 (the	 claim	 that	 no	
features	 of	 Jonathan’s	 psychology	 made	 his	 act	 right),	 so	 unless	 one	 wants	 to	 change	 the	
concept	of	 ‘making	right’,	 to	a	different	one	to	that	which	 I	am	using,	one	cannot	reject	(P7)	
(and	 if	 one	were	 to	 change	 the	 concept,	 that	would	obviously	 just	be	a	new	 (perhaps	more	
solvable)	 problem,	 it	 would	 not	 be	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 I	 am	 posing).	 Similar	 remarks	
count	against	rejecting	(P8).		
What	 about	 (P5)	 (the	 claim	 that	 Jonathan’s	 act	 is	morally	worthy)?	 Endorsing	 some	 form	of	
moral	anti-realism	could	allow	one	to	claim	that	no	acts	are	morally	worthy,	so	that	Jonathan’s	
act	isn’t	either,	thereby	rejecting	(P5).	This	avoids	having	to	reject	(P6),	but	only	by	trivialising	
it	 –	 it	 is	 true	only	because	 the	antecedent	 is	never	 satisfied	–	 so	 I	 think	 that	 a	 strategy	 that	
rejects	(P5)	is	at	least	as	prima	facie	implausible	as	just	rejecting	(P6).	
So,	 leaving	 aside	 the	 possibility	 of	 rejecting	 (P5),	 there	 are	 no	 choices	 for	 the	 proponent	 of	
psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act;	they	must	reject	all	of	the	following	prima	
facie	reasonable	claims:	
(P1)	 My	 reason	 for	 congratulating	my	 friend	was,	 inter	alia,	 that	 she	had	won	an	
award.12	
(P2)	 My	reason	for	congratulating	my	friend	was,	inter	alia,	that	I	read	that	she	had	
won	an	award.13	
(P6)	 A’s	φing	is	morally	worthy	only	if	A	φs	for	a	reason	that	makes	φing	right.14	
(P9)	 For	any	p,	if	p	makes	A’s	φing	worth	doing	then	A	could	φ	for	the	reason	that	
p.15	
Of	 course,	 one	 can	 perhaps	 put	 forward	 good	 arguments	 as	 to	 why	 these	 claims	 are	
nonetheless	false,	or	why	it	is	nonetheless	acceptable	to	reject	them.	For	instance,	one	might	
argue	that	(P9)	is	false,	by	providing	cases	in	which	one	seemingly	cannot	do	some	action	for	a	
																																								 																				
12	Rejecting	(P1)	solves	The	Non-Psychological	Reason	Problem.	
13	Rejecting	(P2)	solves	The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Psychologism).	
14	Rejecting	(P6)	solves	The	Moral	Worthiness	Problem.	
15	Rejecting	(P9)	solves	The	Right	Reasons	Problem.	
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reason	 that	 makes	 it	 worth	 doing.16 	Alternatively,	 perhaps	 one	 could	 construct	 counter-
examples	to	(P6).17	
My	 point,	 again,	 is	 not	 that	 one	 cannot	 argue	 against	 these	 claims,	 or	 that	 the	 arguments	
against	these	claims	are	wrong,	rather	it	is	just	that	these	claims	are	prima	facie	reasonable	so	
that	rejecting	them	is	a	stance	that	demands	some	explanation	–	you	are	rejecting	something	
that	on	the	face	of	it	seems	reasonable.		So,	again,	that	at	least	counts	in	favour	of	looking	for	a	
theory	that	doesn’t	reject	such	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.	
5 Conclusion	
As	with	 the	previous	 chapter’s	discussion	of	 favourism	about	 reasons	 to	act,	 the	purpose	of	
this	chapter	was	not	 to	argue	against	psychologism	about	 the	 reasons	 for	which	we	act,	but	
only	to	show	the	cost	of	accepting	it,	which	is	that	one	must	reject	(P1),	(P6)	and	(P9),	which	
are,	as	I	have	argued,	all	prima	facie	reasonable.	
																																								 																				
16	Schroeder	 (2007,	 33)	 gives	 the	 following	example:	 The	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 surprise	party	waiting	 at	
home	for	him	makes	going	home	early	worth	doing	for	Nate.	However,	Nate	cannot	go	home	early	for	
the	reason	that	there	is	a	surprise	party	waiting	(because	it	won’t	be	a	surprise	party	if	he	is	aware	of	it,	
and	he	can’t	go	home	for	the	reason	that	there	is	a	surprise	party	waiting	for	him	if	he	isn’t	aware	that	
there	is).	
17	For	instance,	one	might	think	that	discovering	the	cure	for	cancer	exclusively	for	the	reason	that	one	
will	be	admired	 for	having	done	so	 is	nonetheless	morally	worthy.	 I	would	disagree,	as,	 I	 think,	many	
others	would.	Ultimately,	 I	 think,	whether	or	not	one	rejects	 it	depends	upon	whether	or	not	one	 is	a	
consequentialist	 about	 moral	 worthiness	 –	 noting	 that	 one	 can	 be	 a	 consequentialist	 about	 moral	
rightness	without	being	a	consequentialist	about	moral	worthiness	(cf.	Mill:	‘the	motive	has	nothing	to	
do	with	the	morality	of	the	action,	though	much	with	the	worth	of	the	agent.’	(1863,	29)).	
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(IV)		Acting	for	what	you	believe	
In	which	I	show	what	it	costs	to	think	that	a	reason	for	which	an	agent	acts	 is	
the	 content	 of	 the	belief	 they	acted	on.	 I	 show	how	 ‘deliberativism	about	 the	
reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act’	 clashes	 with	 some	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	
about	the	factivity	of	reasons,	the	explanatory	power	of	the	reasons	for	which	
we	act,	the	factivity	of	explanation	and	what	an	agent’s	reasons	for	acting	are	
in	Gettier	cases.	I	set	out	which	claims	the	proponent	of	this	view	must	choose	
between	rejecting.	
There	is	an	account	of	the	reasons	for	which	an	agent	acts	that	aims	to	reconcile	the	idea	that	
an	agent	who	acts	 intentionally,	deliberately	and	purposefully	also	acts	for	a	reason	with	the	
idea	that	the	reasons	for	which	they	act	are	often	not	features	of	their	psychology.	According	
to	this	account,	which	is	what	I	have	called	‘deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act’,	
the	considerations	in	light	of	which	an	agent	acts,	which	is	what	they	believed	when	they	acted	
on	their	belief,	are	the	reasons	for	which	they	act.	
The	problems	for	this	view,	as	I	shall	show,	arise	from	the	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	that	
‘being	 a	 reason’	 is	 a	 seemingly	 factive	 property,	 that	 one’s	 reasons	 for	 acting	 explain	 one’s	
actions	 and	 that	 even	 when	 the	 considerations	 in	 light	 of	 which	 one	 acts	 are	 true,	 we	 are	
sometimes	reluctant	to	call	them	the	agent’s	reasons	for	acting.	
1 Some	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	about	reasons	1.1 The	factivity	of	reasons	
If	Sally	 is	 running	because	she	mistakenly	 thinks	 that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her,	we	don’t	 tend	to	
say,	 ‘her	reason	for	running	 is	 that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her,	even	though	one	 isn’t’.	One	reason	
that	we	don’t	 tend	 to	 say	 it	 is,	 I	 submit,	 that	 the	expression	sounds	odd.1	As	Alvarez	puts	 it,	
there	is	an	‘air	of	paradox’	about	it:	
‘Othello	kills	Desdemona	for	the	reason	that	Desdemona	has	been	unfaithful	to	him,	although	
she	has	not	been	unfaithful	to	him’	sounds	only	marginally	 less	paradoxical	than	‘Othello	kills	
Desdemona	because	of	the	fact	that	Desdemona	has	been	unfaithful	to	him,	although	she	has	
not	been	unfaithful	to	him’.	It	 is	not	that	one	cannot	give	meaningful	interpretations	to	these	
expressions: we	may	hear	them	as	conveying	what	the	agent	him-	or	herself	would	have	said	if	
asked	about	their	reason...	All	the	same,	the	fact	that	these	expressions	have	an	air	of	paradox	
																																								 																				
1	Indeed,	this	claim	was	met	with	laughter	when	I	put	it	to	a	seminar	audience.	
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and	 require	 this	 special	 interpretation	 are	 arguably	 explained	 by	 the	 thought	 that	 both	 ‘the	
reason	that’	and	‘the	fact	that’	are	factive	operators.		(Alvarez	2016b,	8)2	
I	 think	Alvarez’s	reading	 is	correct:	 it	 is	not	that	we	can’t	 find	any	meaning	 in	the	expression	
‘Sally’s	reason	for	running	was	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	even	though	one	wasn’t’	–	it’s	that	
the	expression	sounds	odd,	and	we	have	to	re-interpret	it	to	make	sense	of	it.	Moreover,	the	
fact	that	we	don’t	say	such	things	should	tell	us	something	about	the	applicability	of	the	term	
to	such	cases.		
I	suggest,	therefore,	that	the	claim	that	‘…is	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting’	is	a	factive	predicate	
is	prima	facie	reasonable.	Thus:	
(D1) For	any	p,	if	p	was	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	is	the	case.	1.2 The	explanatory	power	of	reasons	
We	can	explain	an	agent’s	action	by	giving	 their	 reason	 for	acting.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 seemingly	
natural	to	think	that	when	we	so	explain	an	agent’s	action,	 it	 is	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	
itself	 that	 explains	 their	 action.	 When	 I	 say	 that	 Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	 was	 that	 she	
believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	it	strongly	seems	to	suggest	(if	not	directly	implies)	that	
Sally	ran	because	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	Likewise,	if	I	say	that	my	reason	for	
congratulating	my	friend	was	that	she	had	won	an	award	 it	suggests	that	 I	congratulated	my	
friend	because	she	had	won	an	award.	
The	idea	that	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	always	explains	their	action	is,	as	Lilian	O’Brien	notes	
‘very	widely	shared’	(2015,	282).	For	instance:	
I	act	in	light	of	those	reasons.	They	are	the	reasons	why	I	do	what	I	do.	(Dancy	2000,	103)	
When	an	agent	acts	for	a	(specific)	reason	that	very	reason	is	also	the	explanation	(or	at	least	
part	of	the	explanation)	of	why	she	did	what	she	did.	(Heuer	2004,	45)	
Taking	something	as	one’s	reason,	in	acting	on	it,	is	taking	it	as	an	explanatory	reason.	(Setiya	
2007,	36)	
A	 fairly	 standard	way	 of	 linking	 reasons	 for	 action	 and	 explanations	 of	 action…	 is	 that	when	
someone	acts	for	a	reason	then	their	reason	for	acting	that	way	explains	their	acting	that	way.	
(Stout	2009,	57	emphasis	added)	
When	 there	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 which	 an	 agent	 acted	 then	 that	 reason	 explains	 (features	 in	 an	
explanation	of)	that	action.	(Raz	2011,	14)	
																																								 																				
2	For	 others	 who	 take	 such	 remarks	 to	 sound	 odd	 see	 Unger	 (1978,	 208),	 Scanlon	 (2014,	 36),	 Dancy	
(2008a,	267)	and	Comesaña	&	McGrath	(2014,	75)	–	the	 latter	two	are	particularly	worth	noting	since	
they	advance	a	deliberative	account	and	nonetheless	recognize	the	oddness	of	such	expressions.	
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I	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 so	widely	held	precisely	because	 it	matches	our	 intuitions.	The	claim	 that	
something	was	one’s	reason	for	acting	seems	to	be	substitutable	for	the	claim	that	one	acted	
because	of	it.	Thus,	we	have	the	second,	prima	facie	reasonable	claim	for	this	discussion:	
(D2) For	any	p,	if	p	was	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	explains	why	A	φ’d.	1.3 The	factivity	of	explanation	
Consider	 the	 following	 statements:	 I	 took	 my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 was	 raining,	 although	 it	
wasn’t	raining.	The	reason	why	the	window	broke	was	that	a	brick	struck	 it,	although	a	brick	
didn’t	 strike	 it.	 That	 it’s	 unfair	 explains	why	 it’s	wrong,	 although	 it’s	 not	 unfair.	 All	 of	 these	
statements	sound	strange	to	the	point	of	unintelligibility.	What	makes	them	sound	strange	is	
that	explanatory	relations	(whether	causal	or	non-causal)	are	seemingly	factive	relations	(and	
that	 is	 so	whether	 they	are	picked	out	by	 ‘because’,	 ‘explains’	or	 ‘reason	why’)	–	 something	
cannot	explain	unless	it	is	true.		
I	 take	 this	 to	 be	 such	 an	 obviously	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claim	 that	 I	 won’t	 defend	 its	
intuitiveness	further:	
(D3) For	any	p,	if	p	explains	anything	then	p	is	the	case.	1.4 Gettier	cases	
Edmund	Gettier	(1963)	introduced	a	now-familiar	sort	of	character	to	epistemology:	someone	
who	has	a	justified,	true	belief	that	falls	short	of	knowledge.	Gettier	characters	are	relevant	to	
this	discussion	because,	when	an	agent’s	 justified	belief	 is	 true	by	happy	accident,	what	 the	
agent	 believes	 (despite	 its	 truth)	 seemingly	 does	 not	 explain	 their	 action,	 as	 Hornsby	
demonstrates:	
Edmund…believes	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	of	the	pond	is	dangerously	thin,	having	been	told	
so	by	a	normally	reliable	friend,	and…accordingly	keeps	to	the	edge.	But	Edmund’s	friend	didn’t	
want	Edmund	to	skate	in	the	middle	of	the	pond	(never	mind	why),	so	that	he	had	told	Edmund	
that	 the	 ice	 there	was	thin	despite	having	no	view	about	whether	or	not	 it	actually	was	thin.	
Edmund,	then,	did	not	keep	to	the	edge	because	the	 ice	 in	the	middle	was	thin.	Suppose	now	
that,	 as	 it	 happened,	 the	 ice	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 pond	was	 thin.	 This	makes	 no	 difference.	
Edmund	still	didn’t	keep	to	 the	edge	because	the	 ice	was	 thin.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 ice	was	 thin	
does	not	explain	Edmund’s	acting,	even	though	Edmund	did	believe	that	it	was	thin,	and	even	
though	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	 thin	 actually	was	 a	 reason	 for	 him	 to	 stay	 at	 the	 edge.	 (Hornsby	
2007,	251	emphasis	added)	
I	 think	 Hornsby’s	 claim	 is	 intuitive:	 there	 is	 no	 sense	 in	 which	 Edmund’s	 action	 was	 the	
consequence	of	the	ice	being	thin,	and,	indeed,	the	ice	could	have	been	thick	in	the	middle	of	
the	 pond	 and	 Edmund	 would	 have	 stayed	 at	 the	 edge	 just	 the	 same.	 And	 given	 those	
observations,	it	seems	hard	to	see	how	it	could	be	true	that	Edmund	stayed	at	the	edge	of	the	
lake	because	the	ice	was	thin.	So,	I	suggest	that	the	following	claim	is	prima	facie	reasonable:	
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(D4) The	 fact	 that	 the	 ice	 was	 thin	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 Edmund	 stayed	 by	 the	
edge	of	the	lake.	
2 Deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	
Recall	the	following	claim	about	reasons	from	Table	I-4:	
Deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act:	For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	which	A	
φ’d	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	φs.	
While	deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	is	characterised	by	this	bi-conditional,	
it	may	help	the	reader	when	we	come	to	the	problems	with	the	account	if	we	separate	out	the	
left-to-right	 and	 right-to-left	 readings	 (noting	 that	 the	 deliberative	 account	 is	 committed	 to	
both).	Thus:	
(DEL1)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	φs	then	p	is	A’s	reason	for	
φing.	
(DEL2)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	
φs.3	
It	is	easy	enough	to	say	that	something	is	‘a	consideration	in	light	of	which	one	acts’,	perhaps,	
but	what	 does	 it	mean?4		 Jonathan	Dancy,	who	 is	 probably	 the	 progenitor	 of	 contemporary	
deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act,	provides	the	following	insight:	
The	reasons	for	which	we	act	are	the	considerations	 in	the	 light	of	which	we	do	what	we	do.	
These	are	the	features	which	we	take	to	tell	in	favour	of	so	acting;	they	will	figure	prominently	
in	our	deliberation.	(Dancy	2006,	123)	
So,	 a	 condition	 on	 something’s	 being	 a	 consideration	 in	 light	 of	 which	 one	 acts	 is	 that	 one	
should	 have	 taken	 it	 to	 ‘favour’	 doing	 that	 action.	 Dancy,	 and	 other	 proponents	 of	
deliberativism,	understand	the	favouring	relation	in	the	conventional	way	that	I	have	already	
discussed	(see	§	(I)4.4	and	§	(II)3.1)	–	as	‘making,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing’.	So,	a	condition	
on	something’s	being	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	one	acts	is	that	one	must	take	that	thing	
to	make	one’s	action,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
But	 this	 is	not	all	 there	 is	 to	being	a	consideration	 in	 light	of	which	one	acts;	one	could	take	
something	to	make	an	action,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing	and	actually	do	that	action	without	
that	thing	being	the	consideration	in	light	of	which	one	did	it.	For	instance,	I	could	take	the	fact	
that	 it’s	pleasant	outside	to	make	going	outside	worth	doing	and	 I	could	actually	go	outside,	
																																								 																				
3	It’s	worth	noting	that	many	who	do	not	subscribe	to	deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	
nonetheless	take	(DEL2)	to	be	true	(e.g.	Stout	2009;	Alvarez	2010;	Parfit	2011;	Hyman	2015).	
4 	These	 are	 what	 Scanlon	 (1998)	 calls	 ‘operative	 reasons’,	 what	 Olson	 and	 Svensson	 (2005)	 call	
‘deliberative	reasons’	and	what	Dancy	(2000)	and	Schroeder	(2008)	call	‘motivating	reasons’.	
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but	the	consideration	in	light	of	which	I	do	so	might	be,	say,	that	I	need	to	get	lunch	(I	would	
still	have	gone	outside	if	the	weather	had	been	dreadful).		
What	makes	something	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	one	acts	is	not	merely	that	one	takes	
it	to	favour	one’s	action,	but	that	one	acts	on	it.	What	that	means	may	be	a	little	opaque,	but	I	
think	that	we	can	say,	by	way	of	explication,	that	one	acts	on	something	that	one	took	to	make	
one’s	action	worth	doing	if	one	acts	as	a	result	of	taking	it	to	make	one’s	action	worth	doing.5	
What	does	this	all	mean?	Well,	when	I	see	rain	outside,	I	believe	that	it’s	raining	and	I	believe	
that	my	umbrella	will	keep	me	dry.	I	reason	thus:	it’s	raining,	my	umbrella	will	keep	me	dry,	I	
want	to	stay	dry	(or	judge	it	good	or	what	have	you),	and	so	I	had	better	take	my	umbrella.	I	
take	these	considerations	to	favour	taking	my	umbrella	and	I	took	my	umbrella	as	a	result	of	
taking	 those	 considerations	 to	 favour	 doing	 so.	 It	 is	 these	 two	 conditions	 (taking	 some	
consideration	to	favour	acting,	and	acting	as	a	result	of	taking	it	to	favour	doing	so)	that	make	
some	consideration	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	an	agent	acts.	So	much,	then,	for	what	it	
is	to	be	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	one	acts.	
3 What	Sally	and	Edmund	took	to	favour	acting	3.1 Sally’s	considerations	
What	were	the	considerations	in	light	of	which	Sally	ran?	That	is,	what	was	it	that	she	took	to	
favour	 running	 (that	 is,	 to	 make	 running,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing)?	Well,	 Sally	 heard	
something	 that	 sounded	 like	a	bear,	and	her	 thought	process,	albeit	a	quick	one,	must	have	
been	something	like:	‘A	bear’s	coming!	The	safe-house	is	nearby	–	I	can	make	it.	 I	had	better	
run!’	 So,	 amongst	 the	 considerations	 that	 Sally	 took	 to	 favour	 running	was	 that	 a	 bear	was	
chasing	 her.	 Of	 course,	 a	 bear	wasn’t	 chasing	 her,	 but	 that	 doesn’t	 prevent	 it	 from	 being	 a	
consideration	in	light	of	which	she	acted,	any	more	than	the	fact	that	a	bear	wasn’t	chasing	her	
prevented	her	from	believing	that	one	was.		
In	order	for	one	to	take	something	to	favour	some	action,	for	it	to	be	a	consideration	in	light	of	
which	 one	 acted,	 it	 is,	 as	 I	 have	 noted,	 enough	 that	 one	 believes	 it,	 believes	 that	 it	 favours	
one’s	action	(in	the	sense	of	making	it,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing)	and	acts	on	those	beliefs.	
In	particular,	it	is	not	necessary	that	one	know	it,	or	even	that	it	be	the	case,	because	the	belief	
operator,	unlike	knowledge,	is	not	factive.	
																																								 																				
5	The	 natural	 interpretation	 of	 ‘as	 a	 result’	 here	 is	 an	 explanatory	 one	 –	 but	 I	 want	 to	 avoid	 such	 a	
commitment	 since	 some	 (e.g.	 Dancy	 2000)	 don’t	 think	 the	 ‘taking’	 is	 explanatory,	 but	 is	 merely	 an	
‘enabling	condition’	for	the	action.	
	 74	
This	 is	 a	 noteworthy	 upshot	 of	 the	 deliberative	 account:	 an	 agent	 can	 act	 in	 light	 of	 a	
consideration	that	was	false.	And	this	 is	what	Sally	does:	Sally	 takes	 that	a	bear	was	chasing	
her	to	favour	her	action,	and	acts	in	the	light	of	that	consideration.	
(D5) A	consideration	in	light	of	which	Sally	ran	was	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	
Was	 the	 fact	 that	 she	believed	 that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	a	consideration	 in	 light	of	which	
Sally	ran?	 It	was	not.	Sally	does	not	think	to	herself:	 ‘Hmmm,	 I	believe	that	a	bear	 is	chasing	
me.	That	I	believe	that	a	bear	is	chasing	me	makes	running	worth	doing	(regardless	of	whether	
or	not	a	bear	 is	chasing	me…),	so	 I	had	better	do	 it.’	 It	would	be	odd	for	Sally	 to	reason	this	
way,	 because	 it’s	 only	 in	 unusual	 circumstances	 that	we	 take	 considerations	 about	our	 own	
psychology	to	favour	our	actions.	
These	remarks	relate	to	remarks	made	in	§	(I)4.2,	that	are	perhaps	worth	revisiting.	Recall	that	
Sam	believes	that	the	security	services	are	trying	to	read	her	mind.	She	takes	that	the	security	
services	are	 trying	 to	 read	her	mind	 to	 favour	wearing	a	 foil	hat	 (she	 takes	 it	 to	be,	 in	 some	
respect,	worth	 doing).	 However,	 knowing	 that	 she	 has	 a	 delusional	 disorder,	 she	 also	 takes	
that	she	believes	that	the	security	services	are	trying	to	read	her	mind	to	favour	going	to	see	a	
doctor.	Sam	deliberates	about	the	way	she	takes	the	world	to	be	as	well	as	the	way	she	takes	
her	mind	to	be.	
Sally	is	not	like	Sam	–	when	Sally	decides	to	run	it’s	not	because	she	has	deliberated	about	her	
own	psychology	–	what	Sally	takes	to	favour	her	action	is	the	way	world	is,	according	to	her.	If	
Sally	 thought	 that	merely	 believing	 that	 a	 bear	was	 chasing	 her	would	make	 running	worth	
doing	regardless	of	whether	or	not	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	then	it	could	be	a	consideration	in	
light	 of	 which	 she	 runs.	 But,	 ex	 hypothesi,	 that	 isn’t	 what	 Sally	 thinks,	 what	 Sally	 takes	 to	
favour	running	is	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	(even	though	no	bear	is	actually	chasing	her)	–	Sally	
is	 just	 mistaken	 about	 what	 makes	 running	 worth	 doing,	 because	 nothing	 makes	 it	 worth	
doing.		
The	point	is	that	we	should	not	infer	from	the	fact	that	Sally	runs	because	she	believes	that	a	
bear	 is	 chasing	 her	 that	 what	 she	 deliberates	 about	 is	 her	 mental	 states	 rather	 than	 their	
propositional	contents.	In	short:		
(D6) That	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	was	not	a	consideration	in	light	
of	which	Sally	ran.	
What	about	the	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound?	Is	that	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	
she	ran?	Maybe	you	want	to	say	that	Sally’s	reasoning	goes	like	this	‘That	sounded	like	a	bear!	
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There	must	 be	 a	 bear	 coming!	 I	 had	 better	 run!’	 Her	 reasoning	might	 go	 like	 that.	 But	 that	
doesn’t	make	hearing	a	bear-like	sound	something	she	took	to	favour	running.		
Why	 not?	 Because	 she	 doesn’t	 think	 that	 hearing	 a	 bear-like	 sound	 makes	 running	 worth	
doing.	Sally	doesn’t	think:	‘if	I	hear	a	bear-like	sound	I	should	run,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	
a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 me.’	 Hearing	 a	 bear-like	 sound	 is	 what	 makes	 her	 believe	 that	 a	 bear	 is	
chasing	 her,	 but	 it’s	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	 that	 she	 takes	 to	 favour	 running.	 That	 is,	 if	
hearing	a	bear-like	sound	plays	any	role	in	her	deliberation	it	is	in	helping	her	decide	what	to	
believe;	but	once	she	has	settled	on	believing	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	it	is	what	she	believes	
that	she	takes	to	favour	her	action,	not	what	she	took	to	favour	believing	it.	So:	
(D7) That	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound	was	not	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	Sally	
ran.	3.2 Edmund’s	considerations	
What	were	the	considerations	in	light	of	which	Edmund	stayed	by	the	edge	of	the	pond?	That	
is,	what	was	it	that	he	took	to	favour	staying	by	the	edge	of	the	pond	and	on	the	basis	of	which	
he	did	so?		
Well,	his	thought	process	might	have	gone	(if	somewhat	elaborately)	like	this:	‘The	ice	is	thin	in	
the	middle.	If	I	skate	there	it	might	crack,	I	might	fall	through.	That	would	be	dreadful,	perhaps	
fatal.	I’d	better	just	stay	at	the	side.’	Assuming	that	this	(or	something	in	its	vicinity)	is	how	his	
reasoning	 went,	 the	 things	 that	 Edmund	 took	 to	 favour	 his	 action,	 and	 which	 made	 the	
difference	 to	what	 he	 did,	were	 things	 like	 that	 the	 ice	was	 thin,	 that	 skating	 on	 thin	 ice	 is	
dangerous	and	so	on.	Thus,	we	can	say:	
(D8) A	consideration	in	light	of	which	Edmund	stayed	by	the	edge	was	that	the	ice	
was	thin.	
4 The	problems	for	deliberativism		
The	problems	for	deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	will	no	doubt	be	obvious	
from	the	remarks	of	the	previous	sections.	Nonetheless,	it	is	worth	being	explicit	about	them.	
What	 follows	 are	 four	 distinct	 problems	 for	 the	 deliberative	 account:	 The	 False	 Reasons	
Problem;	 The	 Explanatory	 Reasons	 Problem;	 The	 Deliberative	 Gettier	 Problem;	 and	 The	
Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism).	
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4.1 The	False	Reasons	Problem	
The	False	Reasons	Problem	is	this:	A	consideration	in	 light	of	which	Sally	ran	was	that	a	bear	
was	chasing	her,	so	it	was	her	reason	for	running,	so	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	but	no	bear	was	
chasing	her!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(D5)	 A	consideration	in	light	of	which	Sally	ran	was	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	
(DEL1)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	φs	then	p	is	A’s	reason	for	
φing.	
(D1)	 For	any	p,	if	p	was	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	is	the	case.	
(D9) It	is	not	the	case	that	a	bear	was	chasing	Sally.	4.2 The	Explanatory	Reasons	Problem	
The	Explanatory	Reasons	Problem	is	this:	A	consideration	in	light	of	which	Sally	ran	was	that	a	
bear	was	chasing	her,	so	 it	was	her	reason	for	running,	so	 it	explains	why	she	ran,	so	a	bear	
was	 chasing	 her,	 but	 no	 bear	 was	 chasing	 her!	 Explicitly,	 the	 following	 claims	 are	mutually	
inconsistent:	
(D5)	 A	consideration	in	light	of	which	Sally	ran	was	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	
(DEL1)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	φs	then	p	is	A’s	reason	for	
φing.	
(D2)	 For	any	p,	if	p	was	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	explains	why	A	φ’d.	
(D3)	 For	any	p,	if	p	explains	anything	then	p	is	the	case.	
(D9)	 It	is	not	the	case	that	a	bear	was	chasing	Sally.	4.3 The	Deliberative	Gettier	Problem	
The	Deliberative	Gettier	Problem	 is	 this:	A	consideration	 in	 light	of	which	Edmund	stayed	by	
the	edge	of	the	pond	was	that	the	ice	was	thin	in	the	middle,	so	that	was	his	reason	for	staying	
by	the	edge,	so	it	explains	why	he	stayed	by	the	edge,	but	it	doesn’t	explain	why	he	stayed	by	
the	edge!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
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(D8)	 A	consideration	in	light	of	which	Edmund	stayed	by	the	edge	was	that	the	ice	
was	thin.	
(DEL1)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	φs	then	p	is	A’s	reason	for	
φing.	
(D2)	 For	any	p,	if	p	was	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	explains	why	A	φ’d.	
(D4)	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 ice	 was	 thin	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 Edmund	 stayed	 by	 the	
edge	of	the	lake.	4.4 The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism)	
The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism)	 is	 this:	Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	was,	
inter	 alia,	 that	 she	 believed	 a	 bear	was	 chasing	 her,	 so	 that	was	 a	 consideration	 in	 light	 of	
which	she	ran,	but	it	wasn’t!6	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(F5)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	believed	a	bear	was	chasing	
her.7	
(DEL2)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	
φs.	
(D6)	 That	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	was	not	a	consideration	in	light	
of	which	Sally	ran.	4.5 The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism)	
The	 Experiential	 Reason	 Problem	 (for	 Deliberativism)	 is	 this:	 Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	was,	
inter	alia,	that	she	head	a	bear-like	sound,	so	that	was	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	she	ran,	
but	it	wasn’t!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(F6)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound.		
(DEL2)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	
φs.	
(D7)	 That	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound	was	not	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	Sally	
ran.	
5 Responses	to	the	problems	for	deliberativism		
What	 can	 the	 proponent	 of	 this	 account	 do?	 Rejecting	 (D9)	 is	 not	 an	 option:	 a	 bear	wasn’t	
chasing	Sally	–	that	much	we	know	for	sure.	Rejecting	any	of	(D5),	(D6),	(D7)	or	(D8)	(the	claims	
																																								 																				
6	This	argument	 is	often	 (e.g.	Dancy	2000,	124–25;	Alvarez	2016b,	9)	used	by	proponents	of	 (DEL2)	 to	
argue	against	the	idea	that	Sally’s	reason	for	running	was	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	
My	 point	 is	 that	 it	 is	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 Sally’s	 reason	 for	 running	 was	 that	 she	
believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	–	so	if	one’s	theory	of	reasons	commits	you	to	rejecting	it,	it	is	at	
some	cost	that	it	does	so.	
7	This	is	from	§	(II)1.3,	where	we	first	considered	this	example.	
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about	the	considerations	in	light	of	which	Sally	and	Edmund	did	or	did	not	act)	 is	also	not	an	
option	–	the	truth	of	(D5)	to	(D8)	just	follows	from	what	it	 is	to	be	a	consideration	in	light	of	
which	one	acts	(and	the	construction	of	the	examples).	Of	course	one	could	change	the	notion	
of	 consideration	 that	 we	 are	 working	 with,	 but	 that	 would	 be	 to	 change	 the	 account,	 it	
wouldn’t	solve	the	problem	for	deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	
So,	the	proponent	of	deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	must	reject:	
(F5)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	believed	a	bear	was	chasing	
her.	8		
(F6)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound.9		
(D1)	 For	any	p,	if	p	was	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	is	the	case.10	
And,	EITHER:	
(D3)	 For	any	p,	if	p	explains	anything	then	p	is	the	case.11	And;	
(D4)	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 ice	 was	 thin	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 Edmund	 stayed	 by	 the	
edge	of	the	lake.12	
OR:	
(D2)	 For	any	p,	if	p	was	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	explains	why	A	φ’d.	13	
As	ever,	one	can,	perhaps,	construct	compelling	arguments	as	to	why	these	claims	are,	in	spite	
of	 their	prima	 facie	 reasonableness,	 nonetheless	 false.	 For	 instance,	Dancy	(2000)	 suggested	
that	rejecting	(D3),	and	insisting	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	non-factive	explanation,	might	be	
the	appropriate	response	to	The	Explanatory	Reasons	Problem.	This	view	has	proved	to	be	less	
than	 compelling;	 indeed,	 the	 claim	 that	 explanation	 could	 be	 non-factive	 is	 apparently	 so	
unpalatable	a	thesis	that	even	Dancy	has	now	abandoned	it,	yielding	to	what	he	describes	as	‘a	
barrage	of	criticism’.14		
The	rejection	of	(D2)	 is	now	the	more	favoured	approach	amongst	deliberativists.15	The	main	
strategy	 for	 doing	 so	 appears	 to	 be	 this:	 given	 that	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 is	 an	
intentional	 object	 (qua	 what	 the	 agent	 believes),	 it	 is	 not	 the	 sort	 of	 thing	 that	 can	 do	
																																								 																				
8	Rejecting	(F5)	solves	The	Psychological	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism).		
9	Rejecting	(F6)	solves	The	Experiential	Reason	Problem	(for	Deliberativism).	
10	Rejecting	(D1)	solves	The	False	Reasons	Problem.	
11	Rejecting	(D3)	solves	The	Explanatory	Reasons	Problem.	
12	Rejecting	(D4)	solves	The	Deliberative	Gettier	Problem.	
13	Rejecting	(D2)	solves	both	The	Explanatory	Reasons	Problem	and	The	Deliberative	Gettier	Problem.	
14	See	Dancy	(2014).	Although,	Comesaña	&	McGrath	(2014)	appear	to	have	picked	up	the	non-factive	
baton.			
15	(E.g.	Stoutland	1998;	Davis	2003,	2005;	Sandis	2013;	Dancy	2014)	
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explaining,	 so	 (D2)	 can’t	be	 true.	 The	problem,	 it	 seems	 to	me,	 is	 that	 this	 line	of	 argument	
reasons	 to	 its	 conclusion	 by	 taking	 (DEL1)	 as	 given,	 when	 that	 is	 precisely	 what	 is	 in	
contention.16		
Nonetheless,	as	with	the	previous	discussions,	what	 is	at	 issue	here	 is	not	whether	or	not	an	
argument	can	be	given	that	makes	rejecting	(D2)	(and	(F5),	(F6)	and	(D1))	tolerable,	my	point	is	
just	 that	 it	 counts	 against	 deliberativism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	 that	 such	 an	
argument	 needs	 to	 be	 given	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 If	 your	 theory	 has	 some	 counter-intuitive	
consequences	its	counter-intuitiveness	doesn’t	make	it	wrong,	but	it	certainly	counts	against	it	
when	compared	to	a	more	intuitive	theory.	
6 Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 deliberative	 account	 must	 reject	 a	 number	 of	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	 claims,	 as	 previous	 chapters	 did	 for	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act	 and	
psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	The	next	chapter	considers	whether	or	not	
the	difficulties	 faced	by	 these	 three	accounts	should	persuade	us	 that	 there	are	 just	several,	
irreconcilable	concepts	of	reason	at	play.	
	
																																								 																				
16	That	 is,	 it	 concludes	 that	an	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting	can’t	explain	 their	action	by	assuming	 it	 is	an	
intentional	object,	but	this	begs	the	question,	which	is,	in	part,	about	whether	or	not	the	agent’s	reason	
for	acting	is	an	intentional	object.	
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(V)		On	the	plurality	of	reasons	
In	which	I	explain	what	a	pluralist	theory	of	reasons	is	and	why	‘going	plural’	is	
not	a	panacea.	I	suggest	that	a	given	reason	expression	could	have	more	than	
one	 sense,	 and	 I	 show	 how	 we	 can	 accommodate	 theories	 of	 reasons	 that	
accept	that	idea,	i.e.	pluralist	theories	of	reasons,	in	our	categorisation	schema.	
I	 discuss	 some	 examples	 of	 pluralist	 theories	 from	 the	 literature.	 I	 show	 how	
pluralist	 theories	 can	 solve	 some	 of	 the	 problems	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapters.	 I	 explain	why	pluralism	 is	 not,	 however,	 enough,	 and	 I	 suggest	 that	
our	investigation	should	go	beyond	favourism,	psychologism	and	deliberativism.		
The	previous	three	chapters	set	out	some	of	the	main	problems	for	the	most	popular	claims	
from	 each	 of	 the	 three	 families	 of	 claims	 about	 reasons.	 In	 doing	 so	 they	 painted	 a	 bleak	
picture	 of	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 reasons;	 as	 Dancy	 notes	 (paraphrasing	 Aristotle)	 the	
theories	 ‘leave	one	 saying	 things	 that	nobody	would	 say	unless	defending	a	 theory.’	 (2008a,	
267)	So	what	is	to	be	done?	One	possible	solution,	which	I	wish	to	consider	now	only	so	that	
we	may	set	it	aside,	is	to	think	that	there	are	different	senses	of	a	given	reason	expression.		
Up	until	now	all	of	the	theories	I	have	considered	have	been	univocal;	that	is,	they	have	(as	I	
noted	 in	 §	(I)1)	 all	 assumed	 that	 a	 given	 reason	 expression	 always	 picks	 out	 reasons	 of	 the	
same	 kind.	 Homonyms,	 I	 said,	 are	 the	 exception	 and	 not	 the	 rule.	 But	 what	 if	 reason	
expressions	 are	 homonyms	 of	 some	 sort,	 picking	 out	 kinds	 of	 things	 that	 are	 confusingly	
similar,	 but	 nonetheless	 distinct?	 Perhaps,	 that	 is,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	 Sally	 runs	 for	 a	
reason	 and	 a	 sense	 in	which	 she	doesn’t	 run	 for	 a	 reason	 (or	 runs	 for	 no	 reason).	 Similarly,	
perhaps	 if	there	 is	no	milk	at	home	but	 I	believe	that	there	 is,	then	there	 is	a	sense	 in	which	
there	is	no	reason	for	me	to	buy	milk	and	a	sense	in	which	there	is	a	reason	for	me	to	buy	milk.	
Perhaps,	 the	 same	 reason	 expression	 can	 have	 different	 senses;	 perhaps,	 that	 is,	 the	 same	
reason	expression	can	be	used	to	pick	out	different	kinds	of	reason.	
A	 theory	 that	 admits	 that	 a	 single	 reason	 expression	 can	 have	 different	 senses	 is	 a	pluralist	
theory	of	reasons.	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	explain	what	pluralist	theories	of	reasons	
are,	why	one	would	adopt	pluralism,	and	to	show	that	even	 if	we	adopt	a	pluralist	theory	of	
reasons,	 we	 should	 look	 for	 a	 new	 account	 of	 the	 reason-relation,	 beyond	 favourism,	
deliberativism	and	psychologism.	
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1 The	sense	of	an	expression	
For	expositional	purposes	I	want	to	stress	the	distinctions	we	are	now	working	with:	there	are	
(i)	 different	 reason	 expressions,	 (ii)	 different	 kinds	 of	 reason	 they	 pick	 out	 and,	 now	 (iii)	
different	senses	of	a	reason	expression.		
In	§	(I)1,	I	discussed,	at	length,	the	possibility	that	different	reason	expressions	might	pick	out	
different	kinds	of	reason.	However,	I	assumed	that	each	reason	expression	picks	out	only	one	
kind	 of	 reason.	Now,	 I	 am	 allowing	 that	 the	 same	 reason	 expression	may	 pick	 out	different	
kinds	of	 reason	–	and	 to	 the	extent	 that	 it	 does,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 reason	expression	has	
different	senses.	That	is,	a	single	reason	expression	has	different	senses	if	and	only	if	it	can	be	
used	to	pick	out	different	kinds	of	reason	(and	two	kinds	of	reason	are	different	if	and	only	if	
the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	of	each	kind	differ).	
A	further,	important,	clarification	is	to	note	that	saying	that	a	reason	expression	has	different	
senses	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	it	picks	out	a	‘disjunctive’	kind	of	reason.	If,	for	instance,	
‘a	reason	there	is	to	act’	just	picks	out	one	kind	of	reason,	which	happens	to	be	disjunctive	(in	
the	sense	that	the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	of	that	kind	are	disjunctive1),	then	there	could	
not	be	a	sense	in	which	something	is	and	a	sense	in	which	it	isn’t	a	reason	to	act	–	there	is	just	
one	 sense	 of	 that	 reason	 expression,	 even	 though	 the	 conditions	 for	 its	 application	 are	
disjunctive.	In	contrast	if	a	single	reason	expression	can	be	used	to	pick	out	two	different	kinds	
of	reason,	there	are	two	senses	to	that	expression,	and	this	 is	so	even	if	both	of	the	kinds	of	
reason	picked	out	are	non-disjunctive.2	
2 Expanding	the	categorisation	schema	
To	account	for	the	possibility	of	a	plurality	of	senses	for	any	given	reason	expression,	we	need	
to	expand	the	categorisation	schema	set	out	in	Table	I-3	(and,	indeed,	expanding	the	schema	
in	this	way	can	be	used	to	further	explicate	what	we	mean	by	there	being	different	senses).		
																																								 																				
1	I	 haven’t	 considered	 any	 disjunctive	 conditions	 for	 being	 a	 reason	 (I	 am	not	 convinced	 that	 anyone	
holds	what	I	would	call	a	disjunctive	theory).	However,	we	would	have	a	disjunctive	claim	about	reasons	
to	act	 if,	for	 instance,	we	said:	 ‘p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	 if	and	only	if	either	p	makes	A’s	φing,	 in	some	
respect,	worth	 doing	 or	 A	 takes	p	 to	make	 A’s	 φing,	 in	 some	 respect,	worth	 doing.’	 This	would	 be	 a	
disjunctive,	 but	 nonetheless	 univocal,	 account	 of	 the	 expression	 ‘a	 reason	 there	 is	 to	 act’	 (it	 is	
disjunctive	between	the	favourist	and	deliberativist	conditions).	
2	In	the	event	that	this	is	not	clear,	consider	the	following:	there	is	a	sense	of	the	word	‘bat’	according	to	
which	that	which	a	hitter	in	a	baseball	game	uses	is	a	‘bat’,	and	a	sense	in	which	it	isn’t	a	‘bat’	(it’s	not	a	
winged	mammal).	 The	 expression	 ‘a	 bat’	 has	 two	 senses,	 each	 picking	 out	 a	 non-disjunctive	 kind	 of	
thing.	In	contrast	‘(sporting)	bat	∨	(animal)	bat’	is	a	disjunctive	expression	(you	could	say	that	it	picks	out	
a	‘disjunctive	kind	of	thing’	if	you	believe	in	disjunctive	kinds)	that	has	only	one	sense	–	it’s	not	the	case	
that	something	could	be	both	‘(sporting)	bat	∨	(animal)	bat’	and	not	‘(sporting)	bat	∨	(animal)	bat’	(that	
is,	 if	 something	 is	 either	 a	 sporting	bat	or	 an	animal	bat	 then	 is	 a	 ‘(sporting)	bat	∨	 (animal)	bat’).	My	
point	is	just	that	being	disjunctive	is	unrelated	to	having	several	senses.	
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Table	V-1	 is	a	categorisation	schema	that	allows	for	two	senses	of	a	given	reason	expression	
and	thereby	provides	a	way	to	represent	both	univocal	and	pluralist3	theories	of	reasons.		
Reason	expression	 Sense	A	 Sense	B	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ…	 Claim	 Claim	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing…	 Claim	 Claim	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ…	 Claim	 Claim	
For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing…	 Claim	 Claim	
Table	V-1:	A	categorisation	schema	that	accommodates	pluralist	theories	of	reasons	
Recall	 that	 a	 reason	 expression	 only	 picks	 out	 different	 kinds	 of	 reason	 if	 the	 conditions	
between	different	senses	of	the	expression	differ	(if	they	don’t	then	the	‘different’	senses	both	
pick	out	the	same	kinds	of	reason,	in	which	case	there	is	really	only	one	sense).	So,	a	univocal	
theory	 is	 represented	 in	Table	V-1	by	providing	 the	 same	 conditions	under	both	 senses.	 For	
instance,	 the	 ‘Received	 View’,	 which	 is	 a	 univocal	 theory	 that	 is	 classified	 in	 the	 original	
schema	as	(F,	F,	F,	P),	would	be	as	follows	in	this	new	schema:	
Reason	expression	 Sense	A	 Sense	B	
Reasons	there	are	to	act	 Favourism	 Favourism	
Reasons	for	acting	 Favourism	 Favourism	
Reasons	one	has	to	act	 Favourism	 Favourism	
Reasons	for	which	one	acts	 Psychologism	 Psychologism	
Table	V-2:	The,	univocal,	'Received	View'	represented	in	the	new	schema	
There	is	only	one	sense	to	each	expression	in	the	‘Received	View’,	hence	the	claims	about	each	
reason	under	each	 ‘sense’	 in	 the	 categorisation	 schema	are	 the	 same.	We	can	enrich	our	4-
tuple	 descriptions	 to	 represent	 the	 possibility	 of	 theories	 with	 multiple	 senses	 of	 a	 given	
reason	expression	by	introducing	a	‘/’	to	denote	alternate	senses.	So:	(F,	F,	F,	P)	≡	(F/F,	F/F,	F/F,	
P/P).		
Now,	 in	 contrast	 to	 this	univocal	 theory,	 a	pluralist	 theory	of	 reasons	 is	any	 theory	 that,	 for	
some	 reason	 expression,	 makes	 a	 different	 claim	 under	 each	 sense.	 Here	 is	 an	 example	
pluralist	theory	represented	using	this	schema:	
																																								 																				
3	Or	at	least	‘dual’	sense	theories	–	I	suppose	it’s	possible	that	an	expression	could	have	more	than	two	
senses,	but	I	don’t	consider	that	here.	
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Reason	expression	 Sense	A	 Sense	B	
Reasons	there	are	to	act	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	
Reasons	for	acting	 Favourism	 Favourism	
Reasons	one	has	to	act	 Favourism	 Favourism	
Reasons	for	which	one	acts	 Favourism	 Favourism	
Table	V-3:	An	example	pluralist	theory	
The	4-tuple	description	of	this	theory	is	(F/D,	F/F,	F/F,	F/F).	This	is	not,	to	my	knowledge,	one	
that	 anyone	 advocates	 –	 I	 use	 it	 only	 to	 indicate	 what	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 looks	 like	 in	 this	
schema.	This	theory	is	pluralist	with	respect	to	reasons	there	are	to	act;	it	takes	‘a	reason	there	
is	 to	 act’	 to	 pick	 out	 either	 a	 fact	 that	 makes	 the	 act,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing,	 or	
something	that	the	agent	took	to	make	the	act,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	But	it	is	univocal	
with	respect	to	all	the	other	reason	expressions.		
In	what	follows	I	want	to	briefly	represent	(what	I	take	to	be)	the	two	main	‘pluralist’	theories	
of	reasons	that	have	been	considered	in	the	literature	to	date.	
3 Favourist/Deliberativist	(F/D)	pluralism	3.1 Objective	and	subjective	reasons	
An	increasingly	common	response	to	cases	like	Sally’s	mistake	about	the	bear	or	my	ignorance	
about	my	 lack	of	milk	 is	 to	distinguish	between	objective	and	subjective	kinds	of	reason	(e.g.	
Stoutland	2007;	Schroeder	2007;	Markovits	2011;	Vogelstein	2012;	Whiting	2014).	An	objective	
reason	 is	something	that	 (in	my	parlance)	makes	one’s	action,	 in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	
whereas	a	subjective	reason	is	something	that	(again,	in	my	parlance)	the	agent	took	to	make	
their	action,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.4		
So,	 to	 give	 some	 examples,	 what	 Sally	 takes	 to	 make	 running	 worth	 doing	 (that	 a	 bear	 is	
chasing	her)	 is	a	subjective	 reason	 for	her	 to	 run	but	not	an	objective	 reason	 for	her	 to	 run.	
And,	 in	 contrast,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 am	 out	 of	 milk	 is	 an	 objective	 reason	 for	 me	 to	 buy	more	
(because	 it	 makes	 it,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing)	 but	 not	 a	 subjective	 reason	 (because	 I	
believe	that	I	have	plenty	–	I	don’t	take	anything	to	make	buying	milk,	in	some	respect,	worth	
doing).	If,	on	the	other	hand,	it	is	raining	and	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	then	the	fact	that	it	is	
raining	 is	 both	 an	 objective	 reason	 and	 a	 subjective	 reason	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	 umbrella	
																																								 																				
4	An	 alternative	 vernacular	 for	 the	 subjective/objective	 reasons	 distinction	 is	 talk	 of	 first-person	 and	
third-person	reasons	(respectively).	
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(because	it	both	makes	taking	an	umbrella,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing	and	I	believe	that	it	
does).5		
It	 should	 perhaps	 be	 clear	 that,	 given	 these	 definitions,	 an	 objective	 reason	 is	 the	 kind	 of	
reason	 that	 favourists	 take	 reason	 expressions	 to	 pick	 out	 (i.e.	 the	 sort	 of	 thing	 that	makes	
actions,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing),	 and	 a	 subjective	 reason	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 reason	 that	
deliberativists	 take	 reason	 expressions	 to	 pick	 out	 (i.e.	 the	 sort	 of	 thing	 that	 agents	 take	 to	
make	their	actions,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing).	3.2 A	pluralist	theory	
So	far	the	distinction	between	objective	and	subjective	reasons	is	merely	terminological.	One	
could	make	this	distinction	and	yet	retain	a	univocal	theory	of	reasons	if	one	were	to	say	that	
no	 single	 reason	 expression	 can	 be	 used	 to	 pick	 out	 either	 objective	 or	 subjective	 reasons.6	
However,	 some	explicitly	 invoke	 the	distinction	between	objective	and	subjective	 reasons	so	
as	 to	offer	 a	pluralist	 theory	of	 reasons.	 For	 instance,	Vogelstein	 says	of	Parfit’s	(2011)	well-
known	‘snake’	example7:	
There	seems	to	be	a	sense	in	which	there	is	a	reason	for	you	to	run	away	(since	you	believe	that	
running	away	will	save	your	life),	and	a	sense	in	which	there	is	no	reason	for	you	to	run	away	
(since	no	good	will	come	of	it).	That	is,	there	is	a	subjective	reason,	but	no	objective	reason,	for	
you	to	run	away.	Likewise,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	there	is	a	reason	for	you	to	stand	still	(since	
it	will	save	your	 life),	and	a	sense	 in	which	there	 is	no	reason	for	you	to	stand	still	 (since	you	
believe	nothing	to	suggest	that	any	good	will	come	of	it).	That	is,	there	is	an	objective	reason,	
but	no	subjective	reason,	for	you	to	stand	still.	(Vogelstein	2012,	241)	
Vogelstein	is	saying	is	that	there	are	two	senses	to	being	a	reason	there	is	to	act.	One	sense,	he	
suggests,	corresponds	to	objective	reasons,	the	other	corresponding	to	subjective	reasons.	So,	
since	he	thinks	one	of	the	reason	expressions	has	two	senses,	he	is	offering	what	I	have	called	
a	‘pluralist’	theory	of	reasons.	And	according	to	his	pluralist	theory	of	reasons	one	sense	of	the	
expression,	‘a	reason	there	is	to	act’	is	favourist	and	the	other	sense	is	deliberativist.	
																																								 																				
5	If	 one	 assumes	 that	 intentional	 objects	 are	 propositions	 and	 that	 true	 propositions	 are	 facts	 –	
otherwise	 the	 ontology	 of	 subjective	 and	 objective	 reasons	 is	 different,	 so	 one	 and	 the	 same	 thing	
cannot	be	both	an	objective	and	a	subjective	reason.	That	being	so,	in	this	example	I	would	still	have	an	
objective	 and	 a	 subjective	 reason,	 they	 would	 just	 be	 different	 things	 on	 account	 of	 the	 ontological	
difference	between	these	kinds	of	reason.	
6	For	instance,	I	think	that	Schroeder	(2008)	invokes	the	objective	and	subjective	reason	distinction	only	
to	say	that	the	expression	‘a	reason	there	is	to	act’	picks	out	objective	reasons,	whereas	the	expression	
‘a	reason	one	has	to	act’	picks	out	subjective	reasons	(this	is,	I	think,	also	Dancy’s	(2012)	interpretation	
of	 Schroeder’s	 view),	 so	 his	 theory	 is	 not	 pluralist,	 it	 just	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 kinds	 of	 reason	
picked	 out	 by	 these	 expressions	 (which	 are	 normally	 taken	 to	 be	 co-extensive	 (see	 §	(I)1)).	 For	 the	
classification	of	Schroeder’s	view	see	Table	I-6.	
7	Here,	 for	 reference,	 is	 Vogelstein’s	 version	 of	 this	 example:	 ‘While	 walking	 in	 a	 desert,	 you	 have	
angered	a	poisonous	 snake.	 You	believe	 that	 running	away	will	 save	 your	 life,	 and	believe	nothing	 to	
suggest	otherwise.	As	it	turns	out,	however,	you	must	stand	still	in	order	to	save	your	life,	as	this	snake	
will	attack	moving	targets.’	(Vogelstein	2012,	241)	
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Vogelstein	 is	 not	 alone.	 Although	 they	 don’t	 talk	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘objective’	 and	 ‘subjective’	
reasons,	both	Hyman	(2011)	and	Locke	(2015)	offer	a	pluralist	account	of	the	expression	‘the	
agent’s	reason	for	acting,’	of	precisely	this	kind.	They	both	hold	(in	my	parlance)	that	there	is	a	
sense	 of	 ‘the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting’	 that	 picks	 out	 a	 consideration	 in	 light	 of	 which	 the	
agent	acted	(that	 is,	a	subjective	 reason	that	they	acted	on),	and	a	different	sense	that	picks	
out	 a	 fact	 that	makes	 their	 action,	all	 things	 considered,	worth	 doing,	 and	 explains	 it	 in	 the	
right	way	(that	 is,	an	objective	reason	that	explains	their	action	in	the	right	way).8	Thus,	both	
Hyman	 and	 Locke	 think	 that	 one	 of	 the	 senses	 of	 being	 a	 reason	 for	 which	 an	 agent	 acts	
corresponds	to	favourism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	and	another	sense	corresponds	
to	deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	
So	there	are	pluralist	theories	that	mix	favourism	and	deliberativism.	I	don’t	want	(or	need)	to	
categorise	them	all,	so,	for	the	sake	of	argument	let’s	just	characterise	a	pluralist	theory	of	this	
kind	as	pluralist	about	every	reason	expression	(i.e.	(F/D,	F/D,	F/D,	F/D)):	9	
Reason	expression	 Sense	A	 Sense	B	
Reasons	there	are	to	act	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	
Reasons	for	acting	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	
Reasons	one	has	to	act	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	
Reasons	for	which	one	acts	 Favourism	 Deliberativism	
Table	V-4:	Pure	F/D	pluralism	
4 Favourist/Psychologist	(F/P)	pluralism	
Michael	 Smith	 (1987,	1994)	 is	 typically	 taken	 to	hold	what	 I	have	 called	 the	 ‘Received	View’	
(see	 Table	 V-2),	 which	 is	 a	 combination	 of,	 inter	 alia,	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act	 and	
psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	I	think	that	this	is	a	misreading	of	Smith.	In	
what	 follows	 I	 want,	 briefly,	 to	 make	 the	 case	 that	 Smith	 argues	 for	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 of	
reasons.	4.1 The	misinterpretation	of	Michael	Smith	
Firstly,	 although	 Smith’s	 definition	 of	 ‘normative	 reasons’	 in	 these	 works	 is	 loose,10	we	 can	
plausibly	 treat	what	 he	 refers	 to	 as	 ‘normative	 reasons’	 as	what	we	 have	 already	 called	 an	
																																								 																				
8	Although	 it	 is	perhaps	worth	noting	 that	 they	differ	 in	 their	views	of	what	 it	 takes	 for	such	a	 fact	 to	
explain	an	action	in	the	right	way	(Hyman	thinks	it	is	knowledge,	Locke	thinks	it	is	an	explanatory	chain).	
9	Some	theories	may	not	be	pluralist	about	every	expression,	in	the	way	that	this	one	is	–	but	that	isn’t	
very	important	here.	
10	(See	Smith	1987,	39)	
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‘objective	 reason’	 (that	 is,	 something	 that	makes	 an	 action,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing),	
which	 is,	 you	 will	 recall,	 what	 favourists	 take	 reasons	 to	 be.	 Smith’s	 usage	 of	 the	 term	
‘normative	reason’	is	thus	consistent	with	its	contemporary	usage.11	
In	 contrast,	 Smith’s	 usage	 of	 the	 term	 ‘motivating	 reason’	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 contemporary	
usage.12		 Smith	 argues	 that	motivating	 reasons	 are	 all	 psychological	 states	 of	 the	 agent	 that	
rationalise	 their	 action	 (that	 is,	motivating	 reasons	 are	 the	 sorts	 of	 thing	 that	 psychologism	
takes	reasons	to	be),	and	this	is	because	he	defines	motivating	reasons	such	that:	
The	distinctive	feature	of	a	motivating	reason	to	φ	is	that	in	virtue	of	having	such	a	reason	an	
agent	 is	 in	a	state	that	 is	potentially	explanatory	of	his	φing.	 (Note	the	‘potentially’.	An	agent	
may	 therefore	have	a	motivating	 reason	 to	φ	without	 that	 reason's	being	overriding.)	 (Smith	
1987,	38	emphasis	in	original)	
It	 is	 typical	 to	 interpret	 Smith’s	 remarks	 about	motivating	 reasons	 to	 be	 about	 ‘the	 agent’s	
reason	 for	acting’,	and	hence	 to	 take	Smith	 to	be	arguing	 for	a	univocal	psychologism	about	
the	agent’s	reason	for	acting13	–	this,	I	think,	is	a	mistake.	For	one,	the	fact	that	he	talks	about	
motivating	 reasons	 being	 only	 potentially	 explanatory	 should	 already	 tell	 us	 that	 he	 isn’t	
talking	about	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	–	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	is	something	that	is	
generally	taken	to	be	(and	Smith	certainly	takes	it	to	be)	actually	explanatory	(see	§	(IV)1.2).		
Furthermore,	 the	fact	 that	Smith	talks	about	motivating	reasons	to	φ	 should	be	 indicative	of	
the	fact	that	the	kind	of	reason	he	is	talking	about	is	such	that	reasons	of	that	kind	are	(in	the	
sense	introduced	in	§	(I)1)	 independent	of	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	That	is,	the	
‘to’	 preposition	makes	 clear	 that	 something	 could	 be	 a	motivating	 reason	 to	 do	 something	
even	 if	one	does	not	do	 it.	Now,	since	we	know14	that	 reasons	of	 the	kind	picked	out	by	the	
expression	‘the	agent’s	reason	for	acting’,	are	dependent	on	the	actions	they	are	reasons	for,15	
when	Smith	refers	to	‘motivating	reasons	to	φ’	he	can’t	be	talking	about	the	agent’s	reason	for	
acting.	
Thus,	 contrary	 to	 the	 typical	 interpretation,	when	 Smith	 talks	 about	 ‘motivating	 reasons’	 he	
isn’t	necessarily	talking	about	those	reasons	picked	out	by	the	expression	‘the	agent’s	reason	
for	acting’.	So,	when	he	says	that	motivating	reasons	are	features	of	the	agent’s	psychology,	he	
is	likewise	not	necessarily	advocating	psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	I	think	
that	in	saying	what	he	does,	Smith	isn’t	making	a	claim	about	any	particular	reason	expression	
–	he	is	just	defining	the	term	‘motivating	reason’.		
																																								 																				
11	See	§	(I)4.1	for	a	discussion	of	the	contemporary	usage	of	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons.	
12	This	a	point	that	both	Darwall	(2003,	442–43)	and	Setiya	(2007,	30)	make.	
13	Which	is,	indeed,	why	he	is	associated	with	the	Received	View.	
14	See	§	(I)1.5.	
15	In	the	sense	that	its	reason-hood	depends	on	the	occurrence	of	the	action	for	which	it	is	a	reason.	
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The	right	way	to	understand	Smith’s	usage	of	the	terms	‘normative’	and	‘motivating’	reasons	
is,	 I	 suggest,	 as	 different	 senses	 of	 any	 given	 reason	 expression.	 For	 instance,	 I	 take	 such	 a	
pluralist	conception	to	be	the	most	natural	way	to	construe	the	following	remarks:	
The	claim	that	A	has	a	reason	to	φ	is	ambiguous.	It	may	be	a	claim	about	a	motivating	reason	
that	A	has	or	a	claim	about	a	normative	reason	that	A	has.	(Smith	1987,	38	emphasis	in	original)	
Smith	 is	 saying	 that	 the	expression	 ‘a	 reason	A	has	 to	φ’	 is	ambiguous	between	 two	senses:	
being	 a	 normative	 reason	 (which	 is	 the	 favourist	 kind	 of	 reason,	 on	 Smith’s	 definition)	 and	
being	a	motivating	reason	(which	is	a	psychologistic	kind	of	reason,	on	Smith’s	definition).	That	
is,	 Smith	 is	 recommending	 a	 pluralist	 account	 of	 that	 expression,	 and	 therefore,	 a	 pluralist	
theory	of	reasons.	Moreover,	I	think,	Smith’s	pluralism	extends	to	all	the	reason	expressions.16	4.2 Another	kind	of	pluralism	
That	having	been	said,	Smith’s	actual	theory	 is	 largely	 irrelevant	to	our	primary	concern.	The	
remarks	 above	 are	mainly	 intended	as	 context	 (if	 somewhat	polemical);	 all	 that	we	need	 to	
take	 from	 this	 discussion	 is	 that	 the	 materials	 for	 another	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reasons	 are	
already	out	there	–	one	which	takes	all	reason	expressions	to	have	two	senses,	one	favourist	
and	 the	 other	 psychologist	 (i.e.	 (F/P,	 F/P,	 F/P,	 F/P)).	We	 can	 represent	 such	 a	 theory	 in	 our	
revised	schema	as	follows:	
Reason	expression	 Sense	A	 Sense	B	
Reasons	there	are	to	act	 Favourism	 Psychologism	
Reasons	for	acting	 Favourism	 Psychologism	
Reasons	one	has	to	act	 Favourism	 Psychologism	
Reasons	for	which	one	acts	 Favourism	 Psychologism	
Table	V-5:	Pure	F/P	pluralism	
5 Why	be	a	pluralist?	
We	have	 considered	 two	distinct	pluralist	 theories	of	 reasons,	which	 I	 have	 called	 ‘pure	F/D	
pluralism’	and	‘pure	F/P	pluralism’.	But	why	would	you	want	to	be	a	pluralist	in	the	first	place?	
																																								 																				
16	Consider	his	use	of	 the	expression	 ‘the	agent’s	normative	 reason	 for	 acting.’	 (Smith	1994,	131–32).	
Consider	 also	 the	 following:	 ‘The	 distinction	 is	 that	 between	 psychological	 states	 that	 teleologically	
explain	[i.e.	motivating	reasons]	and	considerations	that	justify	[i.e.	normative	reasons].	The	importance	
of	making	this	distinction	in	this	way	becomes	clear	when	we	ask	whether	all	actions	must	be	done	for	
reasons.	 For	 though	 this	 question	 gets	 answered	 resoundingly	 in	 the	 affirmative	 when	 reasons	 are	
understood	to	be	motivating	reasons…	the	question	gets	answered	just	as	resoundingly	in	the	negative	
when	reasons	are	understood	to	be	normative	reasons.’	(Smith	2004,	174–75)	
	
	 88	
5.1 Pluralism	respects	the	‘two	senses’	intuition	
Well,	if	it	strikes	you	(as	it	strikes	me)	that	it	is	true	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	Sally	runs	for	
a	reason	and	a	sense	in	which	she	doesn’t,	or	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	I	have	a	reason	to	
buy	milk	and	a	sense	in	which	I	don’t,	then	you	have	already	set	the	stage	for	a	plural	theory	of	
reasons.	Indeed,	it	seems	to	me,	if	you	want	your	theory	of	reasons	to	respect	this	‘two	senses’	
intuition	 (which	 you	 might,	 if	 it	 is	 an	 intuition	 you	 share)	 then	 you	 have	 to	 adopt	 a	 plural	
theory	of	reasons.	5.2 Pluralism	may	solve	the	problems	that	univocal	theories	face	
A	second	appealing	 feature	of	pluralist	 theories	of	 reasons	 is	 that	 they	 seem	to	provide	one	
with	a	means	of	 solving	many	of	 the	problems	 faced	by	 the	univocal	claims	discussed	 in	 the	
previous	chapters.	
For	instance,	consider	The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	discussed	in	§	(II)4.2,	which	consisted	of	
the	following	set	of	mutually	inconsistent	claims:	
The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	
(F4)	 Sally	ran	deliberately.	
(F3)	 If	A	φs	deliberately	then	A	φs	for	a	reason.	
(F7)	 If	A	φs	for	a	reason	then	there	was	a	reason,	p,	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	only	 if	A’s	φing,	 is	 in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	
According	to	a	pluralist	theory	of	reasons,	this	problem	needs	re-formulating	in	a	manner	that	
brings	 to	 light	which	 sense	 of	 each	 reason	 expression	 the	 claim	 is	 being	 made	 about.	 So,	
denoting	the	different	senses	of	each	reason	expression	as	‘reasonA’	(favourist)	and	‘reasonB’,	
(either	deliberativist	or	psychologist	 –	depending	on	one’s	 theory),	we	 can	 re-formulate	 this	
problem	as	the	following	set	of	mutually	inconsistent	claims:	
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A	re-formulation	of	The	Deliberate	Action	Problem17	
(F4)	 Sally	ran	deliberately.	
(F3’)	 If	A	φs	deliberately	then	A	φs	for	a	reasonB.	
(UNI)	 A	φs	for	a	reasonB	if	and	only	if	A	φs	for	a	reasonA.	
(F7’)	 If	A	φs	for	a	reasonA	then	there	was	a	reasonA,	p,	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV’)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reasonA	for	A	to	φ	only	if	A’s	φing,	is	in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	
By	 adding	 (UNI),	 this	 re-formulation	 makes	 a	 premise	 of	 the	 problem	 that	 is	 implicit	 in	 its	
original	 formulation,	explicit:	 that	 ‘the	 reason	 for	which	one	acts’	 is	a	univocal	expression.	A	
pluralist	theory	of	reasons	then	solves	The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	by	rejecting	(UNI),	which	
thus	avoids	the	need	to	reject	the	other	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.		
And,	 indeed,	 pluralist	 theories	 of	 reasons	 can	 solve	 most	 of	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	
previous	 chapters	 in	 a	 similar	manner.	 However,	 they	 don’t	 solve	 all	 of	 them,	 and	 pluralist	
theories	face	new	problems	of	their	own,	as	the	next	sections	will	show.	
6 Pluralism	is	no	panacea	
Since	I	share	the	‘two	senses’	intuition,	I	think	that	our	eventual	theory	of	reasons	ought	to	be	
pluralist.	However,	as	I	will	argue	in	this	section,	just	adopting	a	pluralist	theory	of	reasons	is	
not	enough	to	solve	the	problems	considered	in	the	previous	chapters.	Firstly,	 ‘conventional’	
pluralist	 theories	 (i.e.	 those	made	 up	 of	 only	 favourist,	 psychologist	 or	 deliberativist	 claims)	
cannot	solve	all	of	 the	problems	considered	 in	previous	chapters.	And	secondly,	 the	pluralist	
solution	to	any	given	problem	relies	on	there	being	an	implicit	univocality	assumption	in	that	
problem	 –	 but	 since	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 that	 all	 of	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 previous	
chapters	 implicitly	 include	 such	 an	 assumption,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 that	 pluralism	 really	
provides	us	with	a	solution.	
																																								 																				
17	This	is	only	meant	to	be	an	indicative	example	of	how	the	pluralist	might	respond;	in	particular,	there	
are	 other	 ways	 to	 formulate	 this	 problem	 that	 change	 which	 reason	 expression	 the	 univocality	
assumption	 concerns.	 For	 example,	 compare	 (UNI)	 with	 (UNI*)	 in	 the	 following,	 alternative	 re-
formulation	of	The	Deliberate	Action	Problem:	
(F4)	 Sally	ran	deliberately.	
(F3’)	 If	A	φs	deliberately	then	A	φs	for	a	reasonB		
(F7*)	 If	A	φs	for	a	reasonB	then	there	was	a	reasonB,	p,	for	A	to	φ.	
(UNI*)	 For	any	p,	p	is	a	reasonB	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	is	a	reasonA	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV’)	 For	any	p,	p	is	a	reasonA	for	A	to	φ	only	if	A’s	φing,	is	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.
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6.1 Conventional	pluralism	cannot	solve	all	the	problems	
There	 is	 a	 problem	 that	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 that	 only	 consists	 of	 favourist,	 psychologist	 or	
deliberativist	 claims,18	i.e.	 a	 conventional	 pluralist	 theory,	 cannot	 solve	 –	 The	 Experiential	
Reasons	Problem.		
Recall	that	favourism,	psychologism	and	deliberativism	all	face	some	form	of	The	Experiential	
Reasons	Problem	because	none	of	them	are	compatible	with	the	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	
that	(i)	Sally’s	hearing	a	bear-like	sound	could	be	her	reason	for	running;	or	(ii)	that	my	reading	
that	my	friend	had	won	award	could	be	my	reason	for	congratulating	her.	That	being	so,	any	
conventional	pluralist	theory	will	also	face	The	Experiential	Reasons	Problem.	
Furthermore,	it	is	worth	noting	that	since	both	favourism	and	deliberativism	face	some	form	of	
The	 Psychological	 Reasons	 Problem,	 any	 pluralist	 theory	 that	 only	 consists	 of	 favourist	 or	
deliberativist	 claims	 (such	 as	 pure	 F/D	 pluralism),	 will	 also	 face	 The	 Psychological	 Reasons	
Problem.	
The	 point	 of	 these	 remarks	 is	 this:	 even	 if	 we	 adopt	 a	 (conventional)	 pluralist	 theory	 of	
reasons,	that	still	will	not	help	us	solve	all	the	problems	considered	in	the	previous	chapters.	If	
we	are	to	do	that,	we	need	a	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons.	6.2 Just	because	you	could	doesn’t	mean	you	can	
Secondly,	 we	 should	 be	 sceptical	 about	 the	 pluralist’s	 approach	 to	 solving	 the	 problems	
considered;	 as	 Dancy	 puts	 it:	 ‘one	 cannot	 resolve	 philosophical	 puzzlement	 in	 this	 way	 by	
multiplication	of	senses.’	(2011,	351)	
One	way	to	interpret	Dancy’s	remark	is	the	insistence	that	you	can’t	solve	these	problems	by	
just	postulating	different	senses	that	aren’t	actually	 ‘there’.	However,	as	Dustin	Locke	rightly	
points	out,	this	is	not	what	the	pluralist	intends:	
I	am	not	suggesting	that	we	can	resolve	philosophical	puzzlement	by	multiplication	of	senses.	
Rather,	 I	 am	 claiming	 that	 senses	 are	 already	multiple—the	 phrase	 ‘S’s	 reason	 [for	 acting]’	
already	has	two	distinct	senses.	(Locke	2015,	218)	
To	re-interpret	Locke’s	argument	in	my	own	terms:	if	you	have	the	‘two	senses’	intuition	it	 is	
that	 intuition	 that	makes	you	 think	 that	 reasons	are	plural,	which	 then	 forms	 the	basis	 for	a	
plural	theory	of	reasons.	That	is,	 it’s	not	that	you	are	multiplying	senses	in	order	to	solve	the	
problems,	it’s	that	(at	least	if	you	have	the	‘two	senses’	intuition)	the	senses	just	are	multiple,	
and	once	you	acknowledge	 that,	many	of	 the	problems	 that	 a	univocal	 theory	 faces	 can	 fall	
																																								 																				
18	As	opposed	to	the	claims	of	some	new	family,	not	yet	considered.	
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away.	 If	the	‘two	senses’	 intuition	is	right,	then,	the	pluralist	can	insist	that	our	philosophical	
puzzlement	 has	 arisen	 only	 because	 we	 haven’t	 recognised	 that	 the	 senses	 already	 are	
multiple.	
However,	 a	 more	 nuanced	 interpretation	 of	 Dancy’s	 objection	 is	 harder	 for	 the	 pluralist	 to	
avoid.	I	think	that	Dancy	can	reasonably	be	interpreted	as	having	meant	that	even	if	the	senses	
are	multiple,	 the	 fact	 that	 invoking	multiple	 senses	of	 the	 relevant	 reason	expressions	could	
solve	many	of	the	problems	considered	in	the	previous	chapters	should	not	make	us	think	that	
they	can	be	solved	that	way	(i.e.	that	that	is	the	correct	solution	to	them).	
It	might	be	that	the	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	in	any	given	problem	are	really	restricted	to	
a	single	sense	of	the	reason	expressions	involved	–	in	which	case	the	assumption	of	univocality	
does	no	work,	and	the	problem	returns.	That	 is,	 for	 instance,	The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	
may	actually	be	like	this:	
Another	re-formulation	of	The	Deliberate	Action	Problem	
(F4)	 Sally	ran	deliberately.	
(F3*)	 If	A	φs	deliberately	then	A	φs	for	a	reasonA.	
(UNI)	 A	φs	for	a	reasonB	if	and	only	if	A	φs	for	a	reasonA.	
(F7’)	 If	A	φs	for	a	reasonA	then	there	was	a	reasonA,	p,	for	A	to	φ.	
(FAV’)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reasonA	for	A	to	φ	only	if	A’s	φing,	is	in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
(F10)	 Sally’s	running	was	not	at	all	worth	doing.	
In	this	construal,	because	all	the	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	are	all	about	the	same	sense	of	
reason,	 ‘reasonA’,	 the	univocality	assumption	does	no	work.	So,	a	pluralist	 theory	of	 reasons	
would	thus	still	have	to	find	some	claim,	in	addition	to	(UNI),	to	reject	–	the	problem	returns.	
A	pluralist	solution	to	any	given	problem	relies	on	that	problem	being	the	result	of	a	conflation	
of	 different	 senses	 of	 the	 same	 reason	 expression	 –	 that	 is,	 it	 relies	 on	 a	 univocality	
assumption	being	a	part	of	every	problem.	The	difficulty	for	pluralist	solutions	to	the	problems	
considered	 is	 that	 it	 seems	quite	plausible	 that	at	 least	some	of	 the	problems	considered	do	
not	result	from	a	conflation	of	senses,	and,	in	that	case	pluralism	is	no	help	in	solving	them.	
So,	again,	it	seems	that	if	we	do	want	to	solve	all	of	the	problems	considered	in	the	previous	
chapters,	we	need	a	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons.	
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7 A	challenge	for	pluralism	
It	 is	 generally19	agreed	 that	 whenever	 we	 give	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 we	 explain	 the	
agent’s	 action	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 them	 seem	 rational.20	For	 instance,	 saying	 that	 Sally’s	
reason	for	running	was	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	explains	the	fact	that	she	
ran	in	a	way	that	makes	her	seem	rational	for	running;	and,	likewise,	saying	that	my	reason	for	
congratulating	my	friend	was	that	she	had	won	an	award	explains	why	I	congratulated	her	in	a	
way	that	makes	me	seem	rational	for	having	done	so.	
This	observation	is	of	some	relevance	to	pluralism	because	it	is	seemingly	not	restricted	to	any	
particular	sense	of	the	 ‘agent’s	reason	for	acting’	expression.	That	 is,	 it	seems	as	though,	we	
may	add	a	further	prima	facie	reasonable	claim	to	those	already	considered:	
(S1)	 Whenever	 we	 give	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting,	whatever	 the	 sense	 of	 the	
expression	 used,	 we	 explain	 their	 action	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 them	 seem	
rational.	
Why	is	this	claim	problematic	for	pluralism?	Well,	recall	the	following:	
(F5)	 Sally’s	reason	for	running	was,	inter	alia,	that	she	believed	a	bear	was	chasing	
her.	
(P1)	 My	 reason	 for	 congratulating	my	 friend	was,	 inter	alia,	 that	 she	had	won	an	
award.	
Only	 pure	 F/P	 pluralism21	can	 accommodate	 the	 truth	 of	 both	 (F5)	 and	 (P1);	 it	 does	 so	 by	
insisting	 that	 a	 different	 sense	 of	 the	 expression,	 ‘the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting’,	 is	 being	
invoked	 in	 each	 case	 (psychologistic	 in	 the	 former,	 favourist	 in	 the	 latter).	 This	 view	 is	
problematic	because,	 if	 it	were	 true,	 it	would	be	hard	 to	see	why	our	 respective	 reasons	 for	
acting	can	both	be	cited	in	an	explanation	of	our	actions	that	makes	us	each	seem	rational.	
Consider:	according	to	pure	F/P	pluralism,	the	relations	between	(i)	Sally’s	belief	and	her	action	
and	 (ii)	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 and	my	 action	 are	 different.	 And	 yet,	 giving	
either	explains	our	respective	actions	 in	a	way	that	makes	us	seem	rational.	So	the	pure	F/P	
pluralist	 is	 seemingly	 forced	 to	 say	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 reason-relations	 being	 different,	 by	
incredible	 coincidence,	 both	 Sally’s	 and	my	 reason	 for	 acting	 end	 up	 standing	 in	 a	 common	
relation	to	our	respective	actions	–	the	relation	in	virtue	of	which	giving	the	agent’s	reason	for	
acting	explains	their	action	 in	a	way	that	makes	them	seem	rational.	Pure	F/P	pluralism	thus	
																																								 																				
19	(E.g.	Dancy	2000,	8;	Stout	2009,	53;	Gibbons	2010,	343;	Broome	2013,	47)	
20	This	 is	 not	 to	 assume	 that	 it	 is	 the	 agent’s	 reason	 that	does	 the	explaining:	 one	 can	hold	 this	 view	
without	holding	that	it	is	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	that	explains	their	action,	as,	for	instance,	Dancy	
(2014)	does.	
21	Or	less	‘pure’	variants	of	it,	such	as:	(F/F,	F/F,	F/F,	F/P).	
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faces	an	unenviable	dilemma:	either	it	accepts	this	highly	implausible	coincidence22	or	it	rejects	
this	new	prima	facie	reasonable	claim.23	
This	is	a	particular	problem	for	F/P	pluralism,	but	it	is	also	a	constraint	on	any	pluralist	theory	
of	reasons.	That	 is,	any	pluralist	theory	of	reasons	will	have	to	provide	some	account	of	how	
(S1)	could	be	true,	or	suffer	the	consequences	of	rejecting	it.	 I	will	return	to	this	point	 in	the	
final	chapter,	when	I	set	out	my	own	pluralist	theory	of	reasons.		
8 Conclusion	
I	have	suggested	that	while	the	‘two	senses’	intuition	might	provide	us	with	some	motivation	
for	adopting	a	pluralist	theory	of	reasons,	we	cannot	rely	on	pluralism	to	solve	the	problems	
considered	 in	 the	previous	chapters.	 Instead,	 I	have	argued,	we	need	a	new	family	of	claims	
about	reasons.	The	aim	of	the	remaining	chapters	is	to	advance	and	then	defend	such	a	family.	
																																								 																				
22	The	‘highly	implausible	co-incidence’	being	that	giving	either	sense	of	the	expression,	independently,	
explains	the	agent’s	action	in	a	way	that	makes	them	seem	rational.	
23	I.e.	(S1).	
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(VI)		A	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons	
In	which	I	set	out	a	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons,	and	introduce	the	major	
challenge	 to	 it.	 I	 define	 ‘pro	 tanto	 rational’	 actions	 as	 actions	 that	 an	 agent	
takes	to	be,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	I	set	out	a	new	family	of	claims	about	
reasons,	explanatory	 rationalism,	which	 says	 that	all	 practical	 reasons	explain	
why	 the	actions	 for	which	 they	are	 reasons	are	pro	 tanto	 rational.	 I	 introduce	
the	 major	 challenge	 for	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	
Problem,	 which	 argues	 that	 only	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	 psychology	 could	
explain	either	why	they	do	something	or	why	it	was	rational	for	them	to	do	it.	I	
set	out	the	program	for	the	forthcoming	chapters.	
In	§	(I),	 I	noted	that	most	theories	of	reasons	subscribe	to	one,	if	not	several	of	the	following	
claims:	 favourism	 about	 reasons	 to	 act,	 psychologism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	
and/or	 deliberativism	 about	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 we	 act	 (see	 Table	 I-6).	 In	 §§	(II)-(IV),	 I	
showed	that	each	of	these	accounts	is	inconsistent	with	several	prima	facie	reasonable	claims.		
In	§	(V),	I	argued	that,	even	if	the	senses	of	any	given	reason	expression	are	plural,	pluralism	is	
no	panacea:	 that	 is,	we	cannot	 just	 rely	on	the	plurality	of	senses	as	 the	way	to	make	those	
prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 consistent	 with	 our	 theory	 of	 reasons.	 In	 short,	 I	 argued,	 we	
must	look	beyond	favourism,	psychologism	and	deliberativism:	we	need	a	new	family	of	claims	
about	reasons.		
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 introduce	 a	 new	 family	 of	 claims	 about	 reasons:	 explanatory	 rationalism.	
According	 to	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 the	 fundamental	 reason-relation	 is	 that	 of	 explaining	
why	an	action	 is	pro	tanto	 rational;	which	 is	 to	say	that	all	practical	 reasons	explain	why	the	
actions	for	which	they	are	reasons	are	pro	tanto	rational.	Now,	since	explanatory	rationalism	
rejects	favourism	about	reasons	to	act,	psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act	and	
deliberativism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act,	 it	can	solve	all	of	the	problems	set	out	 in	
§§	(II)-(IV).	 My	 aim,	 in	 the	 chapters	 that	 follow,	 is	 to	 set	 out	 and	 defend	 explanatory	
rationalism.	
In	this	chapter	I	define	what	it	is	for	an	action	to	be	pro	tanto	rational,	I	describe	explanatory	
rationalism	and	I	set	out	the	challenges	for	it.	
1 Pro	tanto	rational	action	
Fevzi	 is	waiting	 to	board	a	 flight	 to	 Japan.	 It’s	early	 so	he	had	 to	miss	his	morning	 swim.	He	
looks	 forlornly	out	of	 the	window,	 yearning	 to	 go	 swimming.	He	 could	abandon	his	 trip	 and	
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have	his	swim	but	he	thinks	 it	would	be	better	 to	stay	and	board	the	 flight.	Nonetheless,	he	
still	thinks	that	there	is	something	to	be	said	for	going	swimming.	We	can	say	this	about	Fevzi:	
he	thinks	that	swimming	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	but	he	thinks	that	boarding	the	flight	
is	all	things	considered	worth	doing.	
In	contrast,	Fevzi	sees	nothing	of	worth	in	aimlessly	wandering	around	the	airport.	If	he	went	
for	a	wander	he’d	miss	the	flight	without,	at	least	by	his	lights,	any	good	coming	of	it;	he	thinks	
that	wandering	aimlessly	is,	in	no	respect,	worth	doing.	
There	 are	 clear	 differences	 between	 these	 three	 actions	 (flying,	 swimming,	wandering)	 that	
are,	I	submit,	of	relevance	to	their	rational	standing.	First,	I	will	introduce	some	terminology	to	
characterise	those	differences	and	then	I	will	argue	that	what	differentiates	the	three	actions	
is	 relevant	 to	 their	 rational	 standing.	 In	 particular,	 I	 will	 suggest	 that	 even	 though	 it	 is	 not	
rational	for	Fevzi	to	go	swimming,	it	is	nonetheless	more	rational	for	him	to	go	swimming	than	
it	 is	 for	 him	 to	 wander	 aimlessly	 around	 the	 airport,	 and	 that	 we	 should	 have	 some	
terminology	that	reflects	that.	1.1 Two	kinds	of	rational	action	
The	rational	thing	for	Fevzi	to	do	is	to	board	his	flight.	If	he	were	to	go	swimming	we	would	say	
that	he	acted	irrationally	since,	by	his	own	lights,	it	was	not	all	things	considered	worth	doing.	
Doing	one	thing	when	you	believe	something	else	to	be	all	things	considered	more	worth	doing	
is	not	a	rational	thing	to	do.	
If	 we	 leave	 aside	 the	 question	 as	 to	 what	 makes	 an	 action	 worth	 doing,1	I	 think	 we	 can	
(hopefully	uncontroversially)	characterise	a	familiar	sense	of	rational	action	as	follows:	
Assumption It	 is	 rational	 for	A	 to	φ	 if	 and	 only	 if	 A	 takes	φing	 to	 be,	 all	 things	
considered,	worth	doing.2	
This	 is	 an	 assumption,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 definition	 or	 an	 analysis	 of	 what	 it	 is	 for	 an	 action	 to	 be	
rational,	nor	is	it	a	claim	about	why	an	action	is	rational	(we	will	come	to	that	shortly).	This	is	
meant	to	be	a	fairly	bland	assumption	about	what	obtains	when	it	is	rational	for	some	agent	to	
act;	 it	 leaves	 unspecified	 all	 of	 the	 details	 that	 would	 actually	 furnish	 us	 with	 a	 theory	 of	
																																								 																				
1	Depending	on	one’s	theory	of	rationality	or	‘motivation’,	saying	that	Fevzi	takes	getting	on	the	plane	to	
be,	 in	some	respect,	worth	doing	could	be	cashed	out	by	saying	that	he	believes	that	by	boarding	the	
plane	he	will	go	to	Japan	and	either	that	he	wants	to	go	to	Japan	or	that	he	judges	that	going	to	Japan	
would	 be	 good,	 or	 right,	 or	 something	 of	 the	 sort.	 Nothing	 that	 I	 have	 to	 say	 is	meant	 to	 express	 a	
commitment	to	either	of	these	views.	See	§	(II)3.2	for	related	caveats.	
2	For	 instance,	 this	 is,	 I	 think,	 in	 keeping	 with	 Parfit’s	 (2011,	 34)	 characterisation	 of	 rational	 action.	
Compare	also:	‘an	agent	is	shown	to	be	acting	rationally	if,	as	we	might	put	it,	he	is	shown	to	be	trying	to	
do	what	there	is	good	reason	to	do,	even	if	as	a	matter	of	fact	he	is	quite	mistaken	on	that	front.’	(Dancy	
2004,	33)	
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rationality.	 I	 state	 it	 here	 only	 so	 that	 we	may	 better	 understand	 the	 concept	 of	 pro	 tanto	
rationality,	which	I	will	introduce	forthwith.	
What	 separates	Fevzi’s	boarding	 the	 flight	 from	both	his	going	 swimming	and	his	wandering	
aimlessly	around	the	airport	 is	that	 it	 is	rational	for	him	to	do	the	former,	but	not	the	 latter.	
However	 it	 is	nonetheless	 common	 to	distinguish	acts	 like	Fevzi’s	going	 swimming	 from	acts	
like	his	wandering	aimlessly,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	they	are	both	irrational.	While	it	would	be	
plainly	 irrational	of	Fevzi	 to	do	the	 latter,	 if	he	were	to	go	swimming	that	would	be	a	typical	
example	of	an	akratic	action,	or	so-called	‘weakness	of	will’.		
I	suggest	that	what	separates	akratic	acts	from	‘plainly’	irrational	ones	is	of	relevance	to	their	
rational	standing.	If	Fevzi	were	to	go	swimming	that	would	be	markedly	more	rational	than	if	
he	were	to	wander	aimlessly	around	the	airport;	that	is,	there	would	be	markedly	more	by	way	
of	rational	intelligibility	in	his	action	if	he	swam	than	if	he	wandered	–	and	that	is	so	even	if	we	
concede	that	going	swimming	is	nonetheless	not	a	rational	thing	to	do.		
Now,	if	what	separates	akratic	behaviour	from	what	I	have	called	‘plainly	irrational’	behaviour	
is	 of	 relevance	 to	 the	 rational	 standing	 of	 those	 actions,	 then,	 I	 suggest,	 we	 need	 an	
intermediate	concept	of	rationality	that	allows	us	to	recognise	the	former	as	somehow	more	
rational	than	the	other.	To	that	end,	let	us	define	‘pro	tanto	rational	actions’	thus:	
Definition It	 is	pro	tanto	rational	 for	A	 to	φ	 if	and	only	 if	A	 takes	φing	 to	be,	 in	
some	respect,	worth	doing.3	
This	 is	a	definition,	not	a	claim.4	I	have	used	the	term	‘rational’	because	(for	the	reasons	 just	
outlined)	I	believe	that	an	action’s	being	pro	tanto	rational	is	of	some	relevance	to	the	action’s	
rational	standing	(a	pro	tanto	rational	action,	is,	I	submit,	in	a	familiar	sense	of	the	word	more	
rational	than	an	action	that	is	not	even	pro	tanto	rational).	If	the	reader	balks	at	terminology	
that	 says	 that	 it	 is	 to	 any	 extent	 rational	 for	 Fevzi	 to	 go	 swimming,	 then	please	 feel	 free	 to	
substitute	 some	 less	 objectionable	 term	 in	 its	 place	 (mutatis	 mutandis	 throughout	 this	
discussion).5		
Lastly,	 in	order	to	make	the	distinction	between	rational	action	and	pro	tanto	 rational	action	
clear,	I	suggest	that	we	can	refer	to	the	former	as	all	things	considered	rational	action,	noting	
																																								 																				
3	Daniel	Whiting	 (2014,	5)	uses	 the	 terminology	of	pro	 tanto	 rational	action	equivalently.	Parfit	 (2011,	
34)	also	indicates	the	distinction	I	have	suggested	when	he	distinguishes	between	actions	that	are	‘less	
than	fully	rational’	and	actions	that	are	‘irrational’.	
4	That	is,	I	am	just	defining	the	use	of	the	technical	‘pro	tanto	rational’	predicate	here.	
5	I	believe	that	a	pro	tanto	 rational	action	 is	an	action	that	on	Smith’s	(1987)	terminology	the	agent	 is	
motivated	to	do	(note:	the	state	of	being	motivated	is	defeasible,	on	Smith’s	account),	so	I	could	have	
talked	in	terms	of	 ‘motivation’.	However,	 I	have	avoided	the	terminology	of	 ‘motivation’	as	 I	think	the	
dangers	of	misunderstanding	are	even	more	pronounced	there.	
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that	this	is	the	typical	understanding	of	‘rational’	action.	So,	for	the	sake	of	clarity,	here	is	how	
the	two	concepts	apply	to	Fevzi’s	possible	actions:	
Action	 All	things	considered	rational?	 Pro	tanto	rational?	
Boarding	his	flight	 ü ü6	
Going	swimming	 û ü	
Wandering	aimlessly	 û û	
Table	VI-1:	The	ways	in	which	Fevzi’s	actions	are	(or	aren’t)	rational	
Saying	that	going	swimming	is	pro	tanto	rational	whereas	wandering	aimlessly	is	not	even	pro	
tanto	 rational	allows	us	to	recognise	that	there	 is	a	difference	 in	the	rational	standing	of	the	
two	actions	without	 impinging	on	 the	 fact	 that	boarding	 the	 flight	 is	 the	only	 really	 rational	
thing	for	Fevzi	to	do.		
2 Explanatory	Rationalism	
The	family	of	reason	claims	I	want	to	introduce	says	that	reasons	of	any	kind	explain	why	the	
actions	 for	 which	 they	 are	 reasons	 are	 pro	 tanto	 rational.	 Because	 this	 family	 of	 claims	
emphasises	 the	explanatory	 character	of	 the	 reason-relation,	 and	because	a	 reason	explains	
why	 an	 action	 is	 rational,	 I	will	 call	 this	 family	 of	 claims	 ‘explanatory	 rationalism’.	Using	 the	
schema	developed	in	§	(I),	we	can	represent	explanatory	rationalism	as	follows:	
Reason	expression	 Explanatory	rationalism	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	p	makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	explains	(in	the	right	way)	why	A	φ’d.	
Table	VI-2:	Explanatory	rationalism	
According	 to	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 there	 are	 three	 kinds	 of	 reason:	 the	 expressions	 ‘a	
reason	 for	A	 to	φ’	 and	 ‘a	 reason	A	has	 to	φ’	pick	out	one	kind,	 the	expression	 ‘a	 reason	 for	
φing’	picks	out	another7	and	‘A’s	reason	for	φing’	picks	out	a	final	kind.	
																																								 																				
6	Any	all	 things	considered	rational	action	 is	automatically	a	pro	tanto	rational	action	since	 if	an	agent	
takes	 an	 action	 to	 be	all	 things	 considered	worth	 doing	 they	 certainly	 take	 it	 to	 be,	 in	 some	 respect,	
worth	doing.	
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In	later	chapters	I	will	argue	that	explanatory	rationalism	avoids	all	of	the	problems	set	out	in	
§§	(II)-(V)	 and	 that,	 indeed,	 explanatory	 rationalism	characterises	 the	de	 facto	 sense	of	each	
reason	expression.	However,	 in	 line	with	the	two	senses	 intuition,	 I	will	 suggest	 that	there	 is	
another	sense	to	each	reason	expression,	which	is	favourist.	Before	we	get	there,	though,	I	will	
need	 to	demonstrate	how	 it	 is	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 could	be	 true	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	
major	objection	to	it,	which	I	will	call	‘The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem’.	
3 A	problem	for	explanatory	rationalism	
Recall	 the	 following	 example	 from	 §	 (III):	My	 friend	 has	won	 a	much-coveted	 award;	 I	 read	
about	it	in	a	newspaper	so	I	call	her	up	to	congratulate	her.	I	suggested	that	it	was	prima	facie	
reasonable	to	claim	that	my	reasons	for	congratulating	my	friend	were,	inter	alia,	that	she	won	
an	award	and	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	in	the	newspaper.		
Now,	according	 to	explanatory	 rationalism,	an	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting	both	explains	why	 it	
was	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	do	what	they	did	and	explains	why	they	did	it.	Therefore,	if	
explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	 these	 prima	 facie	 reasonable	 claims	 about	
what	my	reasons	for	congratulating	my	friend	were	(as	I	intend	it	to	be),	the	following	must	be	
true:	
(R1) I	congratulated	my	friend	because	she	had	won	an	award.	
(R2) I	congratulated	my	friend	because	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
(R3) It	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend	 because	 she	 had	
won	an	award.	
(R4) It	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	my	friend	because	I	read	that	
she	had	won	an	award.	
There	 is	a	 familiar	argument	against	the	 idea	that	 facts	about	the	external	world	can	explain	
why	we	act	(which	(R1)	supposes),	which	proceeds,	broadly	as	follows:	if,	for	instance,	I	believe	
that	it	is	raining	when	it	isn’t,	I	will	still	take	my	umbrella	–	because	I	believe	that	it	is	raining.	
However,	given	that	I	need	to	believe	that	it	is	raining	in	order	to	take	my	umbrella8,	then	even	
if	I	take	my	umbrella	when	it	is	raining,	I	must	still	take	my	umbrella	because	I	believe	that	it	is	
raining.	But,	if	my	belief	that	it	is	raining	can	explain	my	action	whether	it	is	true	or	false,	then	
what	 explanatory	 work	 can	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 do?	 None,	 the	 argument	 concludes	 –	
which	must	mean	that	only	features	of	an	agent’s	psychology	can	explain	their	actions	–	that	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
7	As	 a	 result,	 something	 could	be	 a	 reason	 for	 an	 agent	 to	φ	without	being	 a	 reason	 for	 their	φing.	 I	
discuss	this	point	further	in	§	(XVI)A.3.	
8	Assuming	I	see	nothing	else	of	worth	in	taking	my	umbrella.	
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is,	 (R1)	 is	 not	 literally	 true.	 The	 same	 argument	 applies	 to	 (R2),	 and,	 as	 I	 will	 show,	 can	 be	
generalised	also	to	the	explanation	of	why	it	is	(pro	tanto)	rational	for	an	agent	to	act;	that	is,	it	
can	be	used	to	show	that	(R3)	and	(R4)	are	also	false.	
This	argument,	which	I	call	‘The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem’,	is	the	motivating	argument	for	
psychologism	(and	psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act,	in	particular)	because	it	
insists	 that	 only	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	 psychology	 can	 explain	 their	 actions,	 and	 therefore	
(given	 that	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	must	 explain	 their	 action),	 that	 only	 features	 of	 an	
agent’s	psychology	could	be	amongst	their	reasons	for	acting.	
4 An	outline	of	what	follows	
To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 argument	 considered	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 is	 right,	 explanatory	
rationalism	 cannot	 solve	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 §§	(II)-(IV)	 –	 indeed,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	
that	 argument	 is	 right,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 just	 collapses	 into	 psychologism.	 The	 rest	 of	
this	discussion	is	thus,	for	the	most	part,	a	response	to	the	argument	of	the	previous	section.	
In	 §	(VII),	 I	make	 some	 assumptions	 about	 the	 structural	 principles	 and	 logical	 properties	 of	
explanatory	 relations,	 which	 I	 will	 use	 throughout	 my	 discussion.	 In	 §	(VIII),	 I	 use	 this	
framework	 to	 provide	 a	 formal	 construal	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem.	 In	 §	 (IX),	 I	
show	 how	 the	 Problem	 also	 precludes	 perceptual	 experiences	 from	 explaining	 why	 we	 act,	
thereby	 counting	 against	 (R2);	 and,	 further,	 how	 it	 applies	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 it	 is	
rational	to	act,	thereby	also	counting	against	(R3)	and	(R4).		
The	de	 facto	 response	 to	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	 is	 to	accept	 the	conclusion	and	
say	 that	 the	purported	 explanans	 in	 (R1),	 i.e.	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	 had	won	 an	 award,	 is	
merely	elliptical	for	the	real	explanans,	which	is	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	
an	award.	Because	this	 is	a	claim	about	how	it	 is	that	a	normative	reason9	to	do	some	action	
could	 explain	 why	 someone	 does	 it,	 I	 call	 this	 ‘the	 elliptical	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	
explanation’.	
An	 alternative	 and	 increasingly	 popular	 theory,	 which	 seeks	 to	 preserve	 the	 bona	 fide	
explanatory	 role	 of	 normative	 reasons	 in	 action	 explanation,	 rejects	 the	 conclusion	 of	 The	
Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	and	says	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	explains	my	
action	directly.	This	is	the	direct	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.	
In	§	(X),	 I	 set	out	both	 the	elliptical	and	 the	direct	 theories	of	normative	 reason	explanation,	
and	I	argue	that	they	are	each	flawed	in	ways	that	should	make	us	look	for	an	alternative.	
																																								 																				
9	I	re-habilitate	this	terminology	in	§	(X)1,	understanding	normative	reasons	as	things	that	make	actions,	
in	some	respect,	worth	doing;	without	associating	them	with	any	particular	reason	expression.		
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In	 §§	(XI)	 &	 (XII),	 I	 develop	 that	 alternative:	 the	 indirect	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	
explanation.	 This	 theory	 argues	 that	 a	 normative	 reason	 explains	 an	 agent’s	 action	 by	
explaining	the	features	of	the	agent’s	psychology	that,	in	turn,	explain	their	action.		
My	 argument	 for	 the	 indirect	 theory	 proceeds	 in	 two	 stages:	 first,	 in	 §	(XI),	 I	 argue	 that	we	
should	 reject	 the	 conclusion	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	because	 it	 is	 based	 on	 a	
false	 principle	 of	 explanation,	 which	 I	 call	 ‘the	 exclusion	 principle’.	 The	 exclusion	 principle	
requires	 that	only	 the	most	proximal	 explanations	of	 some	explananda	 explain	 it;	but	 this	 is	
mistaken	 –	 most	 of	 the	 explanations	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 are,	 to	 some	 extent,	 distal	
explanations.		
Then,	 in	§	(XII),	 I	 show	how	 that	 insight	helps	 inform	 the	account	of	how	normative	 reasons	
explain	 actions.	 I	 argue	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 distal	 explanations	 of	 our	 actions;	 they	
explain	those	features	of	our	psychology	that,	in	turn,	explain	our	actions.	I	then	show	how	the	
indirect	theory	can	be	used	to	show	that	both	(R1)	and	(R2)	are	true.	
In	 §	(XIII),	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 same	 reasoning	 accounts	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 (R3)	 and	 (R4).	 For	
instance,	I	argue	that	the	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	explains	why	it	 is	
pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her	because	it	explains	why	I	believed	that	she	had	
won	an	award,	which,	 in	 turn,	explains	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	congratulate	
her.		
However,	I	note,	the	transitivity	of	explanation	fails	on	some	occasions,	in	particular	when	the	
explanatory	 chain	 is	 a	deviant	 causal	 chain.	 So,	we	need	 some	account	of	why	 it	 is	 that	 the	
explanatory	chain	up	to	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	an	agent	to	act	is	transitive	if	it	
isn’t	deviant,	but	isn’t	transitive	if	it	is	deviant.	In	§§	(XIV)	&	(XV),	I	provide	such	an	account.	
First,	 in	 §	(XIV),	 I	 introduce	 the	mystery	 relation.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	mystery	 relation	 is	 a	 non-
causal,	transitive,	explanatory	relation	that	relates:	the	belief	that	p	to	some	justification	for	it	
when	 that	 belief	 is	 justified;	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 when	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 is	
knowledgeable;	 a	 justification	 for	 the	 belief	 that	p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	p	when	 that	 justification	
affords	 the	opportunity	 for	 knowledge;	 and	 an	 action	 to	 some	belief	 that	 explains	why	 that	
action	is	pro	tanto	rational	when	that	action	is	done	intentionally.	
In	 §	(XV),	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive	 with	 the	 non-causal	 explanatory	
relation	involved	in	explaining	why	some	action	is	rational,	whereas	merely	causal	relations	are	
not.	 This	 allows	me	 to	 distinguish	 between	 deviant	 cases	 (which	 lack	 the	 required	 chain	 of	
mystery	 relations)	 and	 non-deviant	 cases	 (which	 don’t).	 This	 leads	 me	 to	 argue:	 (i)	 that	
because	I	know	that	my	friend	has	won	an	award,	the	fact	that	she	has	won	an	award	explains	
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why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her	(which	is	(R3));	and	(ii)	that	because	my	
belief	that	she	had	won	an	award	is	based	on	the	fact	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award,	
the	fact	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	also	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	
to	congratulate	her	(which	is	(R4)).		
Finally,	in	(XVI),	I	revisit	explanatory	rationalism	and	show	how	it	avoids	the	problems	faced	by	
other	theories.	I	conclude	by	setting	out	my	preferred	theory	of	reasons,	new	pluralism,	which	
holds	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 tells	 us	 one	 sense	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	 reason,	 whilst	
favourism	tells	us	the	other.	I	then	show	how	new	pluralism	easily	responds	to	the	challenge	
for	pluralist	theories	introduced	in	the	previous	chapters.	
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(VII)		We	need	to	talk	about	explanation	
In	 which	 I	make	 some	 assumptions	 about	 explanation.	 I	 say	 what	 I	mean	 by	
‘explains’	 and	 I	 state	 that	 I	 will	 talk	 as	 though	 explananda	 are	 facts	 and	
explanantia	are	propositions	(whether	or	not	they	are).	I	distinguish	two	sorts	of	
explanatory	 relation,	 ‘fully	 explains’	 and	 ‘partially	 explains’,	 where	 a	 full	
explanation	 is	 sufficient	 for	 the	 truth	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 explains	and	a	partial	
explanation	 is	 an	 element	 (or	 subset)	 of	 a	 full	 explanation,	 and	 I	make	 some	
assumptions	 about	 the	 logical	 properties	 of	 these	 relations.	 Lastly,	 I	 say	 that	
some	 fact	 is	 ‘overexplained’	 just	 in	 case	 there	are	 two	genuinely	different	 full	
explanations	of	that	fact.	
In	this	chapter	I	make	some	assumptions	about	the	structural	principles	and	logical	properties	
of	 explanatory	 relations.	 This	 is	with	 a	 view	 to	 having	 a	 technical	 framework	with	which	 to	
more	formally	characterise	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	
next	 chapter.	 While	 I	 think	 that	 the	 assumptions	 below	 are	 intuitive	 and	 hopefully	
uncontroversial,1	I	think	that	neither	the	thrust	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	nor	the	
effectiveness	of	my	solution	to	it	depends	on	formalising	explanatory	relations	in	this	manner.	
1 What	do	I	mean	by	‘explains’?	
Here	is	what	Broome	has	to	say	about	the	many	meanings	of	‘explains’:	
‘Explain’	in	common	usage	has	various	senses.	In	one	of	them,	Darwin	explained	why	evolution	
occurs.	 In	 another,	 The	 Origin	 of	 Species	 explains	 why	 evolution	 occurs.	 In	 a	 third,	 natural	
selection	explains	why	it	occurs.	(Broome	2013,	48)	
I,	like	Broome,	wish	to	stick	to	his	third	sense	of	‘explains’	in	this	discussion.	That	is,	when	I	talk	
of	something	explaining	something	else,	that	which	explains	is	meant	to	be	the	explanans	and	
not	a	description	of	it	or	the	one	who	describes	it.	Similarly,	when	I	talk	of	something	being	an	
explanation2	of	something	else,	I	mean	to	say	that	it	is	an	explanans	of	that	thing.3	
This	‘explains’	relation,	so	understood,	is,	I	suggest,	the	same	relation	as	the	one	picked	out	by	
the	‘because’	or	‘reason	why’	expressions,	so	I	shall	hereafter	take	them	to	be	equivalent.	
																																								 																				
1	I	take	several	of	these	assumptions	from	Broome	(2013).	
2	That	 said,	 in	 §	 (X),	 when	 I	 come	 to	 talk	 of	 normative	 reason	 explanation,	 I	 will	 mean	 something	
different	(and	more	akin	to	the	second	sense).		
3	Kim	 suggests	 that	 there	may	 be	 a	 fourth	 kind	 of	 ‘explains’	 relation:	 ‘The	 explanans	 relation	 relates	
propositions	 or	 statements;	 the	 explanatory	 relation	 relates	 events	 or	 facts	 in	 the	 world.	 The	
explanatory	 relation	 is	 an	 objective	 relation	 among	 events	 that,	 as	 we	 might	 say,	 “ground”	 the	
explanans	relation,	and	constitutes	its	“objective	correlate.”’	(Kim	1988,	226)	The	‘explains’	relations	as	I	
will	use	it	is	thus	what	Kim	calls	‘the	explanans	relation’,	and	notably	not	the	objective	relation	that	he	
takes	to	underpin	it	(what	he	calls	‘the	explanatory	relation’).	
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2 Ontological	assumptions	2.1 On	the	ontology	of	explananda	
Throughout	this	discussion	I	will	assume,	purely	for	expositional	convenience,	that	explananda	
are	facts.	One	consequence	of	this	assumption	is	that,	for	 instance,	one	can	explain	why	it	 is	
raining	 if	 it	 is	 raining,	 but	 one	 cannot	 explain	why	 it	 is	 raining	 if	 it	 is	 not	 raining.	 A	 second	
consequence	is	that	when	I	talk	of	something	explaining,	for	instance,	an	action	or	a	belief	this	
is	not	meant	to	imply	anything	about	the	ontology	of	those	explananda.		2.2 On	the	ontology	of	explanantia	
Throughout	 this	 discussion	 I	 will	 mostly	 treat	 explanantia	 as	 propositions	 (or	 sets	 of	
propositions).	4	Importantly,	 I	 do	 not	 assume,	 in	 my	 exposition	 that	 explanantia	 are	 true	
propositions:	 this	 is	 because	 I	 want	 to	 be	 able	 to	 recognise	 the	 possibility	 of	 non-factive	
theories	within	my	discussion	–	although	I	will	ultimately	dismiss	them,	because	I	do	think	that	
explanation	is	factive.5	
Explanatory	rationalism	implies	that	all	practical	reasons	stand	in	explanatory	relations	to	the	
rationality	of	the	actions	for	which	they	are	reasons.	Thus,	whatever	sort	of	thing	explanantia	
are,	so	too	are	reasons.	This	means,	therefore,	that	 I	will	be	treating	reasons	as	propositions	
also.		
However,	 although	 I	 will	 talk	 as	 though	 explanantia	 and	 reasons	 are	 propositions,	 I	 am	 not	
arguing	 that	 they	are.	My	 theory	 is	neither	about	what	explanantia	are	nor	 is	 it	 about	what	
reasons	are;	 it	 is	about	the	relation	 in	which	reasons	stand	to	the	actions	for	which	they	are	
reasons.	So,	if	your	preferred	theory	of	explanation	says	that	mental	states	or	states	of	affairs	
can	be	explanantia	then	it	is	compatible	with	my	theory	that	reasons	could	be	mental	states	or	
states	of	affairs	also;	my	point	 is	not	that	reasons	are	propositions,	my	point	 is	only	that	 it	 is	
the	 ontology	 of	 the	 relata	 of	 explanatory	 relations	 that	 determines	 the	 ontology	 of	 reasons	
(because	I	think	the	reason-relation	is	ultimately	an	explanatory	relation).6	
																																								 																				
4	Again,	while	I	might	occasionally	talk	about	(for	instance)	beliefs	explaining	things,	that	should	not	be	
read	as	implying	that	it	is	the	belief	(qua	mental	state)	doing	the	explaining,	as	opposed	to	the	fact	that	
the	agent	has	that	belief.		
5 	Given	 the	 assumption	 that	 explanation	 is	 factive	 (i.e.	 all	 explanantia	 are	 true),	 and	 that	 true	
propositions	 are	 facts,	 my	 treating	 explanantia	 as	 propositions,	 amounts	 to	 Broome’s	 (2013,	 48)	
convention	of	treating	them	as	facts.	
6	This	is	not	a	trivial	caveat:	some	are	strongly	of	the	view	that	mental	states,	and	not	facts	about	them,	
are	an	agent’s	reasons	(e.g.	Turri	2009),	whilst	others	are	seemingly	of	the	view	that	it	is	only	states	of	
affairs	(and	not	facts)	that	have	the	metaphysical	‘oomph’	needed	to	explain	(e.g.	Dancy	2000).		
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3 Full	explanation	and	partial	explanation	
Suppose	that	Joanne’s	roof	leaks	and	that	it	rained	last	night	and	that	her	carpet	is	now	wet.7	
When	 I	 say	 that	 Joanne’s	 carpet	 is	 wet	 because	 her	 roof	 leaks	 and	 she	 says	 that	 it	 is	 wet	
because	it	rained	last	night,	although	we	each	cite	different	facts	by	way	of	explanation	of	why	
the	carpet	is	wet,	 it	seems	clear	that,	as	Broome	puts	it,	 ‘our	explanations	are	not	rivals,	and	
we	would	 not	 feel	we	were	 contradicting	 each	 other.’	(2013,	 49)	 Furthermore,	 although	we	
each	say	that	the	facts	we	cite	explain	why	the	carpet	is	wet,	neither	fact	is	what	we	might	call	
‘the	whole	story’	of	why	the	carpet	is	wet.		
It	 seems	 natural	 to	 think	 that	 the	 reason	 why	 the	 explanations	 that	 Joanne	 and	 I	 give	 are	
neither	 rivals	nor,	 individually,	 the	whole	story	of	why	the	carpet	 is	wet,	 is	because	they	are	
each	part	of,	what	Broome	calls,	‘one	big	explanation’	–	where	that	one	big	explanation	is	the	
whole	 story	 of	why	 the	 carpet	 is	wet.	 Supplementing	 this	 idea,	 Broome	 suggests	 that	when	
giving	an	explanation	we	typically	pick	 just	some	part	of	this	big	explanation	and	that	 ‘which	
part	we	pick	out	will	depend	on	our	context:	our	background	knowledge,	our	interests	in	the	
matter	and	so	on.’	(2013,	49)		
I	 want	 to	 further	 regiment	 Broome’s	 suggestion.	 I	 suggest	 that	 we	 call	 this	 ‘one	 big	
explanation’	a	 ‘full	explanation’,	and	 the	elements	 (or	 subsets)	of	 it	 ‘partial	explanations’,	 so	
that	 all	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 either	 full	 or	 partial.	 In	 the	 following	 sections	 I	 will	 make	
some	 assumptions	 about	 the	 logical	 properties	 of	 the	 ‘fully	 explains’	 and	 ‘partially	 explains’	
relations.8	3.1 Full	explanations	
We	could	think	of	full	explanations	as	complex	propositions	or	sets	of	propositions;	for	ease	of	
exposition	I	will	use	the	latter,	without,	in	doing	so,	intending	any	claim	about	the	ontology	of	
explanantia.			
What	 differentiates	 a	 full	 explanation	 from	 a	 partial	 explanation,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 that	 a	 full	
explanation	 is	 sufficient	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 its	explanandum,	 so	 that	 a	 set	 of	 propositions	 fully	
explains	some	fact	only	if	it	is	sufficient	for	the	truth	of	that	fact.	That	is:	
																																								 																				
7	This	is	Broome’s	(2013,	48)	example.	
8	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 Ruben	 (2004)	 makes	 much	 use	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 full	 and	 partial	
explanation,	 which	 is,	 in	 many	 respects,	 similar	 to	 mine	 (though	 I	 am	 perhaps	 more	 prescriptive).	
Schnieder	 (2011)	 draws	 the	 same	 distinction	 between	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘	 complete’	 and	 ‘incomplete’	
explanations.	 See	 also	 Raz’s	 (2009,	 185–86)	 discussion	 of	 a	 ‘complete	 reason	 why’	 for	 analogous	
remarks.	
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Assumption For	any	proposition	p,	some	set,	Δ,	fully	explains	the	fact	that	p	only	if	
Δ	entails9	p.10	
However,	 just	 entailing	 the	 truth	 of	 some	 proposition	 is	 obviously	 not	 sufficient	 for	 fully	
explaining	 it	 (hence	the	above	 is	not	a	bi-conditional).	For	 instance,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	
entails	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 does	 not	 explain	 (fully	 or	
otherwise)	the	fact	that	it	is	raining.	
To	substantiate	this	point,	we	can	assume	that	the	‘fully	explains’	relation	is11:	- Irreflexive	–	Nothing	fully	explains	itself;	- Asymmetric	–	If	p	fully	explains	q	then	q	does	not	also	explain	p;	and	- Non-monotonic	–	If	Δ	is	a	full	explanation	of	the	fact	that	p,	then	adding	some	arbitrary	
proposition	to	Δ	does	not	entail	that	the	set	so	created	is	also	a	full	explanation	of	the	
fact	that	p.	
While	the	argument	of	subsequent	chapters	does	not	depend	on	explanatory	relations	having	
these	properties,	 if	at	 least	 some	of	 them	seem	plausible	 then	 that	 should	make	 it	 clear	 the	
extent	to	which	mere	entailment	 falls	short	of	explanation	(as	entailment	 is	a	reflexive,	non-
symmetric,	monotonic	relation).		
Assuming	 that	 full	 explanations	 are	 non-monotonic	 means	 that	 adding	 some	 arbitrary	
proposition	into	what	is	already	a	full	explanation	of	some	fact	does	not	give	you	a	further	full	
explanation.	 I	 want	 to	 strengthen	 this	 assumption	 by	 requiring	 that	 full	 explanations	 never	
contain	superfluous	parts;	that	is,	as	Wedgwood	puts	it:	
The	explanans…	must	not	contain	any	irrelevant	elements	that	could	be	stripped	away	without	
making	it	any	less	sufficient	to	produce	the	explanandum.	(Wedgwood	2002,	363)	
This	is	a	strengthening	of	non-monotonicity	because	it	requires	not	just	that	you	cannot	add	an	
arbitrary	 proposition	 into	 a	 full	 explanation	 and	 still	 say	 that	 that	 enlarged	 set	 is	 a	 full	
																																								 																				
9	In	what	way	does	a	set	of	propositions	that	fully	explains	some	other	fact	 ‘entail’	 it?	 I	suggest	that	 it	
logically	 entails	 it,	 so	 that	 full	 explanations	 necessitate	 their	 explananda.	 This	 may	 mean	 that	 a	 full	
explanation	of	the	fact	that	p	may	 include	facts	 (such	as	 facts	about	physical	 laws)	that	are	seemingly	
extremely	peripheral	 (though	not	 irrelevant)	to	the	question	 ‘why	 is	 it	 the	case	that	p?’	However,	 it	 is	
important	 to	note	that	 I’m	not	saying	that	everything	 in	a	 full	explanation	 is	 the	sort	of	 thing	that	we	
would	say	‘explains’	the	explanandum	–	so	one	could	accept	that	some	fact	is	a	part	of	a	full	explanation	
without	accepting	that	it	is	the	sort	of	thing	that	we	would	say	‘explains’	their	action	(this	might	be	what	
we	would	call	an	‘enabling	condition’).	See	further	remarks	in	the	next	section.	
10	Cf.	Schnieder	says	that	a	complete	explanation	is	an	explanation	‘whose	explanans	is	sufficient	for	the	
explanandum.’	(2011,	450)	
11	Explanatory	 relations	 are	 commonly	 assumed	 to	 have	 these	 properties	 –	 see,	 for	 instance,	 Rosen’s	
(2010)	remarks	about	explanation	(in	general)	in	his	discussion	of	grounding	explanations.	Although	it	is	
worth	 noting	 that	 there	 is	 some	 dissent	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 explanatory	 relations	 respect	 these	
properties	(see	e.g.	Ruben	2004).	
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explanation,	 but	 that	 each	 element	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 should	 be,	 in	 some	 sense,	
‘necessary’	 to	 it.	 This	 property	 is,	 in	 other	 areas,	 known	 as	 ‘minimality’.12	I	 characterise	 it	
formally	as	follows:	
MINIMALITY	 For	any	proposition	p,	some	set,	Δ,	fully	explains	the	fact	that	p	only	if	
there	is	no	Γ	such	that	Γ	fully	explains	the	fact	that	p	and	Γ	is	a	proper	
subset	of	Δ.13	
Lastly,	it	is	worth	noting	that	while	a	full	explanation	is	sufficient	for	its	explanandum,	at	least	
some	full	explanations	are	not	necessary	for	their	explananda.	For	instance,	suppose	that	the	
fact	that	I’ve	just	been	to	the	gym	together	with	the	fact	that	I	am	always	tired	after	I’ve	been	
to	 the	 gym	 fully	 explains	 why	 I’m	 tired.	 The	 fact	 that	 it	 fully	 explains	 my	 tiredness	 in	 this	
instance	 clearly	does	not	mean	 that	whenever	 I	 am	 tired	 it	 is	 because	 I’ve	been	 to	 the	gym	
etc.,	which	is	to	say	that	at	least	some	full	explanations	are	not	necessary	for	their	explananda.			3.2 Partial	explanation	
We	 can	 now	 define	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘partial	 explanation’	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘full	
explanation’,	as	follows:	any	element	of	a	full	explanation	of	some	fact	is	a	partial	explanation	
of	that	fact.	That	is:	
Definition For	any	propositions,	p	and	q,	p	partially	explains	the	fact	that	q	if	and	
only	if	there	is	a	set,	Δ,	such	that	Δ	fully	explains	the	fact	that	q,	and	p	
is	an	element	of	Δ.	
For	the	sake	of	completeness,	it	is	worth	noting	that	a	set	can	also	be	a	partial	explanation	(if	it	
is	a	subset	of	a	full	explanation):	
Definition For	any	proposition,	p,	and	set,	Γ,	Γ	partially	explains	the	fact	that	p	if	
and	only	if	there	is	a	Δ	such	that	Δ	fully	explains	the	fact	that	p	and	Γ	is	
a	subset	of	Δ.	
Some	house-keeping:	Firstly,	just	because	some	proposition	(or	set)	is	a	partial	explanation	of	
some	fact,	we	need	not	say	that	it	explains	that	fact.	That	is,	while	we	might	say	that	the	fact	
that	Joanne	had	carpet	under	the	hole	in	her	roof	is	a	part	of	the	full	explanation	of	why	her	
carpet	is	wet	(it’s	is	a	necessary	part	of	the	sufficient	condition)	we	might	not	want	to	say	that	
that	fact	explains	why	her	carpet	is	wet.	Like	Broome,	I	suggest	that	what	determines	whether	
																																								 																				
12	See,	for	 instance,	Audi’s	(2012b,	699)	characterisation	of	minimality	 in	the	context	of	grounding.	My	
formalization	is	a	transposition	of	his.	
13 	See,	 for	 instance,	 Raz’s	 (2009,	 185–86)	 remarks	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 non-redundancy	 to	
explanations.	
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or	 not	we	 say	 that	 some	partial	 explanation	explains	 some	other	 is	 a	matter	 of	 background	
knowledge	and	other	features	of	the	context.14		
Secondly,	 however,	 I	 will	 assume	 that	 if	 something	 explains	 some	 fact	 then	 it	 is	 a	 partial	
explanation	of	that	fact	(note	this	is	not	merely	restricted	to	what	we	say	explains	the	fact,	but	
what	actually	explains	it).	Although	I	struggle	to	see	how,	if	one	accepts	the	basic	structure	of	
full	and	partial	explanation	set	out	here,	one	could	deny	this,	it	is	perhaps	still	worth	stressing:	
Assumption For	any	propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	p	explains	the	fact	that	q	 then	p	 is	a	
partial	explanation	of	the	fact	that	q.	
Thirdly,	the	‘partially	explains’	relation,	so	understood,	is	a	contingent	relation	(unlike	the	‘fully	
explains’	relation);	the	fact	that	it	rained	last	night	only	partially	explains	why	Joanne’s	carpet	
is	 wet	 given	 other	 facts	 about	 the	 way	 the	 world	 is.	 However,	 even	 though	 that	 fact	 only	
partially	 explains	 why	 the	 carpet	 is	 wet	 given	 other	 facts,	 the	 ‘partially	 explains’	 relation	 is	
nonetheless	still	between	that	fact	and	the	fact	that	the	carpet	is	wet.	
Fourthly,	and	more	trivially,	it	follows	from	the	above	that	all	full	explanations	are	also	partial	
explanations	(since	any	full	explanation	is	a	subset	of	a	full	explanation).	
Lastly,	I	will	assume,	for	the	sake	of	completeness,	that	the	‘partially	explains’	relation	is	(like	
the	‘fully	explains’	relation),	irreflexive,	asymmetric	and	non-monotonic.	3.3 Explaining	why	the	carpet	is	wet	
Returning	 to	 our	 example,	 then:	 the	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Joanne’s	 carpet	 is	wet	
includes,	 inter	alia,	 facts	such	as	the	fact	that	 it	rained	last	night,	the	fact	that	her	roof	 leaks	
and	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 carpet	 beneath	 her	 leaky	 roof.	 That	 full	 explanation	 entails	 that	
Joanne’s	carpet	is	wet.		
Each	of	 the	members	of	 that	 full	 explanation	 (i.e.	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	night,	 etc.)	 is	 a	
partial	 explanation	 of	 why	 Joanne’s	 carpet	 is	 wet.	 However,	 contextual	 and	 pragmatic	
considerations	will	determine	whether	or	not	we	say,	of	any	given	partial	explanation,	that	it	
explains	why	her	carpet	is	wet.15	
																																								 																				
14	This	is	a	suggestion	about	the	practice	of	saying	that	one	thing	explains	another	–	I	make	no	comment	
on	whether	or	not	all	partial	explanations	explain	actions	in	some	non-context	relative	sense.	
15	Cf.	 ‘A	 partial	 explanation	 may	 be	 good	 relative	 to	 one	 set	 of	 circumstances,	 but	 bad	 relative	 to	
another,	in	which	interests,	beliefs,	or	whatever	differ.’	(Ruben	2004,	22)	
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4 Overdetermination	and	overexplanation	
Having	thus	characterised	full	and	partial	explanation,	I	now	want	to	offer	a	characterisation	of	
overexplanation	 in	 terms	 of	 these	 concepts,	 as	 it	 is	 of	 some	 relevance	 to	 The	 Explanatory	
Exclusion	Problem.	4.1 Overdetermination	
Something	is	said	to	be	overdetermined	if	and	only	if	there	are	two	separate	sets	of	conditions	
that	 are	 each	 individually	 sufficient	 for	 it	 to	 obtain	 and	 those	 conditions	 determine	 that	 it	
obtain.16	Different	kinds	of	determination	 relation	yield	different	 sorts	of	overdetermination.	
Causal	 overdetermination	 (and	 whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	 possible)	 is	 probably	 the	 most	 hotly	
debated	kind	of	overdetermination	–	here	is	a	representative	characterisation:	
Suppose	 that	 a	 certain	 event,	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	 mental	 property,	 causes	 a	 physical	 event.	 The	
causal	 closure	of	 the	physical	 domain	 says	 that	 this	physical	 event	must	 also	have	a	physical	
cause.	We	may	assume	 that	 this	physical	 cause,	 in	 virtue	of	 its	physical	 property,	 causes	 the	
physical	 event…	 Could	 it	 be	 that	 the	 mental	 cause	 and	 the	 physical	 cause	 are	 each	 an	
independent	 sufficient	 cause	 of	 the	 physical	 effect?	 The	 suggestion	 then	 is	 that	 the	 physical	
effect	 is	overdetermined.	So	 if	 the	physical	 cause	hadn't	occurred,	 the	mental	 cause	by	 itself	
would	have	caused	the	effect.	(Kim	1993,	280–81)	
The	principle	is	something	like	this:	something	is	causally	overdetermined	if	you	could	take	one	
of	 its	 causes	 away	 and	 it	 would	 still	 obtain	 (or	 occur,	 or	 exist	 or	 what	 have	 you).	 A	 classic	
example:	 two	vandals	each	 throw	 rocks	 that	 simultaneously	 strike	and	break	a	window.	The	
breaking	 of	 the	window	 is	 seemingly	 causally	 overdetermined	 because	 either	 rock-throwing	
would	have	been	sufficient	to	break	the	window.	It’s	beyond	the	scope	of	this	discussion	to	get	
into	what	that	means	for	the	causal	status	of	either	rock-throwing.	4.2 Overexplanation	
Here	is	how	I	propose	to	characterise	overexplanation:	
Definition For	 any	 proposition	p,	 the	 fact	 that	p	 is	 overexplained	 if	 and	 only	 if	
there	are	(at	least)	two	genuinely	different	full	explanations	of	the	fact	
that	p.	
Is	 there	 a	 difference	 between	 overexplanation	 and	 overdetermination?	 If	 you	 are	 an	
explanatory	 realist	 (so	 that	 explanatory	 relations 17 	are	 underpinned	 by	 ontological	
																																								 																				
16	I	 stress	 the	 latter	conjunct	as	 there	being	merely	 two	sets	of	conditions	 that	entail	 some	fact	 is	not	
sufficient	 for	 the	 fact	 to	 be	 over-determined	 (if	 it	 were	 then,	 arguably,	 everything	 would	 be	
overdetermined,	 given	 the	 reflexivity	 of	 the	 entailment	 relation,	 and	 the	 claim	 that	 everything	 is	
determined	in	some	more	metaphysically	significant	sense	than	entailment).	
17	Of	the	kind	I	have	in	mind	(see	fn.	3	of	this	chapter	for	clarification).	
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determination	relations18)	and	you	hold	that	explanations	are	genuinely	different	only	 if	 they	
are	 independent,19	then	 you	will	 probably	 think	 that	 overdetermination	 and	overexplanation	
are	the	same	thing.	
However,	since	I	want	to	allow	for	the	possibility	of	rejecting	either	explanatory	realism	or	that	
two	 explanations	 are	 genuinely	 different	 only	 if	 they	 are	 independent,	 I	 distinguish	
overexplanation	 from	 overdetermination.	 Distinguishing	 them	 in	 this	 manner	 does	 not	
preclude	 the	possibility	of	 there	being	 the	 same;	 that	depends	only	on	how	one	defines	 the	
definiens	of	overexplanation.	
What	does	it	mean	for	two	full	explanations	to	be	genuinely	different?	I	suggest	it	is	that	they	
should	explain	the	explanandum	in	different	ways.	Why	call	them	‘genuinely	different’	and	not	
merely	 ‘different’	explanations?	Because	 I	want	to	allow	for	the	possibility	that	non-identical	
full	explanations	(i.e.	‘different’)	full	explanations	may	nonetheless	explain	some	explanandum	
in	the	same	way	(i.e.	without	being	‘genuinely	different’).		4.3 Benign	overexplanation	
It	 is	 widely	 believed	 that	 genuine	 causal	 overdetermination	 is	 rare	 (if	 it	 is	 even	 possible).20	
Assuming	 that	 causal	 determination	 relations	 underpin	 causal	 explanatory	 relations,	 causal	
overexplanation	is	presumably	equally	rare.	
However,	bona	fide	cases	of	non-causal	overexplanation	abound.	For	instance,	recall	that	I	said	
that	swimming	will	both	help	me	sleep	better	and	 improve	my	mood.	Swimming	 is	 then,	 for	
me,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing	 partly	 because	 it	 will	 help	 me	 sleep	 better	 and	 partly	
because	 it	 will	 improve	 my	 mood.	 The	 explanatory	 relations	 involved	 here	 are,	 I	 suggest,	
clearly	not	causal.	
Now	consider	this:	swimming	would	still	be,	 in	some	respect,	worth	doing	even	if	 it	wouldn’t	
help	me	sleep	better	because	it	would	still	improve	my	mood.	Conversely,	if	it	weren’t	the	case	
that	swimming	would	improve	my	mood,	we	could	still	say	that	it	was,	in	some	respect,	worth	
doing	because	it	would	help	me	sleep	better.		
																																								 																				
18	Cf.:	 ‘According	 to	 “explanatory	 realism,”	when	 something	 is	 correctly	 invoked	 as	 an	 explanation	 of	
another	thing,	the	explanatory	relation	must	be	grounded	in	some	objective	relation	of	dependence	or	
determination	holding	for	the	explanans	and	the	explanandum.’	(Kim	1993,	xii)	
19	That	is,	in	whatever	sense	you	take	an	overdetermining	cause/factor	to	be	independent.		
20	Kim	 (1993,	 280)	 	 describes	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 could	 be	 systematic	 causal	 overdetermination	 as	
‘absurd’.	
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In	contrast,	if	it	hadn’t	rained	last	night	then,	ceteris	paribus,	the	fact	that	Joanne’s	roof	leaks	
would	not	continue	to	partially	explain	the	fact	that	her	carpet	was	wet	(her	carpet	would	not	
have	been	wet,	if	her	roof	didn’t	leak).		
What	differentiates	 these	 two	cases	 is	 seemingly	 this:	while	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	night	
and	the	fact	that	her	roof	leaks	are	part	of	the	same	full	explanation	of	why	her	carpet	is	wet,	
the	 fact	 that	 swimming	would	 help	me	 sleep	 better	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	would	 improve	my	
mood	are	part	of	two	genuinely	different	full	explanations	of	why	swimming	would	be,	in	some	
respect,	worth	doing	–	they	explain	the	explanandum	 in	different	ways.	Thus,	since	there	are	
two	genuinely	different	full	explanations	of	why	swimming	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing,	it	
is	 overexplained.	 Whereas,	 in	 contrast,	 since	 there	 are	 not	 two	 genuinely	 different	
explanations	of	why	Joanne’s	carpet	is	wet,	the	fact	that	her	carpet	is	wet	is	not	overexplained.		
The	 characterisation	 of	 overexplanation	 hangs	 on	 what	 it	 is	 for	 two	 explanations	 to	 be	
genuinely	different.	 I	 have	given	what	 I	 take	 to	be	an	unambiguous	example	here,	but	 I	will	
return	to	what	makes	explanations	genuinely	different	in	the	next	chapter	(see	§	(VIII)3.2).	
5 Summary	
I	 have	 said	 that	 there	 are	 two	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relation:	 full	 and	 partial,	 and	 I’ve	made	
some	 assumptions	 about	 the	 logical	 properties	 of	 each.	 I	 then	 provided	 an	 analysis	 of	
overexplanation	 in	 terms	of	 full	explanation.	 In	 the	next	chapter	 I	will	put	 these	concepts	 to	
work	 in	 a	 characterisation	 of	 the	 main	 challenge	 to	 my	 theory:	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	
Problem.		
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(VIII)		The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	
In	which	I	set	out	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem,	which	is,	in	some	form	or	
another,	 the	 motivating	 argument	 for	 psychologistic	 theories	 of	 reasons.	 I	
provide	 a	 formal	 construal	 of	 the	 Problem,	 showing	 how	 it	 results	 from	 two	
seemingly	 trivial	 claims	 about	what	 explains	 an	 agent’s	 action	when	 they	 act	
from	error	and	from	ignorance	together	with	five	seemingly	plausible	principles	
of	explanation.	I	show	how	the	Problem	implies	that	I	did	not	congratulate	my	
friend	because	she	had	won	an	award,	but	only	because	I	thought	she	had.	
My	friend	has	won	a	much-coveted	award;	I	read	about	it	in	a	newspaper	so	I	call	her	up	and	
congratulate	 her.	 Did	 I	 congratulate	 her	 because	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 or	 just	 because	 I	
thought	she	had?		
There	 is	 a	 well-established	 response	 to	 this	 question	 that	 proceeds,	 broadly,	 along	 the	
following	lines:	if	she	hadn’t	won	an	award	but	I	had	believed	that	she	had,	then	I	would	still	
have	congratulated	her,	and	 I	would	have	congratulated	her	because	 I	believed	that	she	had	
won	an	award.	Conversely,	 if	 I	hadn’t	believed	that	she	had	won	the	award	then	even	 if	she	
had	won	it	 I	would	not	have	congratulated	her.	So,	 if	 I	hadn’t	believed	that	she	had	won	the	
award,	the	fact	that	she	had	won	the	award	could	not	have	explained	why	I	congratulated	her	
(since	I	wouldn’t	have).		
So,	it	seems	as	though	what	matters	to	the	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	is	the	
fact	that	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	and	not	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award;	
that	 is,	 I	 did	 not	 really	 congratulate	 my	 friend	 because	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 but	 only	
because	I	thought	she	had.	
An	argument	along	these	lines	is	what	typically	motivates	the	view	that	facts	about	the	world	
cannot	explain	an	agent’s	action	and	 that,	 therefore,	an	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting	must	be	a	
feature	of	their	psychology.1	Indeed,	this	line	of	reasoning	is	the	motivating	argument	for	what	
I	called	‘psychologism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act’.2	So,	for	those	who	want	to	reject	
that	form	of	psychologism	(as	I	do),	this	argument	is	the	one	to	beat.	
In	what	follows	I	offer	a	formal	construal	of	the	argument	as	an	argument	about	what	explains	
an	agent’s	action	(i.e.	as	an	argument	that	is	only	indirectly	about	what	their	reason	for	acting	
is).	I	will	use	the	concepts	introduced	in	the	previous	chapter	to	formally	characterise	the	three	
																																								 																				
1	Since	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	always	explains	their	action	(see	§	(IV)1.2).	
2	See	Table	I-4.	
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components	of	what	 I	will	call	 ‘The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem’,	which	are:	the	argument	
from	false	belief3;	the	argument	from	impotent	facts4;	and	a	principle	of	explanation	that	I	call	
‘the	 exclusion	 principle’5.	 In	 particular,	 on	 my	 construal,	 the	 conclusion	 of	 The	 Explanatory	
Exclusion	Problem	can	be	arrived	at	from	two	seemingly	trivial	claims	about	what	explains	an	
agent’s	 action	 when	 they	 act	 in	 error	 or	 ignorance,	 together	 with	 five	 seemingly	 plausible	
principles	of	explanation.	
My	intent	in	formalising	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	 is	three-fold:	firstly,	doing	so	will	
help	me	demonstrate,	in	§	(IX),	that	the	Problem	applies	also	to	the	facts	on	which	an	agent’s	
beliefs	are	based6	and	to	the	explanation	of	why	it	 is	rational	for	someone	to	do	something.7	
Secondly,	formalising	the	Problem	will	help	me	to	discriminate	more	easily	between	different	
responses	to	it.	And,	thirdly,	a	formal	construal	allows	me	to	identify	more	precisely	where	The	
Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	goes	wrong.		
I	 should	 note	 that	 other	 construals	 of	 this	 argument	 are	 possible,	 and	mine	 is	 by	 no	means	
definitive	 (though	 I	 hope	 it	 is	 illuminating).	 However,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 one	 can	 construe	 the	
overall	problem	in	a	way	that	makes	it	immune	to	my	eventual	response;	that	is,	I	do	not	think	
that	my	response	to	the	overall	problem	hangs	on	formalising	it	in	the	way	that	I	do.	
Lastly,	 we	 should	 also	 be	 clear	 that	 my	 discussion	 here	 is	 strictly	 about	 what	 explains	 an	
agent’s	action,	and	not	what	their	reason	for	acting	is.	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	only	
bears	upon	what	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	could	be	to	the	extent	that	we	assume	that	an	
agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 always	 explains	 their	 action	 (although	 this	 is	 a	 widely	 held	
assumption	-	see	§	(IV)1.2).	
1 An	overview	
Recall	 that	 I	 said	 that	 if	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	set	out	in	§§	(II)-(IV),	the	following	must	be	true:	
(R1)	 I	congratulated	my	friend	because	she	had	won	an	award.	
The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	provides	the	following	argument	against	this	claim:	
																																								 																				
3	This	is	Stout’s	(1996,	2009)	name	for	this	argument.	
4	Stout	(1996)	discusses	what	he	calls,	‘The	Argument	from	the	Impotence	Unrepresented	Facts’;	while	
his	argument	 is	 in	 some	respects	 similar	 to	mine,	 the	premises	and	conclusions	of	our	arguments	are	
sufficiently	different	as	to	make	them	different	arguments.	
5	This	 principle	 share’s	 some	 similarities	 with	 Kim’s	 principle	 of	 causal	 exclusion,	 but,	 as	 I	 shall	 note,	
differs	from	it	in	particular	respects	that	shall	turn	out	to	be	critical	to	this	discussion.	
6	And	not	merely	facts	about	the	external	world.	
7	And	not	merely	to	the	explanation	of	why	they	do	it.	
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The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R1)	
Premise	1 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.8	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation9,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
Conclusion	1 The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	 award	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 I	
congratulated	her.	
The	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 on	 setting	 out	 the	 argument	 for	 Premise	1	 and	 for	 EXCLUSION.	 In	
§	(IX)	 I	 will	 show	 how,	 by	 altering	 Premise	1,	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 can	 also	
provide	arguments	against	(R2),	(R3)	and	(R4).	1.1 The	argument	for	Premise	1	
Premise	1,	 as	 I	 will	 demonstrate,	 follows	 from	 the	 conclusions	 of	 two	 other	 arguments:	 the	
argument	from	false	belief	and	the	argument	from	impotent	facts.		
The	conclusion	of	the	argument	from	false	belief	is	that	we	can	give	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	
congratulated	my	 friend	without	mentioning	 the	 fact	 that	 she	won	an	award;	 so	 long	as	we	
note	that	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	I	show	how	this	conclusion	can	be	arrived	at	
from	a	seemingly	trivial	claim	about	what	would	have	explained	my	action	had	my	belief	been	
false	together	with	three	seemingly	plausible	principles	of	explanation.		
The	conclusion	of	the	argument	from	impotent	facts	is	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	had	won	an	
award	is	not	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	her	from	the	fact	
that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had.	 I	 show	 how	 this	 conclusion	 can	 be	 arrived	 inferred	 from	 (i)	 a	
seemingly	 trivial	 claim	about	what	 the	explanatory	power	of	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	won	an	
award	would	have	been	if	 I	hadn’t	believed	that	she	had;	together	with	(ii)	another	plausible	
principle	of	explanation.		
Premise	1	can	then	be	inferred	from	the	conclusions	of	these	two	arguments.	1.2 The	argument	for	EXCLUSION	
The	argument	for	EXCLUSION	is	more	straightforward.	In	short:	 if	some	fact	is	not	part	of	a	full	
explanation	 of	 some	 explanandum	 and	 it	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	
																																								 																				
8	That	 is,	a	genuinely	different	explanation	of	why	 I	 congratulated	my	 friend…	 I	omit	 this	qualification	
throughout,	for	brevity.	
9	That	 is,	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	why	q…	Again,	 I	 omit	 this	 qualification	 throughout,	 for	
brevity.	
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that	explanandum,	then	seemingly,	by	the	law	of	the	excluded	middle,	it	is	not	part	of	any	full	
explanation	of	that	explanandum,	which	means	that	it	does	not	explain	it.	1.3 What’s	next	
In	what	follows	I	set	out	the	argument	from	false	belief	and	the	argument	from	impotent	facts.	
I	 then	 show	 the	 conclusions	 of	 these	 two	 arguments	 yield	 Premise	1.	 I	 then	 set	 out	 the	
argument	for	EXCLUSION.	I	then	show	how	Premise	1,	together	with	EXCLUSION,	yields	Conclusion	
1	(which	is	the	denial	of	(R1)).		
For	reference,	the	figure	below	provides	an	overview	of	the	structure	of	this	discussion.	
	
Figure	VIII-1:	The	argument	for	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	
2 The	Argument	from	False	Belief	
Dancy	provides	a	concise	summary	of	the	argument	from	false	belief,	as	it	realtes	to	an	agent’s	
reason	for	acting:	
[Consider]	the	case	where	things	are	not	as	the	agent	conceives	them	to	be.	Surely,	 in	such	a	
case,	we	cannot	 say	 that	his	 reason	 for	acting	as	he	did	was	 that	p.	We	have	 to	 say	 that	his	
reason	 for	acting	was	 that	he	believed	 that	p.	Accepting	 this	 for	 the	case	where	 the	 relevant	
belief	is	false,	then,	we	might	still	hope	that	‘that	p’	can	indeed	be	the	explanation	of	the	action	
where	it	is	the	case	that	p,	but	that	where	it	is	not	the	case	that	p	the	explanation	can	only	be	
‘that	he	believed	that	p’.	But,	as	Bernard	Williams	puts	it,	the	true-false	distinction	should	not	
be	 allowed	 to	 affect	 the	 form	 of	 the	 relevant	 explanation.	 Supposing,	 therefore,	 that	 our	
explanation	 should	 take	 the	 same	 form	 whether	 it	 is	 or	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 and	 having	
already	accepted	that	the	correct	explanation	in	cases	where	it	is	not	the	case	that	p	is	‘that	he	
believed	 that	p’,	we	are	driven	 to	 say	 the	 same	where	 the	 relevant	belief	 is	 true	 rather	 than	
false.	(Dancy	2000,	121)	
Adapting	Dancy’s	argument	to	my	present	concern	about	what	explains	an	agent’s	action	(and	
not	just	their	reason	for	acting),	the	main	conclusion	of	this	line	of	reasoning	seems	to	be	that	
we	can	always	explain	an	agent’s	action	in	terms	of	their	beliefs,	without	reference	to	the	truth	
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or	falsity	of	that	belief.	This	conclusion	may	seem	obvious,	however,	since	some	deny	it,10	it	is	
worth	being	explicit	about	the	argument	for	it.	
In	 what	 follows	 I	 provide	 a	 formal	 construal	 of	 this	 argument.	 I	 take	 my	 construal	 to	 be	
plausible	and,	 I	hope,	 informative;	however,	other	 construals	are	available	 (e.g.	 Stout	2009).	
The	 conclusion	 of	 the	 argument	 from	 false	 belief,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 my	 friend’s	 award,	 is	 as	
follows:	
Conclusion	1a There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 my	 friend	 that	
includes	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	had	won	an	 award	but	 not	
the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
This	conclusion	is	the	first	part	of	the	argument	for	Premise	1.	 In	§	3,	 I	present	the	argument	
from	impotent	facts,	which	is	the	second	part	of	the	argument	for	Premise	1.	2.1 Acting	on	false	beliefs	
The	argument	 from	 false	belief	 starts,	 predictably,	with	an	observation	about	what	happens	
when	an	agent	acts	on	a	 false	belief.	Consider:	even	 if	my	belief	had	been	false,	 I	would	still	
have	congratulated	my	friend,	and	I	would	have	congratulated	her	because	I	believed	that	she	
had	won	an	award.11	Now,	to	say	that	I	would	have	congratulated	her	because	I	believed	that	
she	had	won	an	award	is	to	say	that	the	former	partially	explains	the	latter.	
Moreover,	 I	 suggest,	 when	 I	 congratulate	 her	 because	 of	 my	 false	 belief	 that	 she	 won	 an	
award,	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 did	 not	 win	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 any	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
congratulated	her.12		
This	much	should	be	undeniable.	Thus:	
Premise	1a If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award	(but	I	still	believed	
that	 she	had13),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	 that	 she	had	won	an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 not	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	2.2 The	Factivity	Principle	
Recalling	the	discussion	of	§	(IV)1.3,	where	we	noted	that	the	factivity	of	explanation	is	a	prima	
facie	reasonable	and	widely	held	principle	of	explanation,	let	us	just	assume	the	following:	
																																								 																				
10	See	the	discussion	of	exclusive	disjunctivist	theories	in	§	(X)A.4.	
11	Compare:	why	did	Sally	run?	Because	she	thought	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	
12	Perhaps,	 one	 could	 craft	 a	 weird	 example	 in	 which	 it	 was,	 but	 that	 is	 not	 my	 example.	 Likewise,	
compare:	the	fact	that	a	bear	wasn’t	chasing	Sally	does	not	explain	why	she	ran.	The	relevance	of	this	
qualification	will	become	clear	as	the	discussion	proceeds.	
13	This	remark	is	parenthetical	because	it	is	already	implied	by	the	ceteris	paribus	condition.	
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FACTIVITY	 For	any	propositions	p	and	q,	if	p	partially	explains	the	fact	that	q	then	
p	is	the	case.	
This	means	that	when	Sally	runs	because	she	mistakenly	believes	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	the	
false	proposition	 that	 a	 bear	was	 chasing	her	 does	not	 explain	why	 she	 ran.	 Likewise,	 if	my	
belief	 that	my	 friend	had	won	an	award	had	been	 false,	 the	 false	proposition	 that	my	 friend	
had	won	an	award	would	not	explain	why	I	congratulated	her.	2.3 Two	more	principles	of	explanation	
Consider	the	following,	much-discussed	remark:	
The	difference	between	false	and	true	beliefs	on	the	agent’s	part	cannot	alter	the	form	of	the	
explanation	which	will	be	appropriate	to	his	action.	(Williams	1981,	102)	
Here	 is	what	 I	 take	 to	 be	 an	 implication	 of	what	Williams	 is	 saying,	 in	my	 terminology:	 the	
same	full	explanation	of	one’s	action	is	available	whether	one’s	belief	is	true	or	false.14	While	
this	claim	may	seem	obvious,	there	are	those	who	deny	it,	and	who	do	so	for	different	reasons,	
so	it	is	worth	considering	it	in	more	detail.	
In	 what	 follows,	 I	 want	 to	 show	 how	 this	 claim	 can	 be	 motivated	 by	 two	 principles	 of	
explanation,	 the	 endurance	 principle	 and	 the	 sufficiency	 principle,	 that	 are	 both	 general	 (i.e.	
apply	beyond	the	explanation	of	action)	and	plausible.		2.3.1 The	Endurance	Principle	
The	following	remark,	I	suggest,	relies	on	the	endurance	principle:	
When	an	agent	acts	on	false	beliefs,	we	cannot	explain	the	action	in	terms	of	the	facts	but	only	
in	terms	of	those	beliefs	–	there	is	only	an	internalist	explanation	of	their	action.	But	even	when	
the	beliefs	are	true	that	same	internalist	explanation	works.	(Stout	1996,	24	emphasis	added)	
Stout	suggests	 that	since	we	can	explain	an	agent’s	actions	 in	 terms	of	 the	 facts	about	what	
they	believed	when	their	belief	was	false,	we	can	likewise	explain	their	action	in	terms	of	the	
facts	about	what	they	believed	when	their	belief	is	true.	In	which	case,	given	the	fact	that	Sally	
believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	(partially)	explains	why	she	ran	when	her	belief	was	false,	
if,	ceteris	paribus,	her	belief	had	been	true,	the	fact	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	
her	would	still	have	(partially)	explained	why	she	ran.	But	why	should	this	be	the	case?	Why	
does	it	follow	that	what	explains	in	the	false	belief	case	also	explains	in	the	true	belief	case?		
Let’s	 start	by	noticing	 this:	when	Sally	 runs	because	 she	mistakenly	 thought	 that	a	bear	was	
chasing	her,	we	know,	 from	FACTIVITY,	 that	 the	 false	proposition	 that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	
																																								 																				
14	Williams’s	remark,	I	think,	goes	further	than	this	–	I	think	that,	given	that	explanation	is	factive,	there	
is	a	reading	of	his	remark	on	which	it	just	is	the	conclusion	of	the	argument	from	false	belief.	
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(i.e.	 the	 content	 of	 Sally’s	 belief)	 could	not	 partially	 explain	why	 Sally	 ran.	 Furthermore,	 the	
fact	that	a	bear	was	not	chasing	Sally	is	also	not	part	of	any	full	explanation	of	why	she	ran	–	
and,	in	particular,	it	is	not	part	of	the	same	full	explanation	as	the	fact	that	she	believed	that	a	
bear	was	 chasing	 her.15	So,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 clear	 sense	 in	which,	 when	 Sally’s	 belief	 is	
false,	 the	 proposition	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	why	 she	
ran.16		
Now	consider	what	would	have	happened	if,	ceteris	paribus,	Sally’s	belief	had	been	true	rather	
than	false?	This	would	have	happened:	a	proposition	that	was	irrelevant	to	the	explanation	of	
her	action	(i.e.	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her)	would	have	gone	from	being	false	to	being	true.	
But	 why	 would	 that	 proposition’s	 suddenly	 becoming	 true	 affect	 the	 pre-existing	 partial	
explanation	relations	if	 it	was	irrelevant	to	those	partial	explanations	when	it	was	false?	That	
is,	why	would	Sally’s	belief	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	stop	explaining	her	action	just	because	
a	false	proposition	that	was	irrelevant	to	that	explanation	suddenly	became	true.17	Seemingly,	
it	would	not.	
To	 the	 extent	 that	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning	 is	 persuasive,	 I	 suggest	 that	 that	 is	 just	 because	 it	
accords	 with	 a	 more	 general	 principle	 of	 explanation	 –	 namely	 that	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 a	
proposition	that	is	irrelevant	to	some	explanation	of	some	explanandum	(i.e.	neither	it	nor	its	
negation	 is	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum)	 when	 it	 is	 false	 suddenly	
becomes	 true,	 then	 that	 does	 not	 stop	 anything	 that	 partially	 explained	 that	 explanandum	
when	 that	 proposition	 was	 false	 from	 continuing	 to	 explain	 it	 when	 it	 is	 true.	 That	 is,	 the	
partial	explanation	relations	between	facts	endure	when	the	truth-value	of	a	proposition	that	
is	irrelevant	to	them	changes.	Thus:	
																																								 																				
15	Again,	one	could	craft	a	weird	example	in	which	it	was,	but	that	is	not	my	example.	
16	This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 proposition	 is	 irrelevant	 in	 all	 senses	 of	 relevance	 –	 for	 instance,	 it	 is	
certainly	 something	 she	 took	 to	 make	 running	 worth	 doing;	 the	 point	 is	 just	 that	 from	 a	 particular	
explanatory	 perspective,	 it	 is	 seemingly	 irrelevant.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 stressing	 this:	 just	 because	 the	
proposition	 that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her	 is	 irrelevant	when	 it	 is	 false,	does	not	mean	that	 it	 is	 irrelevant	
when	 it	 is	 true	 –	 a	 proposition	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 some	 partial	 explanation	 of	 some	 fact	 only	 in	 some	
particular	instance	and	only	in	so	far	as	neither	it	nor	its	negation	are	part	of	the	same	full	explanation	
of	that	fact	as	that	partial	explanation.	
17	Consider:	even	if	the	fact	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	is	relevant	to	the	explanation	of	her	action	when	
true	that	does	not	show	that	its	becoming	true	would	destroy	pre-existing	partial	explanation	relations,	
despite	its	prior	irrelevance.	
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ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.18	
Although	this	claim	is	long-winded,	I	take	the	principle	to	be	ultimately	intuitive.	However,	 in	
the	 event	 that	 it	 is	 not	 clear,	 the	 next	 section	 discusses	 some	 examples	 and	 a	 failed	
counterexample.		2.3.2 Some	examples	of	the	endurance	principle	
The	reader	who	is	already	comfortable	with	ENDURANCE	may	skip	these	examples.	
Example	 1:	 An	 uncontroversial	 example:	 Suppose	 that	 a	 teacher	 is	 performing	 a	 science	
experiment	 for	 her	 students,	 although	 one	 of	 the	 students,	 Nathan,	 is	 absent.	 She	 heats	 a	
metal	rod	and	it	expands.	The	fact	that	the	rod	was	heated	partially	explains	why	it	expanded,	
and	 the	 false	 proposition	 that	Nathan	 is	 present	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 that	 explanation	 of	 why	 it	
expanded.19	Moreover,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 had	 Nathan	 been	 present,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 rod	was	
heated	would	still	partially	explain	why	it	expanded.	
Example	 2:	Of	 course,	Nathan’s	being	present	 is	 rarely	 likely	 to	 feature	 in	an	explanation	of	
why	the	rod	expanded,	so	here	is	another	example,	in	which	the	proposition	that	is	irrelevant	
when	false,	explains	when	true.	Consider	the	case	in	which	swimming	will	help	me	sleep	better	
but	won’t	 improve	my	mood.	We	already	established20	that	 the	 fact	 that	swimming	will	help	
me	 sleep	better	partially	 explains	why	 swimming	 is,	 for	me,	 in	 some	 respect,	worth	doing.21	
Moreover,	 I	suggest,	neither	the	false	proposition	that	swimming	will	 improve	my	mood,	nor	
the	fact	that	it	won’t	improve	my	mood	explain	why	it	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing	–	so	the	
proposition	that	swimming	will	 improve	my	mood	 is	 irrelevant	to	the	full	explanation	of	why	
swimming	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.		
However,	if,	ceteris	paribus,	swimming	would	improve	my	mood	then	it	would	partially	explain	
why	swimming	was,	 in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	But	 just	because,	once	it	obtains,	the	fact	
that	 swimming	would	 improve	my	mood	starts	explaining	why	swimming	would	be,	 in	 some	
respect,	 worth	 doing,	 doesn’t	 mean	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 swimming	 will	 help	 me	 sleep	 better	
																																								 																				
18	More	formally:	For	any	propositions	p,	q	and	r,	if,	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p,	q	partially	explains	the	
fact	 that	r	then,	provided	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	 is	part	of	 the	same	explanation	of	r	as	q,	 if,	ceteris	
paribus,	it	were	the	case	that	p,	then	q	would	still	partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.	
19	Neither	it	nor	its	negation	is	part	of	the	full	explanation	(of	which	the	fact	that	the	rod	was	heated	is	
part)	of	why	the	rod	expanded.	
20	See	§	(VII)4.3.	
21	Given	that	I	want	to	sleep	better,	or	judge	it	good	and	what	have	you.	
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stops	explaining	why	it	is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	All	that	happens	now	is	that	they	both	
explain.	
Example	3:	A	would-be	counterexample:	suppose	that	Tom	throws	a	rock	at	a	window	and	it	
breaks,	 while	 Susie	 stands	 and	 watches.	 The	 fact	 that	 Tom	 threw	 a	 rock	 at	 the	 window	
(partially)	 explains	why	 it	 broke.	 Seemingly,	 neither	 the	 false	 proposition	 that	 Susie	 threw	a	
rock	at	the	window	nor	the	fact	that	she	didn’t	throw	a	rock	explains	why	the	window	broke:	
the	proposition	that	Susie	threw	a	rock	is	irrelevant	to	the	full	explanation	of	why	the	window	
broke.		
However,	suppose	that	Susie	had	thrown	a	rock,	and	she	had	thrown	it	before	Tom,	and	her	
rock	 had	 broken	 the	window.	 In	which	 case	 Tom’s	 rock-throwing	would	 seemingly	 cease	 to	
explain	why	the	window	broke	(his	rock	would	have	sailed	through	the	empty	space	where	the	
window	used	to	be).	So,	contra	the	endurance	principle,	when	an	irrelevant	proposition	goes	
from	true	to	false	that	can	stop	something	from	partially	explaining	the	explanandum.	
This	 counterexample	 fails	 because	 it	 violates	 the	 ‘ceteris	 paribus’	 condition	 in	 ENDURANCE.	 In	
making	it	the	case	that	Susie	threw	a	rock	at	the	window	and	it	broke	we	are	not	changing	the	
truth-value	of	only	 irrelevant	propositions,	but	of	 relevant	propositions	as	well.	For	 instance,	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 window	 was	 intact	 before	 Tom’s	 rock	 hit	 it	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 same	 full	
explanation	of	why	the	window	broke	as	the	fact	that	Tom	threw	the	rock.22	So	of	course	the	
fact	 that	 Tom	 threw	 the	 rock	 stops	 explaining	why	 the	window	broke	 –	 by	 adding	 in	 Sally’s	
rock-throwing	 we	 have	 taken	 away	 an	 element	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 that	 Tom’s	 rock-
throwing	was	part	of,	so	everything	in	it	stops	explaining.	
In	contrast,	suppose	we	honour	the	 ‘ceteris	paribus’	condition	and	change	only	that	which	 is	
not	 part	 of	 the	 same	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	window’s	 breaking	 as	 Tom’s	 rock	 throwing.	 So,	
let’s	 suppose	 that	 Susie’s	 rock	 harmlessly	 bounces	 off	 the	 window.	 In	 this	 circumstance	 it	
should	still	be	clear	(given	that	all	other	things	are	equal)	that	Tom’s	rock	breaks	the	window	
and	Tom’s	rock-throwing	explains	why	the	window	broke.	ENDURANCE	perseveres.	2.3.3 The	Sufficiency	Principle	
Now:	 another	 principle	 of	 explanation	 –	 the	 sufficiency	 principle.	 Recall	 that	 I	 interpreted	
Williams’s	remark	as	the	claim	that	the	same	full	explanation	of	an	agent’s	action	is	available	
whether	 their	 belief	 is	 true	 or	 false.	 We	 need	 more	 than	 just	 ENDURANCE	 to	 reach	 that	
conclusion.	
																																								 																				
22	It	 is	 a	necessary	part	of	 that	 full	 explanation	because	 if	 the	window	hadn’t	been	 intact,	 it	wouldn’t	
have	been	broken	by	Tom’s	rock.	
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Consider:	there	is	a	set	of	partial	explanations	of	why	Sally	ran	(when	her	belief	was	false)	that	
is	a	full	explanation	of	why	she	ran.	What	ENDURANCE	tells	us	is	that	that	which	partially	explains	
her	 action	when	 her	 belief	 is	 false	would	 also	 partially	 explain	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	her	 belief	
were	 true.	 So,	 the	 same	 set	of	partial	 explanations	 that	 fully	 explained	her	 action	when	her	
belief	was	false	would	still	be	a	set	of	partial	explanations	of	her	action	if	her	belief	were	true.	
However,	we	need	 to	add	 some	 further	 requirement	 to	 guarantee	 that	 that	 set	 is	 still	 a	 full	
explanation	when	her	belief	 is	 true	(as	opposed	to	being	merely	a	set	of	partial	explanations	
i.e.	an	incomplete	full	explanation).	What	is	that	requirement?	
It	is	this:	whatever	suffices	to	explain	an	agent’s	action	when	an	agent’s	belief	is	false	likewise	
suffices	 to	 explain	 it	 when	 their	 belief	 is	 true.	 And,	 again,	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	 is	 just	 a	
consequence	of	 an	 intuitively	 plausible,	 and	more	 general	 principle	of	 explanation	 –	namely	
that	if	some	set	of	partial	explanations	suffices	to	explain	(i.e.	is	a	full	explanation	of)	some	fact	
in	 some	 situation,	 then	 whenever	 those	 partial	 explanations	 all	 explain	 that	 fact,	 they	 will	
suffice	to	explain	it.	Thus:		
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	
all	 the	elements	of	Δ	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	q,	Δ	 fully	explains	
the	fact	that	q.23				2.3.4 Combining	the	Endurance	Principle	and	the	Sufficiency	Principle	
The	endurance	principle	and	the	sufficiency	principle	provide	us	with	the	conclusion	that	the	
same	 full	 explanation	 of	 an	 agent’s	 action	 is	 available	 whether	 their	 belief	 is	 true	 or	 false.	
How?	By	ensuring	that	 just	changing	the	truth-value	of	some	proposition	that	 is	outside	of	a	
full	 explanation	 of	 some	 explanandum	 (i.e.	 which	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 that	
explanandum)	cannot	affect	whether	or	not	that	 full	explanation	 is	available.	So,	 if	you	think	
that	neither	the	proposition	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her,	nor	the	fact	that	a	bear	is	not	chasing	
her,	 are	parts	of	 the	 full	 explanation	of	why	Sally	 ran	 (when	her	belief	was	 false),	 then	 that	
same	full	explanation	will	be	available,	ceteris	paribus,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	a	bear	 is	
chasing	her.24	
																																								 																				
23	This	may	seem	close	to	MINIMALITY,	but	it	is	a	very	distinct	claim.	However,	the	conjunction	of	the	two	
yields	what	we	might	call	counterfactual	minimality,	which	can	be	defined	as	follows:	
C-MINIMALITY	 For	any	proposition	p,	some	set,	Δ,	fully	explains	the	fact	that	p	only	if	there	is	
no	 Γ	 such	 that	 Γ	 is	 a	 proper	 subset	 of	 Δ	 and	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 Δ	 had	 not	
existed	but	Γ	had,	then	Γ	would	fully	explain	the	fact	that	p.	
I	suspect	that	an	 intuitive	commitment	to	C-MINIMALITY,	resulting	from	an	 implicit	commitment	to	both	
MINIMALITY	and	SUFFICIENCY	as	principles	of	explanation,	helps	motivates	the	argument	from	false	belief.	
24	Note	that	non-factivists	(e.g.	Dancy	2000),	who	think	that	explanation	can	be	non-factive,	would	say	
that	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	(qua	the	content	of	her	belief)	is	part	of	the	full	explanation	of	why	Sally	
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This	 may	 seem	 elaborate,	 but	 distinguishing	 these	 two	 general	 explanatory	 principles	 is	
essential	not	only	to	discriminating	between	different	rejections	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	
Problem,25	but	also	to	clearly	demonstrating	why	it	is	wrong.	2.4 Concluding	the	argument	from	false	belief	
Here,	then,	is	my	construal	of	the	argument	from	false	belief:	if,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	
not	won	an	award	then	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	have	been	a	
part	of	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	her	(from	Premise	1a).	However,	neither	the	
fact	 that	 she	 had	 not	 won	 an	 award	 nor	 the	 false	 proposition	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	
would	have	been	part	of	that	explanation	(from	Premise	1a	and	FACTIVITY).		
We	should	make	two	observations	from	these	remarks	about	what	would	have	been	the	case	
if	 my	 belief	 had	 been	 false:	 firstly,	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
congratulated	my	friend	that	would	have	included	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	
award	 but	 not	 the	 (false)	 proposition	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award.	 Secondly,	 the	 (false)	
proposition	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	have	been	irrelevant	to	the	explanation	of	my	
action.	
From	 the	 second	observation,	we	can	 conclude	 (from	ENDURANCE)	 that	whatever	would	have	
partially	 explained	my	action	 if	my	belief	had	been	 false	must	 also	partially	 explain	 it	when,	
ceteris	paribus,	my	belief	is	true.	So,	since	all	the	elements	of	what	would	have	fully	explained	
my	action	had	my	belief	been	false	also	(partially)	explain	my	action	when	my	belief	is	true,	we	
can	infer	(from	SUFFICIENCY)	that	that	set	of	partial	explanations	must	likewise	fully	explain	my	
action	when	my	belief	is	true.		
Now	 recall	 the	 first	 observation:	 had	 my	 belief	 been	 false	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 full	
explanation	 of	 my	 action	 that	 included	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	
award	but	not	the	(false)	proposition	that	she	had	won	an	award.	But	given	that	the	same	full	
explanation	is	available	whether	my	belief	is	true	or	false,	that	must	mean	that	even	when	my	
belief	is	true,	there	is	a	full	explanation	of	my	action	that	includes	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	
my	friend	had	won	an	award	but	not	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
ran.	This,	however,	would	not	stop	them	from	agreeing	with	the	claim	that	the	same	full	explanation	of	
Sally’s	action	is	available	whether	her	belief	 is	true	or	false	(indeed,	the	desire	to	agree	with	Williams’	
claim	is	a	part	of	what	persuades	Dancy	to	adopt	non-factivism).	
25	In	 particular:	 those	 whom	 I	 call	 ‘exclusive	 disjunctivists’	 (e.g.	 Collins	 1997;	 Stoutland	 1998)	 reject	
ENDURANCE,	whereas	those	whom	I	call	 ‘supplementarists’	(possibly	Alvarez	2010)	reject	SUFFICIENCY.	See	
the	Appendix	to	§	(X)	for	further	discussion.	
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Formally:	
The	Argument	From	False	Belief	
Premise	1a	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award	(but	I	still	believed	
that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 not	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
FACTIVITY	 For	any	propositions	p	and	q,	if	p	partially	explains	the	fact	that	q	then	
p	is	the	case.	
ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.	
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	
all	 the	elements	of	Δ	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	q,	Δ	 fully	explains	
the	fact	that	q.	
Conclusion	1a	 There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 my	 friend	 that	
includes	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	had	won	an	 award	but	 not	
the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
The	conclusion	of	 the	argument	 from	 false	belief	provides	 the	 first	part	of	 the	argument	 for	
Premise	1.	 The	 argument	 from	 impotent	 facts,	 which	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 next	 section,	
provides	the	second	part	of	that	argument.	
3 The	Argument	from	Impotent	Facts	
The	argument	from	impotent	facts	 is,	mercifully,	simpler.	 It	 is,	 in	some	sense,	summarised	 in	
the	following	remark:	
Whenever	the	agent	acts	in	light	of	the	fact	that	p	[i.e.	because	p],	the	agent	must	take	it	that	
p,	 and	 I	 understand	 this	 sort	 of	 ‘taking	 it	 that’	 as	 a	weak	 form	of	 belief…	 The	 psychologised	
explanation	of	the	action	is	to	be	understood	as	the	same	explanation	as	the	non-psychologised	
one.	(Dancy	2000,	126)	
Dancy	makes	 two	key	observations:	 the	 first	 is	 that	 if	 the	agent	 loses	 their	belief	 that	p,	 the	
possibility	of	explaining	in	terms	of	the	fact	that	p	disappears.	The	second	is	that	the	fact	that	p	
is	not	part	of	a	(genuinely)	different	explanation	of	the	agent’s	action	from	the	fact	that	they	
believed	that	p.		
The	argument	from	impotent	facts	shows	how	Dancy’s	first	observation,	together	with	another	
general	principle	of	explanation,	entails	his	second.	Applied	to	the	case	of	my	friend’s	award,	it	
runs	 as	 follows:	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	had	won	 an	 award	would	 not	 have	 explained	why	 I	
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congratulated	her	if	I	hadn’t	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	(because,	 inter	alia,	I	would	
not	have	congratulated	her).		That	being	so,	the	explanatory	power	of	the	fact	that	my	friend	
had	won	an	award	depends	on	my	believing	that	she	had.	But	one	proposition	cannot	be	part	
of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 from	 another	 if	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 the	 former	
depends	on	the	truth	of	the	latter.	Therefore:	
Conclusion	1b The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	 explanation	of	why	 I	 congratulated	her	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
The	following	sections	set	out	this	argument	in	more	detail.	3.1 Impotence	
If	I	hadn’t	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	I	would	not	have	congratulated	her	(I’m	
not	a	sarcastic	sort26).	So,	in	the	event	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	and	I	had	not	believed	
that	 she	 had,	 the	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 explain	 why	 I	 had	
congratulated	her.	Thus:	
Premise	1b If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(though	she	had27)	then	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	not	
have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
This	case	is	clear:	had	I	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	then	the	fact	that	she	
had	won	an	award	would	not	have	explained	why	I	congratulated	her	because	I	wouldn’t	have	
congratulated	her.	However,	even	if	I	had	congratulated	her,	it	would	not	have	been	because	
she	won	an	award	 (absent	some	weird	circumstances).	For	 instance,	 suppose	 that	 I	believed	
that	she	had	just	got	a	new	job,	I	might	have	still	congratulated	her	then,	but	even	so	it	would	
be	wrong	to	say	that	I	congratulated	her	because	she	had	won	an	award.	
The	point	is	that,	in	the	absence	of	any	weirdness28,	something	that	one	would	ordinarily	take	
to	make	one’s	action	worth	doing	could	not	explain	why	one	did	 it	unless	one	believed	it.	As	
others	note:	
																																								 																				
26	And,	 ex	 hypothesi,	 I	 didn’t	 take	 anything	 else	 to	make	 congratulating	 her,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	
doing.	
27	This	remark	is	parenthetical	because	it	is	already	implied	by	the	ceteris	paribus	condition.	
28	Hornsby	gives	the	following	example	of	such	weirdness:	‘Consider	George	who	is	quite	ignorant	of	the	
condition	of	the	ice…It	might	be	that	George	is	sociable,	and	skates	at	the	edge	because	that	is	where	
the	other	skaters	are;	and	it	might	then	be	true	that	he	skates	at	the	edge	because	the	ice	in	the	middle	
is	thin	(there	is	a	two-step	explanation	of	Georges	skating	there	which	adduces	the	thinness	of	the	ice).’	
(Hornsby	 2007,	 296)	 The	 point	 is	 that	 I’m	 not	 saying	 that	 a	 fact	 can	never	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	
unless	the	agent	believes	it.	What	I	am	establishing	is	that	in	either	of	the	examples	given	(and	we	are	
kept	‘in’	those	examples	by	the	ceteris	paribus	clauses)	–	it	does	not	explain	my	action	unless	I	believe	it.	
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A	fact	cannot	be	a	reason	that	explains	one’s	action	unless	the	person	is	aware	of	 it.	(Alvarez	
2016a,	30)		
If	I	act	in	the	light	of	the	fact	that	I	am	married	[i.e.	because	I	am	married],	I	must	believe	that	I	
am.	(Dancy	2000,	126)	
So,	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 that	 which	 an	 agent	 believes	 typically	 depends	 upon	 their	
believing	it.	3.2 The	Difference	Principle	
When	 is	 one	 proposition	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 from	another?	 Recall	 the	
case	of	 overexplanation	 considered	 in	 §	(VII)4.3:	we	 said	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 swimming	would	
improve	my	mood	and	the	fact	that	swimming	would	help	me	sleep	better	were	each	parts	of	
genuinely	 different	 explanations	 of	 why	 swimming	 was,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing.	 In	
contrast,	we	 said	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 Joanne’s	 roof	 leaks	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	 night	
were	not	parts	of	genuinely	different	explanations.	
Why	did	we	 reach	 these	 conclusions?	 It	was	 because	 even	 if	 it	 stopped	being	 the	 case	 that	
swimming	 would	 help	 me	 sleep	 better,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 would	 improve	 my	 mood	 would	
continue	 to	 explain	 why	 swimming	 was,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing;	 and	 vice	 versa.	 In	
contrast,	 if	 Joanne’s	 roof	 didn’t	 leak,	 then,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	 night	
would	not	explain	why	her	carpet	 is	wet.	 It	was	because	of	 this	difference	between	 the	 two	
examples	 that	 we	 said	 the	 former	 involved	 genuinely	 different	 explanations,	 whereas	 the	
latter	did	not.	
The	point,	I	suggest,	is	this:	a	proposition	is	seemingly	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation	
from	some	other	proposition	only	if	its	explanatory	power	does	not	depend	on	the	truth	of	the	
latter.	So	the	fact	that	it	rained	last	night	is	not	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation	of	why	
the	carpet	 is	wet	from	the	fact	that	the	roof	 leaks	because,	ceteris	paribus,	 if	 the	roof	didn’t	
leak	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	night	would	 stop	explaining	why	 the	 carpet	was	wet	 (it	
wouldn’t	be	wet	anymore).29	Thus:	
DIFFERENCE	 For	 any	 propositions	 p,	 q	 and	 r,	 p	 is	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	of	the	fact	that	r	from	q	only	if,	ceteris	paribus,	had	p	been	
the	case	and	q	not	been	the	case,	p	would	still	partially	explain	the	fact	
that	r.	
																																								 																				
29	Cf.	 ‘If	 the	 rationalizing	 explanation	 is	 dependent	on	 the	physiological	 explanation	 in	 an	 appropriate	
sense	(e.g.,	by	being	reducible	to	it),	then	in	truth	there	is	only	one	explanation	here.’	(Kim	1989,	80)	
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The	 difference	 principle	 connects	 the	 property	 of	 being	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	from	some	other	proposition	with	the	property	of	being	logically	 independent	of	
that	other	that	proposition.30	3.3 Concluding	the	argument	from	impotent	facts	
Here,	then,	 is	what	 I	have	called	 ‘the	argument	from	impotent	facts’:	 the	fact	that	my	friend	
had	won	an	award	would	not	have	explained	why	I	congratulated	her	if	I	hadn’t	believed	that	
she	 had.	 That	 being	 so,	 since	 some	 proposition	 is	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	
from	some	other	only	if	its	explanatory	power	does	not	depend	on	the	truth	of	the	latter,	the	
fact	 that	my	 friend	won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
congratulated	her	from	the	fact	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
Formally:	
The	Argument	from	Impotent	Facts	
Premise	1b	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(though	she	had)	then	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	not	
have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
DIFFERENCE	 For	 any	 propositions	 p,	 q	 and	 r,	 p	 is	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	of	the	fact	that	r	from	q	only	if,	ceteris	paribus,	had	p	been	
the	case	and	q	not	been	the	case,	p	would	still	partially	explain	the	fact	
that	r.	
Conclusion	1b	 The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	 explanation	of	why	 I	 congratulated	her	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
4 The	argument	for	Premise	1	
I	 said	 that	 Premise	1	 can	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 argument	 from	 false	 belief	
together	with	the	conclusion	of	the	argument	from	impotent	facts,	here’s	how:	The	argument	
from	false	belief	tells	us	that	there	is	a	full	explanation,	call	it	‘Δ*’,	of	why	I	congratulated	my	
friend	that	 includes	the	fact	that	 I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	but	not	the	fact	that	
she	had	won	an	award.	The	argument	from	impotent	facts	tells	us	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	
won	an	award	is	not	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	her	from	
the	fact	that	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.31	
Now,	since	Δ*	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	that	includes	the	fact	that	I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award,	 the	argument	from	impotent	 facts	means	that	the	fact	
																																								 																				
30	In	the	Appendix	to	§	(X)	I	note	that	those	whom	I	call	‘inclusive	disjunctivists’	reject	this	principle.	
31	This	means	 that,	 for	any	 full	explanation,	Δ,	of	why	 I	 congratulated	my	 friend	 that	 includes	 the	 fact	
that	 I	 believed	 that	my	 friend	 had	won	 an	 award,	 there	 is	 no	 full	 explanation	 that	 is	 both	 genuinely	
different	from	Δ	and	includes	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award.	
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that	my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 cannot	 be	 part	 of	 an	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	my	
friend	that	 is	genuinely	different	 from	Δ*.	Therefore,	 there	 is	a	 full	explanation,	Δ*,	of	why	 I	
congratulated	my	friend	such	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	is	neither	a	part	of	Δ*	
nor	is	it	part	of	a	full	explanation	that	is	genuinely	different	from	Δ*.	
Formally:	
Conclusion	1a	 There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 my	 friend	 that	
includes	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	had	won	an	 award	but	 not	
the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
Conclusion	1b	 The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	 explanation	of	why	 I	 congratulated	her	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
Premise	1	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
The	formal	argument	for	Premise	1	is	set	out	in	full	in	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.	
5 The	Exclusion	Principle	
Premise	1	 is	the	first	premise	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem.	The	second	premise	 is	a	
final	principle	of	explanation:	the	exclusion	principle.	The	exclusion	principle	says	that	if	some	
proposition	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 some	 explanandum,	 and	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum	 then	 it	 does	 not	 explain	 that	
explanandum.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 set	 out	 the	 argument	 for	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 and,	 as	 an	
aside,	discuss	its	relation	to	Kim’s	well-known	principle	of	causal	exclusion.	5.1 The	argument	for	the	exclusion	principle	
The	 reasoning	behind	 the	exclusion	principle	 is	 straightforward:	 if	 you	 say	 that	 you	can	 fully	
explain	 some	 explanandum	 without	 mentioning	 p,	 then	 p	 can’t	 just	 be	 added	 to	 that	 full	
explanation	 (because	 it	 would	 be	 superfluous	 –	 and	 MINIMALITY	 precludes	 superfluous	
explanans),	so	p	and	that	full	explanation	can’t	together	be	part	of	the	same	full	explanation.	
Moreover,	if	p	 is	also	not	part	of	a	genuinely	different	full	explanation,	then	we	are	drawn	to	
the	conclusion	 that,	by	 the	 law	of	excluded	middle,	p	 is	not	a	part	of	any	 full	explanation	of	
that	explanandum	(since	it	isn’t	part	of	the	same	full	explanation	and	isn’t	part	of	a	genuinely	
different	 explanation).	 But	 if	 it	 isn’t	 part	 of	 any	 full	 explanation,	 then	 it	 isn’t	 a	 partial	
explanation	–	which	means,	as	I	set	out	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	does	not	explain.		
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Thus,	 if	 there	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 some	explanandum	 that	does	 include	some	 fact	 then	 if	
that	 fact	 is	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum,	 it	 does	 not	
explain	it.	Or,	in	other	words:	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
This	is	the	second	premise	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem.		5.2 The	exclusion	principle	and	the	principle	of	causal	exclusion	
As	 an	 aside,	 before	 we	 conclude,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 a	 close	
relation	 of	 a	 principle	 that	 is	 central	 to	 the	 exclusion	 problem	 in	mental	 causation,	 namely,	
Kim’s	principle	of	causal	exclusion:	
If	an	event	e	has	a	sufficient	cause	c	at	t,	no	event	at	t	distinct	from	c	can	be	a	cause	of	e	(unless	
this	is	a	genuine	case	of	causal	overdetermination).	(Kim	2008,	17)	
There	are	several	similarities	between	Kim’s	principle	and	mine.32	However,	despite	my	use	of	
the	‘exclusion	principle’	label,	there	are	also	some	significant	differences.		
One	difference	that	is	particularly	worth	stressing	is	that	while	Kim’s	principle	is	restricted	only	
to	the	consideration	(or	exclusion)	of	simultaneous	events,	there	is	no	analogous	restriction	in	
my	exclusion	principle.	This	difference	 is	particularly	worth	stressing	because	 it	 is	 the	reason	
why	 my	 argument	 against	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 (see	 §	(XI))	 does	 not	 also	 apply	 to	 Kim’s	
principle	of	causal	exclusion.		
																																								 																				
32 	In	 particular,	 much	 of	 the	 conceptual	 apparatus	 of	 Kim’s	 principle	 of	 causal	 exclusion	 has	 an	
explanatory	 analogue	 in	 the	 conceptual	 apparatus	 I	 have	 used.	 For	 instance,	 Kim’s	 (1993,	 280)	
distinction	 between	 partial	 and	 sufficient	 causes,	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 the	 causal	 analogue	 of	my	 distinction	
between	partial	and	full	explanation.	It	is	thus	possible	to	transpose	Kim’s	principle	into	an	explanatory	
analogue	of	it,	using	the	structural	principles	of	explanation	I	have	assumed	(it	is	perhaps	worth	noting	
here	that	Kim	(1988,	233)	originally	formulated	his	principle	as	the	principle	of	explanatory	exclusion).	
Doing	so	reveals	both	the	respects	in	which	my	exclusion	principle	is	similar	to	his,	and	those	in	which	it	
is	not.		
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6 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R1)	
Here,	 then,	 is	 the	 argument	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 against	 the	 claim	 that	 I	
congratulated	my	friend	because	she	won	an	award	(i.e.	against	(R1)):	
The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R1)	
Premise	1	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
Conclusion	1	 The	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	 award	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 I	
congratulated	her.	
7 Conclusion	
I	have	demonstrated	how	two	seemingly	 trivial	claims	about	what	explains	an	agent’s	action	
when	they	act	in	error	and	in	ignorance,	together	with	five	plausible	principles	of	explanation	
can	 lead	 to	 the	 somewhat	 counterintuitive	 conclusion	 that	 I	 did	 not	 congratulate	my	 friend	
because	she	had	won	an	award,	but	only	because	I	thought	she	did.		
Indeed,	 as	 is	 presumably	 clear,	 this	 result	 should	 generalise	 beyond	 this	 example	 –	 The	
Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	is	a	problem	for	anyone	who	thinks	that	facts	about	things	that	
are	external	to	our	minds	can	explain	why	we	do	the	things	that	we	do.	So,	for	instance,	if	the	
Problem	is	to	be	believed	then	one	never	takes	one’s	umbrella	because	it	 is	raining,	but	only	
because	one	believes	that	it	 is	raining.	Similarly,	one	never	waits	to	cross	the	road	because	a	
car	is	coming,	but	only	because	one	thinks	a	car	is	coming.		
The	standard	response	to	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	is	to	accept	the	conclusion	and	to	
insist	that	when	I	say	that	I	congratulated	my	friend	because	she	won	an	award,	the	purported	
explanans	of	that	expression	(the	fact	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award)	is	merely	elliptical	for	
the	real	explanans,	which	it	conversationally	implies	(that	I	knew	or	believed	that	had	she	won	
an	award).	I	will	deal	with	this	response,	and	other	common	responses	in	§	(X).	Before	then,	in	
the	next	chapter,	I	want	to	show	how	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	can	be	used	to	create	
further	problems	for	explanatory	rationalism.	
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Appendix	
A.1 The	argument	for	Premise	1	
For	reference,	here	is	the	argument	for	Premise	1,	in	full:	
Premise	1a	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award	(but	I	still	believed	
that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 not	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
FACTIVITY	 For	any	propositions	p	and	q,	if	p	partially	explains	the	fact	that	q	then	
p	is	the	case.	
ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.	
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	
all	 the	elements	of	Δ	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	q,	Δ	 fully	explains	
the	fact	that	q.	
Premise	1b	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(though	she	had)	then	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	not	
have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
DIFFERENCE	 For	 any	 propositions	 p,	 q	 and	 r,	 p	 is	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	of	the	fact	that	r	from	q	only	if,	ceteris	paribus,	had	p	been	
the	case	and	q	not	been	the	case,	p	would	still	partially	explain	the	fact	
that	r.	
Premise	1	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
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(IX)		Other	Uses	for	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	
In	which	I	show	how	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	can	be	used	to	arrive	at	
some	other	conclusions	that	are	inconvenient	for	explanatory	rationalism.	I	set	
out	 the	 general	 form	 of	 the	 Problem,	 followed	 by	 the	 general	 form	 of	 the	
argument	for	the	first	premise	of	the	Problem.	I	show	the	Problem	can	be	used	
to	argue	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 read	 that	my	 friend	had	won	an	award	does	not	
explain	why	I	congratulated	her,	and	that	neither	that	fact,	nor	the	fact	that	she	
had	 won	 an	 award,	 can	 explain	 why	 it	 was	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 me	 to	
congratulate	her.	
Recall	 that	 in	 §	(VI),	 I	 said	 that	 if	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 to	 be	 consistent	with	 the	prima	
facie	reasonable	claims	set	out	in	§§	(II)-(IV),	the	following	must	be	true:	
(R1)	 I	congratulated	my	friend	because	she	had	won	an	award.	
(R2)	 I	congratulated	my	friend	because	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	
(R3)	 It	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend	 because	 she	 had	
won	an	award.	
(R4)	 It	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	my	friend	because	I	read	that	
she	had	won	an	award.	
In	 the	 previous	 chapter	 I	 showed	 how	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 provides	 an	
argument	against	(R1).	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	show	that	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	
Problem	 also	 provides	 an	 argument	 against	 (R2),	 (R3)	 and	 (R4),	 by	 using	 it	 to	 reach	 the	
following	conclusions:	
Conclusion	2 The	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	does	not	explain	
why	I	congratulated	her.	
Conclusion	3 The	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	does	not	explain	why	it	was	pro	
tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	
Conclusion	4 The	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	does	not	explain	
why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	
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1 The	general	form	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	
The	general	form	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	the	claim	that	some	proposition,	x,	
explains	some	proposition,	z,	is	as	follows:	
The	general	form	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem		
Premise	#	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	z	such	that	x	is	neither	a	part	of	that	
full	explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
Conclusion	#	 x	does	not	explain	why	z.	
The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	can	thus	provide	the	argument	for	Conclusions	2,	3,	and	4,	
if	we	provide	the	appropriate	specification	of	‘Premise	#’.	How	do	we	do	so?	1.1 The	general	form	of	the	argument	for	Premise	#	
In	the	argument	for	Premise	1	of	the	previous	chapter,	the	only	premises	that	were	specific	to	
the	example	considered	were	these:	
Premise	1a	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award	(but	I	still	believed	
that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 not	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
Premise	1b	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(though	she	had)	then	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	not	
have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
The	general	form	of	these	premises	is,	for	the	particular	propositions	x,	y	and	z,	as	follows:	
Premise	#a	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	x	had	not	been	the	case	(but	y	still	had)	then	(i)	the	
fact	that	y	would	have	partially	explained	why	z;	and	(ii)	the	fact	that	
not	x	would	not	have	partially	explained	why	z.	
Premise	#b	 If,	 ceteris	 paribus,	y	had	not	 been	 the	 case	 (but	 x	 still	 had)	 then	 the	
fact	that	x	would	not	have	partially	explained	why	z.	
All	of	the	other	premises	in	the	argument	for	Premise	1	were,	you	will	recall,	general	principles	
of	explanation.	As	a	result,	if	Premise	#a	and	Premise	#b	are	true	of	x,	y	and	z,	then	Premise	#	
is	true	of	them	too	(given	FACTIVITY,	SUFFICIENCY,	ENDURANCE	and	DIFFERENCE);	and	if	Premise	#	 is	
true	of	them	then	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	implies	that	x	does	not	explain	z.	So,	to	
arrive	 at	 Conclusions	 2,	 3,	 and	 4	 we	 need	 only	 show	 that	 the	 appropriate	 specifications	 of	
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Premise	 #a	 and	 Premise	 #b	 are	 true	 of	 those	 cases.	 I	 consider	 the	 argument	 for	 each	
conclusion	in	turn.	
2 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R2)	
Does	the	fact	that	 I	 read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	explain	why	 I	congratulated	her?	
The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 for	 (R2)	 concludes	 that	 it	 does	 not.	 To	 reach	 that	
conclusion	we	need	to	establish	the	following:	
Premise	2 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	is	neither	a	part	
of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation.		
Now,	 as	 discussed,	 in	 order	 to	 arrive	 at	 Premise	2	 we	 need	 only	 demonstrate	 that	 the	
appropriate	specifications	of	Premise	#a	and	Premise	#b	are	true.	That	 is	 the	purpose	of	 the	
following	sections.	2.1 The	argument	for	Premise	2a	
Firstly,	 suppose	 that,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 I	 hadn’t	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 but	 I	 still	
believed	 that	 she	 had	 –	maybe	 I	 saw	 her	 win	 it,	 or	 heard	 about	 it	 from	 another	 friend,	 or	
maybe	 (incredibly)	 I	 acquired	 the	 belief	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	 brain	 aneurism.	 In	 such	 a	
circumstance,	would	I	still	have	congratulated	her?	Of	course	I	would!	I	thought	that	she’d	an	
award!	And,	I	submit,	I	would	have	congratulated	her	because	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	
award.	
Moreover,	 continuing	 to	 suppose	 that,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 I	 hadn’t	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	
award	(but	nonetheless	believed	that	she	had),	would	the	fact	that	I	hadn’t	read	that	she	had	
won	 an	 award	 explain	why	 I	 congratulated	 her?	 Surely	 not!	Why	would	 it?	 This	 is	 a	 prosaic	
case,	not	a	weird	one.	
Thus,	combining	these	two	insights,	we	arrive	at	the	following	specification	of	Premise	#a:	
Premise	2a If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	(but	
I	 still	 believed	 that	 she	had)	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	 that	 she	
had	won	an	award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	
her;	 and	 (ii)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 had	not	 read	 that	 she	had	won	an	award	
would	not	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	2.2 The	argument	for	Premise	2b	
Now	consider:	if,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	even	though	I’d	
read	 that	 she	 had	 in	 the	 newspaper	 (perhaps	 I’m	 sceptical	 of	 the	 mainstream	 media,	 or	
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jealousy	makes	me	withhold),	would	I	have	congratulated	her?	Of	course	I	wouldn’t:	as	we’ve	
already	established.	I	didn’t	think	that	she’d	won	an	award,	so	it	would	have	been	odd	of	me	
to	congratulate	her	 (again,	 I	didn’t	 see	anything	else	of	worth	 in	congratulating	her,	and	 I’m	
not	a	sarcastic	sort).		
But	 if	 I	wouldn’t	 have	 congratulated	 her	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 had	 read	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	 wouldn’t	 have	 explained	 why	 I	 congratulated	 her	 (since	 I	 wouldn’t	 have,	 and	
explananda	must	be	the	case).	Thus:	
Premise	2b If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(although	I	had	read	that	she	had	won	an	award)	then	the	fact	that	 I	
had	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her	(since	I	wouldn’t	have).	2.3 The	argument	for	Premise	2	
To	 run	 through	 the	argument,	 for	 clarity:	we	know,	 from	condition	 (i)	of	Premise	2a,	 that	 if,	
ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	(but	had	still	believed	that	she	
had	 won	 an	 award)	 then	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 full	 explanation,	 call	 it	 ∆*,	 of	 why	 I	
congratulated	 her	 that	 would	 have	 included	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	
award.	And,	from	FACTIVITY,	we	know	that	had	I	not	read	that	she	had	won	an	award,	the	(false)	
proposition	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	could	not	have	been	a	part	of	∆*.	
We	also	know,	from	condition	(ii)	of	Premise	2a,	that	the	fact	that	 I	didn’t	 read	that	she	had	
won	an	award	would	not	have	been	a	part	of	∆*.	So,	since	(had	I	not	read	that	she	had	won	an	
award)	 neither	 the	 (false)	 proposition	 that	 I	 read	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	 award	nor	 its	 (true)	
negation	would	have	been	elements	of	∆*,	we	know,	from	ENDURANCE,	that	all	the	elements	in	
∆*	must	also	have	explained	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	in	the	case	in	which	I	did	read	that	
she	had	won	an	award.	So,	from	SUFFICIENCY,	we	know	that	∆*	is	likewise	a	full	explanation	of	
why	I	congratulated	her	when	I	did	read	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
Now,	from	Premise	2b,	we	know	that	 if,	ceteris	paribus,	 I	hadn’t	believed	that	my	friend	had	
won	 an	 award	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 had	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her	(since	I	wouldn’t	have).	So,	from	DIFFERENCE,	we	know	that	
the	 fact	 that	 I	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 cannot	 be	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	 of	 why	 I	 congratulated	 her	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	
award.	And	since	∆*	 includes	 the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	 that	 she	won	an	award,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
read	that	she	had	won	an	award	cannot	be	part	of	an	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	her	
that	is	genuinely	different	from	∆*.	Therefore:	
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Premise	2	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	is	neither	a	part	
of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation.	2.4 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R2)	
So,	the	Problem	for	(R2)	is	as	follows:	
The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R2)	
Premise	2	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	is	neither	a	part	
of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation.	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
Conclusion	2	 The	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	does	not	explain	
why	I	congratulated	her.		
3 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R3)	
Does	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	won	an	 award	explain	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	
congratulate	her?	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	 for	 (R3)	 concludes	 that	 it	does	not.	 To	
reach	that	conclusion	we	need	to	establish	the	following:	
Premise	3 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	 friend	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 she	won	 an	 award	 is	
neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	explanation.	
In	the	following	sections	 I	will	demonstrate	that	the	appropriate	specifications	of	Premise	#a	
and	Premise	#b	are	true.	3.1 The	argument	for	Premise	3a	
If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award,	but	I	still	believed	that	she	had,	would	it	
still	have	been	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	congratulate	her?	 I	 suggest	 that	 it	would:	 in	any	
normal	circumstances	if	you	think	that	your	friend	has	won	an	award	the	rational	thing	to	do	is	
to	congratulate	her	–	if	you	didn’t	then	you	would	be	acting	irrationally	(unless,	say,	you	were	
very	jealous,	or	knew	that	she	doesn’t	like	to	be	congratulated	–	but	that’s	not	my	example).	
Why	doesn’t	the	falsity	of	my	belief	seem	to	matter?	It	is	because,	as	Wedgwood	notes:	
When	we	assess	a	choice	or	decision	as	rational	or	irrational,	we	are	assessing	it	on	the	basis	of	
its	relation	to	the	agent’s	beliefs,	desires,	and	other	such	mental	states	–	not	on	the	basis	of	its	
relation	to	facts	about	the	external	world	that	could	vary	while	those	mental	states	remained	
unchanged.	(Wedgwood	2002,	350)	
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For	instance,	we	already	acknowledged	(see	§	(II)1.1)	that	it	was	rational	for	Sally	to	run	given	
that	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her1;	furthermore,	it	was	rational	in	spite	of	the	fact	
that	no	bear	was	chasing	her.	What	matters	to	the	pro	tanto	rationality	of	an	action	is,	as	I’ve	
suggested,	that	the	agent	takes	there	to	be	something	of	worth	in	doing	it	–	not	that	it	actually	
is,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
So,	if,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award,	but	I	still	believed	that	she	had,	then	it	
would	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her,	and	that	would	have	been,	in	
part,	because	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
Moreover,	 in	 this	 counterfactual	 case,	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	had	not	won	an	award	would	
clearly	not	have	explained	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	Again,	the	
case	is,	ex	hypothesi,	prosaic	and	not	weird.	Thus:	
Premise	3a If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award	(but	I	still	believed	
that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	
me	to	congratulate	her;	and	(ii)	the	fact	that	she	did	not	win	an	award	
would	 not	 have	 partially	 explained	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	
me	to	congratulate	her.		3.2 The	argument	for	Premise	3b	
Now	consider:	 if,	ceteris	paribus,	 I	had	not	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	even	though	
she	had,	would	 it	still	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	 for	me	to	congratulate	her?	Perhaps	you	
think	that	the	answer	depends	on	whether	or	not	it	was	rational	for	me	not	to	believe	that	she	
had	won	an	award?	I	will	return	to	the	question	of	whether	or	not	that	matters	 in	§	4.1,	but	
suppose,	for	now,	that	it	was.	
If	I	didn’t	believe	that	she	had	won	an	award	and	didn’t	take	congratulating	her	to	be,	in	any	
other	 respect,	worth	 doing,	 then	 it	would	 not	 have	 been	 even	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	
congratulate	her.	No	rational	(non-sarcastic)	person,	with	such	beliefs	and	desires	(etc.)	would	
congratulate	their	friend.	Thus:	
Premise	3b If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(though	she	had)	then	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	not	
have	 partially	 explained	 why	 it	 was	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 me	 to	
congratulate	her	(since	it	wouldn’t	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	
to	congratulate	her).	
																																								 																				
1	If	you	are	concerned	about	whether	or	not	her	belief	is	rational	in	the	first	place,	please	forestall	those	
concerns	until	§	4.1.	
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3.3 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R3)	
Trusting	 that	 the	 reasoning	 is	now	 familiar,	 I	will	 spare	 the	 reader	a	demonstration	of	how	 I	
think	we	can	arrive	at	Premise	3	from	Premise	3a	and	Premise	3b.	So,	the	Problem	for	(R3)	is	
as	follows:	
The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R3)	
Premise	3	 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	 friend	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 she	won	 an	 award	 is	
neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	
different	explanation.	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
Conclusion	3	 The	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	does	not	explain	why	it	was	pro	
tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	
4 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R4)	
Finally:	does	the	 fact	 that	 I	 read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	 in	 the	newspaper	explain	
why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her?	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	
for	(R4)	says	it	does	not.	This	is	what	we	need	to	show	to	get	there:	
Premise	4 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	friend	such	that	the	fact	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	
an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	different	explanation.	4.1 The	argument	for	Premise	4a	
Suppose,	 as	 we	 did	 in	 §	2.1,	 that	 ceteris	 paribus,	 I	 hadn’t	 read	 that	 my	 friend	 had	 won	 an	
award,	but	I	still	believed	that	she’d	won	an	award.	If	I	hadn’t	read	that	she’d	won	an	award,	
but,	say,	I’d	seen	her	win	it,	would	it	still	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	
her?	Of	course	it	would.	Likewise,	if	I’d	heard	about	her	award	from	a	(reliable)	friend	it	would	
have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	But	what	if	I	acquired	the	belief	as	the	
result	 of	 brain	 aneurism?	Would	 it	 still	 have	been	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	
her?	Some	think	it	would	not,	for	instance:	
If	an	agent	has	irrational	beliefs,	those	beliefs	are	not	able	to	make	rational	any	actions	done	in	
their	light.		(Dancy	2000,	60)	
It	would	not	be	rational	for	Holly	to	put	on	winter	clothes	if	her	belief	that	it	 is	snowing	were	
due	 to	 crazed	 conviction,	 say,	 or	 wishful	 thinking.	 Irrationality	 cannot	 beget	 rationality!	 A	
subject’s	 beliefs	 contribute	 to	making	 it	 rational	 for	 her	 to	 act	 in	 certain	 ways	 only	 if	 those	
beliefs	are	themselves	rational.	(Whiting	2014,	4)	
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If	 this	 is	 so,	 then	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 way	 that	 one	 acquires	 one’s	 beliefs	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	
rationality	 of	 one’s	 actions;	 that	 is,	 we	 cannot	 so	 easily	 omit	 mention	 of	 them	 in	 the	
explanation	of	why	it	is	rational	for	an	agent	to	do	some	action.	
In	some	respect,	I	disagree	–	I	think	that	an	irrational	belief	can	nonetheless	explain	why	it	was	
pro	 tanto	 rational	 (but	 probably	 not	 all	 things	 considered	 rational)	 for	 someone	 to	 do	
something,2	as	do	others.3	Nonetheless,	even	if	irrational	beliefs	can’t	explain	why	actions	are	
pro	 tanto	 rational,	 that	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 experiences	 or	 appearances	 on	 which	 an	
agent’s	beliefs	are	based	are	necessary	to	a	full	explanation	of	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	
that	agent	to	do	some	action;	it	means	only	that	the	fact	that	the	relevant	beliefs	of	the	agent	
are	rational4	is	necessary	to	a	full	explanation.		
So,	 if	ceteris	paribus,	 I	hadn’t	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award,	but	 I	still	believed	that	
she’d	won	an	award	and	that	belief	was	(still)	rational,	would	it	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	
for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend?	Of	 course!	And	 it	would	have	been	pro	 tanto	 rational,	 in	
part,	because	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 did	not	 read	 that	my	 friend	 had	won	 an	 award	 clearly	would	 not	
explain	why	it	would	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	Thus:	
																																								 																				
2	An	argument	 to	 that	effect:	 suppose	 that	Bernard	Ortcutt,	 spy	extraordinaire,	 comes	 to	believe	 that	
the	FBI	has	discovered	that	he	is	a	spy	and	has	sent	agents	to	apprehend	him.	His	belief	is	well-founded	
–	FBI	counter-intelligence	exists	to	capture	spies	like	him;	a	normally	regular	asset	has	gone	missing;	and	
he’s	been	repeatedly	trailed	by	a	black	sedan	this	week.	It	is,	I	submit,	pro	tanto	rational	for	Bernard	to	
go	into	hiding	(since	he	is	a	patriot	(so	isn’t	minded	to	turn),	and	has	no	interest	in	jail	time,	it	is	likely	
also	all	 things	 considered	 rational).	 Now	 consider	Ornard	 Bertcutt:	 Ornard	 has	 actually	 lived	 a	 rather	
pedestrian	life	but,	through	some	freak	co-incidence	(a	peculiar	mental	disorder,	say),	his	mental	states	
are	all	 identical	to	Bernard’s	–	he	is	Bernard’s	mental	duplicate.	So,	Ornard,	like	Bernard,	believes	that	
the	FBI	is	out	to	get	him.	However,	Ornard’s	belief	is	not	only	false,	it	is	plainly	not	rational.	Nonetheless,	
it	 is,	 I	 submit,	 at	 least	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 him	 to	 go	 into	 hiding.	 	 Some	 resistance	 to	 this	 view	 is	
understandable:	to	believe	that	the	FBI	is	chasing	you	is	certainly	outlandish,	and	Ornard	only	believes	it	
because	he	is	crazy	–	so	surely	going	into	hiding	can’t	be	even	a	pro	tanto	rational	thing	for	him	to	do?	If	
Ornard	 goes	 into	 hiding	 it’s	 because	 he’s	 not	 rational,	 it’s	 not	 the	 rational	 thing	 for	 him	 to	 do!	 The	
problem,	however,	with	saying	that	it	isn’t	even	pro	tanto	rational	for	Ornard	to	go	into	hiding	is	that	we	
are	seemingly	 forced	to	question	whether	or	not	 it	 is	pro	tanto	rational	 for	Bernard	to	go	 into	hiding.	
Why?	Because	of	 the	widely	held	view	that	what	 it	 is	 rational	 for	an	agent	 to	do	supervenes	on	 their	
mental	states	(e.g.	Broome	2013,	151),	which	is	to	say	that	there	can	be	no	change	in	what	it	is	rational	
for	 an	 agent	 to	 do	 without	 a	 change	 in	 their	 mind.	 Now,	 since	 Bernard	 and	 Ornard	 are	 mental	
duplicates,	given	that	what	it	is	rational	for	an	agent	to	do	supervenes	on	their	mental	states,	there	can	
be	no	difference	between	Bernard	and	Ornard	 in	what	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	do,	 since	 there	 is	no	
difference	in	their	brain	states.	
3	‘Given	my	irrational	belief	that	smoking	will	protect	my	health,	it	would	be	rational	for	me	to	smoke.	
Given	 this	 hermit’s	 irrational	 belief	 that	 his	 life	 of	 self-inflicted	 pain	 would	 please	 God,	 he	 could	
rationally	live	such	a	life.’	(Parfit	2011,	114)	
4	Whatever	your	preferred	standard	of	rationality	for	beliefs	is.	
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Premise	4a If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	(but	
I	 still	 believed	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award)	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	 award	would	 have	 partially	 explained	
why	 it	was	pro	tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	congratulate	her;	and	 (ii)	 the	
fact	 that	 I	 had	not	 read	 that	 she	had	won	an	award	would	not	have	
partially	explained	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	
her.	4.2 The	argument	for	Premise	4b	
Finally:	if,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	even	though	I’d	read	
that	she	had,	would	it	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her?	Again,	perhaps	
you	think	it	depends	on	whether	or	not	it	was	rational	for	me	not	to	believe	that	she	had	won	
an	award.	And	perhaps,	 further,	 you	 insist	 that	given	 the	ceteris	paribus	 clause	 it	 can’t	have	
been	rational.	Well,	I	disagree.	
Supposing	 that	 pathological	 jealousy	makes	me	withhold.	 The	 all	 things	 considered	 rational	
thing	for	me	to	do	is	to	cease	withholding	(and	perhaps	seek	treatment).	Then,	once	I’ve	done	
that,	 it	would	be	pro	 tanto	rational	 for	me	to	congratulate	my	 friend.	But,	given	that	 I	don’t	
believe	that	she	has	won	an	award	(that	 is,	before	 I	cease	withholding),	 I	suggest,	 it	can’t	be	
pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	I	see	nothing	of	any	worth	in	doing	so	–	and	not	
because	I	don’t	like	her,	or	don’t	care	about	her	feelings	–	but	because	I	don’t	believe	that	she	
has	 won	 an	 award.	 To	 insist	 that	 it	 is	 even	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 congratulate	 her,	
despite	the	fact	that	I	don’t	believe	that	she	has	won	an	award,	is	to	insist	that	it	is	pro	tanto	
rational	for	me	to	do	something	that	I	take	to	be,	in	no	respect,	worth	doing.	I	don’t	see	how	
that	could	be	rational.	
So,	given	that	it	wouldn’t	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her,	the	fact	that	
I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	could	not	explain	why	it	would	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	
for	me	to	congratulate	her.	Thus:	
Premise	4b If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(although	I	had	read	that	she	had	won	an	award)	then	the	fact	that	 I	
had	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	 I	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	her	
(since	it	wouldn’t	have	been	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	
her).	4.3 The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R4)	
Again,	 I	 will	 not	 spell	 out	 the	 reasoning	 from	 Premise	 4a	 and	 Premise	 4b	 to	 Premise	4.	 So,	
concluding,	the	Problem	for	(R4)	is:	
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The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	(R4)	
Premise	4	 There	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	
congratulate	my	friend	such	that	the	fact	that	I	read	that	she	had	won	
an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	different	explanation.		
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
Conclusion	4	 The	fact	that	I	read	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	does	not	explain	
why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.		
5 The	Argument	from	Illusion	
Many	 have	 observed 5 	a	 similarity	 between	 the	 problem	 that	 I	 have	 formalised	 as	 The	
Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	and	the	argument	from	illusion	in	the	literature	on	perception.		
To	the	extent	 that	we	conceive	of	 the	argument	 from	 illusion	as	a	problem	for	 the	 idea	that	
the	 external	 world	 could	 explain	why	we	 believe	what	we	 believe	 then	 the	 argument	 from	
illusion	 can	 be	 represented	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem,	 briefly,	 as	
follows.	
I	see	a	tomato	so	I	believe	that	there	is	a	tomato	before	me.	If	no	tomato	had	been	before	me,	
but	it	still	appeared	to	me	as	though	one	had,	then	the	fact	that	it	appeared	to	me	as	though	a	
tomato	were	 there	would	partially	explain	why	 I	believed	 that	a	 tomato	was	 there.	And	 the	
fact	 that	 there	 wasn’t	 a	 tomato	 wouldn’t.	 This	 provides	 the	 relevant	 specification	 of	
Premise	#a.		
And	then	if	there	had	been	a	tomato	but	it	hadn’t	appeared	to	me	as	though	there	had	(blind	
spots	in	my	vision,	say),	then	I	wouldn’t	have	believed	that	there	was	a	tomato,	so	the	fact	that	
there	was	a	tomato	wouldn’t	have	explained	why	 I	believed	that	there	was	 (since	 I	wouldn’t	
have	believed	that	there	was).	This	provides	us	with	the	relevant	specification	of	Premise	#b.		
From	these	specifications	of	Premise	#a	and	Premise	#b,	together	with	the	relevant	principles	
of	 explanation,	we	 can,	 in	 a	manner	 that	 should	 now	 be	 familiar,	 arrive	 at	 The	 Explanatory	
Exclusion	Problem,	and	the	consequent	conclusion	that	the	fact	that	there	is	a	tomato	before	
does	not	explain	why	I	believe	that	there	is.	
However,	there	are	other	versions	of	the	argument	from	illusion	according	to	which	it	is	not	a	
claim	 about	 what	 explains	 an	 agent’s	 beliefs.	 For	 instance,	 one	 interpretation	 of	 it	 is	 as	 a	
problem	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 veridical	 perceptual	 experience	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	 knowledge.	
																																								 																				
5	(E.g.	Stout	1996;	Dancy	2000;	Hornsby	2008;	Hyman	2011;	McDowell	2013)	
	 140	
When	 the	 argument	 from	 illusion	 is	 conceived	 in	 that	 manner,	 it	 cannot	 be	 so	 simply	
characterised	 as	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem.	 Although,	 I	 submit,	 the	 problems	 are	
nonetheless	related.	
6 Conclusion	
I	 have	 now	 shown	 how	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 can	 provide	 arguments	 against	
(R1)-(R4).		
Since	explanatory	 rationalism	requires	 the	 truth	of	 (R1)-(R4)	 if	 it	 is	 to	be	consistent	with	 the	
prima	facie	reasonable	claims	set	out	in	earlier	chapters,	I	will	need	to	find	some	way	to	reject	
the	 conclusions	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem.	 My	 solution	 will	 be	 to	 reject	 the	
exclusion	principle,	which,	I	will	argue,	by	means	of	several	counterexamples,	is	clearly	false.	I	
will	argue,	 inter	alia,	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	explains	why	I	congratulated	
her	because	it	explains	why	I	believed	that	she	won	an	award,	and	the	exclusion	principle	fails	
to	provide	for	the	transitivity	of	that	sort	of	explanation.	
Before	 then,	 however,	 I	 wish	 to	 consider	 the	 other,	 more	 commonplace	 responses	 to	 The	
Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem,	 and	what	 is	wrong	with	 them.	 That	 is	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 next	
chapter.	
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(X)		How	normative	reasons	don’t	explain	
In	which	I	reject	two	accounts	of	how	normative	reasons	explain.	I	re-introduce	
talk	of	normative	reasons,	defining	them	as	things	that	make	actions,	 in	some	
respect,	 worth	 doing.	 I	 ask	 how	 it	 is	 that	 we	manage	 to	 explain	 our	 actions	
when	we	say	that	we	acted	because	of	a	normative	reason	there	was	to	act;	for	
instance:	how	is	it	that	I	explain	why	I	took	my	umbrella	when	I	say	that	I	took	it	
because	it	was	raining?	I	suggest	that	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	explains	why	I	
took	my	umbrella	either	 ‘elliptically’,	 ‘directly’	or	 ‘indirectly’.	 I	note	 that	which	
answer	one	accepts	will	depend	on	one’s	response	to	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	
Problem:	 elliptical	 theorists	 accept	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Problem,	 direct	
theorists	 reject	 the	 first	premise,	and	 indirect	 theorists	 reject	 the	second.	 I	 set	
out	the	problems	with	elliptical	and	direct	theories.	
We	often	explain	why	we	do	something	by	citing	some	fact	that	counted	in	favour	of	doing	it:	I	
say	that	I	took	my	umbrella	because	it	was	raining;	Marshall	says	that	he	is	going	to	the	station	
because	 his	 daughter	 is	 on	 the	 7	 o’clock	 train.	 How	 are	 we	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 these	
commonplace	explanations?	
If	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	is	to	be	believed,	we	should	not	interpret	them	literally.	
That	 is,	 the	purported	 explanantia	 (i.e.	 that	which	 follows	 the	 ‘because’)	 in	 such	 statements	
are	not	the	actual	explanantia;	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	does	not	really	explain	why	I	took	my	
umbrella.	Instead,	whatever	explanatory	power	these	statements	have	is	due	to	there	being	a	
short-hand;	when	 I	 say	 that	 I	 took	my	 umbrella	 because	 it	was	 raining,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	
raining	is	merely	elliptical	for	what	really	does	the	explaining,	which	is	the	fact	that	I	believed	
that	it	was	raining,	or	that	I	knew	that	it	was.	
Alternatively,	one	could	reject	the	conclusion	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem,	and	insist	
that	 these	 remarks	 are	 literally	 accurate;	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 really	 does	 explain	why	 I	
took	my	umbrella.	There	are	two	ways	of	doing	this:	either	by	rejecting	the	first	premise	of	the	
Problem,	or	the	second.		
Theories	that	reject	the	first	premise	say	that	the	contribution	of	the	fact	that	 it	 is	raining	to	
the	explanation	of	why	I	took	my	umbrella	is,	in	some	sense,	independent	from,	or	in	addition	
to	the	explanatory	contribution	of	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	They	argue	that	
the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 explains	my	 action	directly	 (that	 is,	 unmediated	 by	 features	 of	my	
psychology).	According	to	the	most	popular	theories,	the	direct	explanatory	relation	between	
	 142	
the	world	and	the	action	is	the	result	of	the	special	connection	between	the	world	and	actions	
that	knowledge	engenders.	
In	contrast,	 theories	that	reject	the	second	premise	accept	that	the	explanatory	contribution	
of	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	is	not	in	addition	to	the	explanation	that	is	already	provided	by,	
inter	 alia,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 was	 raining.	 Thus	 they	 deny	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
raining	 directly	 explains	 why	 I	 took	my	 umbrella.	 However,	 they	 insist,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	
raining	does	indirectly	explain	why	I	took	my	umbrella,	by	explaining	why	I	believed	that	it	was	
raining.		
In	short:	we	want	to	understand	how	it	is	that	I	manage	to	explain	my	action	when	I	say,	‘I	took	
my	umbrella	because	 it	was	 raining.’	 There	 are	 three	possible	 accounts:	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	
raining	either	explains	my	action	elliptically,	or	it	explains	it	directly,	or	it	explains	it	indirectly.	
In	what	 follows	 I	will	 set	 out	 the	 problems	with	elliptical	 and	direct	 theories,	which	 are	 the	
typical	responses	to	this	problem.	In	subsequent	chapters	I	will	defend	my	own	indirect	theory.	
Before	 then	 it	 will	 help	me	 better	 characterise	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 this	 discussion	 if	 we	 re-
introduce	talk	of	‘normative	reasons’;	that	is	the	focus	of	the	first	section.	
1 Normative	reason	explanations	1.1 Normative	reasons	
I	want	to	re-habilitate	the	term	‘normative	reason’,	which	I	abandoned	in	§	(I).	Let	us	define	it	
as	follows:	
Definition For	any	p,	p	is	a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ	if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	
φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.1	
A	few	points,	already	discussed	in	§	(I)4,	are	worth	stressing	here:	Firstly,	while	this	definition	
is	closely	aligned	to	the	conventional	definition	of	normative	reasons,	 it	departs	from	it	 in	so	
far	as	I	am	not	saying	anything	about	how	normative	reasons,	so	defined,	relate	to	expressions	
like	‘the	reasons	there	are	to	act’	or	‘the	reasons	for	which	an	agent	acted’	–	for	my	purposes	
the	term	‘normative	reason’	is	strictly	a	term	of	art	meaning	anything	that	makes	an	action,	in	
some	respect,	worth	doing.		
Secondly,	I	will	assume,	to	avoid	ambiguity,	that	‘counting	in	favour	of’	and	‘making,	 in	some	
respect,	 worth	 doing’	 are	 equivalent	 relations.	 This	 assumption	 has	 no	 bearing	 on	 the	
argument	of	this	chapter.		
																																								 																				
1	Note:	this	definition	makes	no	explicit	assumptions	about	the	ontology	of	‘p’.	
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Finally,	it	is	worth	recalling	that	that	which	counts	in	favour	of	an	action	(i.e.	that	which	makes	
it,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing),	is	typically	not	a	feature	of	the	agent’s	psychology,	which	is	
to	say	that	normative	reasons	are	typically	not	features	of	an	agent’s	psychology.	1.2 Normative	reason	explanations	
In	§	(VII)1,	I	noted	that	the	word	‘explains’	and	‘explanation’	have	different	meanings.	If	we	say	
that	the	fact	 that	 it	 rained	 last	night	 is	an	explanation	of	why	Joanne’s	carpet	 is	wet,	we	are	
giving	one	sense	of	‘explanation’,	in	which	an	explanation	is	an	explanans.	This	is	the	sense	of	
‘explanation’	and	‘explains’	that	I	have	focussed	on	in	previous	chapters	–	it	is	the	sense	that	is	
involved	in	the	concepts	of	full	and	partial	explanation.		
However,	I	suggest	that	‘I	took	my	umbrella	because	it	was	raining’	is	an	explanation	of	why	I	
took	my	umbrella	in	different	sense	of	the	word	–	the	sentence	is	an	elucidation	of	why	I	took	
my	 umbrella,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 explanans	 of	 why	 I	 took	 it.	 It	 is	 in	 that	 sense	 of	 the	 word	
‘explanation’	that	I	suggest	that	we	call	sentences	in	which	a	normative	reason	for	an	agent	to	
act	 appears	 in	 the	 position	 of	 an	 explanans	 of	 why	 they	 acted, 2 	‘normative	 reason	
explanations’.	
It	 is	 a	 fact	 that	 we	 often	 give	 normative	 reason	 explanations	 of	 our	 actions.	 I	 gave	 a	 few	
examples	in	my	opening	remarks,	here	are	some	more3:	Sandra	is	going	to	the	shops	because	
she	 is	 out	 of	milk;	 I’m	 flying	 to	 Bodrum	because	 that’s	where	my	 father	 lives;	 Theresa	May	
made	a	deal	with	the	DUP	in	2017	because	that	was	the	only	way	for	her	to	form	a	majority	
government.4	In	 all	 of	 these	 examples,	 something	 that	 made	 the	 action,	 in	 some	 respect,	
worth	doing	(for	that	agent),	which	is	to	say,	a	normative	reason	for	them	to	do	it,	appears	to	
explain	their	action.	And,	indeed,	when	such	explanations	are	given,	you	understand	why	the	
action	was	done	–	so	an	explanation	of	some	sort	has	certainly	been	provided.	
2 Theories	of	normative	reason	explanation	
In	the	introduction	to	this	chapter	I	asked	how	it	was	that	I	managed	to	explain	my	why	I	took	
my	umbrella	when	 I	said	that	 I	 took	my	umbrella	because	 it	was	raining.	The	remarks	of	 the	
previous	 section	 should	 have	 made	 clear	 that	 this	 is	 a	 specific	 instance	 of	 a	 more	 general	
																																								 																				
2	That	is,	sentences	like	‘A	φ’d	because	p’	or	‘the	fact	that	p	explains	why	A	φ’d’	where	the	fact	that	p	is	
a	normative	reason	for	A	to	φ.	
3 	For	 the	 following	 examples,	 assume	 that	 the	 relevant	 supporting	 conditions	 (desires,	 evaluative	
judgements,	evaluative	facts…)	are	in	place	such	that:	the	fact	that	Sandra	is	out	of	milk	is	a	normative	
reason	for	her	to	go	to	the	shops;	the	fact	that	my	father	lives	in	Bodrum	is	a	normative	reason	for	me	
to	 go	 there;	 the	 fact	 that	making	 a	 deal	with	 the	DUP	was	 the	 only	way	 for	May	 to	 form	 a	majority	
government	was	a	normative	reason	for	her	to	do	so.	
4	Of	course,	the	purported	explanantia	of	these	remarks	are,	at	best,	partial	explanations.	
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question:	 how	 do	 we	 manage	 to	 explain	 our	 actions	 when	 we	 give	 a	 normative	 reason	
explanation	 of	 them?	 Answering	 this	 question	 is	 the	 job	 of	 what	 I	 will	 call	 a	 ‘theory	 of	
normative	reason	explanation’.		
Which	 theory	of	normative	 reason	explanation	one	holds	depends	on	one’s	 response	 to	The	
Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem:	 those	who	 accept	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Problem	 insist	 that	
when	 we	 give	 a	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 it	 is	 not	 really	 the	 normative	 reason	 that	
explains	our	action.	Instead,	they	argue,	the	normative	reason	is	elliptical	for	that	which	really	
does	the	explaining	–	which	is	the	agent’s	awareness	of,	or	belief	in	the	normative	reason.	This	
is	the	elliptical	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.		
Those	who	reject	the	first	premise	of	the	Problem	insist	that,	when	we	give	a	normative	reason	
explanation	 of	 an	 agent’s	 action,	 the	 normative	 reason	 explains	 the	 agent’s	 action	 directly;	
that	 is,	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 involved	 are	 unmediated	 by	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	
psychology.	These	are	direct	theories	of	normative	reason	explanation.	
Finally,	those	who	reject	the	second	premise	of	the	Problem	accept	the	primacy	of	features	of	
the	agent’s	psychology	in	explaining	their	action,	but	nonetheless	insist	that	normative	reasons	
can	explain	an	agent’s	action	indirectly,	by	explaining	those	features	of	the	agent’s	psychology	
that	explain	their	action.	These	are	indirect	theories	of	normative	reason	explanation.	
The	 focus	of	 the	next	 two	sections	 is	on	critiquing	elliptical	 and	direct	 theories	of	normative	
reason	explanation,	respectively.	Subsequent	chapters	are	devoted	to	the	defence	of	my	own	
indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.	
3 Elliptical	theories	
Elliptical	 theories5	accept	 the	 conclusion	of	 The	Explanatory	 Exclusion	Problem;	 they	 suggest	
that	when	I	say	that	I	took	my	umbrella	because	it	was	raining,	the	purported	explanans	(the	
fact	 that	 it	was	 raining)	 is	not	 the	actual	 explanans.	Nonetheless,	when	 I	 say	 that	 I	 took	my	
umbrella	because	it	was	raining,	you	understand	why	I	took	it	–	that	is,	in	spite	of	the	apparent	
inaccuracy	of	what	I	said,	you	still	understood	why	I	took	my	umbrella.	The	question	is:	how?	
How	do	we	manage	 to	explain	our	actions	 if	 the	purported	explanans	 in	a	normative	 reason	
explanation	is	not	the	actual	explanans?		
The	 elliptical	 theorist’s	 response,	 is	 to	 say	 that,	 in	 a	 normative	 reason	 explanation,	 the	
normative	reason	is	elliptical	for	the	actual	explanans,	so,	for	instance,	when	I	say	that	I	took	
my	umbrella	because	it	was	raining,	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	is	elliptical	for	some	feature	of	
																																								 																				
5	The	 name	 for	 these	 theories	was	 inspired	 by	Maria	 Alvarez’s	 (2010,	 180)	 related	 (but	 not	 identical)	
discussion	of	what	she	calls	‘Humean	explanations.’		
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my	psychology,	which	 is	what	 really	does	 the	explaining.	 That	 is,	when	we	give	a	normative	
reason	 explanation,	 ‘we	 suppose	 that,	 properly	 understood,	 it	 should	 be	 seen	 as	
enthymematic,	 i.e.	 as	an	acceptable	 shorthand	version	of	 the	 full	 explanation.’	 (Dancy	2000,	
121)	
	
Figure	X-1:	Elliptical	theories	of	normative	reason	explanation	
Although	they	are	rarely6	explicitly	advocated,	elliptical	theories	provide	what	is	probably	the	
de	facto	account	of	how	facts	about	the	world	explain	our	actions.	3.1 Elliptical	for	what?	
What	 feature	 of	 our	 psychology	 is	 it	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	meant	 to	 be	 elliptical	 for,	
when	we	give	a	normative	reason	explanation?	Opinions	diverge.	One	view	is	that	if	I	say	that	I	
took	 my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 was	 raining	 the	 conversational	 implicature7	is	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believed	that	it	was	raining,8	another	view	is	that	it	is	the	fact	that	I	acted	for	the	reason	that	it	
was	 raining,	9	and	another	 still	 is	 that	 it	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 knew	 that	 it	was	 raining.10	Of	 these	
three	views	only	the	latter	is	robust	to	a	particular	sort	of	challenge	posed	by	Gettier	cases,11	
so	I	will	assume	that	the	conversational	implicature	of	saying	that	I	took	my	umbrella	because	
it	was	raining	is	that	I	knew	that	it	is	raining.	
																																								 																				
6	Sandis	(2013)	and,	 I	think,	Dancy	(2014)	are	rare	exceptions.	Sandis	(2012,	178	fn.	24)	also	attributes	
this	view	to	Michael	Smith.	
7	Which,	recall,	is	what	really	explains	why	I	took	my	umbrella.	
8	This	is	probably	the	de	facto	view,	and,	I	think,	is	explicitly	the	position	of	Sandis	(2013).	
9	See	Dancy	(2014).	
10	Gibbons	 (2010,	359)	 comes	 close	 to	advocating	 this	 view	–	although	 I	 think	his	 eventual	position	 is	
closer	 to	 the	 indirect	 theory	 that	 I	 advocate	 in	 §	(XII),	 since,	 on	 the	 same	 page,	 he	makes	 clear	 that	
normative	reasons	can	explain.	
11	The	challenge	 is	 this:	 recall,	 from	§	(IV)1.4	 that	when	Edmund	had	a	Gettier	belief	 (i.e.	 justified	and	
true	but	not	knowledgeable)	that	the	ice	was	thin	we	could	not	say	that	he	stayed	at	the	edge	because	
the	ice	was	thin.	However,	if	the	conversational	implicature	of	saying	‘He	stayed	at	the	edge	because	the	
ice	was	thin’	is	merely	that	he	believed	that	the	ice	was	thin,	then	there	is	no	reason	why	we	should	not	
say	it	–	this	is	then	a	problem	for	elliptical	theories	that	take	the	purported	explanans	to	be	elliptical	for	
the	fact	that	the	agent	believed	it.	In	contrast,	if	the	conversational	implicature	is	that	he	knew	the	ice	
was	thin,	then	we	should	not	say	that	he	stayed	at	the	edge	because	the	ice	was	thin,	since	he	did	not	
know	it.	Dancy’s	(2014)	account,	according	to	which	the	conversational	implicature	is	that	he	stayed	at	
the	edge	for	the	reason	that	the	ice	was	thin	could	account	for	the	fact	that	we	don’t	say	that	he	stayed	
at	the	edge	because	the	ice	was	thin	if	he	were	willing	to	say	that	an	agent	only	acts	for	the	reason	that	
p	if	they	know	it;	but	he	isn’t,	so	it	can’t.	
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3.2 The	problems	with	elliptical	theories	
Elliptical	 theories	 claim	 that	 normative	 reason	 explanations	 provide	 some	 explanation	 of	 an	
agent’s	action	only	because	they	imply	that	the	agent	knew	that	normative	reason.	Critically,	
elliptical	theorists	insist,	the	normative	reason	does	no	explanatory	work	of	its	own.	
I	 raise	 two	 related	 concerns	 with	 this	 view:	 first,	 it	 makes	 normative	 reasons	 explanatorily	
inert,	contrary	to	the	prevailing	view	that	they	ought	to	have	explanatory	power;	and	second,	
it	 renders	 ordinary	 language	 explanations	 of	 our	 actions	 thoroughly	 unsuited	 to	 the	 task	 to	
which	we	habitually	put	them.	
On	the	first:	the	‘explanatory	constraint’,	so	named	by	Jonathan	Dancy	(2000),12	and	to	which	
many13	subscribe,	 says	 that	 any	 theory	 of	 reasons	 must	 account	 for	 someone	 doing	 some	
action	because	of	a	normative	reason	that	there	is	for	them	to	do	it.	This	constraint	seems	like	
a	 modest	 one:	 assuming	 that	 normative	 reasons	 indeed	 have	 some	 normative	 import,	 the	
explanatory	 constraint	 requires	 only	 that	 normative	 reasons	 have	more	 than	 just	 normative	
significance.	As	Ulrike	Heuer	succinctly	puts	it,	this	requirement,	‘expresses	nothing	more	than	
the	everyday	assumption	 that	we	 sometimes…	do	 something	because	 it	 is	 right	or	 justified.’	
(Heuer	 2004,	 47)	 Indeed,	 one	must	wonder	what	 the	 point	 of	 normativity	 is	 if	 we	 can’t	 do	
things	because	there	are	such	normative	reasons	for	us	to	do	them	(why	recommend	an	action	
if	that	recommendation	can’t	affect	whether	or	not	you	do	it?).	
The	problem	for	elliptical	theories	is	that	they	clearly	fail	the	explanatory	constraint.	They	hold	
that	it	 is	never	the	normative	reason	per	se	that	explains	the	agent’s	action,	but	only	what	is	
implied	by	it	–	thereby	rendering	normative	reasons	explanatorily	inert.14  
The	 second	 problem:	 denying	 that	 normative	 reasons	 explain	 our	 actions	 contradicts	 our	
habitual	patterns	of	speech.	We	routinely	cite	normative	reasons	by	way	of	explanation	of	our	
actions	 and	 it	 does	 quite	 severe	 disservice	 to	 our	 ordinary	 language	 expressions	 to	 suppose	
that	when	I	say,	‘Laura	threw	away	the	milk	because	it	had	gone	off’	the	real	explanans	is	not	
what	 I	 say	 it	 is15	but	 only	 what	 is	 implied	 by	 it.	 Ordinary	 language	 may	 be	 occasionally	
imprecise	 or	 misleading,	 but	 to	 accept	 such	 ubiquitous	 misrepresentation	 as	 a	 part	 of	 our	
everyday	accounts	of	actions	seems	to	be	a	high	price	to	pay.	I	think	we	can	do	better.	
																																								 																				
12	Dancy’s	work	is,	to	my	knowledge,	also	the	first	appearance	of	this	argument.	
13	(e.g.	Dancy	2000,	101;	Smith	2004,	175;	Hornsby	2007,	301;	Raz	2009,	194;	Hieronymi	2011,	415)	
14	This	argument	is	similar	to	The	Right	Reasons	Problem	(see	§	(III)3.2).	However,	while	that	argument	
required	 that	 an	 agent	 should	 be	 able	 to	 do	 something	 for	 reasons	 that	 make	 it	 worth	 doing,	 this	
argument	requires	that	an	agent	should	be	able	to	do	something	because	of	what	makes	it	worth	doing,	
indeed,	 they	 should	 be	 able	 to	 do	 it	 because	 it	 is	 worth	 doing.	 The	 problem	 for	 The	 Explanatory	
Exclusion	Problem	is	that	it	is	incompatible	with	the	idea	that	such	facts	could	explain	an	agent’s	action.	
15	That	is,	what	follows	the	‘because’.	
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4 Direct	theories		
The	 only	 way	 to	 satisfy	 the	 explanatory	 constraint	 and	 to	 accept	 the	 literal	 form	 of	 our	
everyday	expressions	is	to	concede	that	(non-psychological)	normative	reasons	can	explain	our	
actions.	 This	means	 rejecting	 the	 conclusion	of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	Problem.	 The	 first	
way	to	do	that,	which	we	consider	now,	is	to	reject	the	first	premise.	
Recall	the	general	form	of	the	first	premise	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem:	
Premise	#	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	z	such	that	x	is	neither	a	part	of	that	
full	explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
Now,	as	we	established	 in	§	(VIII),	 it	 seems	as	 though	whenever	we	give	a	normative	 reason	
explanation	 we	 can	 make	 a	 claim	 that	 fits	 the	 Premise	 #	 form	 about	 the	 explanatory	
contribution	of	the	normative	reason	to	the	explanation	of	the	action16;	that	is,	for	any	action	
and	any	normative	 reason	 to	do	 that	action,	 there	 is	always	a	 full	explanation	of	 that	action	
such	 that	 that	 normative	 reason	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	
genuinely	different	full	explanation.	Direct	theories	deny	this	claim.	4.1 How	normative	reasons	directly	explain	actions	
Direct	theories	say	that	when	a	normative	reason	explains	an	action	it	adds	something	to	the	
explanation	of	 that	 action	 that	 is	 independent	of,	 and	 in	 addition	 to,	what	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
agent	knew	it	provides.		
	
Figure	X-2:	Direct	theories	of	normative	reason	explanation	
But	how	are	 facts	about	 the	world	 supposed	 to	directly	explain	our	action?	Here	 is	a	 typical	
response:	following	Gilbert	Ryle	(1949),	one	can	conceive	of	knowledge	as	a	capacity	or	ability.	
In	particular,	 one	 can	 conceive	of	 knowledge	as	 the	 capacity	 to	 respond	 to	 a	 fact	 about	 the	
world,	that	is,	the	capacity	to	respond	to	a	normative	reason.		
The	suggestion	is	that,	when	an	agent	acts	from	knowledge:	- ‘The	fact	that	things	actually	are	the	way	they	believe	them	to	be	weighs	with	them’	
(Hornsby	2008,	254);	or	- The	fact	exerts	a	rational	influence	on	the	agent’s	will	(McDowell	2013);	or	
																																								 																				
16	There	 are,	 perhaps,	 exceptions	 in	 ‘weird’	 cases,	 where	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 agent	
believes	that	p	are	both	normative	reasons	for	them	to	φ	(see	Dancy	2000,	124)	–	but	these	are	peculiar	
enough	that	they	can	be	ignored.		
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- The	agent	is	guided	by	the	fact	(Hyman	2015);	or	- The	agent	exhibits	a	rational	response	to	the	fact.	(Smith	2004)	
Thus,	 knowing	 some	 fact	 engenders	 a	 special,	 direct	 connection	between	 the	agent	 and	 the	
fact.	 When	 one	 knows	 something	 the	 fact	 itself	 guides	 one	 or	 impresses	 itself	 upon	 one’s	
action	and	thereby	accounts	for	what	one	does:	that	is	how	normative	reasons	directly	explain	
an	agent’s	action.	
Not	all	direct	theories	rely	on	knowledge	to	account	for	the	direct	connection,	however.	Some,	
such	as	Dancy’s	(2000)	non-factive	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation	do	not	think	that	a	
normative	 reason	need	even	be	 true	 in	order	 to	explain	an	agent’s	 action,	 so	 long	as	 it	was	
believed.	More	generally,	even	amongst	knowledge-based	direct	theories,	 the	precise	nature	
of	 how	 the	 normative	 reason	 explains	 depends	 on	 the	 way	 in	 which	 one	 rejects	 the	 first	
premise	 of	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem.	 I	 consider	 the	 main	 ways	 of	 being	 a	 direct	
theorist	in	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.	4.2 The	problems	with	direct	theories	4.2.1 What’s	weird	about	direct	normative	reason	explanation	
How	exactly	does	‘responding’	to	a	normative	reason,	being	‘guided’	by	one	or	‘acting	in	light	
of	 it’	 make	 that	 normative	 reason	 directly	 explanatory?	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 explanation	 that	
knowledge	 is	 supposed	 to	engender	 is	 thoroughly	mysterious,	and	accounts	of	 it	are	 replete	
with	metaphors	but	thin	on	detail.	If	the	concept	of	‘responding	to	the	fact’	is	not	causal	(and	
none	 seem	 to	 think	 it	 is),	 what	 exactly	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 direct	 connection	 between	 the	
agent	and	the	fact,	when	they	respond	to	the	fact,	that	makes	that	fact	explain	their	action?17	
Now,	 if	 it	were	 self-evident	 that	 there	 is	 such	a	direct	 connection	 then	 the	use	of	metaphor	
might	 well	 be	 unproblematic.	 For	 instance,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 maglev	 trains	 are	 ‘guided’	 by	
magnets	without	needing	to	be	literal	about	the	relation	between	the	magnets	and	the	train	
because	 it	 is	 seemingly	 clear	 that	 something	 the	magnets	 are	 doing	 is	 directly	 affecting	 the	
train.	 However,	 it	 is	 very	 much	 not	 clear	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 directly	 affecting	 my	
action	–	so	we	need	an	account	of	what	is	occurring	that	is	not	couched	in	metaphors	in	order	
to	convince	us	that	the	normative	reason	really	is	directly	related	to	the	action.	I	am	concerned	
that	 no	 such	 account	 is	 available	 because	 there	 is	 no	 such	 direct	 relation.	 This	 is	 the	 first	
problem	for	direct	theories.	
																																								 																				
17	Similar	 remarks	 can	 be	made	 for	 direct	 theories	 that	 aren’t	 knowledge-based,	 such	 as	 non-factive	
theories.	See	remarks	in	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter	for	further	detail.	
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4.2.2 You	cannot	credibly	reject	Premise	1	
Now	for	the	second	problem	for	direct	theories.	In	§§	(VIII)2-4,	I	set	out	the	argument	for	the	
following	claim:	
Premise	1	 There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	such	that	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
Direct	theories	reject	this	claim,	in	this	instance,	and	they	reject	that	a	similar	sort	of	claim	can	
be	made	for	any	normative	reason	that	purports	to	explain	an	agent’s	action.	The	problem,	I	
suggest,	is	that	there	is	no	credible	way	to	reject	Premise	1.	
First,	 recall	 that	 Premise	1	 followed	 from	 four	 principles	 of	 explanation	 together	 with	 the	
following	two	claims:	
Premise	1a	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	my	friend	had	not	won	an	award	(but	I	still	believed	
that	 she	 had),	 then	 (i)	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	
award	would	have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her;	and	(ii)	
the	 fact	 that	 she	 had	 not	 won	 an	 award	 would	 not	 have	 partially	
explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
Premise	1b	 If,	ceteris	paribus,	I	had	not	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	
(though	she	had)	then	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	would	not	
have	partially	explained	why	I	congratulated	her.	
Assuming	that	these	claims	are	uncontentious,18	the	only	options	for	one	who	wants	to	reject	
Premise	1	are	to	reject	one	of	FACTIVITY,	ENDURANCE,	SUFFICIENCY,	or	DIFFERENCE.		
I	think	that	there	is	no	unproblematic	way	for	a	direct	theorist	to	reject	one	of	these	principles	
of	 explanation.	 I	 provide	 a	 full	 account	 of	 my	 reasoning	 in	 the	 Appendix	 to	 this	 chapter,	
however,	by	way	of	overview	here:	denying	FACTIVITY	comes	at	the	cost	of	denying	something	
that	is	seemingly	obviously	true	(i.e.	that	explanation	is	factive).	Denying	DIFFERENCE	makes	the	
concept	 of	 being	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 obscure,	 and	 relying	 on	 the	 denial	 of	
difference	 to	 account	 for	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 results	 in	 an	 implausibly	 ubiquitous	
level	of	overexplanation.	Meanwhile,	theories	that	deny	ENDURANCE	seemingly	stretch	credulity	
by	 insisting	 that,	 in	 some	 cases,	 the	 mind	 plays	 no	 explanatory	 role	 in	 action.	 And	 lastly,	
theories	 that	 deny	 SUFFICIENCY	 must	 insist	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 indispensable	 to	 the	
explanation	of	an	action	if	they	are	known	–	and	there	is	no	good	account	of	why	that	should	
be	the	case.	
																																								 																				
18	And	I	know	of	no	one	who	would	deny	either.	
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The	 upshot,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 credible	 way	 to	 reject	 the	 first	 premise	 of	 The	
Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 for	 normative	 reason	 explanation,	 and	 therefore	 no	 credible	
way	of	being	a	direct	theorist.	
5 Conclusion	
I	have	discussed	two	possible	responses	to	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	for	normative	
reason	 explanation,	 elliptical	 theories	 and	 direct	 theories.	 I	 suggested	 that	 both	 of	 these	
theories	are	deeply	problematic.	
If	normative	reasons	don’t	explain	elliptically,	and	don’t	explain	directly,	then,	 I	suggest,	they	
must	 explain	 indirectly,	 that	 is,	 by	 explaining	 those	 features	 of	 the	 agent’s	 psychology	 that	
explain	 their	 actions.	 In	 the	 next	 chapter	 I	 will	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 my	 indirect	 theory	 by	
showing	that	the	exclusion	principle	is	false.	Subsequent	chapters	will	then	set	out	and	defend	
my	indirect	theory.	
Appendix	
A.1 Four	direct	theories	of	normative	reason	explanation	
Direct	 theories	of	normative	 reason	explanation	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 first	premise	of	The	
Explanatory	 Exclusion	Problem	 is	 always	 true	of	 normative	 reasons.	As	noted	 in	 §	4.2.2,	 this	
means	that	direct	theories	must	reject	one	of	the	following	principles	of	explanation:	
FACTIVITY	 For	any	propositions	p	and	q,	if	p	partially	explains	the	fact	that	q	then	
p	is	the	case.	
DIFFERENCE	 For	 any	 propositions	 p,	 q	 and	 r,	 p	 is	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation	of	the	fact	that	r	from	q	only	if,	ceteris	paribus,	had	p	been	
the	case	and	q	not	been	the	case,	p	would	still	partially	explain	the	fact	
that	r.	
ENDURANCE	 For	 any	 propositions	p,	 q	and	 r,	 the	 following	 holds:	 Suppose	 that	q	
partially	explains	the	fact	that	r	when	it	is	not	the	case	that	p.	Suppose	
further	that	neither	p	nor	not	p	is	part	of	the	same	explanation	of	r	as	
q.	 Then,	 if,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 it	 were	 the	 case	 that	 p,	 q	 would	 still	
partially	explain	the	fact	that	r.	
SUFFICIENCY	 For	any	proposition	q,	and	any	set,	Δ,	 if	Δ	 is	a	 full	explanation	of	 the	
fact	 that	q	 in	 some	circumstance,	 then,	 in	any	circumstance	 in	which	
all	 the	elements	of	Δ	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	q,	Δ	fully	explains	
the	fact	that	q.	
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Since	 any	 direct	 theory	must	 reject	 one	 of	 these	 principles,	we	 can	 categorise	 the	 different	
direct	theories	according	to	which	of	these	principles	they	reject,	as	follows19:	- Non-factivist:	 Theories	 that	 reject	 FACTIVITY	 and	 insist	 that	 when	 normative	 reasons	
explain	an	agent’s	action	they	do	so	qua	the	content	of	the	agent’s	belief.	- Inclusive	 disjunctivist:	 Theories	 that	 reject	 DIFFERENCE	 and	 insist	 that	when	 normative	
reasons	 explain	 what	 an	 agent	 does	 they	 do	 so	 as	 part	 of	 an	 explanation	 that	 is	
genuinely	different	from	the	explanation	in	terms	of	the	agent’s	psychology.	- Exclusive	disjunctivist:	Theories	 that	 reject	ENDURANCE	and	 insist	 that	when	normative	
reasons	explain	what	an	agent	does	they	do	so	as	part	of	the	full	explanation	instead	of	
the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.	- Supplementarist:	 Theories	 that	 reject	 SUFFICIENCY	 and	 insist	 that	 when	 a	 normative	
reason	explains	an	agent’s	 action	 they	do	 so	as	part	of	 the	 full	 explanation	 together	
with	the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.		
In	what	 follows	 I	will	 set	out	 the	account	of	how	normative	reasons	explain	 in	each	of	 these	
strategies,	followed	by	the	problems	they	face.	
A	 caveat	 regarding	 all	 these	 theories:	 they	 are	 all	 to	 a	 greater	 or	 lesser	 extent,	 of	my	 own	
construction.	 Most	 of	 the	 literature	 from	 which	 these	 theories	 are	 drawn	 is	 actually	 a	
discussion	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 (and	 how)	 normative	 reasons	 can	 be	 the	 reason	 for	 which	 an	
agent	acts.	 I,	however,	am	answering	a	simpler	question:	can	normative	 reasons	explain	our	
actions?	 The	 theories	 below	 have	 been	 inspired	 by	 responses	 to	 the	 former	 question,	 and	
while	I	suggest	that	certain	authors	hold	some	forms	of	the	theories	below,	nothing	in	what	I	
say	 depends	 on	 these	 attributions	 being	 accurate.	 That	 is,	 so	 long	 as	 they	 are	 correct	
characterisations	of	possible	theories,	it	is	not	vital	that	those	to	whom	I	attribute	them	would	
agree	with	the	attribution.	
A.2 Non-factivist	theories	
Non-factivist	 theories	 reject	 the	 factivity	 principle.	 According	 to	 non-factivist	 theories	 (e.g.	
Dancy	 2000;	 Comesaña	 and	McGrath	 2014),	 saying	 that	 I	 took	my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 was	
raining	has	 the	conversational	 implicature	that	 it	was	raining,	but	does	not	entail	 that	 it	was	
raining;	indeed,	they	stress,	that	implicature	is	cancellable.	
																																								 																				
19	There	 is	a	 fourth	strategy	that	 I	haven’t	considered	here.	One	could	differentiate	the	explanantia	of	
normative	 reasons	 and	 psychological	 facts	 (I	 believe	 that	 Stout	 (1996)	 adopts	 this	 strategy,	 but	 one	
could	also	develop	such	a	strategy	based	on	Hornsby	(2008)	and	McDowell’s	(2013)	disjunctivism	about	
acting)	–	and	consequently	argue	that	normative	reasons	can	explain	something	an	agent	does	e.g.	the	
fact	that	there	is	beer	in	the	fridge	explains	the	fact	that	I	got	beer	(I	couldn’t	have	done	so	had	there	
not	 been	 beer	 there).	 I	 don’t	 consider	 this	 strategy	 here	 because	 I	 think	 it	 suffers	 all	 the	 failings	 of	
elliptical	theory	without	its	simplicity	–	we	want	to	be	able	to	give	a	normative	reason	explanation	of	the	
fact	that	I	went	to	the	fridge,	not	merely	the	fact	that	I	got	beer.	
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These	 theories	 suggest	 that	when	a	normative	 reason	explains	an	agent’s	action	 facts	about	
what	the	agent	believes	are	really	second	fiddle	in	explanatory	terms	to	the	normative	reason:	
they	act	as	mere	enabling	conditions	 for	the	normative	reason	(qua	what	the	agent	believes)	
to	explain	what	the	agent	does.		
The	 idea	 seems	 to	 be	 this:	 a	 normative	 reason	 cannot	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 unless	 the	
agent	believes	it20	–	so	the	fact	that	the	agent	believes	it	must	at	least	enable	the	explanation.	
However,	 ‘there	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 a	 consideration	 that	 is	 a	 proper	 part	 of	 an	
explanation,	and	a	consideration	that	is	required	for	the	explanation	to	go	through,	but	which	
is	not	itself	a	part	of	that	explanation.’	(Dancy	2000,	127)		
According	to	this	strategy,	the	facts	about	what	the	agent	believes	don’t	have	the	explanatory	
force	necessary	to	explain	the	agent’s	action,	only	the	normative	reason	does.	That	is,	the	fact	
that	I	believe	that	it	 is	raining	enables	the	contents	of	my	belief,	namely,	that	it	 is	raining,	to	
explain	why	I	took	my	umbrella	(and	so	they	are	independent	parts	of	the	same	explanation	–	
although	it’s	the	normative	reason	that	is,	 in	some	sense,	the	major	party).	They	say	that	we	
should	 understand	 expressions	 like	 ‘Sally	 ran	 because	 she	 thought	 a	 bear	 was	 chasing	 her’	
appositionally,	where	the	reference	to	Sally’s	believing	is	a	qualification	on	the	truth	value	of	
the	explanans,	but	not	a	part	of	the	explanans	itself.21		
Non-factivist	theories	can	thus	accept	that	the	same	full	explanation	is	available	whether	the	
agent’s	belief	is	true	or	false	because	the	truth	or	falsity	of	the	content	of	the	agent’s	belief	has	
no	bearing	on	whether	or	not	it	is	in	that	full	explanation.	A.2.1 The	problem	for	non-factivist	theories		
The	 first	 problem	 with	 non-factivist	 theories	 is	 that	 they	 are	 absurd.	 If	 we	 admit	 that	
falsehoods	 can	 explain	 that	 seems	 to	 make	 the	 concept	 of	 explanation	 itself	 thoroughly	
mysterious.	If	someone	says	that	they	took	their	umbrella	because	it	was	raining	even	though	
it	wasn’t,	I	would	not	think	they	were	cancelling	a	Gricean	implicature,	I	would	think	that	they	
misspoke,	because	what	they	said	is	just	plainly	contradictory.		
Secondly,	non-factivist	theories	rest	their	claim	to	plausibility	on	the	idea	that	beliefs	are	mere	
enabling	conditions	–	they	don’t	have	the	requisite	explanatory	force	 in	and	of	themselves.	 I	
am	sceptical	that	the	perceived	explanatory	weakness	of	‘enabling	conditions’	is	genuine	and	
isn’t	merely	a	consequence	of	their	salience	 in	a	given	context.	Were	 it	merely	a	question	of	
salience	then	the	explanatory	power	of	facts	about	the	agent’s	psychology	would	be	restored	
																																								 																				
20	Recall	the	discussion	of	§	(VIII)3.1.	
21	Dancy	proposes	this	sort	of	reading:	‘Sally	ran	because	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	as	she	believed.’	
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and	we	would	again	have	to	question	what	normative	reasons	add	by	way	of	explanation.	But	
even	putting	such	scepticism	aside,	it	is,	as	Turri	(2009)	notes,		far	from	clear	that	facts	about	
what	 an	 agent	 believes	 are	 aptly	 categorised	 as	 enabling	 conditions.22	And	 if	 they	 aren’t	
enabling	conditions,	concerns	about	what	normative	reasons	really	do	by	way	of	explanation	
return.		
Thirdly,	non-factivist	 theories	 struggle	 to	explain	why	 it	 is	 that,	when	an	agent	has	a	Gettier	
belief,	we	don’t	give	a	normative	reason	explanation	of	 their	action.23	For	 instance,	we	don’t	
say	that	Edmund	stayed	at	the	edge	because	the	ice	was	thin	when	his	 justified	belief	that	 it	
was	thin	is	only	accidentally	true	–	although	the	non-factivist	would	insist	that	we	should.24		
Fourthly,	 it	 is	worth	 noting,	 from	 a	 rhetorical	 perspective,	 that	 even	 the	 progenitor	 of	 non-
factivist	theories,	Jonathan	Dancy,	has	since	abandoned	them	(see	Dancy	2014).		
A.3 Inclusive	disjunctivist	theories	
Inclusive	disjunctivist	 theories	 reject	 the	difference	principle.	 They	accept	 that	 there	 is	 a	 full	
explanation	of	why	 I	congratulated	my	friend	that	does	not	 include	the	fact	that	she	won	an	
award. 25 	Nonetheless,	 they	 say,	 there	 is	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
congratulated	my	friend	that	does	 include	the	fact	that	she	won	an	award.	They	suggest	that	
even	 though	 the	 explanation	 in	 terms	 of	 normative	 reasons	 would	 not	 exist	 without	 the	
explanation	in	terms	of	beliefs,	it	is	nonetheless	genuinely	different	from	it.26	
What	would	make	you	believe	 this?	Well,	as	already	noted,27	there	are	structural	 similarities	
between	the	argument	 from	 illusion	 in	 the	 literature	on	perception	and	 the	problem	for	 the	
																																								 																				
22	Turri	(2009,	505–6)	argues	that	it	is	normally	odd	to	ask	why	an	enabling	condition	for	an	explanation	
obtains,	but	 that	 it	 is	not	normally	odd	 to	ask	why	an	agent	believed	what	 they	believed	–	 therefore	
facts	about	what	an	agent	believes	aren’t	enabling	conditions.	
23	See	fn.	11.	
24	See,	for	instance,	Dancy	(2014,	89)	for	this	criticism	of	non-factivist	theories.	
25	This	 is	 what	 makes	 them	 inclusive	 disjunctivists	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 exclusive	 disjunctivists,	 to	 be	
considered	in	the	next	section.	I	have	adopted	the	inclusive	vs.	exclusive	distinction	from	Ruben	(2008)	
and	Stout	(2009);	they	say	that	inclusive	disjunctivists	accept	some	role	for	the	highest	common	factor,	
while	 exclusive	 disjunctivists	 do	 not.	 Note	 Pautz	 (2010,	 298–99)	 draws	 the	 same	 distinction	 between	
different	types	of	disjunctivism,	but	he	calls	inclusive	disjunctivism	the	‘overdetermination	version’;	and	
exclusive	disjunctivism	and	‘the	restrictive	version’.	
26	This	 is,	 I	 think,	 the	 view	 that	 John	Hyman	 sets	 out:	 ‘If	 James	merely	 believed	 that	 going	 to	 church	
would	please	his	mother	but	did	not	know	that	it	would,	we	can	say	that	he	went	to	church	because	he	
believed	that	 it	would	please	his	mother,	but	we	cannot	say	that	he	went	to	church	because	 it	would	
please	his	mother.	But	 if	he	knew	that	 it	would	please	his	mother,	we	can	say	either	 that	he	went	 to	
church	because	he	knew	that	 it	would	please	his	mother	or	 that	he	went	 to	church	because	 it	would	
please	his	mother.’	(Hyman	2011,	366–67)	
27	See	§	(IX)5.		
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explanation	of	action	that	I	have	construed	as	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem.28	One	could,	
inspired	 by	 disjunctivist	 responses	 to	 the	 former,	 adopt	 a	 disjunctivist	 view	 of	 action	
explanation	as	a	response	to	the	latter.	The	idea	is	this:	although	it	is	always	explanatory,	the	
highest	common	factor	of	all	action	explanations	(explanation	in	terms	of	the	facts	about	what	
the	 agent	 believes)	 is	 not	 the	 limit	 of	 the	 resources	 available	 for	 action	 explanation29	–	
sometimes	we	 can	also	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 directly,	 and	 differently,	 with	 a	 normative	
reason.	So	while	 the	action	 is	already	 fully	explained	by	 facts	about	what	 the	agent	believes	
(and	 relevant	 supplementary	 facts	 (e.g.	 facts	 about	 what	 they	 want,	 judge	 good	 etc.))	 the	
normative	reason	adds	another,	additional	explanation	of	it.	A.3.1 The	problems	for	inclusive	disjunctivist	theories	
The	 first	 problem	 with	 inclusive	 disjunctivist	 theories	 is	 that,	 in	 rejecting	 the	 difference	
principle	we	 are	 rejecting	 a	 seemingly	 plausible	 account	 of	 (at	 least	 part	 of)	 what	 it	 is	 that	
makes	explanations	genuinely	different.	As	a	result,	I	find,	we	begin	to	lose	our	handle	on	what	
it	is	that	makes	the	explanation	genuinely	different.		
Secondly,	and	relatedly,	it’s	not	at	all	clear	what	would	be	in	the	full	explanation	of	the	agent’s	
action	that	includes	the	normative	reason.	Given	MINIMALITY,	it	cannot	include	all	the	elements	
of	the	full	explanation	that	includes	the	belief	–	so	it	must	be	some	other	set	of	facts.	But	what	
other	 set	 of	 facts	 is	 also	 sufficient	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend	 and	which	 explains	my	
doing	so	directly?	I	cannot	think	of	any.	
And	 lastly,	 and	 perhaps	most	 obviously,	 the	 inclusive	 disjunctivist	 accepts	 that	my	 action	 is	
overexplained,	because	there	are	two	genuinely	different	explanations	of	it.	This	is	problematic	
because,	 as	Dancy	puts	 it,	 ‘[it]	would	mean	 that	 there	 are	 somehow	 too	many	explanations	
around’	(2000,	171).30	And	this	is	not	a	benign	case	of	overexplanation	–	it’s	not	at	all	clear	that	
the	fact	that	I	congratulate	my	friend	is	explained	in	two	different	ways.		
																																								 																				
28	Consider:	For	perception,	when	it,	for	instance,	appears	as	though	there	is	a	tomato	one	is	always	in	
either	one	of	two	states:	either	one	is	seeing	a	tomato	or	it	merely	appears	to	one	as	though	there	is	a	
tomato.	The	fact	that	it	appears	as	though	there	is	a	tomato	is	the	highest	common	factor	of	these	two	
states.	Compare	Horsnby’s	(2008)	construal	of	action:	when	one	acts	on	the	belief	that	it	is	raining	one	is	
always	 in	one	of	 two	states	–	acting	on	the	knowledge	that	 it	 is	 raining	or	merely	acting	on	the	belief	
that	it	is	raining.	Acting	on	the	belief	that	it	is	raining	is	seemingly	the	highest	common	factor	of	these	
two	states.	
29	As	 McDowell	 puts	 it:	 ‘The	 point	 of	 the	 disjunctive	 approach	 is	 to	 reject	 a	 highest	 common	 factor	
conception,	not	in	the	sense	of	denying	that	there	are	common	features	between	the	disjuncts,	but	in	
the	sense	of	refusing	to	restrict	our	resources	for	rational	explanation	to	those	that	are	available	for	the	
“worse”	disjunct.’	(McDowell	2013,	27)	
30	Davis	(2005)	also	makes	this	argument.	
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The	problem	isn’t	just	confined	to	this	case	either.	What	the	inclusive	disjunctivist	requires	is	
that	whenever	we	can	give	a	normative	reason	explanation	of	an	action,	the	agent’s	action	is	
overexplained.	 But	 if	 this	 sort	 of	 overexplanation	 is	 meant	 to	 occur	 whenever	 we	 give	 a	
normative	 reason	 explanation,	 then,	 given	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 such	 explanations,	 inclusive	
disjunctivism	seems	to	require	a	really	implausible	incidence	of	overexplanation.		
Maybe	 you	 want	 to	 insist	 that	 overexplanation	 should	 not	 trouble	 us	 as	 much	 as	
overdetermination,	 because	 there	 aren’t	 independent	 determining	 factors,	 there	 are	 only	
different	explanatory	factors.	However,	I	think	this	response	is	more	trouble	than	it’s	worth	–	
it’s	not	clear	to	me	that	it	makes	overexplanation	unproblematic	and,	as	I’ve	noted,	we	start	to	
lose	 our	 grasp	 on	 what	 makes	 genuinely	 different	 explanations	 genuinely	 different	 if	 they	
aren’t,	in	some	sense,	independent	explanations.	
A.4 Exclusive	disjunctivist	theories		
Exclusive	disjunctivist	theories	reject	the	endurance	principle.	They	reject	the	idea	that,	when	I	
congratulate	my	 friend,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	 award	 explains	 why	 I	
congratulated	her.	According	to	this	stronger	sort	of	disjunctivism	(hence	exclusive	rather	than	
inclusive)	either	an	agent	acts	because	they	believe	the	world	to	be	a	certain	way	or	they	act	
because	 the	 world	 is	 that	 way,	 but	 never	 both.	 On	 this	 account,	 when	 a	 normative	 reason	
explains	an	agent’s	action	it	does	so	instead	of	the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.31	
Why	 would	 you	 believe	 this?	 That	 is,	 why	 think	 that	 sometimes	 beliefs	 don’t	 explain?	
Stoutland	makes	the	following	argument	for	this	view:	
If	someone	goes	to	a	room	because	a	meeting	is	being	held	there,	that	is	adequate	justification	
for	her	effort.	If	it	turns	out	that	the	meeting	isn't	there,	we	have	to	revise	our	justification,	and	
hence	our	explanation,	and	say	she	went	 to	 the	room	because	she	believed	 the	meeting	was	
there.	Her	belief	becomes	an	explanatory	 factor,	 that	 is	 to	say,	 just	 in	case	she	was	mistaken	
about	 the	 situation	 originally	 appealed	 to	 as	 justification.	 This	 is	 the	 general	 case:	 beliefs	
become	explanatory	factors	when	agents	are	mistaken	about	the	situations	originally	taken	to	
justify	them.	
The	situation	 is	analogous	to	someone’s	 flipping	a	switch	to	 turn	on	a	 light,	without	 the	 light	
going	on.	In	this	case	he	tried	to	turn	on	the	light,	just	because	he	failed,	which	would	not	be	
																																								 																				
31 	Both	 Collins	 (1997)	 and	 Stoutland	 (1998)	 adopt	 this	 response	 to	 the	 Problem.	 I	 may	 have	
mis-interpreted	Hyman’s	 (2011)	 view	 in	 fn.	26,	 in	which	 case	 I	 think	 this	 is	his	position.	 Sandis	 (2012,	
119)	also	attributes	this	view	to	Alvarez	(2010),	though	I’m	not	convinced	it	is	her	position.	In	particular,	
Alvarez	 agrees	 that	 beliefs	 still	 explain	 in	 veridical	 cases	 (cf.	 ‘It	 is	 always	 possible	 (and	 sometimes	
necessary,	 namely	 when	 the	 agent	 acted	 on	 a	 false	 belief)	 to	 give	 explanations	 in	 the	 psychological	
form.’	 (Alvarez	 2013,	 149)).	 More	 generally,	 it’s	 not	 clear	 to	 me	 that	 Alvarez	 is	 responding	 to	 The	
Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 as	 I	 have	 characterised	 it	 –	 her	 discussion	 focuses	 on	 the	 pragmatic	
considerations	that	determine	whether	or	not	one	gives	a	normative	reason	explanation	or	one	in	terms	
of	 psychological	 facts.	 However,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 she	 does	 respond	 to	 the	 redundancy	 objection,	 I	
think	she	is	better	characterised	as	adopting	the	supplementarist	theory.	
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true	 if	he	succeeded	 in	 turning	 it	on	without	difficulty.	From	the	 fact	 that	what	someone	did	
when	he	 failed	 to	 turn	on	a	 light	 is	 that	he	 tried,	 it	doesn't	 follow	that	what	he	did	when	he	
succeeded	 also	 included	 trying.	 Analogously,	 given	 that	 what	 explains	 my	 going	 to	 a	 room	
where	I	do	not	find	my	friend	is	that	I	believed	my	friend	was	there,	it	does	not	follow	that	what	
explains	my	going	 to	 the	 room	when	my	 friend	 is	 there	 is	also	 that	 I	believed	 she	was	 there.	
(Stoutland	1998,	61)	
I	think	that	the	most	coherent	reading	of	Stoutland’s	account	is	as	a	rejection	of	the	idea	that	
whenever	an	agent	acts,	 they	act	on	the	way	they	take	things	to	be.	That	 is:	either	an	agent	
acts	on	the	way	they	take	things	to	be	or,	to	use	McDowell’s	(2013)	phraseology,	they	‘act	in	
light	of	the	facts’,	but	not	both.32		If	they	act	on	the	way	they	take	things	to	be,	then	the	fact	
that	they	take	them	to	be	that	way	explains	their	action,	but	if	they	act	in	light	of	the	facts	(i.e.	
in	light	of	a	normative	reason),	then	it	is	the	facts	that	explain	their	action.	That	is,	either	facts	
about	what	they	believe	explain	their	actions	or	normative	reasons	explain	their	actions,	but	
not	both.	A.4.1 The	problems	for	exclusive	disjunctivist	theories	
Firstly,	by	rejecting	the	endurance	principle	the	exclusive	disjunctivist	is	committed	to	the	view	
that	when	some	irrelevant	false	proposition	becomes	true,	that	can	destroy	pre-existing	partial	
explanation	relations.	For	the	reasons	set	out	in	(VIII)2.3.1,	that	seems	implausible.	
However,	even	 if	 it	 turns	out	 that	 the	endurance	principle	 is	 false,	 the	exclusive	disjunctivist	
theory	is	a	difficult	position	to	maintain	because	there	is	widespread	support	for	the	view	that	
beliefs	always	play	some	role	in	explaining	what	an	agent	does.	
Exclusive	disjunctivism	 insists	 that	 there	 is	 no	highest	 common	 factor	 that	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	
explanation	 of	 action,	 whether	 one	 is	 right	 or	 mistaken.	 That	 is,	 it	 insists	 that	 there	 is	 no	
significant	common	factor	between	someone	who	acts	on	something	they	know	to	be	the	case	
and	someone	who	acts	on	something	they	merely	believe.	I	find	this	incredible.	
																																								 																				
32	This	 reading	 has	 Stoutland	 endorsing	 (exclusive)	 disjunctivism	 about	 acting.	 This	 is	 different	 from	
disjunctivism	about	what	explains	an	agent’s	action,	or	what	their	reason	for	acting	is.	It’s	worth	noting	
that	Hornsby	(2008)	and	McDowell	(2013)	give	a	considerably	more	thorough	account	of	disjunctivism	
about	acting,	but	theirs	is	of	an	 inclusive	kind	–	they	concede	that	whenever	an	agent	acts	they	act	on	
the	way	 they	 take	 things	 to	be.	So	while	 I	 take	Stoutland	to	be	a	disjunctivist	about	 the	same	thing,	 I	
don’t	 invoke	 them	 here	 since	 his	 disjunctivism	 is	 far	 stauncher.	 There	 is	 also	 an	 alternative	 reading	
(perhaps	truer	to	his	precise	statements)	on	which	Stoutland	embraces	an	exclusive	disjunctivism	about	
action	explanation	(i.e.	an	exclusive	version	of	the	disjunctivism	considered	in	the	previous	section).	All	
that	 such	 a	 disjunctivism	 insists	 is	 that	 the	 facts	 about	what	 an	 agent	 believes	 do	not	 always	 explain	
their	action,	 it	 is	 silent	on	 the	question	of	whether	or	not	an	agent	always	acts	on	 the	way	 they	 take	
things	to	be.	This	latter	sort	of	disjunctivism	is	weaker	than	the	former	in	so	far	as	it	is	entailed	by	it.	I	
find	the	latter	sort	less	coherent	without	the	former	since	it	is	not	clear	to	me	how	one	could	act	on	the	
way	one	takes	 things	 to	be	without	 the	 fact	 that	one	 takes	 them	to	be	 that	way	playing	some	role	 in	
explaining	what	one	does;	for	that	reason	I	don’t	consider	it	further.	
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Consider:	when	 I	 believe	 that	 it’s	 raining	 I	 am	either	 in	 a	 situation	 in	which	 I	 know	 that	 it’s	
raining	 or	 I	 merely	 believe	 (i.e.	 without	 knowing)	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 Given	 that	 I	 take	 my	
umbrella	whichever	of	the	two	situations	I	am	in,	doesn’t	the	possibility	that	the	two	situations	
may	 be	 indistinguishable	 to	me	 just	mean	 that	 I	 act	 on	 the	way	 I	 take	 things	 to	 be	 in	 both	
situations?33	And	given	that	I	act	on	the	way	I	take	things	to	be,	the	fact	that	I	take	them	to	be	
that	 way	 must	 explain	 my	 action.	 I	 find	 positions	 that	 deny	 this	 reasoning	 impossible	 to	
believe.		
Moreover,	Stoutland’s	supposed	argument	by	analogy	is	not	so	much	an	argument	for	his	view	
as	 it	 is	merely	the	application	of	 it	 to	another	area.	 It	seems	clear	to	me	(and	to	others	(e.g.	
O’Shaughnessy	 1973),	 that	 someone	 who	 goes	 to	 turn	 on	 a	 light	 tries	 to	 turn	 on	 the	 light	
whether	or	not	they	end	up	doing	so.34	Stoutland’s	rejection	of	that	view	is	just	the	same	sort	
of	 (exclusive)	disjunctivism	as	his	 rejection	of	 the	view	 that	one	always	acts	on	 the	way	one	
takes	 things	 to	be.35	And	one	who	 is	not	persuaded	of	his	view	 in	 the	 latter	 is	unlikely	 to	be	
persuaded	by	the	application	of	it	somewhere	else.		
Of	course,	my	incredulous	stare	may	do	nothing	to	alter	the	opinion	of	someone	who	believes	
such	a	 theory;	however,	 I	don’t	 think	 I	 am	alone	 in	my	 incredulity.	 Surely	 there	are	 theories	
that	are	easier	to	believe?	
A.5 Supplementarist	theories	
Finally,	supplementarist	strategies	reject	the	sufficiency	principle.	They	argue	that	just	because	
facts	about	what	an	agent	believes	play	a	 role	 in	explaining	 their	action	 that	does	not	mean	
that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 not	 needed	 for	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 agent’s	 action;	 indeed,	
they	 argue,	 normative	 reasons	 are	 an	 independent	 (and	 necessary)	 part	 of	 the	 same	
explanation	as	the	facts	about	what	an	agent	believes.36	
Supplementarist	 strategies	 differ	 from	 non-factive	 strategies	 in	 that	 they	 insist	 that	 the	
normative	 reason	 can	 explain	 the	 agent’s	 action	 only	 if	 it	 is	 true;	 for	 instance,	 the	
supplementarist	might	insist,	the	normative	reason	only	explains	an	agent’s	action	if	the	agent	
knows	 it.	What	 the	 supplementarist	 rejects	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 same	 full	 explanation	 of	 an	
																																								 																				
33	This	is	not	a	denial	of	disjunctivism	tout	court	–	for	instance,	an	inclusive	disjunctivist	(e.g.	McDowell	
2013)	 can	 acknowledge	 that	 one	 always	 acts	 on	 the	way	 one	 takes	 things	 to	 be;	 they	 just	 deny	 that	
acting	on	the	way	one	takes	things	to	is	all	that	a	person	ever	does.		
34	Compare	these	commonplace	expressions:	‘he	tried	and	failed’;	‘he	tried	and	succeeded’	–	Stoutland’s	
account	makes	the	former	true	of	anyone	who	tries,	and	makes	the	latter	a	contradiction.	
35	Indeed,	Dancy	(2008b)	discusses	a	disjunctivist	account	of	trying	to	act.	
36As	 noted	 in	 fn.	 31	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 Alvarez	 (2010)	 gives	 a	 response	 to	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	
Problem,	I	think	this	may	be	her	view.	
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agent’s	 action	 is	 available	whether	 or	 not	 the	 agent	 knows	what	 they	believe.	 Instead,	 they	
say,	the	normative	reason	is	an	indispensable	part	of	the	explanation	when	(and	only	when)	it	
is	 known.	 Importantly,	 the	 supplementarist	 does	not	 violate	MINIMALITY	 because	 they	do	not	
think	that	the	set	that	omits	the	normative	reason	is	still	sufficient	to	explain	the	agent’s	action	
when	the	agent	acts	from	knowledge	of	the	normative	reason.37	A.5.1 The	problems	for	supplementarist	theories	
The	first	problem	for	supplementarist	theories	is	that	in	rejecting	the	sufficiency	principle	they	
reject	a	seemingly	plausible	principle	of	explanation.	That	is,	if	some	set	of	partial	explanations	
is	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 some	 explanandum	 in	 one	 case,	 given	 that	 whenever	 those	 partial	
explanations	all	explain	an	explanandum	 they	are	sufficient	 to	entail	 it,	why	would	 they	also	
not	be	sufficient	to	explain	it?	
However,	even	 if	 there	were	a	good	argument	for	rejecting	the	sufficiency	principle,	 it	 is	not	
clear	why	it	should	be	false	in	this	case.	That	is:	it’s	not	clear	why	knowing	a	normative	reason	
makes	 that	 normative	 reason	 an	 indispensable	 part	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 agent’s	
action.	 Given	 that	 what	 I	 believe	 doesn’t	 explain	 my	 action	 when	 I	 am	 mistaken,	 so	 an	
explanation	 in	 terms	of	psychological	 facts	 suffices,	why	 is	 that	 explanation	 insufficient	 (and	
the	normative	reason	indispensable)	when	my	belief	happens	to	knowledgeable?	
I	 suppose	 the	 supplementarist	 theorist	will	 answer	 this	question	by	 saying	 that	 it’s	 because,	
when	the	agent	knows	the	normative	reason,	the	normative	reason	is,	itself,	a	part	of	the	story	
of	why	they	acted	because	it	guides	them	or	they	respond	to	it.		When	an	agent	doesn’t	know	
the	normative	reason,	it	doesn’t	guide	them,	so	it	isn’t	part	of	the	reason	why	they	acted.	Then	
I	 fall	back	 to	my	 first	 concern	 (see	§	4.2.1):	 I	 just	don’t	 know	what	 it	means	 for	a	normative	
reason	to	guide	someone	and	until	I	do,	I	can’t	see	why	I	should	accept	that	normative	reasons	
are	indispensable	to	an	explanation	only	if	they	are	known.	
																																								 																				
37	Although	they	do	violate	C-MINIMALITY	(see	§	(VIII)	fn.	23).	
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(XI)		The	Exclusion	Principle	is	False	
In	 which	 I	 show	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 false.	 I	 provide	 two	
counterexamples	 to	 the	 exclusion	 principle,	 one	 involving	 causal	 explanation	
and	 another	 involving	 non-causal	 explanation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 they	 are	
counterexamples	 because	 in	 each	 case	 the	 purportedly	 excluded	 fact	 explains	
the	 explanandum	 by	 explaining	 something	 that,	 in	 turn,	 explains	 the	
explanandum.	 I	suggest	that	the	problem	with	the	exclusion	principle	 is	that	 it	
discriminates	 against	 all	 but	 the	 most	 proximal	 explanations	 of	 any	 given	
explanandum,	 and	 that	 this	 is	 problematic	 at	 least	 partly	 because	 we	 are	
typically	 interested	 in	more	distal	 explanations.	 I	 explain	where	our	 reasoning	
went	wrong	and	which	full	explanation	an	apparently	excluded	fact	is	part	of.	
In	the	previous	chapter	I	argued	that	we	should	not	accept	the	conclusion	of	The	Explanatory	
Exclusion	 Problem	 (at	 least	 as	 far	 as	 normative	 reason	 explanations	 are	 concerned).	 I	 also	
argued	that	we	should	not	reject	the	first	premise	of	the	Problem.	If	we	should	not	accept	the	
conclusion	 and	 we	 should	 not	 reject	 the	 first	 premise,	 the	 only	 remaining	 response	 to	 the	
Problem	is	to	reject	the	second	premise,	the	exclusion	principle.	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	
to	 show	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 false	 and	 to	 explain	why	 it	 is	 false.	 The	 next	 chapter	
builds	 on	 these	 insights	 to	 provide	 the	 makings	 of	 an	 indirect	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	
explanation.		
1 Two	counterexamples	to	the	exclusion	principle	
Recall	the	exclusion	principle:	
EXCLUSION	 For	 any	 propositions,	p	and	q,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	why	q	
such	that	p	 is	neither	a	part	of	that	full	explanation	nor	 is	 it	part	of	a	
genuinely	different	explanation,	then	p	does	not	partially	explain	q.	
In	 this	 section	 I	 want	 to	 discuss	 two	 counterexamples	 to	 EXCLUSION,	 one	 involving	 causal	
explanation	and	the	other	non-causal	explanation.	1.1 A	causal	counterexample	
Jean	contracts	HIV	after	having	been	transfused	with	 infected	blood.	 It	goes	undiagnosed	for	
so	long	that,	tragically,	he	develops	AIDS.	This	much	seems	clear:	Jean	developed	AIDS,	in	part,	
because	he	was	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood.	That	is:	
(a) The	fact	that	Jean	was	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	partially	explains	why	
he	developed	AIDS.	
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However,	we	can	also	give	 the	 following	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS:	he	had	HIV	
and	 it	 went	 untreated.	 The	 fact	 that	 he	 had	 HIV	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 went	 untreated	 are,	 I	
suggest,	 parts	 of	 a	 single	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	 he	 developed	 AIDS.	 Is	 the	 fact	 that	 he	
contracted	HIV	 from	an	 infected	blood	 transfusion	a	part	of	 that	explanation?	 I	 suggest	not:	
the	fact	that	he	had	HIV	is	already	enough1	for	Jean	to	develop	AIDS,2	so	the	fact	that	he	was	
transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	would	be	superfluous	 in	any	full	explanation	that	already	
included	the	fact	that	he	had	HIV.3	Thus,	there	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS	
that	includes	the	fact	that	he	had	HIV	but	does	not	include	the	fact	that	he	was	transfused	with	
HIV-infected	blood.4	
Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	 was	 transfused	 with	 HIV-infected	 blood	 only	 explains	 why	 he	
developed	AIDS	given	 that	he	had	HIV.5	So,	 from	DIFFERENCE,	 the	 fact	 that	he	was	 transfused	
with	 HIV-infected	 blood	 cannot	 be	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	 explanation	 of	 why	 he	
developed	AIDS	from	the	fact	that	he	had	HIV.	
So,	it	follows	that:	
(b) There	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	Jean	developed	AIDS	such	that	the	fact	that	he	
was	 transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	 is	neither	a	part	of	 that	 full	explanation	
nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
Now	 notice	 that	 (b)	 is	 the	 antecedent	 condition	 of	 EXCLUSION	 while	 (a)	 is	 the	 denial	 of	 the	
consequent	 condition.	 That	 is,	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	 was	 transfused	 with	 HIV-infected	 blood	
explains	why	he	developed	AIDS	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	there	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	he	
developed	AIDS	that	it	is	neither	a	part	of	and	nor	is	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
So,	given	that	(a)	and	(b)	are	true,	EXCLUSION	must	be	false.		
																																								 																				
1	Together	with	 the	 fact	 that	 it	went	untreated	and	 the	 fact	 that	a	 sustained,	untreated	HIV	 infection	
leads	to	AIDS,	etc.	
2	We	can	see	this	by	noting	that	a	full	explanation	of	this	sort	(he	had	HIV,	it	went	untreated,	untreated	
infections	lead	to	AIDS…)	would	have	been	available,	ceteris	paribus,	however	he	contracted	HIV.	
3	And	MINIMALITY	precludes	the	possibility	of	full	explanations	having	superfluous	elements.	
4	We	can	arrive	at	this	conclusion	using	the	established	reasoning	from	previous	chapters,	as	follows:	if,	
ceteris	paribus,	Jean	had	not	been	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	but	still	had	HIV	(never	mind	how	
he	 contracted	 it),	 then	he	would	 still	 have	developed	AIDS,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	he	had	HIV	would	have	
(partially)	 explained	why	 he	 developed	 AIDS.	Moreover,	 in	 this	 counterfactual	 circumstance,	 the	 fact	
that	he	had	not	been	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	would	not	have	been	part	of	the	explanation	of	
why	 he	 developed	 AIDS.	 This	 supplies	 us	 with	 the	 appropriate	 specification	 of	 Premise	 #a,	 which,	
together	 with	 FACTIVITY,	 ENDURANCE	 and	 SUFFICIENCY,	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 there	 is	 a	 full	
explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS	that	includes	the	fact	that	he	had	HIV	but	does	not	include	the	
fact	that	he	was	transfused	with	HIV	infected	blood.	
5	If,	ceteris	paribus,	Jean	had	not	contracted	HIV	despite	having	been	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	
then	 he	 wouldn’t	 have	 developed	 AIDS,	 so	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 was	 transfused	 with	 HIV-infected	 blood	
would	not	have	explained	why	he	developed	AIDS.	This	supplies	us	with	the	appropriate	specification	of	
Premise	#b.	
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1.2 A	non-causal	counterexample	
Perhaps	you	agree	that	EXCLUSION	is	false	for	causal	explanation,	but	you	insist	that	it	is	true	of	
non-causal	explanation.	If	that	were	true,	and	one	maintained	that	reason	explanation	is	non-
causal,	 then	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	 Problem	 for	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 would	
return.	The	purpose	of	 this	 section	 is	 to	demonstrate	 that	 EXCLUSION	 is	equally	 false	 for	non-
causal	explanation.	
Consider	the	following	chess	opening:	
	
Figure	XI-1:	The	Hyper	Accelerated	Dragon	
This	game	has	just	begun.	White’s	king	and	kingside	rook	are	in	their	starting	positions	(e1	and	
h1,	respectively).	It	is	typical	in	the	early	stages	of	a	chess	game	for	a	player	to	seek	to	castle.	
For	a	player	playing	white,	castling	on	her	king’s	side	always	involves	moving	the	king	from	e1	
to	g1,	and	(as	part	of	the	same	turn)	the	rook	from	h1	to	f1.	However,	White	cannot	castle	on	
her	king’s	 side	because	of	 the	bishop	 (on	 f1)	between	 the	king	and	 the	kingside	 rook,	which	
obstructs	the	move.	That	is:	
(c) The	 fact	 that	 there	 is	a	bishop	between	 the	king	and	 the	kingside	 rook	partially	
explains	why	White	cannot	castle	on	her	king’s	side.	
I	take	it	that	the	explanatory	relationship	here	is	clearly	non-casual	(or	at	least	not	causal	in	the	
familiar	sense	in	which	Jean’s	story	is	a	causal	story).	
Now,	the	World	Chess	Federation’s	handbook	states	that:	
Castling	 is	 prevented	 temporarily…	 if	 there	 is	 any	 piece	 between	 the	 king	 and	 the	 rook	with	
which	castling	is	to	be	effected.	(FIDE,	n.d.,	3.8.2.2)	
This	fact	(concerning	the	rules	of	chess),	together	with	the	fact	that	there	is	a	piece	between	
White’s	king	and	her	kingside	rook	fully	explains	why	White	cannot	castle	on	her	king’s	side.	
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But	that	full	explanation	does	not	include	the	fact	that	there	is	a	bishop	between	the	king	and	
the	kingside	rook.6	So,	it	seems,	there	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	White	cannot	castle	on	her	
king’s	side	that	includes	the	fact	that	there	is	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	rook	but	does	
not	include	the	fact	that	there	is	a	bishop	between	her	king	and	king’s	side	rook.7	
Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 bishop	between	 the	 king	 and	 the	 rook	 only	 explains	why	
White	cannot	castle	if	there	is	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	rook.8	That	being	so	we	know	
(from	DIFFERENCE)	that	the	fact	that	there	is	a	bishop	between	the	king	and	the	rook	is	not	part	
of	a	genuinely	different	explanation	of	why	White	cannot	castle	 from	the	fact	that	there	 is	a	
piece	between	the	king	and	the	rook.	
So,	it	follows	that:	
(d) There	 is	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 why	White	 cannot	 castle	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	
there	 is	 a	 piece	 between	 the	 king	 and	 the	 rook	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	explanation.	
Now	notice,	again,	 that	 (d)	 is	 the	antecedent	condition	of	EXCLUSION	while	 (c)	 is	 the	denial	of	
the	consequent	condition.	So,	given	that	 (c)	and	 (d)	are	 true,	and	given	that	 the	explanatory	
relations	involved	are	non-causal,	EXCLUSION	must	be	false	of	even	non-causal	explanation.	
2 Why	these	are	counterexamples	to	the	exclusion	principle	
Why	 are	 these	 cases	 counterexamples	 to	 the	 exclusion	 principle?	 Answering	 that	 question	
means	answering	 the	question	of	how	 the	 seemingly	excluded	 facts	nonetheless	explain	 the	
explananda	they	are	excluded	from.	My	answer	is	straightforward:	they	explain	by	explaining	
those	facts	that	in	turn	explain	the	explananda.	
																																								 																				
6	Again,	the	latter	is	just	superfluous	to	that	full	explanation,	and	MINIMALITY	precludes	such	superfluity.	
7	Again,	we	could	argue	to	this	conclusion	using	the	conventional	reasoning:	If,	ceteris	paribus,	there	had	
been	no	bishop	between	the	rook	and	the	king	but	there	had	still	been	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	
rook	(suppose	that	there	was	a	knight	there	instead),	then	the	fact	that	there	was	a	piece	between	the	
king	and	the	rook	would	still	have	explained	why	White	could	not	castle.	Moreover,	had	there	been	no	
bishop	between	the	king	and	the	rook,	the	fact	that	there	was	no	bishop	between	the	king	and	the	rook	
would	not	have	explained	why	White	could	not	castle.	This	provides	us	with	the	relevant	specification	of	
Premise	#a,	so,	from	FACTIVITY,	ENDURANCE	and	SUFFICIENCY	we	can	conclude	that	there	is	a	full	explanation	
of	why	White	cannot	castle	that	 includes	the	fact	that	there	 is	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	rook	
but	does	not	include	the	fact	that	there	is	a	bishop	between	the	king	and	the	rook.	
8	If	the	bishop	hadn’t	been	a	piece	(perhaps	one	is	playing	a	chess	variant	that	excludes	bishops,	but	for	
which	the	rules	are	otherwise	the	same),	 then	White	would	have	been	able	to	castle,	so	the	fact	 that	
there	 is	a	bishop	between	 the	king	and	 the	 rook	would	not	have	explained	why	White	wouldn’t	have	
been	able	 to	 castle	 (since	White	would	have	been	able	 to	 castle).	 This	 is	 the	 relevant	 specification	of	
Premise	#b.	Consider:	if	there	had	been	a	penny	on	the	board	between	the	rook	and	the	king	we	would	
not	say	that	White	cannot	castle;	however,	in	the	chess	variant	in	which	bishops	aren’t	pieces,	they	are,	
from	the	game’s	perspective,	no	different	from	pennies	–	that	is,	they	are	just	irrelevant.	
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2.1 Revisiting	the	causal	counterexample	
In	the	first	counterexample	I	insisted	that	the	fact	that	Jean	was	transfused	with	HIV-infected	
blood	explains	why	he	developed	AIDS.	How	does	it	do	so?	It	does	so	by	explaining	why	he	has	
HIV.		
Of	 course,	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	has	HIV	 is	 the	more	 immediate	explanation	of	 the	 fact	 that	he	
developed	AIDS.	And,	of	course,	the	way	one	contracts	HIV	makes	no	difference	to	whether	or	
not	one	develops	AIDS	given	that	one	has	HIV.	 If	your	question	were	why,	given	that	he	had	
HIV,	 did	 Jean	 develop	 AIDS,	 then	 the	 relevant	 explanation	 includes	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 went	
untreated,	and	the	facts	about	how	a	sustained,	untreated	HIV	 infection	 leads	to	AIDS	–	and	
that	 explanation	 need	make	 no	mention	 of	 how	he	 contracted	HIV.	 But	 it	would	 be	 odd	 to	
always	take	the	fact	that	he	had	HIV	as	given!	And	once	you	don’t	take	it	as	a	given,	a	part	of	
the	explanation	of	how	he	came	to	develop	AIDS	is	why	he	has	HIV	in	the	first	place.	And	he	
has	HIV	because	he	was	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood.		
Summarising:	the	fact	that	Jean	was	transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	explains	both	the	fact	
that	he	has	HIV	and	the	fact	that	he	developed	AIDS,	and	the	fact	that	he	has	HIV	also	explains	
the	fact	that	he	developed	AIDS.	Symbolically:	p	partially	explains	q,	q	partially	explains	r	and	p	
partially	 explains	 r.	 The	 question	 is:	why	 does	p	 partially	 explain	 r?	 I	 think	 the	 simplest	 and	
most	natural	answer	is	that	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are	transitive.	
Given	the	transitivity	of	the	(partial)	explanation	relations	involved,	the	fact	that	p	explains	q	
together	with	 the	 fact	 that	q	 explains	 r	 ensures	 that	p	 explains	 r.	 So,	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	was	
transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	explains	why	he	developed	AIDS	because	 it	explains	 that	
which	 explains	 why	 he	 developed	 AIDS	 and	 because	 of	 the	 transitivity	 of	 the	 explanatory	
relations	involved.		2.2 Revisiting	the	non-causal	counterexample	
What	of	 the	 chess	example?	What	 is	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	piece	
between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	and	the	fact	that	there	is	a	bishop	between	the	king	
and	the	kingside	rook?		
Well,	the	fact	that	there	is	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	is	an	existential	fact.	
And	existential	facts	are	explained	by	their	instances:	
‘Why	 is	 it	 that	 something	 is	 F?	 Because	 A	 is	 F.	 An	 existential	 quantification	 is	 explained	 by	
providing	an	instance.’	(Lewis	1987,	223)	
‘Existential	quantifications	are	true	because	of	their	true	instances.’	(Schnieder	2011,	460)	
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So,	why	 is	 there	a	piece	between	 the	king	and	 the	kingside	 rook?	Because	 there	 is	 a	bishop	
between	 the	king	and	 the	kingside	 rook	 (and	a	bishop	 is	a	piece…)	–	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	a	
bishop	between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	explains	why	there	is	a	piece	between	the	king	
and	the	kingside	rook.	
Summarising:	the	fact	that	there	is	a	bishop	between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	explains	
both	why	there	is	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	and	why	White	cannot	castle	
on	her	king’s	side,	and	the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	a	piece	between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	
also	 explains	why	White	 cannot	 castle.	 Symbolically,	 again:	p	 partially	 explains	q,	q	 partially	
explains	r	and	p	partially	explains	r.	And,	again,	 I	think	the	most	natural	explanation	of	these	
facts	 is	 that	 the	explanatory	relations	 involved	are	 transitive.	 	That	 is:	p	explains	r	because	p	
explains	q	and	q	explains	r.	
3 What’s	wrong	with	the	exclusion	principle	
Having	 understood	 how	 the	 apparently	 excluded	 facts	 of	 these	 two	 counterexamples	
nonetheless	 explain,	 we	 are	 now	 in	 position	 to	 see	 what	 was	 wrong	 with	 the	 exclusion	
principle.	
First,	 some	basic	 terminology:	 if	p	explains	q	 and	q	 explains	 r	and	 the	 explanatory	 relations	
involved	are	 transitive	 then	we	 can	 say	 that	p	 is	 a	distal	 explanation	of	 r,	while	q	 is	 a	more	
proximal	 explanation	 of	 r.	 So,	 the	 suggestion	 of	 the	 previous	 section	was	 this:	 the	 fact	 that	
Jean	 was	 transfused	 with	 HIV-infected	 blood	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 bishop	 between	
White’s	 king	 and	 her	 kingside	 rook	 are	 distal	 (partial)	 explanations	 of	 their	 respective	
explananda.	Whereas,	by	comparison,	the	fact	that	Jean	had	HIV	and	the	fact	that	there	 is	a	
piece	between	the	king	and	the	kingside	rook	are	more	proximal	(partial)	explanations	of	their	
respective	explananda.	I	suggest	that	the	problem	with	the	exclusion	principle,	and	the	reason	
why	it	is	wrong,	is	that	it	denies	the	explanatory	power	of	distal	explanations.	
It	will	always	be	true	of	any	distal	 (partial)	explanation	of	some	explanandum	 that	 there	 is	a	
full	 explanation	 of	 that	 explanandum	of	which	 it	 is	 not	 part.	Moreover,	 a	 distal	 explanation	
does	not	explain	the	explanandum	in	a	way	that	is	genuinely	different	from	the	more	proximal	
explanation.	 So	 it	will	 seemingly	 always	be	 true	of	 any	distal	 explanation	 that	 there	 is	 a	 full	
explanation	of	 some	explanandum	 such	 that	 that	distal	 explanation	 is	 not	 a	part	of	 that	 full	
explanation	nor	is	it	part	of	a	genuinely	different	full	explanation.	That	is,	a	distal	explanation	
of	some	explanandum	will	always	satisfy	the	antecedent	condition	of	EXCLUSION.	
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That	being	 so,	 the	only	way	 to	preserve	EXCLUSION	 is	 to	deny	 the	explanatory	 status	of	distal	
explanations	–	but	 that	 it	 is	 a	 very	heavy	price	 to	pay.	 It	means	 insisting	 that	only	 the	most	
proximate	explanation	of	some	explanandum	explains	it.	And	this	is	absurd!	
Suppose	we	say	that	Franz	developed	lung	cancer	because	he	smoked.	This	explanation	is,	 in	
some	 sense,	 an	 extremely	 distal	 explanation	 of	 why	 he	 developed	 lung	 cancer.	 A	 more	
proximal	 explanation	 would	 be	 that	 he	 regularly	 inhaled	 carcinogens.	 A	 more	 proximal	
explanation	still	would	be	the	fact	that	cells	in	his	lungs	mutated.9		
What	each	of	these	more	proximal	explanations	have	in	common	is	that	a	full	explanation	of	
the	 fact	 that	 Franz	 developed	 lung	 cancer	 can	 be	 given	 in	 terms	 of	 them	 which	 makes	 no	
mention	of,	nor	even	entails,	 the	more	distal	explanation.	For	 instance,	given	that	Franz	was	
inhaling	that	mix	of	carcinogens,	it	doesn’t	matter	(ceteris	paribus)	whether	he	got	them	from	
smoking	or	from	passive	smoking.	Likewise,	given	that	the	cells	in	his	lungs	mutated	it	doesn’t	
matter	(ceteris	paribus)	to	his	developing	lung	cancer	whether	the	cell	mutation	was	the	result	
of	 carcinogen	 inhalation	 or	 exposure	 to	 radiation.	 So,	 if	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 is	 to	 be	
believed,	 we	 can’t	 even	 say	 that	 Franz	 developed	 cancer	 because	 he	 regularly	 inhaled	
carcinogens.	 According	 to	 the	 exclusion	 principle,	 only	 the	most	proximal	 explanation	 of	 his	
lung	cancer	explains	it.	This	is	surely	absurd.10	
The	 absurdity	 of	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 should	 be	 clear	 when	we	 see	 that	 even	 an	 agent’s	
beliefs	 can	 be	 excluded	 from	 the	 explanation	 of	 their	 actions.	 Suppose	 that,	 when	 I	
congratulate	my	friend,	I	believe	that	congratulating	her	will	make	her	happy	and,	say,	I	desire	
to	make	her	happy	(or	what	have	you).	Given	that	I	believe	that	congratulating	her	will	make	
her	 happy,	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	 believe	 it	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
																																								 																				
9	‘The	formation	of	covalent	bonds	between	the	carcinogens	and	DNA	producing	DNA	adducts,	and	the	
resulting	 permanent	mutations	 in	 critical	 genes	 of	 somatic	 cells	 is	 the	major	 established	 pathway	 of	
cancer	causation	by	cigarette	smoke.’		(Hecht	2006,	609)	
10	Yablo	(2008)	makes	an	analogous	criticism	of	Russel’s	remarks	about	causation,	which	follow:		
If	 the	 cause	 is	 a	 process	 involving	 change	 within	 itself,	 we	 shall	 require…	 causal	 relations	
between	 its	 earlier	 and	 later	parts;	moreover	 it	would	 seem	 that	only	 the	 later	parts	 can	be	
relevant	to	the	effect…	Thus	we	shall	be	led	to	diminish	the	duration	of	the	cause	without	limit,	
and	however	much	we	may	diminish	 it,	 there	will	 still	 remain	an	earlier	part,	which	might	be	
altered	without	altering	the	effect,	so	that	the	true	cause…	will	not	have	been	reached.	(Russell	
1917,	135)		
Russell	suggests	that	only	the	‘later	part’	(i.e.	the	more	proximal	part)	of	the	cause	can	be	taken	to	be	
the	 cause	 itself,	 since	 the	 ‘earlier	 part’	 (i.e.	 the	 more	 distal	 part)	 of	 the	 cause	 can	 obtain	 without	
guaranteeing	the	effect,	if	the	later	part	does	not	obtain.	This	is	the	causal	analogue	of	 (what	I	take	to	
be)	the	implication	of	the	exclusion	principle.	In	response	to	Russell’s	thesis	about	what	it	takes	to	be	a	
cause,	Yablo	notes	that,	 ‘if	this…were	truly	disqualifying…essentially	everything	would	be	robbed	of	 its	
intuitive	 causal	 powers.’	 (2008,	 298)	 My	 point	 is	 that	 the	 exclusion	 principle	 has	 exactly	 the	 same	
implication	for	explanation:	 if	 it	were	true	then	essentially	everything	would	be	robbed	of	 its	 intuitive	
explanatory	power.		
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congratulate	her.	That	 is,	 I	don’t	need	 to	believe	 that	 she	has	won	an	award	 to	believe	 that	
congratulating	her	will	make	her	happy,	and	if	 I	don’t	believe	that	it	would	make	her	happy	I	
wouldn’t	congratulate	her,	even	if	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	The	fact	that	I	believe	
that	 congratulating	 her	 would	 make	 her	 happy	 is	 a	 more	 proximal	 explanation	 of	 why	 I	
congratulate	her.	But	it	is	absurd	to	infer	from	this	that	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	she	had	won	
an	award	does	not	explain	why	I	congratulated	her!	
The	exclusion	principle	is	a	damaging	explanatory	prejudice	–	discriminating	against	all	but	the	
most	proximal	explanations	of	any	given	explanandum	will	actually	impede	our	ability	to	offer	
the	 explanations	 that	 we	 ordinarily	 give,	 because	we	 are	 typically	 interested	 in	more	 distal	
explanations	of	any	given	explanandum	than	the	most	immediately	proximal	explanation.	For	
instance,	 if	 you’re	 looking	 to	prevent	 lung	 cancer	 then	 it	matters	 that	 Franz	developed	 lung	
cancer	because	he	smoked	–	knowing	that	cell	mutation	explains	his	cancer	doesn’t	help	you	
much.	What’s	most	wrong	with	the	exclusion	principle,	then,	is	that	it	forces	us	to	say	that	the	
explanations	we	are	interested	in	aren’t	really	explanations.11	
4 Where	did	we	go	wrong?	
Supposing	 you	 accept	 my	 reasoning,	 some	 questions	 still	 remain:	 if	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	 was	
transfused	with	HIV-infected	blood	explains	why	he	developed	AIDS	 then	 it	must	 be	part	 of	
some	full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS.	However,	as	established	in	(b),	there	is	a	full	
explanation	 of	why	 he	 developed	 AIDS	 such	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 he	was	 transfused	with	 HIV-
infected	 blood	 is	 neither	 a	 part	 of	 that	 explanation	 nor	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 genuinely	 different	
explanation.	So	how	could	 it	be	part	of	any	explanation?	 It	was	exactly	this	 line	of	reasoning	
that,	in	§	(VIII)5,	led	us	to	the	exclusion	principle.	Since	we	have	established	that	the	exclusion	
principle	is	false,	we	should	see	what	was	wrong	with	this	reasoning.		
The	 mistake,	 I	 suggest,	 was	 the	 implicit	 assumption	 that	 if	 two	 full	 explanations	 of	 some	
explanandum	 are	 not	 identical	 then	 they	 must	 be	 genuinely	 different	 explanations	 of	 that	
explanandum.	The	point	to	recognise	is	that	for	two	full	explanations	to	be	genuinely	different	
requires	more	 than	 just	 non-identity,	 it	 requires,	per	 the	 difference	 principle,	 some	 form	of	
independence.	That	is,	the	answer	to	the	question	of	how	it	could	be	part	of	any	explanation	is	
that	two	full	explanations	can	be	non-identical	without	being	genuinely	different.	For	instance,	
there	are	two	full	explanations	of	the	fact	that	Jean	developed	AIDS	such	that,	although	they	
																																								 																				
11	Recall	that	in	§	(VIII)5.2,	I	noted	that	my	argument	against	the	exclusion	principle	is	not	an	argument	
against	Kim’s	principle	of	causal	exclusion	(in	spite	of	the	apparent	similarity	of	their	names	and	forms).	
This	 is	because,	as	may	quite	be	clear,	Kim’s	principle	does	not	exclude	distal	causation	since	it	 is	only	
restricted	to	the	exclusion	of	simultaneous	causes.	
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are	not	genuinely	different	explanations	of	why	he	developed	AIDS,	they	are	nonetheless	not	
identical;	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 was	 transfused	 with	 HIV-infected	 blood	 is	 an	
element	of	one	and	not	the	other.	
5 Which	explanation	are	distal	explanations	part	of?	
Another	question:	which	full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS	includes	the	fact	that	Jean	
was	 transfused	with	 infected	blood?	We	know	 it	 cannot	be	 the	 same	 full	explanation	as	 the	
one	that	includes	the	fact	that	he	had	HIV,	because	how	he	contracted	HIV	is	redundant	in	that	
explanation.	So	which	full	explanation	is	it?		
Let	‘[HIV]’	stand	for	the	fact	that	Jean	has	HIV	and	let	‘Δ1’	stand	for	a	full	explanation	of	why	
Jean	developed	AIDS	of	which	[HIV]	is	a	part.	Now	let	‘[Transfusion]’	stand	for	the	fact	that	he	
had	an	infected	blood	transfusion	and	let	‘Γ’	stand	for	a	full	explanation	of	[HIV]	that	includes	
[Transfusion].	Finally,	 let	 ‘Δ2’	stand	for	the	set	obtained	by	substituting	Γ	for	[HIV]	 in	Δ1.12	My	
suggestion	is	this:	Δ2	is	a	full	explanation	of	why	Jean	had	AIDS.		
That	 is,	 if	we	substitute	 the	 full	explanation	of	why	 Jean	had	HIV,	Γ,	 for	 the	 fact	 that	he	had	
HIV,	[HIV],	 into	the	full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS,	Δ1,	that	produces	another	full	
explanation	 of	why	 he	 had	AIDS,	 Δ2.	Now,	 Δ2	 is	 clearly	 not	 identical	 to	 Δ1,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 not	
genuinely	 different	 from	 it.	 Moreover,	 since	 [Transfusion]	 is	 included	 in	 Δ2,	 and	 Δ2	 is	 a	 full	
explanation	 of	 why	 he	 developed	 AIDS,	 [Transfusion]	 is	 a	 partial	 explanation	 of	 why	 Jean	
developed	AIDS.	
To	 answer	 the	 question	 then,	 in	 ‘plain’	 English:	 the	 fact	 that	 Jean	 had	 an	 infected	 blood	
transfusion	is	a	part	of	the	full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS	that	is	got	by	substituting	
the	full	explanation	of	why	Jean	had	HIV	for	the	fact	that	he	had	HIV	into	the	more	proximal	
full	explanation	of	why	he	developed	AIDS.		
6 Conclusion	
I	have	argued	that	the	exclusion	principle	is	false	and	that	seemingly	excluded	facts	can	explain	
an	explanandum	by	explaining	something	that,	in	turn,	explains	that	explanandum.	In	the	next	
chapter	I	will	set	out	the	principles	of	my	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.	
																																								 																				
12	That	is:	Δ! = Γ ∪ Δ! ∖ 𝐻𝐼𝑉 .	
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(XII)		Explaining	why	we	act	
In	 which	 I	 say	 how	 normative	 reasons	 (and	 the	 appearance	 of	 them)	 explain	
why	 we	 act.	 I	 suggest	 that	 normative	 reasons	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 action	 by	
explaining	 their	belief	 that,	 in	 turn,	explains	 the	agent’s	action.	 I	 suggest	 that	
they	 explain	 an	 agent’s	 belief	 by	 explaining	 the	 appearance	 of	 them	 that,	 in	
turn,	 explains	 the	 agent’s	 belief.	 I	 set	 out	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 view	 for	
explanatory	 rationalism	 and	 for	 anti-psychological	 theories	 of	 reasons	 more	
generally.	
In	 light	of	 the	remarks	of	 the	previous	chapter,	my	proposed	answer	to	the	question	of	how	
normative	reasons	explain	our	actions	is	perhaps	clear:	
Facts	about	an	agent’s	[normative]1	reasons	explain	an	agent’s	actions	whenever	they	explain	
why	 she	 has	 the	 (true)	 beliefs	 she	 has	 about	 her	 [normative]	 reasons,	 beliefs	 that	 in	 turn	
explain	her	actions.	(Smith	1998,	38)	
This	 is	 the	 indirect	 theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.	According	to	this	 theory	the	fact	
that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 explains	 why	 I	 congratulated	 her	 because	 it	 explains	 why	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award,	which,	in	turn,	explains	why	I	congratulated	her.		
The	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation	has	been	variously	considered,	endorsed	
or	 rejected,	 by	 others,	 though	 mainly	 in	 passing.2 	However,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 it	 has	 been	
considered	as	thoroughly	as	it	ought	to	have	been,	because,	I	suggest,	its	implications	for	what	
an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	could	be	are	profound	(regardless	of	whether	or	not	one	accepts	
explanatory	rationalism).		
Moreover,	 as	 I	 will	 show,	 the	 indirect	 theory	 applies	 equally	 well	 as	 an	 account	 of	 how	
experiences	explain	actions	–	that	is,	an	experience	explains	an	agent’s	action	if	it	explains	the	
belief	that	explains	the	agent’s	action.	
In	 the	next	chapter	 I	will	 consider	what	 the	 indirect	 theory	should	say	about	how	normative	
reasons	and	the	appearance	of	them	explain	why	it	is	rational	to	act.	
																																								 																				
1	These	are	‘justifying’	reasons	in	Smith’s	original	–	the	substitution	I	make	is	purely	terminological.	
2	See:	Collins	(1997,	111),	Smith	(1998,	38),	Dancy	(2000,	109–101),	Davis	(2005,	74–75),	Saporiti	(2007,	
306),	Raz	(2009,	197)	and	Gibbons	(2010,	359).	Dustin	Locke	(2015)	gives	a	more	thorough	treatment	of	
a	theory	of	this	kind,	however,	Locke’s	treatment	differs	significantly	from	mine,	particularly	in	so	far	as	
it	is	focused	on	what	it	is	for	something	to	be	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting.		
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1 When	normative	reasons	explain	
The	principle	behind	the	 indirect	theory	 is	that	when	an	agent	acts	for	a	reason	‘there	 is	the	
“proximal”	explanation	of	the	action,	given	by	specifying	the	psychological	state	of	the	agent.	
Then	there	is	the	“distal”	explanation	of	the	action,	given	by	specifying	what	is	responsible	for	
the	agent	getting	 into	 that	 state.’	 (Dancy	2000,	109)	For	 this	 to	be	a	 fruitful	account	of	how	
normative	reasons	explain	actions,	 it	must	be	the	case	that	a	normative	reason	can	be	‘what	
gets’	an	agent	into	the	state	of	believing	that	normative	reason.	
	
Figure	XII-1:	The	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation	
But	how	does	a	fact	about	the	world	explain	one’s	belief	 in	 it?	That	explanatory	relation	 is,	 I	
suggest,	also	indirect.	1.1 How	normative	reasons	explain	beliefs	in	them	
Why	 do	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 earth	 is	 spherical?	 Because	 it	 is	 spherical!	 That	 which	 I	 believe	
explains	why	I	believe	it.	Likewise:	if	I’m	being	rained	on,	and	I’m	jumping	to	avoid	the	puddles	
and	I	see	others	rushing	for	shelter,	if	you	were	to	then	ask	me	why	I	believe	it’s	raining	I	will	
reply,	incredulously,	‘Because	it	is	raining!’	
How	could	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	explain	why	I	believe	that	it	is	raining?	Perhaps	you	think	
along	these	 lines:	 it’s	not	the	fact	 that	 it	was	raining	that	explains	why	 I	believed	that	 it	was	
raining,	it	is	only	the	fact	that	it	appeared	to	me	as	though	it	was	raining.	If	it	weren’t	raining	
but	it	still	appeared	to	me	as	though	it	was,	I	would	still	have	believed	that	it	was.	And	so	on.	
This	view,	as	I	argued	in	§	(IX)5,	is	just	another	instance	of	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem,	
which	 the	 previous	 chapter	 discredited.	 In	 short:	 even	 though	 how	 things	 appear	 to	 be	
intermediate	 between	 the	 world	 and	 our	 beliefs	 about	 it,	 that	 does	 not	 prevent	 the	 world	
from	being	able	to	explain	those	beliefs.	
To	wit:	the	fact	that	things	appear	to	be	a	certain	way	may	be	the	more	proximal	explanation	
of	an	agent’s	belief	that	they	are	that	way.	However,	if	things	actually	are	that	way,	and	they	
appear	 to	 be	 that	 way	 because	 they	 are	 that	 way,	 then,	 given	 the	 transitivity	 of	 the	
explanatory	 relations	 involved,	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	 that	 way	 can	 explain	 why	 an	 agent	
believes	them	to	be	that	way.	This	is,	I	suggest,	an	indirect	theory	of	belief	explanation.	
	 Psychological	
fact	explains	 explains	
Normative	
reason	
Action	
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Figure	XII-2:	The	indirect	theory	of	belief	explanation	
Suppose	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining	because	I	 looked	out	of	the	window	and	saw	rain.	
Why	did	it	appear	to	me	as	though	it	was	raining?	Well,	in	part,	because	it	was	raining.	The	fact	
that	it	was	raining	explains	why	I	saw	rain	and	thus	why	it	appeared	as	though	it	was	raining,	
which	 explains	 why	 I	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 raining.	 So,	 because	 the	 explanatory	 relations	
involved	are	transitive,	the	fact	that	it	was	raining	explains	why	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	
If	you	doubt	that	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are	transitive,	please	suspend	your	doubts	
for	the	moment:	this	is	a	subject	I	will	discuss	at	length	in	subsequent	chapters.	
Likewise,	I	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award,	in	part,	because	I	read	that	she	had	won	
an	award.	And	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award,	in	part,	because	she	had	won	an	award.3	The	
fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	explains	why	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award,	which	explains	
why	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	Again,	because	the	explanatory	relations	involved	
are	transitive,	we	can	say	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	explains	why	 I	believed	
that	she	had	won	an	award.	
So,	the	way	that	normative	reasons	explain	our	beliefs	in	them	is	by	explaining	why	it	seemed	
to	us	as	though	those	normative	reasons	were	the	case.	1.2 How	normative	reasons	explain	actions	
What	the	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation	suggests	is	this:	I	congratulated	my	
friend,	in	part,	because	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award,	and	I	believed	that	she	had	won	
an	award,	in	part,	because	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award,	and	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	
award,	in	part,	because	she	won	an	award.	So,	because	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are	
transitive,	we	can	say	that	I	congratulated	my	friend,	in	part,	because	she	won	an	award.	
	
Figure	XII-3:	The	explanation	of	why	I	congratulated	my	friend	
																																								 																				
3	We	 could	 spell	 out	 the	 chain	 further:	 I	 read	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 in	 part,	 because	 the	
newspaper	printed	an	article	about	 it,	and	they	printed	an	article	about	 it,	 in	part,	because	a	reporter	
wrote	an	article	about	 it,	and	they	wrote	about	 it,	 in	part,	because	they	witnessed	her	win	the	award	
and	they	witnessed	her	win	it,	in	part,	because	she	won	it.	The	point	is	that	given	the	transitivity	of	the	
explanatory	relations	involved	there	is	no	requirement	to	spell	out	these	intermediate	steps.	
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1.3 When	normative	reasons	don’t	explain	
Recall	that	we	don’t	tend	to	give	normative	reason	explanations	in	instances	of	false	beliefs	or	
in	 Gettier	 cases	 –	 we	 say	 that,	 in	 those	 cases,	 the	 normative	 reason	 does	 not	 explain	 the	
agent’s	 action.	 The	 indirect	 theory	of	normative	 reason	explanation	 tells	us	why:	because	 in	
both	 false	belief	 cases	and	Gettier	 cases,	 the	normative	 reason	does	not	explain	 the	agent’s	
belief	in	it.	
First,	 a	 false	 belief	 case:	 when	 Sally	 ran	 because	 she	 (mistakenly)	 believed	 that	 a	 bear	 was	
chasing	her,	we	don’t	say	that	she	ran	because	a	bear	was	chasing	her.	Why	not?	Because	the	
proposition	 that	a	bear	was	 chasing	her	 does	not	explain	why	 she	believed	 that	 a	bear	was	
chasing	her.	Clear	enough.	
	
Figure	XII-4:	The	explanation	of	why	Sally	ran	
Second,	a	Gettier	case:	recall	that	Edmund’s	normally	reliable	friend	told	him,	on	a	whim,	that	
the	ice	in	the	middle	of	the	lake	was	thin,	although	she	had	no	idea	about	the	actual	status	of	
the	ice.	As	a	result	Edmund	skated	by	the	edge	of	the	lake;	that	is,	he	skated	by	the	edge	of	the	
lake,	in	part,	because	he	believed	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	was	thin.		
Now,	 as	 it	 turns	 out,	 it	 actually	 was	 thin.	 However,	 as	 we	 have	 already	 acknowledged	 (see	
§	(IV)1.4),	the	fact	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	of	the	lake	was	thin	does	not	explain	why	Edmund	
skated	at	the	edge.	Why	not?	Well	according	to	the	 indirect	theory	tit	 is	because	 it	does	not	
explain	why	he	believed	 that	 it	was	thin;	and	 it	does	not	explain	why	he	believed	that	 it	was	
thin	because	 it	does	not	explain	why	his	 friend	told	him	that	the	 ice	was	thin	 (which	 is	what	
explains	why	he	believed	that	it	was	thin).	
	
Figure	XII-5:	The	explanation	of	why	Edmund	skated	at	the	edge	of	the	lake	
2 Implications	for	explanatory	rationalism	
Recall	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 requires	 that	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 must	 both	
explain	their	action	and	explain	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	do	it.	As	I	set	out	in	
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§	(VI),	if	explanatory	rationalism	is	to	be	consistent	with	the	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	set	
out	in	§§	(II)-(IV),	the	following	must	be	true:	
(R1)	 I	congratulated	my	friend	because	she	had	won	an	award.	
(R2)	 I	congratulated	my	friend	because	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	
(R3)	 It	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend	 because	 she	 had	
won	an	award.	
(R4)	 It	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	my	friend	because	I	read	that	
she	had	won	an	award.	
The	discussion	of	the	previous	section	has	demonstrated	how	it	is	that	(R1)	and	(R2)	are	true:	
the	explanans	 in	each	statement	explains	why	 I	 congratulated	my	 friend	by	explaining	why	 I	
believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.		
	
Figure	XII-6:	Explaining	why	we	act	
In	 the	 next	 chapter	 I	 will	 discuss	 (R3)	 and	 (R4),	 but	 before	 then	 I	 want	 to	 discuss	 the	
implications	 of	 the	 indirect	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 for	 anti-psychological	
theories	of	reasons	more	generally.	
3 Implications	for	anti-psychological	theories	of	reasons	
Recall	that	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	was	the	motivating	argument	for	psychologism	
about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act.	The	reasoning	went	like	this:	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	
must	 always	 explain	 their	 action	 (recall	 §	(IV)1.2),	 however,	 only	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	
psychology	can	explain	their	actions	(as	per	The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem),	therefore,	an	
agent’s	reason	for	acting	must	always	be	a	feature	of	their	psychology.	
This	argument	is,	as	we	have	noted,	the	major	argument	against	any	theory	that	suggests	that	
reasons	are	sometimes	not	features	of	our	psychology.4	The	rejection	of	the	exclusion	principle	
undermined	that	argument,	strengthening	the	case	for	anti-psychological	theories.		
The	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation	now	provides	us	with	an	account	of	why	it	
is	wrong:	normative	reasons	can	explain	actions,	and	they	do	so	by	explaining	the	beliefs	that	
																																								 																				
4	Note:	 anti-psychological	 theories	don’t	 insist	 that	 reasons	are	never	 features	of	our	psychology,	 just	
that	they	at	least	sometimes	aren’t.	
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explain	 our	 actions.	 This	 theory	 does	 not	 deny	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 psychological,	 on	 which	
psychologism	insists,	but	it	nonetheless	provides	a	role	for	the	world	in	explaining	what	agents	
do.	 The	 indirect	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 thus	 provides	 a	 response	 to	
psychologism	for	all	anti-psychological	theories,	and	not	merely	explanatory	rationalism.	
4 Conclusion	
One	 of	 the	 challenges	 I	 set	 myself	 was	 showing	 how	 it	 was	 that	 normative	 reasons	 could	
explain	 an	 agent’s	 action.	 I	 take	 that	 challenge	 to	 have	 now	 been	met.	 In	 particular,	 I	 have	
argued	that,	 regardless	of	whether	or	not	you	accept	explanatory	rationalism	(and	the	other	
arguments	 for	 it	 that	 follow),	 the	 indirect	 theory	 of	 normative	 reason	 explanation	 can	 still	
provide	you	with	an	account	of	how	it	is	that	normative	reasons	can	explain	our	actions.		
The	next	chapter	discusses	how	it	 is	that	normative	reasons	(and	perceptual	experiences	and	
the	like)	can	explain	why	it	is	rational	for	an	agent	to	do	something.	Before	that	discussion,	in	
the	 Appendix	 to	 this	 chapter,	 I	 consider	 two	 potential	 objections	 to	 the	 indirect	 theory	 of	
normative	reason	explanation.	
Appendix	
A.1 Objections	
Objection	1 You	have	suggested	that	a	normative	reason	explains	an	agent’s	action	only	if	
it	 explains	 a	 feature	 of	 their	 psychology	 that	 explains	 their	 action.	 However,	 here	 is	 a	
counterexample	to	that	claim:	
That	it	is	about	to	rain	may	explain	why	everyone	is	coming	in.	Is	their	belief	that	it	is	about	to	rain	
to	be	explained	by	its	being	about	to	rain?	Or	is	it	rather	the	blackness	of	the	clouds	and	the	sudden	
drop	 in	 temperature?	 These	 are	 not	 themselves	 to	 be	 explained	 by	 its	 being	 about	 to	 rain.	 The	
clouds	are	not	black	because	it	will	shortly	rain.	(Dancy	2000,	112) 
For	 expositional	 simplicity,	 let’s	 restrict	 Dancy’s	 example	 to	 claims	 about	 someone	 in	
particular;	call	him	‘Jim’.	For	Jim,	the	argument	goes	like	this:	
(a) The	fact	that	it	is	about	to	rain	is	a	normative	reason	for	Jim	to	come	in;	
(b) The	fact	that	it	is	about	to	rain	explains	why	Jim	is	coming	in;	and	
(c) The	fact	that	it	is	about	to	rain	does	not	explain	why	Jim	believes	that	it	is	about	
to	rain.	
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If	 (a),	 (b)	 and	 (c)	 are	 all	 true	 then	 it	 is	 not	 true	 that,	 as	 I	 have	 argued,	 a	 normative	 reason	
explains	an	agent’s	action	only	if5	it	explains	a	feature	of	their	psychology	that	in	turn	explains	
their	action.6	
Response I	am	happy	to	agree	that	(a)	is	true,	so	I	must	reject	either	(b)	or	(c).	There	are	
some7	who	reject	(b),	on	the	ground	that	facts	about	the	future	can’t	explain	present	actions.	I	
have	 some	 sympathy	 for	 that	 response;	 however,	 it	may	 not	 fare	 so	well	 with	 facts	 known	
from	 inference,	 and	 may	 rely	 on	 a	 causal	 analysis	 of	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 involved.	
Regardless,	 to	 my	mind	 there	 is	 a	 more	 compelling	 response:	 I	 do	 not	 know	 how	 one	 can	
consistently	maintain	both	(b)	and	(c).	
The	only	reason	that	Dancy	gives	in	defence	of	(c)	is	that	the	blackness	of	the	clouds	etc.	is	not	
explained	by	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	That	 is	 true	enough.	But	 to	make	that	argument	 is	 to	
embrace	an	 indirect	 theory	of	belief	explanation	–	namely	that	some	fact	p	explains	the	fact	
that	an	agent	believes	that	p	only	if	it	explains	some	fact	that,	in	turn,	explains	the	fact	that	p.	
That	is,	Dancy	presupposes	the	indirect	theory	of	belief	explanation	in	suggesting	that	the	fact	
that	it	is	about	to	rain	can’t	explain	why	Jim	believes	that	it	is	about	to	rain	because	it	does	not	
explain	 the	 blackness	 of	 the	 clouds	 etc.	My	 concern	 is	 that	 I	 don’t	 know	why	we	 should	 be	
indirect	theorists	about	belief	explanation	but	not	about	action	explanation.	
Of	course,	if	one	were	to	deny	(c),	and	insist	that	the	fact	that	it	is	about	to	rain	does	explain	
why	 Jim	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 about	 to	 rain,	 then	 one	 might	 wonder	 what	 the	 explanatory	
connection	 between	 those	 two	 facts	 is	 (given	 that	 it	 is	 unmediated	 by	 any	 perceptual	
experience).	However,	I	don’t	see	how	one	can	wonder	this	without	likewise	wondering	what	
the	explanatory	connection	between	the	fact	that	it	is	about	to	rain	and	the	fact	that	Jim	came	
in	is.	My	point	is	this:	I	don’t	see	what	basis	one	could	have	for	thinking	that	both	(b)	and	(c)	
are	true	–	either	one	accepts	(b)	and,	for	the	same	reason,	rejects	(c);	or	one	accepts	(c)	and,	
for	the	same	reason,	rejects	(b).		
So,	if	there	is	no	consistent	basis	for	the	truth	of	both	(b)	and	(c),	then	this	is	no	objection	to	
the	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation.	
																																								 																				
5	At	least	in	non-weird	cases.	
6An	argument	of	this	kind	can	likewise	be	made	for	facts	that	are	believed	on	the	basis	of	inference	(i.e.	
where	a	perceptual	experience	that	explains	one’s	belief	that	p	is	also	seemingly	is	not	explained	by	the	
fact	 that	 p).	 Alvin	 Goldman	 (1967)	 considered	 	 these	 sorts	 of	 examples	 in	 his	 causal	 theory	 of	
knowledge,	which	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 indirect	 theory	 in	 several	 respects.	However,	his	 response	 to	 them	
differs	from	mine.	
7	For	instance:	Davis	(2003,	456),	Gibbons	(2010,	359)	and	Locke	(2015,	194).	
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Objection	2 Even	if	we	accept	this	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation,	it	does	
not	guarantee	that	you	congratulated	your	friend	because	she	won	an	award	(i.e.	 it	does	not	
guarantee	the	truth	of	(R1)).		Why	not?	Because	one	may	be	sceptical	as	to	whether	or	not	the	
fact	that	your	friend	won	an	award	really	explains	the	fact	that	you	believed	that	she	had.		
For	instance,	suppose	that	your	friend’s	award	is	particularly	obscure	and	you	just	happen	to	
stumble	upon	a	small	article	about	it	in	a	newspaper	that	you	wouldn’t	normally	read.	Under	
these	 circumstances	 then	 (at	 least	 on,	 for	 instance,	 a	 difference-making	 account	 of	
explanation)	one	might	say	that	the	fact	that	your	friend	won	an	award	does	not	really	explain	
why	you	believed	that	she	had,8	and	it	consequently	does	not	explain	why	you	congratulated	
her.	Thus,	 in	 spite	of	your	 indirect	 theory	of	normative	 reason	explanation,	 (R1)	may	still	be	
false.	
Response I	have	 three	 responses	 to	 this	objection.	First,	 I	 could	 just	accept	 that	 (R1)	 is	
not	 true	when	my	 discovering	 about	my	 friend’s	 award	 is	 so	 chancy.	 There	might	 be	 other	
examples	 (e.g.	 my	 friend	 wins	 a	 Nobel	 Prize),	 for	 which	 the	 explanatory	 connection	 is	
sufficiently	robust	to	counterfactuals	for	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	to	count	as	an	
explanation	of	my	action.	One	strategy	could	thus	be	to	just	restrict	(R1)	to	a	claim	about	such	
cases.	There	would	be	little	lost	for	my	theory	in	making	such	a	restriction.	
My	second	response,	however,	is	to	note	that	even	if	my	friend’s	award	had	been	obscure,	and	
I	 had	 only	 found	out	 about	 it	 because	 I	 stumbled	 upon	 an	 article	 about	 it	 in	 a	 newspaper	 I	
wouldn’t	normally	read,	I	still	think	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	the	award	(partly)	explains	
why	I	believed	that	she	did	and,	therefore,	why	I	congratulated	her.	So,	to	the	extent	that	your	
account	 of	 explanation	 implies	 that	 it	 doesn’t,	 it	 is	 not	 really	 the	 sort	 of	 account	 that	 I	 am	
anyway	inclined	to	accept.9	
																																								 																				
8	Since	 there	 are	 very	 nearby	 possible	 worlds	 in	 which	 you	 don’t	 see	 the	 article,	 but	 in	 which	 she	
nonetheless	wins	the	award.	
9	What	may	be	at	work	here	 is	an	explanatory	analogue	of	Ned	Hall’s	 (2004)	claim	that	 there	are	 two	
concepts	 of	 causation:	 productive	 and	 counterfactual	 dependence.	 I	 suggest	 that	 difference-making	
accounts	of	explanation	can	be	understood	as	particular	kind	of	explanatory	analogue	of	counterfactual	
dependence	concepts	of	causation	(even	without	restricting	the	discussion	only	to	causal	explanation).	
Now,	whilst	I	don’t	want	to	reject	difference-making	accounts	of	explanation,	I	would	suggest	that	there	
is	a	bona	fide	manner	of	explanation	that	is	the	explanatory	analogue	of	Hall’s	productive	causation.	The	
relevance	of	this	observation	to	this	discussion	is	that	Hall	demonstrated	that	one	can	have	productive	
causation	without	counterfactual	dependence,	and	vice	versa.	Thus,	my	suggestion	(modestly	made)	is	
that	there	may	be	two	different	concepts	of	explanation	that	can	likewise	come	apart.	Thus,	it	may	be	
that	even	though	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	does	not	explain	why	I	believed	that	she	had	if	
we	have	in	mind	a	particular	sort	of	counterfactual	dependence	concept	of	explanation	(i.e.	difference-
making),	it	may	nonetheless	still	explain	it	if	we	have	in	mind	the	productive	concept.	
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My	third	response:	in	the	chapters	that	follow	I	argue	that	if	an	agent	knows	that	p	then	that	
entails	that	there	is	a	particular	explanatory	relation	between	the	fact	that	p	and	the	fact	that	
they	believe	that	p.	 If	you	accept	this,	then	you	must	either	reject	the	claim	that	I	knew	that	
my	friend	had	won	an	award	or	accept	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	explains	
why	 I	believed	that	she	had.10	Since	 I	do	 think	that	 (even	 in	the	chancy	case)	 I	knew	that	my	
friend	had	won	an	award,	I	am	also	inclined	to	think	that	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award	
explains	 why	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had,	 and,	 thereby,	 explains	 why	 I	 congratulated	 her.		
However,	if,	in	the	chancy	case,	you	don’t	think	that	I	knew	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award,	
then	 you	 could	 (as	we	did	 for	 the	 first	 response)	 just	 restrict	 (R1)	 to	 a	 claim	 about	 cases	 in	
which	I	knew	that	my	friend	won	an	award,	without	much	loss	for	my	theory.	
																																								 																				
10	If	 you	 reject	 the	 claim	 about	 knowledge	 that	 I	 go	 on	 to	 make	 you	 are,	 of	 course,	 under	 no	 such	
compulsion.	However,	if	you	reject	this	claim	then	you	will	perhaps	have	more	significant	objections	to	
my	theory	than	just	this.	
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(XIII)		Explaining	why	it	is	rational	to	act	
In	which	 I	 say	when	 something	 explains	why	 it’s	 rational	 to	 act,	 and	when	 it	
doesn’t.	 I	 suggest	 that	 normative	 reasons	 or	 appearances	 explain	 why	 it	 is	
rational	 to	 act	 only	 if	 they	 explain	 those	 beliefs	 that	 in	 turn	 explain	why	 it	 is	
rational	to	act.	I	note	that	it	is	tempting	to	infer	that	if	an	agent’s	belief	explains	
why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	some	action	then	whatever	explains	that	belief	
also	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 that	 action.	 I	 show	 how	 that	
inference	 leads	 to	an	apparent	dilemma	for	explanatory	 rationalism.	 I	 counsel	
against	 that	 inference,	 by	 noting	 that	 different	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relations	
may	not	be	transitive	with	each	other.	 I	 then	set	out	 the	task	ahead:	showing	
that	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 concerned	are	 transitive	when,	 and	only	when,	
explanatory	rationalism	needs	them	to	be.	
There	is	a	seemingly	clear	way	in	which	the	account	of	the	previous	chapter	could	also	be	used	
as	an	account	of	how	it	is	that	normative	reasons	(or	the	appearance	of	them)	explain	why	it	is	
rational	 for	an	agent	 to	act:	we	can	say	 that	a	normative	 reason	 (or	 the	appearance	of	one)	
explains	why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 an	 agent	 to	 act	 if	 it	 explains	 the	 belief	 that	 explains	why	 it	 is	
rational	for	the	agent	to	act.		
So,	for	instance,	when	I	look	out	of	the	window	and	see	rain,	we	can	say	that	the	fact	that	it	is	
raining	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	because	it	explains	why	I	believed	
that	 it	was	 raining.	This	proposal	vindicates	explanatory	 rationalism’s	claim	that	 things	other	
than	 features	 of	 an	 agent’s	 psychology	 could	 explain	 why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	
something.	
However,	as	I	will	argue,	we	should	not	assume	that	just	because	some	fact	explains	an	agent’s	
belief	and	their	belief	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	some	action,	that	that	fact	also	
explains	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	that	action.	That	is,	I	suggest,	there	are	occasions	on	
which	the	explanatory	relations	involved	aren’t	transitive.		
In	 the	 next	 chapter	 I	 will	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 what	 separates	 those	 cases	 in	 which	 the	
explanatory	relations	involved	are	transitive	from	those	in	which	they	aren’t.		
1 Another	indirect	theory	
Recall	that	I	need	to	demonstrate	the	following:	
(R3)	 It	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	 to	 congratulate	my	 friend	 because	 she	 had	
won	an	award.	
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(R4)	 It	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	my	friend	because	I	read	that	
she	had	won	an	award.	
The	 question	 of	 how	 these	 claims	 could	 be	 true	 is	 an	 instance	 of	 a	more	 general	 question,	
namely:	how	is	it	that	either	normative	reasons	(qua	facts	about	the	world)	or	the	appearance	
of	them	could	explain	why	it	is	(pro	tanto)	rational	for	an	agent	to	act?	My	answer	is	that	they	
explain	indirectly.	
	
Figure	XIII-1:	Explaining	why	it	is	rational	to	act	
The	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 explains	 why	 it	 appeared	 to	 me	 as	 though	 it	 was	 raining,	 which	
explains	why	I	believed	that	 it	was	raining,	which	explains	why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	take	
my	umbrella.	So,	because	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are	transitive,	the	fact	that	it	was	
raining	explains	why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella.	
Likewise,	 as	 we	 established	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 fact	 that	my	 friend	won	 an	 award	
explains	why	 I	 read	 that	 she	had	won	an	award,	which	explains	why	 I	believed	 that	 she	had	
won	an	award,	which	explains	why	 it	was	pro	tanto	rational	 for	me	to	congratulate	her.	And	
this	 is	 why	 (R3)	 and	 (R4)	 are	 true:	 we	 can	 say	 that	 it	 was	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 me	 to	
congratulate	my	friend	both	because	she	won	an	award	and	because	I	read	that	she	had	won	
an	award,	and	we	can	say	that	because	the	explanatory	relations	involved	are	transitive.	
2 Is	explanation	transitive?	An	apparent	dilemma	
I	have	said	that	normative	reasons	and	how	things	appear	to	be	can	explain	why	it	is	pro	tanto	
rational	 for	an	agent	to	do	some	action	only	 if,	and	because,	 they	explain	one	of	the	agent’s	
beliefs,	which,	in	turn,	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	do	that	action.		
As	I	have	noted,	this	indirect	manner	of	explanation	relies	on	the	transitivity	of	the	explanatory	
relations	 involved.	 With	 that	 in	 mind,	 we	 might	 then	 reason	 from	 this	 observation	 to	 the	
following	theory	about	what	explains	why	it	is	rational	to	act:		- The	Naïve	Theory:	if	the	fact	that	A	believes	that	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	
for	A	 to	φ	 then	whatever	explains	why	A	believes	that	p	also	explains	why	it	was	pro	
tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.		
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In	what	 follows	 I	will	argue	that	 the	naïve	theory	 is	 false.	Before	 I	do	so,	however,	 I	want	 to	
show	 how	 the	 naïve	 theory	 might	 seem	 to	 create	 a	 dilemma	 for	 explanatory	 rationalism,	
irrespective	of	whether	it	is	true	or	false.	
Recall	what	explanatory	rationalism	has	to	say	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act:	- Explanatory	rationalism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act:	For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	reason	
for	φing	if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	and	explains	(in	
the	right	way)	why	A	φ’d.		
This,	combined	with	the	naïve	theory,	means	that	if	A	φs	because	A	believed	that	p	and	it	was	
pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	because	A	believed	that	p,	then	whatever	explains	why	A	believed	
that	p	is	also	A’s	reason	for	φing.	
But	notice	that	sometimes	we	can	explain	why	someone	believed	something	by	citing	things	
that	are	plainly	not	the	reasons	for	which	they	act,	such	as	brain	aneurisms	or	psychosis.	Were	
the	naïve	theory	true,	then,	the	explanatory	rationalist	would	be	forced	to	conclude	that,	if	an	
aneurism	explains	why	an	agent	has	some	belief,	and	they	act	 rationally	on	 that	belief,	 then	
their	reason	for	acting	is	that	they	had	a	brain	aneurism.	This	is	an	undesirable	conclusion.1	
And	yet,	 if	 the	naïve	 theory	 isn’t	 true,	 then	explanation	 is	not	a	generally	 transitive	 relation.	
But	the	 indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	explanation,	and,	more	generally,	my	account	of	
why	(R1)	to	(R4)	are	true,	relies	on	the	transitivity	of	explanation.	
Here,	 then,	 is	 the	 apparent	 dilemma:	 either	 (i)	 we	 accept	 the	 naïve	 theory,	 which	 means	
rejecting	explanatory	 rationalism	about	 reasons	 for	which	we	act;2	or	 (ii)	we	reject	 the	naïve	
theory	by	rejecting	the	transitivity	of	explanation,	which	means	giving	up	on	the	truth	of	(R1)	
to	(R4).3	The	next	section	is	devoted	to	arguing	that	this	dilemma	is	only	apparent	and	that	the	
appearance	of	a	dilemma	is	 the	result	of	a	mistake	–	the	same	mistake	that	 led	to	the	naïve	
theory.	
																																								 																				
1	Of	course,	the	fact	that	one	has	a	brain	aneurism	or	psychosis	could	be	a	reason	for	which	one	does	
something	 (e.g.	 goes	 to	 the	 doctor).	 However,	 if	 that	 brain	 aneurism	 just	 causes	 one	 to	 have	 an	
irrelevant	belief	through	some	arational	process,	we	would	typically	not	want	to	conclude	that	when	an	
agent	acts	because	of	that	belief,	their	reason	for	acting	is	that	they	had	a	brain	aneurism.	
2	Or	saying	that	when	a	brain	aneurism	causes	me	to	believe	that	it	is	raining	that	my	reason	for	taking	
my	 umbrella	 was	 that	 I	 had	 a	 brain	 aneurism.	 I	 take	 this	 to	 be	 worse	 than	 rejecting	 explanatory	
rationalism.	
3 	Which	 means,	 in	 turn,	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 reduces	 to	 psychologism.	 It	 reduces	 to	
psychologism	because,	if	explanation	can’t	be	transitive,	then	only	features	of	an	agent’s	psychology	can	
explain	why	they	act	or	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	act.		
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3 The	apparent	dilemma	is	not	a	dilemma	
One	simple,	but	mistaken,	way	to	arrive	at	the	dilemma	is	to	think	that	there	is	only	one	kind	
of	explanatory	relation.	Were	that	true	then	any	instance	of	a	failure	of	transitivity	(i.e.	if	the	
naïve	theory	were	false)	would	mean	that	explanatory	relations	are	not	transitive.4	However,	
as	 the	 discussions	 of	 previous	 chapters	 have	 suggested,	 there	 is	 not	 just	 one	 kind	 of	
explanatory	relation.	We	can	at	least	distinguish	causal	from	non-causal	explanatory	relations,	
and	I	suggest	that	there	are	probably	still	more	fine-grained	distinctions	between	explanatory	
relations	that	that	distinction	ignores.		
A	more	nuanced	but,	as	 I	will	argue,	equally	mistaken	approach	 is	 to	maintain	 that	although	
there	 are	 different	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	 relation,	 if	 any	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 transitive	
then	they	are	all	transitive	with	each	other.	I	suggest	that	it	 is	this	fallacious	assumption	that	
led	to	the	naïve	theory.	
My	argument	 against	 this	 assumption	proceeds	 in	 two	 stages:	 firstly	 I	will	 demonstrate	 that	
some	explanatory	relations	are	transitive;	secondly	I	will	give	an	example	in	which	explanatory	
relations	are	not	 transitive.	Together	 these	amount	 to	a	counterexample	 to	 the	claim	 that	 if	
any	explanatory	relations	are	transitive	then	they	all	are.		3.1 Some	explanatory	relations	are	transitive	
Firstly,	as	§	(XI)	demonstrated,	we	have	good	reasons	to	think	that	some	explanatory	relations	
are	 transitive:	 if	 they	 weren’t	 then	 distal	 explanations	 of	 some	 explanandum	would	 never	
really	be	explanations	of	that	explanandum.5	Since,	in	both	ordinary	and	scientific	life,	we	are	
mostly	 interested	 in	 somewhat	 distal	 explanations,	 and	 since	 the	 explanations	 we	 normally	
give	are	somewhat	distal,	our	ordinary	and	scientific	explanatory	practice	assumes	that	at	least	
some	explanatory	 relations	 are	 transitive.	 So,	 I	will	 take	 it	 as	 a	 given	 that	 some	explanatory	
relations	are	transitive,	because	that	is	the	best	account	of	why	distal	explanations	that	involve	
such	relations	explain.	
																																								 																				
4	In	so	far	as	a	chain	of	explanatory	relations	does	not	guarantee	an	explanatory	relation	linking	the	two	
explanations	of	the	chain.	
5	Of	course	 it’s	possible	that	some	distal	explanations	explain	for	reasons	other	than	the	transitivity	of	
the	explanatory	relations	involved.	I’m	not	sure	what	those	reasons	could	be,	but	one	might	be	able	to	
construct	examples.	My	point	is	rather	that	the	transitivity	of	the	explanatory	relations	involved	is	really	
the	best	and	 simplest	account	of	how	distal	explanations	explain,	and	 it	 really	does	explain	how	 they	
explain	in	at	least	some	cases.	
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3.2 Not	all	explanatory	relations	are	transitive	with	each	other	
In	this	section	I	will	provide	an	example	in	which	the	transitivity	of	explanation	fails,	and	I	will	
suggest	 that	 it	 is	 because	 the	 explanatory	 chain	 involves	 different	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	
relations	that	aren’t	transitive	with	each	other.	3.2.1 When	explanation	isn’t	transitive	
Recall	that	Sally	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	because	she	heard	a	bear-like	noise.	Why	
did	she	hear	a	bear-like	noise?	Because	the	wind	rustled	the	trees	in	such	and	such	a	way.	That	
is,	the	noise	that	Sally	heard	had	nothing	to	do	with	any	bear,	but	it	nonetheless	sounded	very	
bear-like.	
We	have	already	noted	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	Sally	to	run	because	she	believed	that	
a	bear	was	chasing	her.	And	what	explains	her	belief	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her	was	that	she	
heard	 a	 bear-like	 noise	 (it	 appeared	 to	 her	 as	 though	 a	 bear	 was	 chasing	 her),	 and	 what	
explains	 that	was	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 trees	 rustled	 (in	 the	way	 that	 they	 did).	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	
chain	of	explanatory	relations	from	the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	Sally	to	run	to	the	
fact	 that	 the	 trees	 rustled.	 But	 should	we	 say	 that	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 Sally	 to	 run	
(even	partly)	because	the	trees	rustled?	
I	don’t	 think	we	should.	 It	seems	as	though	even	 if	one	were	to	give	this	sort	of	explanation	
one	 would	 then	 be	 forced	 to	 add	 that	 Sally	 believed	 that	 a	 bear	 was	 chasing	 her.	 And,	 I	
suggest,	that	is	because	it	is	only	really	the	belief	that	is	doing	the	explaining.6	
However,	 if	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 trees	 rustled	 does	 not	 (even	 partially)	 explain	 why	 it	 was	 pro	
tanto	rational	for	Sally	to	run,7	then	the	explanatory	relations	involved	in	this	case	must	not	be	
transitive.8	
Perhaps	you	object:	this	does	not	violate	transitivity	because	the	odd	rustling	of	the	trees	does	
not	 explain	why	 she	 heard	 a	 bear-like	 sound.	Of	 course,	 you	 say,	 it	 explains	why	 she	 heard	
something,	but	it	doesn’t	explain	why	that	sound	sounded	like	a	bear.	While	this	would	be	all	
the	better	for	me	if	I	agreed	with	it,	unfortunately	I	don’t:	of	course	other	factors	may	do	more	
to	explain	the	particular	character	of	the	noise	made,	but	the	fact	that	the	trees	rustled	in	that	
way	is,	I	suggest,	a	part	of	the	explanation	of	why	she	heard	a	bear-like	noise.	
																																								 																				
6	If	you	worry	that	this	is	too	close	to	the	elliptical	view	that	I	rejected,	note	how	we	aren’t	forced	to	add	
anything	about	the	belief	when	we	say	that	I	took	my	umbrella	because	it	is	raining.	
7	Of	course,	if	your	view	of	explanation	is	that	it	is	purely	a	relation	of	counterfactual	dependence,	then	
it	does	explain	it.	However,	I	think	that	is	a	wrong	account	of	explanation	(see	my	response	to	Objection	
2	in	the	Appendix	to	the	previous	chapter).	
8	This	follows	necessarily.	
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3.2.2 Why	explanation	wasn’t	transitive	
The	 rustling	 in	 the	 trees	explained	 the	noise	 that	Sally	heard,	 the	noise	explained	her	belief,	
and	 her	 belief	 explained	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 her	 to	 run.	 However,	 I’ve	 suggested,	 the	
explanatory	relations	here9	aren’t	all	transitive	with	each	other.	Why	not?	Because,	I	suggest,	
they	are	different	sorts	of	explanatory	relation.	
What	sort	of	explanation	 is	the	explanation	of	why	 it	was	pro	tanto	rational	 for	Sally	to	run?	
Well,	 it	 isn’t	causal.	Even	 if	we	allow	that	our	beliefs	cause	our	actions,	 it’s	 still	not	 the	case	
that	 they	 cause	 it	 to	 be	 rational	 for	 us	 to	 act	 –	 any	more	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 person	 is	 in	
trouble	causes	 it	 to	be	right	 to	save	them.	Causation	 just	seems	to	be	the	wrong	concept	 to	
invoke	 when	 describing	 this	 sort	 of	 explanatory	 relation.	 That	 is,	 the	 explanatory	 relation	
between	my	belief	and	the	rationality	of	my	action	is	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation.	
In	contrast,	the	only	sense	in	which	the	rustling	of	the	trees	explains	why	Sally	heard	a	bear-
like	sound	is	a	causal	one;	that	is	the	explanatory	relation	here	is	a	causal	explanatory	relation.	
So,	 the	explanatory	 relations	between	 (i)	 the	 rustling	 trees	and	 the	noise	Sally	heard	and	 (ii)	
her	belief	and	the	rationality	of	running	are	clearly	of	two	different	kinds.	And	I	suggest	that	
the	different	character	of	the	explanatory	relations	involved	is	why	they	aren’t	transitive	with	
each	other.	Note	that	I’m	not	saying	that	causal	explanatory	relations	are	never	transitive	with	
non-causal	explanatory	relations10	–	all	 I	am	saying	is	that	these	particular	sorts	of	causal	and	
non-causal	explanatory	relations	aren’t	transitive.	3.3 The	apparent	dilemma	isn’t	a	dilemma	
I	said	that	the	naïve	theory	and	the	apparent	dilemma	it	produces	were	(at	best)	the	result	of	
the	 assumption	 that	 if	 any	explanatory	 relations	 are	 transitive	 then	all	 explanatory	 relations	
are	 transitive	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 argument	 of	 the	 previous	 two	 sections	 disproves	 that	
assumption	–	while	some	kinds	of	explanatory	relations	are	transitive,	 it	does	not	follow	that	
different	kinds	of	explanatory	relations	are	transitive	with	each	other.	
Thus,	 there	 is	 no	 dilemma	 for	 explanatory	 rationalism	 because	 the	 naïve	 theory	 and	 the	
consequent	 apparent	 dilemma	were	based	on	 the	mistaken	 assumption	 that	 all	 explanatory	
relations	must	be	transitive	with	each	other.		
																																								 																				
9	That	 is:	between	 (i)	 the	 trees	and	 the	noise;	 (ii)	 the	noise	and	 the	belief;	 and	 (iii)	 the	belief	and	 the	
rationality	of	running.	
10	That	 is,	 there	may	be	other	 kinds	of	 causal	 and	non-causal	 explanatory	 relations	 that	 are	 transitive	
with	each	other.	
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However,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 not	 out	 of	 difficulty	 yet,	 in	 the	 next	 section	 I	 will	
discussion	 a	 new	 challenge	 posed	 by	 this	 response.	 Namely	 this:	 why	 should	 it	 be	 that	 the	
explanatory	relations	involved	are	transitive	whenever	explanatory	rationalism	needs	them	to	
be,	and	not	when	it	needs	them	not	to	be?	
4 The	challenge	
We	 are	 talking	 about	 three	 sets	 of	 explanatory	 relations:	 the	 relation	 from	 the	world	 to	 an	
appearance,	 from	 an	 appearance	 to	 a	 belief,	 and	 then	 the	 relation	 of	 that	 belief	 to	 the	
rationality	of	an	agent’s	action.	What	I	seem	to	be	saying	about	these	explanatory	relations	is	
this:	sometimes	they	are	transitive	with	each	other,	and	sometimes	they	aren’t.	In	particular,	I	
am	saying	 that	 the	explanatory	 relations	 in	Figure	XIII-2	are	 transitive,	while	 the	explanatory	
relations	in	Figure	XIII-3	aren’t.	
	
Figure	XIII-2:	A	chain	of	explanatory	relations	that	are	all	transitive	
	
Figure	XIII-3:	A	chain	of	explanatory	relations	that	are	not	all	transitive	
Isn’t	 this	 just	 ad-hoc?	 Why	 should	 we	 suppose	 that	 the	 relations	 are	 transitive	 when	
explanatory	rationalism	needs	them	to	be,	but	aren’t	when	 it	needs	them	not	to	be?	That	 is	
the	remaining	challenge	for	explanatory	rationalism.	
I	 want	 to	 consider	 one	 response	 to	 this	 challenge	 that	 is	 natural,	 but	 won’t	 work,	 before	
setting	the	stage	for	my	own	response.	
5 The	unsuccessful	natural	strategy	
A	 natural	 strategy	might	 be	 to	 reason	 as	 follows:	 perhaps	 in	 the	 second	 case	 the	 failure	 of	
transitivity	 is	 not	 in	 the	 explanatory	 relation	 per	 se,	 but	 in	 the	 putative	 explanans	 (i.e.	 the	
rustling	of	the	trees);	it’s	neither	the	content	of	Sally’s	belief	nor	is	it	something	that	her	belief	
was	 based	 on	 –	 it’s	 of	 no	 epistemic	 importance.	 And	 perhaps	 because	 it’s	 of	 no	 epistemic	
importance,	 it’s	 just	 the	wrong	 sort	 of	 thing	 to	 do	 the	 right	 sort	 of	 explaining.	 I	 could	 then	
refine	my	 theory	 in	 a	way	 that	 excluded	 these	 sorts	 of	 (epistemically	 unimportant)	 putative	
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explanans	 for	 some	 principled	 reason,	 and	 I	 could	 then	 insist	 that	 whatever	 met	 those	
conditions	and	explained	my	belief	thereby	also	explained	what	the	belief	explained.	
There	 are	 two	problems	with	 this	 strategy:	 firstly,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 to	me	 that	 one	 could	
make	 such	 a	 restriction	 without	 it	 still	 being,	 in	 some	 respect,	 ad-hoc.	 Secondly,	 and	more	
seriously,	explanatory	relations	may	fail	to	be	transitive	even	when	the	putative	explanans	is	a	
normative	reason	(i.e.	the	right	sort	of	thing),	as	the	next	example	demonstrates.	5.1.1 Another	example	of	failure	of	explanatory	transitivity	
Suppose	that	I	am	in	a	sealed	room	that,	unbeknownst	to	me,	is	slowly	being	filled	with	carbon	
monoxide.	 Suppose	 further	 that,	 after	 a	 short	 while,	 the	 carbon	 monoxide	 causes	 me	 to	
hallucinate,	and,	by	sheer	chance,	 I	have	a	hallucination	of	a	reliable	 friend	bursting	 into	the	
room	and	warning	me	that	it	is	filling	up	with	carbon	monoxide.	It	is	rational	for	me	to	leave,11	
and	I	duly	do	so.12	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 room	 was	 filled	 with	 carbon	 monoxide	 (partly)	 explains	 why	 I	 had	 the	
hallucination.	Of	course,	it	is	only	a	part	of	that	explanation	–	other	factors	of	my	psyche	and	
the	 like	will	do	more	 to	explain	 the	 content	 of	my	hallucination,	but	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	
carbon	monoxide	 in	 the	 room	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 a	 part	 of	 the	 full	 explanation	 of	why	 I	 had	 that	
hallucination.		
Moreover,	the	fact	that	I	had	that	hallucination	explains	why	I	believed	that	there	was	carbon	
monoxide	 in	 the	 room.	And	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 there	was	 carbon	monoxide	 in	 the	
room	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	leave.	
Again,	we	have	an	explanatory	chain	connecting	the	fact	 that	 there	was	carbon	monoxide	 in	
the	 room	with	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	me	to	 leave.	But	does	 the	 fact	 that	
there	was	carbon	monoxide	in	the	room	explain	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	leave?	
I	don’t	think	so.		
It’s	tempting	to	put	it	like	this:	I	wasn’t	really	aware	of	that	fact.	I	am	not	really	responding	to	
the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 carbon	monoxide	 in	 the	 room	because	my	belief	 is	 just	 true	by	happy	
accident.	That	 is,	that	fact	 just	seems	to	stand	 in	the	wrong	sort	of	relation	to	the	fact	that	 I	
believed	that	it	was	raining,	i.e.	it	stands	in	a	purely	causal	explanatory	relation	to	that	fact.	
																																								 																				
11	Assume,	if	you	like,	that	I	know	that	I	am	not	prone	to	hallucinations,	and	also	don’t	believe	that	there	
is	anything	that	might	make	be	hallucinate	now.	
12	Thanks	 for	 this	example	are	owed	to	 John	Roberts,	who	put	 it	 to	me	 in	a	seminar.	This	 is	what	one	
might	call	a	‘deviant’	Gettier	case,	involving	both	a	justified,	true	belief	that	falls	short	of	knowledge	and	
a	 deviant	 causal	 chain	 linking	 the	 fact	 itself	 with	 the	 belief.	 This	 sort	 of	 case	 is	 a	 well-established	
problem	 for	 Goldman’s	 (1967)	 causal	 theory	 of	 knowledge	 (see	 e.g.	 McDonnell	 2015).	 I	 will	 discuss	
deviant	causal	chains	in	greater	detail	in	the	next	chapter.	
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5.1.2 The	natural	strategy	is	unsuccessful	
Now	we	can	see	why	the	natural	strategy	is	unsuccessful:	in	the	example	just	considered,	the	
would-be	explanans	 is	 the	 right	 sort	of	 thing	–	 it	 is	a	normative	 reason,	 indeed,	 it	 is	actually	
what	I	believe	–	and	yet	the	explanatory	relations	involved	still	aren’t	transitive.	So,	as	a	way	of	
distinguishing	between	the	different	cases,	the	natural	strategy	fails.	That	 is,	 it’s	not	because	
of	the	nature	of	the	would-be	explanans	that	transitivity	of	explanation	fails.	
The	 next	 section	 sketches	 out	 my	 strategy,	 which	 will	 be	 developed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 next	
chapter.	
6 The	mysterious	strategy	
Here	 is	 the	challenge:	 I	need	a	principled	account	of	why	 it	 is	 that	 the	explanatory	 relations	
from	the	believed	fact	to	the	rationality	of	the	action	are	transitive	in	the	‘award’	case	but	not	
in	either	the	‘Sally’	case	or	the	‘carbon	monoxide’	case.	What	is	that	account?	
I’ve	hinted	at	my	answer	already,	and	McDowell	expresses	the	intuition	about	what	marks	out	
the	 ‘award’	 case	 from	 the	 others	 nicely	 thus:	 ‘we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 fact	 itself	 is	 exerting	 a	
rational	 influence	on	the	agent’s	will;	we	can	say	 that…	the	agent	 is	 responding	rationally	 to	
the	fact	itself.’	(2013,	17)	Now,	in	§	(X)4.2.1,	I	lamented	the	inscrutably	metaphorical	character	
of	these	sorts	of	remarks,	so,	whilst	they	will	do	as	an	expression	of	the	intuition,	I	would	be	
falling	well	short	of	my	own	standard	if	I	left	it	there.	
In	the	chapters	that	follow	I	want	to	give	a	non-metaphorical	characterisation	of	what	it	is	that	
distinguishes	the	‘award’	case	from	the	others.	In	particular,	I	will	argue,	there	is	a	mysterious,	
transitive,	non-causal	explanatory	relation	between	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	and	
the	fact	that	I	believed	that	she	did	which	is	lacking	in	the	other	cases.	
In	the	subsequent	chapter,	 I	will	argue,	this	mystery	relation	is	transitive	with	the	non-causal	
explanatory	relation	that	obtains	between	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	
award	and	the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	to	congratulate	her.	
This	 argument	 provides	 a	 principled	 reason	 for	 saying	 why	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 are	
transitive	 in	 the	 ‘award’	 case	but	not	 in	 the	others:	because,	 in	 the	 ‘award’	 case	 there	 is	 an	
explanatory	relation	between	the	world	and	my	belief	that	is	lacking	in	the	other	cases.	
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(XIV)		The	Mystery	Relation	
In	 which	 I	 introduce	 the	 mystery	 relation.	 I	 suggest	 that	 a	 mysterious,	 non-
causal	relation	obtains	between	a	belief	and	the	justification	that	it	is	based	on	
when	 that	 belief	 is	 justified.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 must	 be	 non-
causal,	because,	as	deviant	causal	chains	demonstrate,	a	merely	causal	relation	
between	a	belief	and	some	justification	for	 it	 is	not	sufficient	for	that	belief	to	
be	justified.	I	suggest	that	this	exact	same	mysterious	relation	relates:	the	belief	
that	p	to	the	fact	that	p	when	the	belief	that	p	is	knowledgeable;	a	justification	
for	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 when	 that	 justification	 affords	 the	
opportunity	for	knowledge;	and	an	action	to	some	belief	that	explains	why	it	is	
rational	when	 that	action	 is	done	 intentionally.	 I	argue,	 furthermore,	 that	 this	
mystery	relation	is	a	transitive,	explanatory	relation.	
Here	are	 some	questions:	what	distinguishes	a	 justified	belief	 from	a	merely	 justifiable	one?	
What	separates	a	knowledgeable	belief	from	a	belief	that	one	holds,	when	one	is	in	a	position	
to	know	it,	without	knowing	it?	What	is	the	difference	between	a	justification	that	affords	the	
opportunity	 for	 knowledge	 from	 one	 that	 doesn’t?	 And,	 lastly,	what	 distinguishes	 an	 action	
done	intentionally	from	a	mere	bodily	movement?	
I	do	not	claim	to	know	the	answer	to	these	questions.	However,	in	what	follows	I	want	to	see	
what	 can	 be	 said	 without	 offering	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 these	 cases.	 For	
instance,	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 justified	 belief	 and	 a	 merely	 justifiable	 one	 is	 already	
characterised	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 epistemic	 basing	 relation	 –	 the	 question	 is	 how	 that	 relation	
should	be	understood.	But	even	without	answering	that	question,	we	can	still	say	some	things	
about	the	basing	relation.	In	particular,	it	is	widely	agreed	that	the	problem	of	deviant	causal	
chains	frustrates	a	purely	causal	analysis	of	the	basing	relation,	so,	I	suggest,	we	can	suppose	
that	 the	 basing	 relation	 is	 not	 merely	 causal.	 Which	 is	 to	 say,	 I	 suggest,	 that	 there	 is	 a	
mysterious	non-causal	relation	between	a	belief	and	that	which	it	is	based	on,	when	that	belief	
is	justified.	
I	suggest	that	this	exact	same	mysterious	relation	relates:	 the	belief	that	p	 to	the	fact	that	p	
when	the	belief	that	p	 is	knowledgeable;	a	justification	for	the	belief	that	p	to	the	fact	that	p	
when	 that	 justification	 affords	 the	opportunity	 for	 knowledge;	 and	 an	action	 to	 some	belief	
when	 that	 action	 is	 done	 intentionally.	 I	 argue,	 furthermore,	 that	 this	mystery	 relation	 is	 a	
transitive,	explanatory	relation.	
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This	characterisation	of	the	mystery	relation	provides	the	basis	for	the	discussion	of	the	next	
chapter,	 in	which	I	say	that	the	mystery	relation	is	transitive	with	the	non-causal	explanatory	
relation	 that	obtains	between	the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	that	my	 friend	had	won	an	award	and	
the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	to	congratulate	her.		
I	offer	the	following	analysis	modestly.	There	is	no	sense	in	which	I	take	myself	to	have	solved	
the	problem	of	 deviant	 causal	 chains	 for	 the	 contexts	 considered.	 I	 also	do	not	 think	 I	 have	
offered	much	of	an	analysis	of	what	differentiates	deviant	cases	from	non-deviant	cases	other	
than	something	differentiates	them,	and	that	whatever	it	must	be	must	be	in	some	sense	non-
causal,	explanatory	and	transitive.	I	take	these	observations	to	be	relatively	anodyne,	although	
some	may	disagree	with	them.	My	hope	is	that	even	these	bland	observations	will	suffice	for	
the	purposes	of	the	next	chapter.	
1 The	mystery	relation	and	justified	belief	
There	is	a	commonly	recognised	distinction	between	a	justified	belief	and	a	merely	justifiable	
belief.	Here	is	a	typical	example:	
A	justifiable	belief	is	one	the	believer	could	become	justified	in	believing	if	he	just	put	together	
in	 the	 right	 way	 what	 he	 already	 believes.	 To	 illustrate,	 a	 woman	 might	 have	 adequate	
evidence	 for	 believing	 that	 her	 husband	 is	 unfaithful	 to	 her,	 but	 systematically	 ignore	 that	
evidence.	However,	when	her	father,	whom	she	knows	to	be	totally	unreliable	in	such	matters	
and	biased	against	her	husband,	tells	her	that	her	husband	is	unfaithful	to	her,	she	believes	it	
on	 that	 basis.	 Then	 her	 belief	 that	 her	 husband	 is	 unfaithful	 is	 unjustified	 but	 justifiable.		
(Pollock	and	Cruz	1999,	79)	
The	 woman	 in	 this	 example	 has	 some	 justification	 for	 believing	 that	 her	 spouse	 has	 been	
unfaithful	(we	don’t	know	what	it	 is),	which	she	ignores.	In	spite	of	ignoring	the	justifications	
she	 has	 for	 believing	 it,	 she	 still	 ends	 up	 forming	 the	 belief	 that	 her	 husband	 has	 been	
unfaithful,	but	bases	 it	on	 the	 fact	 that	her	 father	 told	her	 that	her	husband	was	unfaithful,	
which	 is	 not	 a	 justification	 for	 believing	 it	 (because	 her	 father	 is	 known	 to	 be	 biased	 and	
unreliable).	
Her	belief	is	merely	justifiable,	and	not	justified,	because	a	justifiable	belief	is	a	belief	for	which	
one	 has	 some	 justification	 (which	 she	 does),	 but	 a	 justified	 belief	 is	 one	 that	 is	based	 on	 a	
justification	one	has	for	it	(which	hers	is	not).	
As	an	aside:	I	am	straying	into	epistemology	here.	To	restrain	the	bounds	of	my	assertions,	let	
me	state	my	assumptions	plainly:	all	 that	 is	meant	by	a	 ‘justification’	here	 is	 something	 that	
could	explain	why	it	is	justifiable	for	one	to	believe	that	p	and	upon	which	one’s	belief	that	p	
could	be	based.	What	I	am	calling	‘justification’	is	more	typically	called	a	‘reason	for	belief’	in	
the	 literature,	but	 I	avoid	the	‘reasons’	terminology	to	avoid	conflating	that	with	the	present	
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discussion.1	Moreover,	 I	 will	 take	 it	 as	 a	 given	 that	 appearances	 could	 be	 justifications	 for	
belief.2	1.1 The	epistemic	basing	relation	
What	does	it	mean	for	a	belief	to	be	based	on	some	justification	for	it?	The	de	facto	analysis	of	
the	‘basing’	relation	is	a	causal	one.	However,	it	is	widely	acknowledged	(e.g.	Korcz	2015)	that	
the	possibility	of	deviant	causal	 chains	between	a	belief	and	a	 justification	 for	 it	 frustrates	a	
purely	causal	analysis	of	basing	by	demonstrating	that	the	fact	that	a	justification	for	a	belief	
stands	in	a	causal	relation	to	it	is	not	enough	to	ensure	that	the	belief	is	justified.	Typically	one	
has	to	qualify	a	causal	analysis	by	saying	that	the	justification	must	cause	the	belief	‘in	the	right	
way’	–	but	a	purely	causal	analysis	of	what	this	‘right	way’	is,	is	lacking.	
Re-purposing	the	example	above:	suppose	that	Eva	sees	her	husband	kissing	another	woman.	
Suppose	that	this	is	adequate	evidence	of	her	husband’s	infidelity	(supplant	more	compelling	
evidence	 if	you	aren’t	convinced).	She	 ignores	the	evidence	and	carries	on	believing	that	her	
husband	 is	 faithful.	Her	 father	 is	out	of	 the	picture	 this	 time,	but	 suppose,	 instead,	 that	 the	
stress	of	ignoring	what	she	has	seen	(it	is	a	difficult	thing	to	ignore)	causes	a	brain	aneurism	(in	
spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 does	 manage	 to	 ignore	 what	 she	 has	 seen)	 that,	 by	 incredible	
coincidence,	causes	her	to	believe	that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	to	her.3	Believing	that	
her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	to	her,	she	sues	for	divorce.4	
In	 this	 case	 her	 belief	 that	 her	 husband	 has	 been	 unfaithful	 is	 justifiable,	 and	 it	 is	 caused	
(albeit,	in	a	roundabout	way)	by	the	justification	she	has	for	believing	it.	But	it	seems	wrong	to	
say	either	 that	her	belief	was	based	on	 the	 justification	 that	she	had,	or,	 indeed,	 that	 it	was	
really	a	justified	belief.5		
So,	 even	 if,	 as	 is	 popularly	 thought,	 ‘the	 basing	 relation	 is	 at	 least	 partly	 a	 causal	 relation,’	
(Pollock	and	Cruz	1999,	79)	the	need	to	stipulate	non-deviancy	of	the	causal	chain	provides	at	
																																								 																				
1	Although	I	think	an	analogous	treatment	of	reasons	for	belief	is	possible,	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	
discussion	to	provide	one.	
2	This	 will	 mean	 excluding	 the	 more	 extreme	 forms	 of	 internalism	 about	 epistemic	 justification	 (e.g.	
Davidson	 2001d)	 but,	 adherents	 to	 that	 view	 are	 in	 the	 minority,	 as	 Littlejohn	 notes:	 ‘most	 statist	
internalists	defend	the	view	that	experiences	constitute	our	reasons	for	belief.’	(Forthcomming,	4)	
3	We	 could	 stress	 the	 independence	 of	 these	 events	 from	 Eva’s	 point	 of	 view:	 she	 has	 ignored	 the	
evidence,	so	when	asked	why	she	believes	that	her	husband	was	cheating	on	her	she	won’t	even	cite	
that	fact	that	she’s	seen	him	kissing	another	woman	–	perhaps	she	actually	managed	to	forget	it.	Who	
knows	what	she	would	say,	the	important	point	 is	that	she	wouldn’t	say	that	she	saw	him	kissing	that	
woman.	
4	Suppose	whatever	you	need	to	suppose	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	 it	was	 rational	 for	her	 to	do	so	 (the	
arationality	of	the	way	she	acquired	her	belief	notwithstanding).	
5	This	example	is	stronger	than,	for	 instance,	Plantinga’s	(1993,	69	fn.	8)	classic	example	because	what	
does	the	causing	is	also	a	justification	for	the	belief,	whereas	in	Plantinga’s	case	it	is	not.	
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least	prima	facie	evidence	that	that	the	relation	is	not	merely	casual.	Moreover,	in	the	absence	
of	a	compelling,	purely	causal,	solution	to	the	problem	of	deviant	causal	chains,6	I	will	assume	
that	there	is	no	such	solution,	and	that	the	basing	relation,	whatever	it	may	be,	is	not	merely	
causal.7		
Thus,	 if	a	belief	 is	based	on	some	 justification	 for	 it	 (i.e.	 if	 it	 is	 justified)	 then	there	 is	a	non-
causal	 relation	 (as	 well	 as,	 perhaps,	 a	 causal	 relation)	 between	 the	 belief	 and	 the	
justification(s)	it	is	based	on	–	let’s	call	it	the	mystery	relation.		
At	 this	point	we	should	do	some	ontological	housekeeping.	The	 relata	of	 the	basing	 relation	
are	probably	not	facts	–	they	are,	perhaps,	beliefs,	experiences	or	events	or	what	have	you.	In	
the	same	vein	I	think	that	the	relata	of	the	mystery	relation	proper	are	also	probably	not	facts.	
However,	it	will	greatly	simplify	my	formal	exposition,	at,	I	think,	no	cost	to	my	argument,	if	we	
treat	them	as	relations	between	facts.8	
(M1) For	 any	 proposition,	p,	 if	A	 has	 a	 justified	 belief	 that	p	 then	 the	 fact	 that	A	
believes	that	p	is	mysteriously	related	to	some	justification	for	it.	
2 The	mystery	relation	and	knowledge	
Now	I	want	to	convince	you	that	the	same	mysterious	relation	obtains	between	the	fact	that	
p9	and	 the	 fact	 that	A	believes	 that	p	when	an	agent	 knows	 that	p.	Why	 should	 you	believe	
this?	
First	consider	that,	as	in	the	case	of	the	basing	relation,	the	possibility	of	deviant	causal	chains	
frustrates	attempts	to	give	a	purely	causal	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	the	fact	that	p	
and	an	agent’s	belief	 that	p	when	 they	know	that	p.	 In	order	 to	maintain	a	 causal	 theory	of	
knowledge,	one	must	insist	that	the	fact	causes	the	belief	in	the	right	way.	
																																								 																				
6	McCain	 (2012)	 offers	 a	 purely	 causal	 solution	 by,	 as	 Korcz	 (2015)	 puts	 it,	 ‘removing	 the	 chain’	 and	
denying	that	the	basing	relation	is	transitive.	However,	 I	share	Korcz’s	concern	that	this	theory	fails	to	
capture	 pre-theoretical	 accounts	 of	what	 our	 beliefs	 are	 based	 on,	 so	 I	 don’t	 find	 it	 very	 compelling.	
More	generally,	to	the	extent	that	one	takes	causal	relations	to	be	transitive,	a	purely	causal	analysis	of	
deviant	causal	chains	will	be	impossible,	assuming	that	the	same	causal	relation	obtains	between	each	
link	in	the	chain.	
7	Recent	solutions	to	the	problem	of	deviant	causal	chains	by	Hyman	(2015)	and	Sosa	(2015)	support	my	
contention	that	relations	affected	by	them	are	not	merely	causal.	They	argue	that	causal	relations	are	
still	 necessary	 for	 such	 relations,	 but	 that	 non-deviancy	 is	 only	 guaranteed	 by	 a	 further	 non-causal	
relation:	‘the	manifestation	of	a	competence’.	
8	There	need	be	nothing	significant	about	this	move:	if	the	relata	of	genuine	basing	relations	or	mystery	
relations	 are	 the	 truth-makers	 of	 propositions	 (e.g.	 Sally’s	 believing	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	 to	 the	
proposition	that	she	believes	 it),	 then	the	basing	relations	and	mystery	relations	 I	mention	are	merely	
the	counterparts	of	the	genuine	relations	in	an	ontology	of	facts.	
9	Again,	some	ontological	housekeeping:	properly	speaking	it	is	probably	the	truth-maker	of	the	fact	that	
p,	that	is	related	to	the	belief,	but	I	am	again	transposing	this	talk	to	an	ontology	of	facts	for	the	sake	of	
simplicity.	
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Let’s	 revisit	 Eva’s	 case:	 Eva	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 know	 that	 her	 husband	 has	 been	 unfaithful10	
because	she	is	watching	him	kiss	another	woman.	And	his	doing	that	is	what	causes	her	to	see	
him	doing	it	which	is	what	causes	her	to	put	the	effort	into	ignoring	it	which	is	what	causes	her	
to	have	a	brain	aneurism	which	is	what	causes	her	to	believe	that	he’s	been	unfaithful	to	her.	
In	 this	 convoluted	way,	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 husband	has	been	unfaithful	 causes	her	 to	believe	
that	 he	 has	 been	 unfaithful	 at	 a	 time	 when	 she	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 know	 that	 he	 has:	 she	
believes	it	without	knowing	it,	even	though	she	is	in	a	position	to	know	it	and	even	though	the	
fact	that	he	had	been	unfaithful	is	what	caused	her	to	believe	that	he	had.	
Thus,	given	that	a	causal	relation	between	the	belief	that	p	and	the	fact	that	p	is	not	sufficient	
for	that	belief	to	be	knowledge	(indeed,	even	if	the	agent	is	in	a	position	to	know	that	p)	and	
given	that	the	‘the	right	way’	of	some	fact’s	causing	a	belief	in	it	cannot	be	analysed	in	purely	
causal	 terms11	we	 can	 say	 that	 if	 an	 agent	 knows	 that	p	 then	 there	 is	 a	 non-causal	 relation	
between	their	belief	that	p	and	the	fact	that	p.		
So,	even	 if	 a	 causal	 relation	between	 the	 fact	 that	p	 and	 the	belief	 that	p	 is	 required	 for	an	
agent	to	know	that	p	(a	not	inconsiderable	‘if’),	a	non-causal	relation	between	the	fact	and	the	
belief	is	still	also	required	for	the	agent	to	know	that	p.		
But	why	suppose	that	this	non-causal	relation	between	the	fact	and	the	belief	is	the	same	as	
the	 mystery	 relation	 that	 basing	 relations	 entail?	 Because,	 I	 suggest,	 the	 cases	 are	 directly	
analogous:	the	distinction	between	a	justified	belief	and	a	merely	 justifiable	one	is	analogous	
to	 the	 distinction	 between	 knowing	 that	 p	 and	merely	 believing	 that	 p12	when	 one	 is	 in	 a	
position	to	know	that	p.		
Indeed,	 the	analogousness	between	 the	 cases	 is	 already	 recognised	 in	 the	diagnosis	of	both	
these	cases	as	cases	of	deviant	causal	chains.	The	simplest	explanation	of	this	analogy	is	that	
the	non-causal	relation	that	is	lacking	in	the	merely	causal	cases	in	each	is	of	a	common	kind,	
which	I	have	called	the	‘mystery	relation’.	Thus:	
(M2) For	any	proposition,	p,	if	A	knows	that	p	then	the	fact	that	A	believes	that	p	is	
mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	
3 The	mystery	relation	and	opportunities	to	know	
Now	I	want	to	convince	you	that	 the	same	mystery	relation	distinguishes	those	 justifications	
that	afford	the	opportunity	for	knowledge	from	those	that	do	not.	
																																								 																				
10	Surely!	
11	Which	we	assume	given	that	such	an	analysis	seems	is	both	unavailable	and	anyway	implausible.	
12	I.e.	Believing	without	knowing	that	p	
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We	 said	 that	 Eva	was	 in	 a	position	 to	 know	 that	her	husband	was	 cheating	on	her.	 Sally,	 in	
contrast,	 is	not	 in	a	position	to	know	that	a	bear	 is	chasing	her	(not	 least	because	one	 isn’t).	
Likewise	(recalling	the	example	from	the	previous	chapter),	when	I	am	in	a	room	that	is	slowly	
filling	with	 carbon	monoxide,	 I	 am	not	 in	 a	position	 to	 know	 that	 the	 room	 is	 full	 of	 carbon	
monoxide	 (there	are	no	alarms,	no	visible	warnings	etc.).	What	differentiates	Eva	 from	Sally	
and	I	with	respect	to	our	epistemic	positions?		
Here	is	a	way	to	characterise	the	difference:	while	we	all	have	a	justification	for	believing	that	
p,	only	Eva	has	a	 justification	 that	affords	 the	opportunity	 for	knowledge.	Characterising	our	
question	 in	 these	 terms,	 and	 generalising	 it	 beyond	 these	 cases,	 we	 can	 ask:	 what	
differentiates	 a	 justification	 for	 believing	 that	p	 that	 affords	 the	 opportunity	 for	 knowledge	
from	 one	 that	 doesn’t?	 I	 think	 it	 is	 the	 mysterious	 relation	 that	 a	 knowledge-affording	
justification	 stands	 in	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 p	 that	 separates	 it	 from	 a	 justification	 that	 does	 not	
afford	the	opportunity	for	knowledge.	
To	start,	consider	these	remarks	by	McDowell,	in	his	discussion	of	how	perceptual	knowledge	
is	possible	(given	the	possibility	of	illusion):	
Suppose	someone	 is	presented	with	an	appearance	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 It	 seems	unproblematic	
that	if	his	experience	is	in	a	suitable	way	the	upshot	of	the	fact	that	it	is	raining,	then	the	fact	
itself	 can	 make	 it	 the	 case	 that	 he	 knows	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 (McDowell	 1982,	 474	 emphasis	
added)	
What	 is	 this	 suitable	 way?	 What	 is	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 ‘fact	 itself’	 and	 the	 man’s	
experience	that	makes	it	possible	for	the	fact	to	‘make	it	the	case	that	the	he	knows	that	it	is	
raining’?	Well,	it	isn’t	merely	causal.		
Suppose	 that	 another	 version	 of	me,	 call	 him	 ‘Twinny’,	 on	 some	 other	 very	 similar	world	 is	
likewise	 in	 a	 room	 that	 is	 slowly	 filling	 with	 carbon	 monoxide.	 Twinny	 doesn’t	 have	 the	
hallucination.	However,	his	friend	sees	the	carbon	monoxide	levels	of	the	room	on	a	monitor	
(which	Twinny	had	no	access	to),	and,	accordingly,	bursts	into	the	room	to	warn	him.	Twinny	
leaves	the	room,	just	as	I	did.		
Now,	what	 Twinny	 and	 I	 experience	 is	 subjectively	 indistinguishable	 (ex	 hypothesi),	 and	 our	
perceptual	 experiences	 justify	 each	 of	 our	 beliefs	 (we	 both	 know	 that	 we	 aren’t	 prone	 to	
hallucinations	etc.).	However,	only	Twinny	had	an	experience	that	can	afford	the	opportunity	
for	knowledge.13	And	that	is	the	upshot	of	the	fact	that	the	justification	that	I	had	for	believing	
that	the	room	was	full	of	carbon	monoxide	was	caused	by	the	fact	that	the	room	was	full	of	
																																								 																				
13	Of	course	I	could	do	the	tests,	gather	the	evidence	and	so	forth	(assuming	I	lived	that	long)	and	then	I	
would	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 know	 that	 the	 room	was	 full	 of	 carbon	monoxide	 –	 but	 there	 and	 then,	 in	
circumstances	as	they	were	originally	described,	I	would	not	be	in	a	position	to	know.	
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carbon	monoxide	by	a	 ‘deviant’	causal	chain	–	whereas	the	chain	 in	Twinny’s	case	was	 ‘non-
deviant’;	that	is,	it	is	only	in	Twinny’s	case	that	his	experience	is	in	a	suitable	way	the	upshot	of	
the	fact.	
Generalising:	we	can	say	that	the	fact	that	p’s	having	caused	a	justification	for	the	belief	that	p	
does	not	ensure	that	that	justification	is	one	that	affords	an	opportunity	for	knowledge.	So,	I	
suggest,	 there	must	be	a	non-causal	relation	(as	well	as,	perhaps,	a	causal	relation)	between	
the	 fact	 that	 p	 and	 a	 justification	 for	 believing	 that	 p	 if	 that	 justification	 is	 to	 afford	 an	
opportunity	for	knowing	that	p.	
What	 is	 that	 non-causal	 relation?	 My	 answer	 is	 presumably	 clear:	 it	 is	 the	 same	mystery	
relation	as	relates	justified	beliefs	to	the	facts	they	are	based	on,	and	knowledge	to	that	which	
is	known.	In	other	words:	
(M3) For	any	propositions,	j	and	p,	if	j	affords	the	opportunity	for	knowledge	that	p	
then	j	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	
4 The	mystery	relation	and	acting	for	a	reason	
Finally,	I	want	to	convince	you	that	the	same	mystery	relation	distinguishes	actions	done	for	a	
reason	from	mere	bodily	movements.	
Consider	the	following	example:	
A	 climber	might	want	 to	 rid	 himself	 of	 the	weight	 and	 danger	 of	 holding	 another	man	 on	 a	
rope,	 and	he	might	 know	 that	 by	 loosening	his	 hold	on	 the	 rope	he	 could	 rid	 himself	 of	 the	
weight	and	danger.	This	belief	and	want	might	so	unnerve	him	as	 to	cause	him	to	 loosen	his	
hold,	 and	 yet	 it	might	 be	 the	 case	 that	 he	 never	 chose	 to	 loosen	 his	 hold,	 nor	 did	 he	 do	 it	
intentionally.		(Davidson	2001b,	79)	
In	this	example	the	fact	that	the	climber	believes	that	 loosening	his	grip	would	rid	himself	of	
danger	 (partially)	explains	why	 it	 is	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 the	climber	 to	 loosen	his	grip,	and	
that	 belief	 also	 causes	 him	 to	 loosen	 his	 grip.	 However,	 he	 does	 not	 loosen	 his	 grip	
intentionally.	 This	 example	 thus	 (famously)	 creates	a	problem	 for	 a	purely	 causal	 analysis	of	
what	 it	 is	 to	 act	 intentionally:	 although	 there	 is	 a	 causal	 chain	 between	 the	 belief	 and	 the	
action,	the	agent	does	not	act	intentionally	because	the	causal	chain	is	‘deviant’.	
Suppose	 that,	 had	 the	 climber	 acted	 on	 his	 beliefs	 and	 desires	 in	 the	 ‘non-deviant’	way,	 he	
would	have	acted	intentionally.	We	can	then	say	that	Davidson’s	climber	was	 in	a	position	to	
do	what	he	did	intentionally,	even	though	he	didn’t.14	So	what	differentiates	someone	who	φs	
																																								 																				
14	Perhaps	being	in	a	position	to	do	something	intentionally	is	just	having	an	intention	to	do	it.	I	leave	it	
for	the	reader	to	decide.	
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intentionally	 from	 someone	 (like	 the	 climber)	 who	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	φ	 intentionally,	 and,	
indeed,	φs	but	does	not	do	so	intentionally?	
The	traditional	‘answer’	to	this	question	is	to	say	that	if	an	agent	acts	intentionally	then,	inter	
alia,	 a	 belief	 that	 explains	why	 their	 action	 is	 rational	must	 cause	 them	 to	do	 it	 in	 the	 right	
way.15	So,	 again,	 assuming	 that	 this	 elusive	 ‘right	 way’	 cannot	 be	 analysed	 in	 purely	 causal	
terms,	we	can	say	that	if	an	agent	acts	intentionally	then	there	is	a	non-causal	relation	(as	well	
as,	 perhaps,	 a	 causal	 relation)	 between	 features	 of	 their	 psychology	 that	 explain	 why	 their	
action	is	rational	and	their	action.16	
And	again,	owing	to	the	analogousness	of	this	case	to	the	others	already	considered,	I	suggest	
that	 this	non-causal	 relation	 is	 the	 very	 same	mystery	 relation	 that	was	 required	of	 justified	
belief,	of	knowledge	and	of	opportunity	for	knowledge-affording	justifications.	Thus:	
(M4) If	A	φs	intentionally	then,	for	some	proposition,	p,	the	fact	that	A	believed	that	
p	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	and	is	mysteriously	related	
to	the	fact	that	A	φ’d.17	
5 A	summary	of	the	examples	
I	have	suggested	 that	what	distinguishes	deviant	causal	 chains	 from	non-deviant	ones	 in	 the	
contexts	 considered	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 non-deviant	 cases,	 the	 relata	 are	 not	 merely	 causally	
related.	In	particular,	I	have	argued,	the	same	non-causal	‘mystery’	relation	is	present	in	each	
case,	so	that:	
(M1)	 For	 any	 proposition,	p,	 if	A	 has	 a	 justified	 belief	 that	p	 then	 the	 fact	 that	A	
believes	that	p	is	mysteriously	related	to	some	justification	for	it.	
(M2)		 For	any	proposition,	p,	if	A	knows	that	p	then	the	fact	that	A	believes	that	p	is	
mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	
(M3)		 For	any	propositions,	j	and	p,	if	j	affords	the	opportunity	for	knowledge	that	p	
then	j	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	
(M4)		 If	A	φs	intentionally	then,	for	some	proposition,	p,	the	fact	that	A	believed	that	
p	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	and	is	mysteriously	related	
to	the	fact	that	A	φ’d.	
As	an	aside:	we	should	note	that	while	mystery	relations	are	non-causal	relations,	they	do	not	
necessarily	 exclude	 causal	 relations.	 That	 is,	 for	 instance,	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	 a	 justified	
																																								 																				
15	Cf.	 ‘An	action	 is	performed	with	a	 certain	 intention	 if	 it	 is	 caused	 in	 the	 right	way	by	attitudes	and	
beliefs	that	rationalize	it.’		(Davidson	2001c,	87)	
16	Note	that	this	is	a	necessary	but	not	sufficient	condition.	
17	This	formulation	excludes,	for	convenience,	instances	where	an	agent	does	something	for	its	own	sake	
(e.g.	I	sang	because	I	felt	like	singing).	In	adopting	this	formulation	I	am	not	claiming	that	such	acts	are	
not	done	intentionally,	it	is	just	more	convenient	to	use	this	formulation.		
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belief	may	be	both	causally	and	mysteriously	related	to	the	justification	it	is	based	on.	Indeed,	
depending	on	your	views	 in	these	areas	 it	might	be	that	a	causal	relation	 is	a	necessary	 (but	
not	sufficient)	condition	for	the	presence	of	a	mystery	relation.		
In	 the	 following	 sections	 I	 will	 argue	 further	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 is	 a	 transitive,	
explanatory	relation.	
6 Mystery	relations	are	explanatory	relations	
Now	 I	 want	 to	 convince	 you	 that	mystery	 relations	 are	 explanatory	 relations.	 They	may	 be	
other	 things	also,	but	 I	aim	to	convince	you	 that	 they	are	definitely	explanatory.	 I	will	 argue	
that	in	each	of	the	cases	of	the	mystery	relation	above	there	is	a	non-causal	explanation	of	the	
explanandum	that	is	lacking	when	the	mystery	relation	is	absent.	6.1 Explaining	justified	beliefs	
It	is	generally	acknowledged	that	the	justification	on	which	an	agent’s	belief	is	based	explains	
why	they	believed	it	(e.g.	Harman	1970).	What	sort	of	explanation	does	it	provide	us	with?	
If	 we	 accept	 that	 the	 basing	 relation	 is	 partly	 a	 causal	 relation	 then,	 even	 though	 a	 causal	
analysis	 is	 insufficient	 for	establishing	 it,	 it’s	 still	 possible	 that	 the	explanatory	 import	of	 the	
basing	 relation	 is	 merely	 causal.	 So,	 is	 the	 way	 that	 a	 justified	 belief	 is	 explained	 by	 the	
justification	on	which	it	is	based	merely	causal?	
The	 fact	 that	 Sally	 heard	 a	 bear-like	 sound	 headed	 her	 way	 (in	 a	 forest	 that	 she	 knew	 to	
contain	 bears)	 is	 a	 justification	 for	 her	 to	 believe	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her.	Moreover,	 her	
belief	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	is	based	on	that	justification	for	it.	So	we	can	say,	as	we	have	
noted,	that	Sally	believes	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	partly	because	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound.	
That	is:	a	justification	for	Sally	to	believe	something	partially18	explains	why	she	believed	it.	
Now	 notice	 that	 for	 Eva	 a	 justification	 for	 her	 to	 believe	 something	 also	 explains	 why	 she	
believed	 it:	 she	believes	 that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	because	 it	appeared	to	her	as	
though	he	was	kissing	another	woman	(which,	indeed,	he	was).	That	is,	for	both	Eva	and	Sally	a	
justification	 for	 their	 belief	 explains	 their	 belief.	 However,	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 explanation	
provided	by	 the	 justification	 in	Sally’s	 case	 seems	 to	be	 importantly	different	 to	 the	 sense	 it	
provides	in	Eva’s	case	–	and	that	difference	cannot	be	characterised	in	causal	terms	(because	a	
causal	relation	obtains	in	both	cases).		
																																								 																				
18	Other	parts	of	the	full	explanation	of	her	belief	include,	for	instance,	the	fact	that	she	knew	the	wood	
to	contain	bears.	
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So,	 there	 is	 a	 seemingly	 non-causal	 explanation	of	 Sally’s	 belief	 that	 is	 lacking	 in	 Eva’s	 case,	
which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	explanatory	 import	of	 the	basing	 relation	 is	not	merely	causal	 (note	
that	Eva’s	belief	is	not	based	on	anything,	so	there	is	no	similar	non-causal	explanation	of	it).	6.2 Explaining	knowledgeable	beliefs	
Another	example:	suppose	that	Eva’s	husband	is	kissing	Sean’s	wife.	Sean	also	sees	it	happen,	
but	straightforwardly	concludes	that	his	wife	has	been	unfaithful	to	him.	Sean	knows	that	his	
wife	has	been	unfaithful	and	he	believes	that	his	wife	has	been	unfaithful	partly	because	she	
has	been	unfaithful.	
Now,	it	 is	also	true	of	Eva	that	she	believes	that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	because	he	
has	been	unfaithful,	even	though	she	doesn’t	know	that	he	has	–	but,	again	 like	the	 justified	
belief	 case,	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 ‘because’	 seems	 different.	 Even	 given	 that	 there	 is	 a	 causal	
explanation	in	Sean’s	case,	the	fact	that	his	wife	is	cheating	on	him	partially	explains	the	fact	
that	he	believes	she	is	in	a	way	that	is	not	merely	causal,	because	it	explains	it	in	a	way	that	is	
qualitatively	different	to	the	merely	causal	explanation	(i.e.	the	Eva	case).	6.3 Mysterious	relations	are	partial	explanatory	relations	
I	will	spare	the	reader	a	rehearsal	of	this	reasoning	for	the	other	cases	considered	and	cut	to	
the	 chase:	 wherever	 we	 compare	 a	 deviant	 causal	 case	 with	 a	 non-deviant	 case	 (in	 the	
contexts	considered),	it	seems	as	though	there	is	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation	in	the	non-
deviant	case	that	 is	 lacking	 in	the	deviant	one.	 Indeed,	 it	seems	to	me	that	 it	 is	precisely	the	
different	character	of	the	explanatory	relations	involved	in	the	non-deviant	case	that	allows	us,	
in	these	contexts,	to	distinguish	the	non-deviant	examples	from	the	deviant	ones.	
So,	since	there	appears	to	be	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation	wherever	we	have	a	mystery	
relation,	 and	 since	mystery	 relations,	 as	we	 have	 established,	 are	 non-causal,	 I	 suggest	 that	
mystery	relations	are	non-causal	(partial)	explanatory	relations.	
Thus,	what	separates	Eva	from	Sean	is	the	fact	that	the	justification	Sean	has	for	his	belief	non-
causally	 (as	well	as,	perhaps,	causally)	explains	his	belief,	whereas,	 for	Eva	 it	merely	causally	
explains	it.		
Likewise,	what	separates	me	in	my	carbon	monoxide	filled	room	from	Twinny	is	that	the	fact	
that	 the	 room	was	 filled	 with	 carbon	monoxide	 non-causally	 (as	 well	 as,	 perhaps,	 causally)	
explains	why	 it	 appeared	 to	Twinny	as	 though	his	 friend	was	warning	him	about	 the	 carbon	
monoxide,	whereas	it	only	causally	explains	why	it	appeared	to	me	that	way.	And	so	on.	
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7 Mystery	relations	are	transitive	
Finally,	 I	 want	 to	 convince	 you	 that	 mystery	 relations	 are	 transitive.	 I	 will	 show	 that	 the	
conditions	for	transitivity	are	satisfied	in	all	of	the	above	examples,	and	I	will	argue	further	that	
the	 transitivity	 of	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 involved	 is	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 why	
knowledgeable	beliefs	are	mysteriously	related	to	the	believed	facts.	7.1 It	is	transitive	in	the	examples	
When	I	congratulated	my	friend	I	knew	that	she	had	won	an	award,	so	the	fact	that	I	believed	
that	she	had	won	an	award	was	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	she	had	won	an	award.	
Moreover,	I	suggest,	since	I	congratulated	her	for	a	reason,	the	fact	that	I	congratulated	her	is	
mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award.	Can	we	conclude	
that	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 congratulated	 her	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 won	 an	
award?	I	think	we	can.		
Consider:	when	I	say	that	I	congratulated	my	friend	because	she	won	an	award	it	has	the	right	
sort	of	explanatory	character,	the	fact	explains	my	action	in	the	right	way.	Likewise,	when	I	say	
that	Twinny	left	the	room	because	it	was	full	of	carbon	monoxide	that	too	has	the	right	sort	of	
explanatory	character.	And	that	 is,	 I	 suggest	because	the	 fact	 that	 the	room	 is	 full	of	carbon	
monoxide	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	 his	 belief,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	 his	
action.	That	is,	I	suggest	that	we	can	conclude	that	our	respective	normative	reasons	to	act	are	
mysteriously	 related	 to	 our	 respective	 actions	 because	 there	 is	 a	 chain	 of	mystery	 relations	
connecting	the	normative	reason	to	the	action	and	the	mystery	relation	is	transitive.		
We	can	see	that	these	cases	have	the	right	sort	of	explanatory	character	by	comparing	them	
with	a	case	in	which	the	normative	reason	fails	to	be	mysteriously	related	to	my	action:	me	in	
my	room	full	of	carbon	monoxide.	In	this	case	when	we	say	that	I	left	the	room	because	it	was	
full	of	carbon	monoxide	that	does	not	have	the	right	sort	of	explanatory	character.	Of	course	
there	is	perhaps	a	sense	in	which	it	is	true	(seemingly	a	strictly	causal	sense),	but	that	is	not	the	
sense	in	which	the	expression	would	be	conventionally	understood.	What	marks	out	the	sense	
in	 which	 the	 expression	 would	 be	 conventionally	 understood	 from	 this	 one	 is,	 as	 I	 have	
suggested,	the	presence	of	this	non-causal	explanatory	relation;	the	mystery	relation.	
Why	is	the	normative	reason	not	related	to	my	action	in	the	carbon	monoxide	case	but	it	is	to	
Twinny’s	action?	Because,	 I	 suggest,	 there	 is	not	a	 chain	of	mystery	 relations	connecting	my	
action	to	the	fact	that	the	room	is	full	of	carbon	monoxide,	while	there	is	a	chain	of	mystery	
relations	connecting	Twinny’s	action	to	that	fact.	
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Moreover,	while	I	will	spare	the	reader	a	demonstration,	I	suggest	that	the	same	reasoning	can	
be	applied	equally	to	all	the	other	cases.		
For	clarity	we	can	summarise	this	as	follows.	Firstly,	some	notation:	for	each	case,	let	‘f’	stand	
for	the	believed	proposition;	‘j’	stand	for	the	justification	that	the	agent	has	for	believing	it;	‘b’	
stand	for	the	fact	that	they	believed	it;	and	‘a’	stand	for	what	the	agent	did.	Table	XIV-1	sets	
out	the	referents	of	these	symbols	for	each	case.	
Example	 f	 j	 b	 a	
Award	case	 My	friend	won	an	
award	
I	read	that	she	had	
won	an	award	
I	believed	that	she	
had	won	an	award	
I	congratulated	
her	
CO19	case	 The	room	was	full	
of	carbon	
monoxide	
It	appeared	to	me	as	
though	my	friend	
was	warning	me		
I	believed	that	the	
room	was	full	of	
carbon	monoxide	
I	left	the	room	
Eva	case	 Her	husband	was	
unfaithful	to	her	
It	appeared	to	her	as	
though	her	husband	
was	kissing	another	
woman	
She	believed	that	her	
husband	was	
unfaithful	
She	sued	for	
divorce	
Climber	case	 Loosening	his	grip	
would	rid	him	of	
danger	
It	appeared	to	him	
as	though	if	he	let	go	
he	would	be	freed	
from	danger20	
He	believed	that	
loosening	his	grip	
would	rid	him	of	
danger	
He	loosened	his	
grip	
Table	XIV-1:	The	component	facts	in	each	example	
My	 suggestion	 is	 this:	 in	 any	 circumstance	 in	 which	 a	 chain	 of	 transitive	 mystery	 relations	
would	 imply	 that	 the	 ends	 of	 the	 chain	 are	 mysteriously	 related,	 running	 through	 the	
reasoning	just	set	out	for	each	of	the	examples	finds	that	the	ends	of	the	chain	are,	indeed	so	
related.	Letting	‘⇝’	stand	for	the	mystery	relation,	Table	XIV-2	sets	this	out.	
Examples	
Observed	relations	 Should	these	obtain:	 Do	they	obtain	
when	they	
should?	f⇝j j⇝b b⇝a f⇝b? j⇝a? f⇝a? 
Award	case	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü 
CO	case	 û	 ü	 ü	 û	 ü	 û	 ü 
Eva	case	 ü	 û	 ü	 û	 û	 û	 ü 
Climber	case	 ü	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	 û	 ü 
Table	XIV-2:	The	transitivity	of	the	mystery	relation	
																																								 																				
19	CO	=	carbon	monoxide.	
20	You	could	supplant	something	more	interesting	here	if	you	liked	–	this	is	just	meant	to	be	indicative.	
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Of	course,	the	fact	that	the	mystery	relation	happens	to	be	transitive	in	these	examples	does	
not	amount	to	proof	that	 it	 is	always	transitive,	but	 is	at	 least	evidence	for	that	claim.	 In	the	
next	section	I	provide	a	different	defence	of	the	claim	that	mystery	relations	are	transitive.			7.2 Knowledge	and	knowledge	affording	justification	
My	 second	 argument	 for	 the	 transitivity	 of	 mystery	 relations	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 the	 best	
account	of	why	it	is	that	knowledgeable	beliefs	are	mysteriously	related	to	the	believed	facts.	
To	 start	 with,	 consider	 that,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 knowledge	 entails	 justified	 belief, 21 	a	
knowledgeable	belief	must	be	based	on	a	justification	for	it.	That	being	so,	it	strikes	me	that	if	
a	 belief	 is	 knowledgeable	 it	 must	 be	 based	 on	 (and	 therefore	 mysteriously	 related	 to)	 a	
justification	that	actually	affords	the	opportunity	for	knowledge.22	If	these	two	claims	are	true,	
then,	for	any	p,	if	A	knows	that	p,	the	fact	that	A	believes	that	p	is	based	on	some	justification	
that	affords	the	opportunity	for	A	to	know	that	p.	
Summarising:	 for	 any	 p,	 a	 knowledgeable	 belief	 that	 p,	 being	 based	 on	 a	 justification	 that	
affords	 the	 opportunity	 for	 knowledge	 that	 p,	 must	 therefore	 be	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 a	
justification	for	the	belief	that	p	that	is,	in	turn,	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	That	is,	
to	use	 the	notation	of	 the	previous	 section,	 if	 the	agent	knows	 that	 f	 then:	 f	 is	mysteriously	
related	to	j,	j	is	mysteriously	related	to	b,	and	f	is	mysteriously	related	to	b.	
So,	if	an	agent	knows	that	p	then	transitivity	is	true	of	the	mystery	relations	between	the	belief	
that	p,	a	justification	on	which	it	is	based	and	the	fact	that	p.	
																																								 																				
21	Which,	picking	my	battles,	I	will	take	as	a	given.	
22	Lehrer’s	gypsy	lawyer	case	is	a	counterexample	to	this	claim	(or	it	would	be	if	it	were	true):		
A	lawyer	is	defending	a	man	accused	of	committing	eight	hideous	murders…	There	is	conclusive	
evidence	 that	 the	 lawyer's	 client	 is	 guilty	 of	 the	 first	 seven	murders.	 Everyone,	 including	 the	
lawyer,	is	convinced	that	the	man	in	question	has	committed	all	eight	crimes,	though	the	man	
himself	 says	 he	 is	 innocent	 of	 all.	 	 However,	 the	 lawyer	 is	 a	 gypsy	with	 absolute	 faith	 in	 the	
cards.	One	evening	he	consults	the	cards	about	his	case,	and	the	cards	tell	him	that	his	client	is	
innocent	 of	 the	 eighth	 murder.	 He	 checks	 again,	 and	 the	 cards	 give	 the	 same	 answer.	 He	
becomes	convinced	that	his	client	is	innocent	of	one	of	the	eight	murders.	As	a	result	he	studies	
the	 evidence	 with	 a	 different	 perspective	 as	 well	 as	 greater	 care,	 and	 he	 finds	 a	 very	
complicated	though	completely	valid	line	of	reasoning	from	the	evidence	to	the	conclusion	that	
his	 client	 did	 not	 commit	 the	 eighth	 murder…	 This	 reasoning	 gives	 the	 lawyer	 knowledge.	
Though	the	reasoning	does	not	increase	his	conviction	–	he	was	already	completely	convinced	
by	the	cards	–	it	does	give	him	knowledge.	(Lehrer	1971,	311–12)		
I	 share	Goldman’s	 intuition	 that,	 ‘To	 the	 extent	 that	 I	 clearly	 imagine	 that	 the	 lawyer	 fixes	 his	 belief	
solely	as	a	result	of	the	cards,	it	seems	intuitively	wrong	to	say	that	he	knows—or	has	a	justified	belief—	
that	 his	 client	 is	 innocent.’	 (2012,	 36	 n8)	 The	 lawyer	 is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 know	 it,	 and	 depending	 on	
whether	or	not	one	thinks	the	tarot	cards	count	as	a	justification,	one	might	even	say	he	has	a	justified	
belief	–	but	I	find	it	strange	to	say	that	he	knows	it	if	the	presence	of	the	only	justification	that	affords	
the	opportunity	for	knowledge	is	neither	here	nor	there	with	respect	to	his	actually	having	the	belief.	
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Do	we	have	reason	to	think	that	the	mystery	relation	 is	 transitive	wherever	 it	appears?	Well	
we	don’t	have	any	reason	to	doubt	it,	but	here	is	another	reason	to	think	that	it	might	be:	the	
transitivity	 of	 the	 mystery	 explanation	 would	 explain	why	 the	 belief	 that	 p	 is	 mysteriously	
related	to	the	fact	that	p	when	the	agent	knows	that	p.	
Although	our	 intuition	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 a	 belief	 that	p	 is	 non-causally	 (if	 also	 causally)	
explained	by	the	fact	that	p	if	an	agent	knows	it,	it’s	not	clear	to	me	how	the	fact	that	p	could	
directly	explain	an	agent’s	belief	that	p	in	much	the	same	way	as	it	is	was	not	clear	to	me	how	
the	 fact	 that	p	 could	directly	 explain	an	agent’s	action.23	However,	given	 that	our	perceptual	
experiences	 intermediate	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 between	 the	 world	 and	 beliefs	 the	
transitivity	 of	 the	 relation	 that	 links	 them	 would	 ensure	 the	 connection	 that	 our	 intuitions	
suggest	 between	 the	 belief	 and	 the	 fact	 itself.	 So,	 I	 suggest,	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 why	
knowledgeable	beliefs	are	mysteriously	related	to	the	believed	facts	is	that	there	is	a	transitive	
chain	of	mysterious	relations	that	links	the	belief	to	the	facts	via	the	justifications.24	7.3 On	whom	is	the	burden	of	proof?	
There	 are	perhaps	numerous	points	 in	 these	 arguments	 to	which	one	 could	object	 –	 but	 all	
they	would	do	is	undermine	the	arguments	for	the	claim	that	mystery	relations	are	transitive,	
they	would	not	undermine	the	claim	itself.	Which	leads	me	to	my	final	point,	in	defence	of	the	
assumption	 that	mystery	 relations	 are	 transitive:	 since	 I	 do	 not	 take	 it	 to	 be	 clear	 that	 the	
burden	of	proof	is	solely	on	me	to	prove	that	they	are,	it	would	need	a	further	argument	still	to	
demonstrate	 that	 they	aren’t.	 In	particular,	 since	my	view	 is	 that	our	working	assumption	of	
any	particular	sort	of	explanatory	relation	should	be	that	it	is	transitive	until	proven	otherwise,	
I	 take	 it	 that	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 is	 actually	 upon	 those	who	would	 deny	 that	 the	mystery	
relation	is	transitive.	
																																								 																				
23	See	my	criticism	of	direct	theories	of	normative	reason	explanation	in	§	(X).	
24	It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 McDowell	 would	 reject	 this	 account.	 He	 notes	 that	 in	 the	 knowledge	 case	
‘appearances	are	no	 longer	conceived	as	 in	general	 intervening	between	the	experiencing	subject	and	
the	world.’	 (1982,	472)	So	 for	McDowell	 it’s	not	 true	 that	 the	 justification	 intermediates	between	the	
belief	and	the	fact	in	the	knowledge	case,	rather	the	fact’s	having	‘made	itself	perceptually	manifest’	is	
enough	to	do	the	job	on	its	own.		
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8 Conclusion	
I	have	for	argued	the	following	claims:	
(M1)	 For	 any	 proposition,	p,	 if	A	 has	 a	 justified	 belief	 that	p	 then	 the	 fact	 that	A	
believes	that	p	is	mysteriously	related	to	some	justification	for	it.	
(M2)		 For	any	proposition,	p,	if	A	knows	that	p	then	the	fact	that	A	believes	that	p	is	
mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	
(M3)		 For	any	propositions,	j	and	p,	if	j	affords	the	opportunity	for	knowledge	that	p	
then	j	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	p.	
(M4)		 If	A	φs	intentionally	then,	for	some	proposition,	p,	the	fact	that	A	believed	that	
p	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	and	is	mysteriously	related	
to	the	fact	that	A	φ’d.	
I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	mysterious	 relation	 in	 each	 case	 is	 the	 same	 relation,	 and	 that	 this	
relation	is	a	non-causal,	transitive,	explanatory	relation.	
I	 should	note:	 this	 is	not	a	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	deviant	causal	 chains	 for	any	of	 these	
cases.	I	take	the	interesting	questions	for	each	case	to	be	what	this	explanatory	relation	is,	why	
it	 obtains,	 and	when	 it	obtains:	 I	 have	 called	 this	 the	mystery	 relation	precisely	because	 the	
answers	to	those	questions,	the	interesting	questions,	remains	shrouded	in	mystery.	All	that	I	
take	 myself	 to	 have	 done	 here	 is	 to	 offer	 some,	 hopefully,	 bland	 observations	 about	 this	
relation.	Nonetheless,	I	hope	that	even	these	bland	observations	will	be	sufficient	to	make	my	
case.	
In	 the	 next	 chapter	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 this	 relation	 is	 transitive	 with	 the	 explanatory	 relation	
between,	for	instance,	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	my	friend	had	won	an	award	and	the	fact	
that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	
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(XV)		Mystery	relations	and	why	it	is	rational	to	act	
In	which	I	say	that	mystery	relations	are	transitive	with	the	explanatory	relation	
involved	in	explaining	why	it	 is	rational.	 I	 label	the	sort	of	explanatory	relation	
that	obtains	between	(i)	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	and	(ii)	the	fact	
that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	an	umbrella,	the	‘E’-relation’.	I	argue	
that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive	 with	 the	 E’-relation.	 I	 show	 how	 this	
accords	with	our	intuitions	in	some	of	the	examples	already	considered.		
I	want	to	say	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	explains	why	it	was	rational	for	me	to	
congratulate	her.	I	also	want	to	say	that	the	fact	that	the	trees	rustled	does	not	explain	why	it	
was	rational	for	Sally	to	run.	However,	in	both	cases,	there	is	a	chain	of	explanatory	relations	
connecting	the	two	facts.1	So,	 if	 I	am	to	say	what	I	want	to	say,	as	noted	in	§	(XIII)4,	 I	need	a	
principled	 reason	 for	 saying	 that	 all	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 involved	 in	 the	 first	 case	 are	
transitive,	while	the	explanatory	relations	involved	in	the	second	case	are	not	all	transitive.	In	
the	last	chapter	I	introduced	the	mystery	relation	with	a	view	to	making	this	case.	
I	have	already	suggested	that	the	merely	causal	explanatory	relation	between	the	rustling	of	
the	trees	and	the	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound	is	not	transitive	with	the	explanatory	
relation	between	the	fact	that	she	believes	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	and	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	
tanto	rational	for	her	to	run.		
My	argument	in	this	chapter	is	this:	the	mystery	relations	between	the	fact	that	my	friend	had	
won	 an	 award	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	are	 transitive	with	 the	 explanatory	
relation	between	the	fact	I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	award	and	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	tanto	
rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.	I	argue	that	something	that	is	not	a	feature	of	an	agent’s	
psychology	(i.e.	a	belief	or	desire	or	what	have	you)	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	
some	 action	 only	 if	 it	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 their	 psychology	 that,	 in	 turn,	
explains	why	it	is	rational	for	them	to	do	that	action.	
I	put	forward	three	arguments	for	the	claim	that	mystery	relations	are	transitive	with	the	sort	
of	explanatory	relation	involved	in	‘explaining	why	it	is	rational’:	firstly,	I	argue	that	they	share	
many	 properties	 in	 common,	 and	 that	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 why	 they	 share	 so	 many	
																																								 																				
1	That	is,	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	explains	why	I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award,	which	
explains	why	 I	 believed	 that	 she	 had	won	 an	 award,	which	 explains	why	 it	was	pro	 tanto	 rational	 to	
congratulate	her.	Likewise:	 the	fact	 that	the	trees	rustled	explains	why	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	nowise,	
which	explains	why	she	believed	that	a	bear	was	chasing	her,	which	explains	why	running	was	pro	tanto	
rational.	See	§	(XIII)4	for	related	diagrams.	
	 202	
properties	 is	that	they	are	the	same	sort	of	transitive,	explanatory	relation.	Secondly,	 I	argue	
that	the	best	analysis	of	this	sort	of	non-causal	relation,	grounding,	takes	it	to	be	of	a	singular,	
transitive	sort.	Thirdly,	 I	argue	that	this	 is	 the	best	account	of	why	we	might	say,	 in	ordinary	
language,	that,	for	instance,	it	is	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	because	it	is	raining.	
1 Explaining	why	it	is	rational	to	act	1.1 The	E’-relation	
The	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	raining	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	my	
umbrella.	 The	 fact	 that	 Sally	 believes	 that	 a	 bear	 is	 chasing	 her	 explains	why	 it	 is	pro	 tanto	
rational	for	her	to	run.	Each	of	these	cases	involves	a	particular	sort	of	explanatory	relation	–	
for	expositional	convenience	it	will	help	if	we	name	it.	Let	us	say	the	following:	
Definition For	 any	 proposition	 p,	 p	 is	 E’-related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 pro	 tanto	
rational	for	A	to	φ	 if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	
for	A	to	φ.	
A	 clarification:	 the	E’-relation	 is	not	 a	 relation	between,	 say,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 believe	 that	 it	 is	
raining	and	the	act	of	taking	my	umbrella.	The	E’-relation	relates	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	it	is	
raining	to	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella.	The	E’-relation	is	just	
a	 particular	 sort	 of	 explanatory	 relation;	 it	 is	whatever	 sort	 of	 explanatory	 relation	 it	 is	 that	
exists	between	those	facts.	1.2 What	are	the	properties	of	the	E’-relation?	
What	can	we	say	about	the	E’-relation?	First,	as	we	have	already	observed	(see	§	(XIII)3.2.2),	it	
is	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation.	The	fact	that	Sally	believes	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her	does	
not	 cause	 it	 to	 be	pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 her	 to	 run,	 and	 you	 should	 accept	 that	 even	 if	 you	
think	it	causes	her	to	run.	Causation	just	seems	to	be	the	wrong	way	to	characterise	this	sort	of	
relation.	So,	the	E’-relation	is	non-causal.	
Second,	it	is	a	transitive	sort	of	explanatory	relation.	It	seems	right	to	say	that	if	it’s	pro	tanto	
rational	 for	 me	 to	 get	 some	 exercise,	 then	 that	 fact	 (partly2)	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 pro	 tanto	
rational	for	me	to	go	swimming.	Now	suppose	that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	get	some	
exercise	(partly)	because	I	believe	that	exercise	will	lift	my	spirits.	In	such	circumstances	it	also	
seems	right	to	say	that	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	exercise	will	 lift	my	spirits	(partly)	explains	
why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	go	swimming.	
																																								 																				
2	Together	with,	perhaps,	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	going	swimming	is	getting	exercise,	etc.	
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So	what?	Well,	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	exercise	will	lift	my	spirits,	p,	explains	why	it	is	pro	
tanto	rational	for	me	to	get	some	exercise,	q.	And	the	fact	that	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	
get	some	exercise	(i.e.	q)	explains	why	it	 is	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	swim,	r.	And	the	fact	
that	I	believe	that	exercise	will	lift	my	spirits	(i.e.	p)	also	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	
me	to	swim	(i.e.	r).	Thus:	p	explains	q,	q	explains	r	and	p	explains	r;	so,	at	least	in	this	instance,	
the	explanatory	relations	involved	satisfy	transitivity.		
Now,	I	submit,	such	explanatory	relations	must	always	be	transitive:	if	it	is	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	A	 believes	 that	ψing	 is	 a	means	 to	φing,	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 rational	 for	A	 to	φ	will	
explain	 why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 A	 to	ψ.	 And	 whatever	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 A	 to	φ,	
together	with	A’s	belief	that	ψing	is	a	means	to	φing,	will	likewise	explain	why	it	is	rational	for	
A	to	ψ.	So,	the	explanatory	relation	involved	in	explaining	why	it	 is	rational	to	do	something,	
i.e.	the	E’-relation,	is	a	transitive	relation.	
Third,	to	the	extent	that	ontological	priority	is	a	meaningful	concept,	the	truth-makers	of	that	
which	 explains	 why	 it	 is	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 to	 do	 some	 action	 are	 ontologically	prior	 to	 the	
rationality	 of	 actions.	 Consider:	 it’s	 possible	 that	 someone’s	 beliefs	 and	 desires/evaluative	
judgements	 (delete	 or	 replace	 as	 appropriate)	may	 never	 align	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 sufficient	 to	
make	 any	 action	 rational	 (perhaps	 they	have	 very	odd	desires,	 or	 normal	 desires,	 but	weird	
beliefs,	or	normal	desires	and	normal	beliefs	but	 just	 live	 in	a	dreadfully	 limited	world)	–	the	
fact	that	no	action	is	rational	does	not	impinge	on	their	ability	to	have	beliefs	and	desires.	So	
you	 can	 have	 beliefs	 and	 desires	 without	 there	 being	 any	 rational	 actions.	 However,	 the	
property	of	being	rational	cannot	be	instantiated	without	beliefs	and	desires.	So,	I	suggest,	the	
latter	are	ontologically	prior	to	the	former;	which	is	to	say	that	the	E’-relation	is	(underpinned	
by)	a	relation	of	ontological	priority.	
Fourth,	and	relatedly,	this	sort	of	explanatory	relation	entails	an	‘in	virtue	of’	claim.	That	is,	if	
the	fact	that	p	explains	why	it	is	rational	for	A	to	φ,	then	we	are	seemingly	always	able	to	say	
that	it	is	rational	for	A	to	φ	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	p.	For	instance,	it	is	rational	for	Sally	to	run	
in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	she	believed	that	a	bear	is	chasing	her.	So,	E’-relations	entail	‘in	virtue	
of’	claims.	
2 A	relation	in	common	
I	 want	 to	 convince	 you	 that	 the	 mystery	 relation	 (a	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relation)	 is	
transitive	with	the	E’-relation	(also	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation).	That	is,	I	will	argue	that:	
(M5) For	any	propositions,	p,	q	 and	 r,	 if	p	 is	mysteriously	 related	 to	q	 and	q	 is	 E’-
related	to	r	then	p	is	E’-related	to	r.	
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Why	 should	 you	 believe	 this?	 Because,	 I	 argue,	 these	 relations	 are	 both	 the	 same	 sort	 of	
transitive,	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relations.	 I	 put	 forward	 three	 arguments	 for	 this	 claim:	
firstly,	 the	 pervasive	 similarities	 between	 the	 mystery	 relation	 and	 the	 E’-relation	 are	 best	
explained	by	 the	presence	of	 a	 common	 relation.	 Secondly,	 the	best	 account	of	 explanatory	
relations	of	this	sort,	grounding,	takes	them	to	be	(i)	unitary	(at	least	until	proven	otherwise)	
and	 (ii)	 transitive.	 Thirdly,	 accepting	 (M5)	 gives	 us	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 why,	 in	 ordinary	
language,	we	might	say,	for	instance,	that	it	is	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	because	it	is	
raining.	
A	point	of	clarification:	I	am	only	arguing	that	these	explanatory	relations	are	of	the	same,	sort	
(that	is,	that	they	belong	to	the	same	family	of	(transitive)	explanatory	relations),	because	that	
is	enough	for	my	argument	for	(M5).	It	is	consistent	with	this	claim	to	suppose	that	they	are	in	
fact	 the	 same	 explanatory	 relation,3	however,	 it	 is	 likewise	 consistent	 with	 this	 claim	 to	
suppose	 that	 they	 aren’t.	 I	 take	 no	 particular	 stance	 on	whether	 or	 not	 they	 are	 the	 same	
explanatory	relation	just	because	I	don’t	need	to	for	my	argument.	2.1 These	relations	are	similar	because	they	are	of	a	common	kind	2.1.1 There	are	a	host	of	similarities	between	the	relations	
What	are	the	similarities	between	the	mystery	relation	and	the	E’-relation?	We	have	already	
noted	 that	 they	 are	 both	non-causal	 explanatory	 relations.	 Associated	with	 their	 both	being	
explanatory	 relations	 comes	 their	 both	 being	 asymmetric,	 irreflexive	 and	 non-monotonic.	
What	else?	
First,	 they	 are	 both	 transitive	 relations.	 In	 the	 previous	 chapter	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 the	
mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive.	 In	 the	 previous	 section	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 E’-relation	 is	
transitive.	
Second,	 they	 are	both	 relations	of	 ontological	 priority.	 I	 have	 already	noted	 that	 that	which	
explains	why	an	action	 is	 rational	must	be	ontologically	prior	 to	the	rationality	of	 the	action.	
What	 of	 the	mystery	 relation?	 The	 examples	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 relate,	 variously:	 facts	
about	the	world	(or	the	agent’s	perception	of	it)	to	facts	about	what	the	agent	believes;	facts	
about	the	world	to	 justifications	for	belief;	and	beliefs	to	actions.	Presumably	anyone	who	 is	
not	an	idealist	and	finds	some	meaning	in	the	notion	of	ontological	priority	will	agree	that	facts	
																																								 																				
3		And	that	might	even	be	more	parsimonious	than	thinking	that	they	are	different	explanatory	relations	
that	belong	to	a	single	family.	
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of	 the	 former	 kind	 are	 ontologically	 prior	 to	 the	 latter.4	That	 is,	 presumably:	 the	 world	 is	
ontologically	 prior	 to	 perceptual	 experiences	 of	 it,	 perceptual	 experiences	 are	 ontologically	
prior	to	beliefs,	and	beliefs	are	ontologically	prior	to	actions	(I	have	already	argued	for	the	last	
claim	in	the	previous	section).	These	don’t	all	need	to	be	true	to	make	the	case,	but	I	think	that	
they	are.	
Third,	 they	 both	 entail	 ‘in	 virtue	 of’	 claims.	 Again,	 I	 have	 already	 noted	 that	 the	 E’-relation	
relation	always	entails	an	‘in	virtue	of	claim’,	and	so	too	does	the	mystery	relation.	Consider:	it	
seems	right	to	say	that	Sean	believes	that	his	wife	has	been	unfaithful	to	him	 in	virtue	of	the	
fact	 that	 she	has	been	unfaithful	 to	him	and	 that	Sally	believes	 that	a	bear	 is	 chasing	her	 in	
virtue	of	 the	fact	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound	–	 in	contrast	 it	does	not	seem	right	to	say	
that	Eva	believes	that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	to	her	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	she	saw	
him	kissing	another	woman.5		2.1.2 They	are	similar	because	they	have	some	explanatory	relation	in	common	
I	 think	 that	 the	 best	 explanation	 of	 these	 similarities	 is	 that	 the	 two	 relations	 both	 are	 the	
same	sort	of	transitive,	non-causal,	explanatory	relation.	
You	might	object	to	this.	Perhaps	you	are	sceptical	of	talk	of	ontological	priority6	or	‘in	virtue	
of’7	relations.	 In	 which	 case	 you	 will	 doubt	 that	 there	 is	 much	 in	 the	 way	 of	 similarity	 that	
needs	 explaining.	 So	 be	 it.	 I,	 like	 many	 others,8	increasingly	 take	 these	 to	 be	 meaningful	
concepts,	 and	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 same	 form	of	words	 can	 be	 used	 in	 different	
cases	 is,	 at	 least,	 a	prima	 facie	 reason	 for	 thinking	 that	 there	 is	 a	 common	 relation	at	work.	
Since	 there	 is	 a	prima	 facie	 reason	 for	 thinking	 that	 there	 is	 a	 common	 relation	 I,	 following	
Audi,	‘take	the	burden	of	proof	to	be	on	those	who	think	there	are	different	relations	at	work	
to	show	why.’	(P.	Audi	2012b,	689)	
Another	 objection:	 perhaps	 you	 say	 that	 these	 similarities,	 at	 best,	 characterise	 a	 genus	 of	
non-causal	explanation	of	which	the	mystery	relation	and	the	E’-relation	are	different	species	–	
their	membership	of	 the	genus	accounts	 for	 their	 similarity,	but	 they	are	 separated	by	 their	
species-hood.	That	is,	perhaps	all	of	these	similarities	derive	from	there	being	an	‘E-relation’,	
where	 an	 E-relation	 is	 a	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relation	 that	 is	 not	 transitive	 with	 other	
																																								 																				
4	And,	 I	 think,	 even	 some	 idealists	 can	 find	 a	meaningful	 degree	of	 ontological	 priority	 of	 suitably	 re-
described	facts	of	the	former	kind	over	facts	about	beliefs.	
5	Nor	does	it	seem	right	to	say	that	she	believes	that	her	husband	has	been	unfaithful	to	her	in	virtue	of	
the	fact	that	he	has;	Eva’s	belief	is	neither	knowledgeable	nor	justified.	
6	E.g.	Hofweber	(2009)	
7	E.g.	 ‘We	 know	we	 are	 in	 the	 realm	of	murky	metaphysics	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	weasel	words	 “in	
virtue	of	”.’	(Oliver	1996,	48)	
8	See	e.g.	Rosen	(2010),	Fine	(2012)	and	Audi	(2012a).	
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E-relations,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 transitive	with	 itself.	 Nothing	would	 then	 force	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	
mystery	relations	and	the	E’-rational	relation	are	the	same	sort	of	E-relation,	which	is	what	is	
required	for	us	to	admit	the	truth	of	(M5).	
Of	 course,	 this	 is	 possible,	 and,	 indeed,	 the	 different	 examples	 are	 not	 alike	 in	 all	 respects.	
However,	what	needs	to	be	shown	is	not	that	there	are	differences	between	the	cases	given,	
but	that	what	differentiates	them	is	such	that	they	cannot	be	the	same	sort	of	E-relation.	And,	
again,	I	take	the	burden	of	proof	here	to	be	on	those	who	think	that	they	aren’t.		2.2 The	best	account	of	such	relations	takes	them	to	be	of	one	kind	
There	 is	 a	 readily	 available	 analysis	 of	 the	 ontological	 underpinnings	 of	 these	 explanatory	
relations	 according	 to	 which	 they	 are	 the	 same,	 transitive	 explanatory	 relation:	 namely,	
grounding.	2.2.1 What	are	grounding	relations?	
Grounding	 is	 the	 ‘in	 vogue’	 relation	 in	 contemporary	 metaphysics.	 Here	 are	 a	 few	
characteristic	grounding	claims9:	
1.	Mental	facts	obtain	in	virtue	of	neurophysiological	facts;	
2.	Dispositional	properties	are	grounded	in	categorical	properties;	
3.	Legal	facts	are	grounded	in	non-legal,	e.g.	social,	facts;	
4.	Morally	wrong	acts	are	wrong	in	virtue	of	non-moral	facts;	
5.	Normative	facts	are	grounded	in	natural	facts.	
(Correia	2010,	251)	
Assuming	 that	 grounding	 is	 a	bona	 fide	 relation;	 here	 are	 some	 things	 that	 are	 taken	 to	 be	
essential	to	grounding10:	
− It	is	an	explanatory	relation;11	
− It	is	a	not	merely	causal	relation12;		
− It	is	transitive;	
																																								 																				
9	Note:	 the	 usefulness	 of	 grounding	 doesn’t	 hang	 on	 the	 truth	 of	 these	 claims	 but	 whether	 or	 not	
grounding	can	be	used	to	characterise	what	the	claims	are	claims	about.	
10	See	e.g.	Rosen	(2010),	Fine	(2012)	and	Audi	(2012a).	
11	As	an	aside:	We	should	note	that	one	could	question	whether	grounding	relations	are	the	non-causal	
explanatory	relations	themselves	or	the	ontological	determination	relations	that	underpins	them.	That	
question	is,	however,	largely	orthogonal	to	our	discussion.	
12	Though	there	is	no	requirement	that	grounding	relations	exclude	causal	relations.	
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− ‘The	fact	that	p	is	grounded	in	the	fact	that	q’	can	be	characterised	by	locutions	like	‘p	
is	the	case	in	virtue	of	q’;	and	
− It	is	a	relation	of	ontological	priority.	
We	should	note	an	important	distinction	between	a	full	and	a	partial	ground.	Here	is	a	typical	
characterisation:	
A	 is	 a	partial	 ground	 for	C	 if	A,	on	 its	own	or	with	 some	other	 truths,	 is	 a	ground	of	C.	 (Fine	
2012,	50)	
Now,	although	full	grounds	are	typically	taken	to	necessitate	that	which	they	ground13,	merely	
partial	 grounds	 are	 not.	 For	 instance,	 the	 possibility	 of	 castling	 with	 one’s	 kingside	 rook	 is	
partially	grounded	 in	 the	 fact	 that	no	pieces	obstruct	 the	move	but	 that	 fact	alone	does	not	
guarantee	that	one	can	castle	with	one’s	kingside	rook	(for	instance,	the	king	may	be	in	check).	
And	while	full	grounds	may	necessitate	that	which	they	ground,	neither	full	nor	partial	grounds	
need	be	necessary	for	that	which	they	ground.	To	take	a	standard	example:	the	fact	that	this	
ball	is	scarlet	fully	grounds	the	fact	that	it	is	red,	but	the	former	is	not	necessary	for	the	latter	
(the	ball	could	be	vermillion	or	ruby).14	2.2.2 These	explanatory	relations	are	grounding	relations	
Grounding	 theorists	aim	to	explain	why	a	variety	of	 relations	 in	seemingly	different	contexts	
exhibit	the	same	properties	by	suggesting	that	they	all	share	the	common	‘grounding’	relation	
(and	then	providing	an	analysis	of	that	relation).	As	Audi	remarks:	
Such	 pervasive	 similarity	 among	 such	 diverse	 subject	 matters	 cries	 out	 for	 explanation.	 I	
propose	that	what	accounts	for	the	similarity	is	simply	that	there	is	a	single	relation	at	work	in	
each	case.	(P.	Audi	2012b,	689)	
In	§	2.1.1,	 I	argued	that	 the	mystery	 relation	and	the	E’-relation	have	a	host	of	properties	 in	
common.	Having	set	out	the	properties	of	grounding	relations	above,	we	can	now	see	that	the	
properties	that	these	relations	have	in	common	just	are	the	properties	of	grounding	relations.	
Like	 grounding	 relations,	 these	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 non-causal,	 transitive,	 explanatory	
relations;	 they	 can	 be	 characterised	 by	 locutions	 like	 ‘in	 virtue	 of’;	 they	 involve	 claims	 of	
ontological	 priority;	 and	 they	 contribute	 to	 necessitating	 that	 to	which	 they	 relate	 although	
they	need	not	be	necessary	 for	 it	 to	obtain.	Following	Audi’s	 logic,	 then,	 the	best	account	of	
why	these	relations	share	those	properties	is	because	they,	too,	are	grounding	relations.		
																																								 																				
13	For	example,	 see	Rosen	 (2010),	Fine	 (2012)	and	Audi	 (2012b).	There	 is	 some	dissent	 from	this	view	
(for	example,	see	Chudnoff	(2011)	and	Leuenberger	(2014)).	
14	The	 analogousness	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 full	 and	 partial	 grounds	with	 the	 concepts	 of	 full	 and	 partial	
explanation	invoked	throughout	this	discussion	is	presumably	clear.	
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Moreover,	 the	 distinction	 between	 full	 and	 partial	 grounds	 readily	 accommodates	 what	 we	
earlier	observed	about	the	strictly	partial	contribution	of	the	fact	that	Sally	believes	that	a	bear	
is	chasing	her	to	the	explanation	of	why	it	is	rational	for	her	to	run:	we	can	say	that	the	partial	
explanation	 partially	 grounds	 that	 which	 it	 explains.	 It	 similarly	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 ready	
characterisation	 of	 the	 strictly	 partial	 way	 in	which	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 explains	why	 I	
believe	that	it	is	raining	even	when	I	know	that	it	is	raining	(for	it	does	not	do	so	on	its	own):	
again	we	can	say	that	the	former	fact	partially	grounds	the	latter.15	
So	 here	 is	 another	 reason	 to	 believe	 (M5):	 there	 is	 a	well-developed	 analysis	 of	 the	 sort	 of	
explanations	 that	 both	 the	 E’-relation	 and	 mystery	 relations	 appear	 to	 exhibit,	 grounding,	
which	takes	them	to	both	be	a	common,	non-causal,	 transitive,	explanatory	relation.	That	 is,	
the	best	available	account	of	the	sort	of	explanations	 involved	 in	the	E’-rational	and	mystery	
relations	entails	the	truth	of	(M5).	2.3 Their	transitivity	makes	sense	of	ordinary	language	
A	 final	 consideration	 in	 support	 of	 (M5)	 is	 that,	 provided	 that	 you	 agree	with	 (M1)-(M4),	 it	
provides	 the	best	account	of	ordinary	 language	expressions	 in	which	non-psychological	 facts	
are	said	to	explain	why	it	is	rational	to	do	something.	
Some	things	we	might	readily	say:	the	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound	(in	a	wood	that	
she	knew	to	contain	bears)	at	least	partly	explains	why	it	was	rational	for	her	to	run.	The	fact	
that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	 at	 least	 partially	 explains	 why	 it	 was	 rational	 for	 me	 to	
congratulate	her.	It	was	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	because	it	was	raining.	
As	with	normative	reason	explanations	of	action,	there	are	three	possible	accounts	of	what	is	
going	 on	 in	 these	 sorts	 of	 explanations:	 either	 the	 purported	 explanans	 explains	 the	
explanandum	elliptically,	directly	or	indirectly.	Now,	I	suggest	that	the	same	arguments	against	
the	elliptical	 and	direct	accounts	of	normative	 reason	explanation	also	apply	 to	 the	elliptical	
and	direct	 accounts	of	 the	explanation	of	why	 it	 is	 rational	 (see	§	(X)).	 In	 contrast,	 provided	
that	you	agree	with	my	account	of	mystery	relations,	the	claim	that	they	are	transitive	with	the	
E’-relation	 (i.e.	 (M5))	 furnishes	 us	 with	 an	 account	 of	 these	 explanations	 that	 is	 thoroughly	
natural.	
																																								 																				
15	Our	readiness	of	to	talk	in	terms	of	grounds	for	belief	or	grounds	for	action	is,	perhaps,	further	grist	to	
this	mill.	
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3 When	non-psychological	facts	explain	why	it	is	rational	
Recall	 the	 challenge	 set	 out	 in	 §	(XIII)4:	 I	 need	 a	 principled	 account	 of	 why	 it	 is	 that,	 for	
instance,	 the	explanatory	relations	 from	the	believed	 fact	 to	 the	rationality	of	 the	action	are	
transitive	in	the	‘award’	case	but	not	in	the	‘carbon	monoxide’	case.	What	is	that	account?	
It	 is	 this:	 something	 that	 isn’t	a	direct	 feature	of	an	agent’s	psychology	can	explain	why	 it	 is	
rational	 for	 them	 to	 do	 some	 action	 only	 if	 it	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 their	
psychology	that	explains	why	that	action	is	rational.	In	particular,	a	merely	causal	explanatory	
relation	is	not	sufficient.		3.1 Some	examples	
It	will	 help	make	 the	account	 clear	 if	we	 revisit	 some	of	 the	different	 cases	 considered.	The	
diagrams	 below	 set	 out	 three	 cases.	 I	 have	 labelled	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 as	 follows:	
instances	of	the	mystery	relation	are	marked	‘⇝’;	instances	of	the	E’-relation	are	marked	‘E’’;	
and	merely	causal	relations	are	marked	‘c’.	
	
Figure	XV-1:	The	explanatory	relations	in	the	award	case.	
	
Figure	XV-2:	The	explanatory	relations	in	the	carbon	monoxide	case	
	
Figure	XV-3:	The	explanatory	relations	in	the	Eva	case	
I	will	 run	 through	each	of	 these	examples	 in	 turn.	 In	 the	award	case	 (Figure	XV-1)	 there	 is	a	
chain	of	non-causal	explanatory	relations	of	a	common	sort	that	 links	the	fact	that	my	friend	
won	 an	 award	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 congratulate	 her.	 In	
particular:	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	read	
		
I	read	that	she	
had	won	an	
award	
My	friend	
won	an	
award	
I	believed	that	
she	won	an	
award	explains	
Congratulating	
her	was	pro	
tanto	rational	explains	 explains	
⇝		 ⇝		 E’		
		
It	appeared	
as	though	my	
friend	was	
warning	me	
of	CO	
There	was	
CO	in	the	
room	
I	believed	that	
there	was	CO	
in	the	room	explains	
Leaving	was	pro	
tanto	rational	
explains	explains	
⇝		c		 E’		
		
It	appeared	to	
her	as	though	
her	husband	
was	kissing	
another	
woman	
Eva’s	
husband	
was	
unfaithful	
She	believed	
that	her	
husband	was	
unfaithful	explains	
Divorcing	him	
was	pro	tanto	
rational	
explains	explains	
E’		⇝		 c		
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that	she	had	won	an	award	in	the	newspaper,	which	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	
believed	 that	 she	 had	 won	 an	 award,	 which	 is	 E’-related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 pro	 tanto	
rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.		
Now,	 since	 the	mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive,	 and	 transitive	with	 the	E’-relation	 (from	 (M5)),	
that	means	that	the	fact	that	my	friend	won	an	award	is	E’-related	to	the	fact	that	it	was	pro	
tanto	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 congratulate	 her;	 that	 is:	 the	 fact	 that	 my	 friend	 won	 an	 award	
explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	congratulate	her.		
In	contrast,	in	the	carbon	monoxide	case,	there	is	no	chain	of	non-causal	explanatory	relations	
linking	the	fact	that	there	was	carbon	monoxide	in	the	room	to	the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	
rational	 for	me	to	 leave	 it.	The	fact	that	there	was	carbon	monoxide	 in	the	room	is	(at	best)	
merely	causally	related	to	the	fact	that	it	appeared	to	me	as	though	my	friend	was	warning	me	
about	the	carbon	monoxide.	However,	the	fact	that	it	appeared	to	me	as	though	my	friend	was	
warning	me	about	the	carbon	monoxide	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	
there	was	(because	I	based	my	belief	on	the	way	things	appeared	to	be),	which	is	E’-related	to	
the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	leave.	So,	again,	given	the	transitivity	of	these	
relations,	the	fact	that	 it	appeared	to	me	as	though	there	was	carbon	monoxide	in	the	room	
does	explain	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	leave.	16	
Finally,	in	Eva’s	case,	there	is	likewise	no	chain	of	non-causal	explanatory	relations	linking	the	
fact	that	her	husband	was	unfaithful	to	the	fact	that	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	her	to	divorce	
him.	While	that	fact	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	justification	Eva	has	for	believing	it	(i.e.	that	
it	 appeared	 to	her	 as	 though	he	was	 kissing	 another	woman),	 since	 that	 justification	 is	 only	
merely	causally	related	to	her	belief,	 the	non-casual	explanatory	chain	does	not	extend	from	
the	fact	in	the	world,	through	the	justification,	to	the	rationality	of	the	action.	That	is,	neither	
the	 fact	 that	 Eva’s	 husband	 was	 unfaithful	 to	 her,	 nor	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 appeared	 to	 her	 as	
though	he	was	kissing	another	woman	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	her	to	divorce	
him.	
																																								 																				
16	It	will	presumably	also	be	clear	how	the	same	line	of	reasoning	should	lead	us	to	the	conclusion	that	
the	 rustling	 of	 the	 trees	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 it	 is	 (pro	 tanto)	 rational	 for	 Sally	 to	 run.	 That	 is,	 the	
rustling	 of	 the	 trees	 is	 merely	 causally	 related	 to	 her	 hearing	 a	 bear-like	 sound,	 so	 the	 explanatory	
between	the	two	facts	 is	not	transitive	with	the	E’-relation,	as	 it	would	need	to	be	 in	order	to	explain	
why	her	action	was	(pro	tanto)	rational.	
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The	table	below	summarises	these	cases:	
Example	 The	believed	fact/justification	for	believing	it	 Explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	to	act?	
Eva	case	
f	 Her	husband	was	unfaithful	to	her	 û 
j	 It	appeared	as	though	her	husband	was	kissing	another	woman	 û 
CO	case	
f	 The	room	was	full	of	carbon	monoxide	 û 
j	 It	appeared	as	though	my	friend	was	warning	me	 ü 
Award	
case	
f	 My	friend	won	an	award	 ü	
j	 I	read	that	she	had	won	an	award	in	the	newspaper	 ü	
Table	XV-1:	A	summary	of	what	explains	and	what	doesn't	in	each	case	
4 Conclusion	
I	have	argued	that	something	that	is	not	a	direct	feature	of	an	agent’s	psychology	can	explain	
why	 their	 action	 is	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 only	 if	 it	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 their	
psychology	that,	in	turn,	explains	why	their	action	is	pro	tanto	rational.	I	have	argued	for	this	
on	 the	 basis	 that	 the	mystery	 relation	 is	 transitive	with	 the	 E’-relation,	while	merely	 causal	
relations	are	not.	I	consider	some	objections	to	this	proposal	in	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.	
The	next,	 and	 final,	 chapter	 combines	 the	 insights	of	 this	discussion	 to	 set	out	my	 theory	of	
reasons.	
Appendix	
A.1 Objections	
Objection	1 The	challenge	was	for	you	to	show	why	it	was	that	(i)	the	fact	that	your	friend	
won	an	award	explained	why	 it	was	rational	 for	you	to	congratulate	her,	despite	 (ii)	 the	 fact	
that	the	room	was	full	of	carbon	monoxide	didn’t	explain	why	it	was	rational	for	you	to	leave.	
Your	‘answer’	is	that	it	is	a	mystery,	but	that’s	no	sort	of	answer!	You	are	just	re-labelling	the	
problem	that	was	already	diagnosed.	What	progress	has	really	been	made?	Don’t	we	want	to	
know	why	this	relationship	is	present	in	(i)	and	not	in	(ii)?	
Response 	Well,	 here	 is	 some	 progress	 that	 has	 been	made:	 we’ve	 identified	 that	 the	
mystery	relation	is	part	of	some	family	of	explanatory	relations,	where	members	of	that	family	
have	certain	properties.	That	is	at	least	the	starting	point	for	a	systematic	investigation	of	why	
the	relationship	is	present.	
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More	 generally,	 however,	 I	 am	not	 trying	 to	 answer	 the	 question	 of	why	 the	 relationship	 is	
present.	The	question	I	am	trying	to	answer	is	why	the	explanatory	chain	in	(i)	is	transitive	and	
why	it	isn’t	in	(ii).	My	answer	is	that	there	is	a	chain	of	(mysterious)	explanatory	relations	in	(i)	
that	 there	 isn’t	 in	 (ii)	and	 that	 these	mystery	 relations	are	 transitive	with	 the	E’-relation	 (i.e.	
(M5)).	If	you	accept	these	two	claims	that	is	enough	to	answer	the	question	that	I	am	trying	to	
answer.	
The	question	as	to	why	 there	 is	a	mystery	relation	is	present	 in	(i)	but	 isn’t	 in	(ii)	 is	a	deeper	
(more	 distal)	 and	 perhaps	 more	 interesting	 question	 than	 the	 one	 I	 am	 answering.	 But	
answering	 it	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	what	 I	 need	 to	 do	 to	make	my	 case.	 In	 identifying	 the	
mystery	 relation	 as	 an	 explanatory	 relation,	 and	 showing	 that	 it	 is	 transitive	 with	 the	
E’-relation,	and	showing	that	it	obtains	in	(i)	but	not	in	(ii),	 I	have	an	answer	to	the	challenge	
posed,	and	I	don’t	need	more	than	that.		
Objection	2 If	 grounding-based	 formulations	of	physicalism	are	 true,	 then	you	are	 forced	
into	the	absurd	conclusion	that,	say,	 the	 fact	 that	Sally’s	brain	 is	 in	state	B	explains	why	 it	 is	
rational	for	her	to	run.		
Much	of	your	argument	for	 (M5)	was	based	on	the	claim	that	the	best	explanation	of	all	 the	
grounding-like	properties	that	the	mystery	relation	and	the	E’-relations	share	is	that	they	both	
involve	a	common,	explanatory	 relation.	 It	was	 for	 that	 reason	 that	you	suggested	 that	 they	
were	transitive,	so,	you	suggest:	
(a) All	explanatory	relations	that	exhibit	grounding-like	properties	are	transitive	with	
each	other.	
Grounding-based	 formulations	 of	 physicalism	 (e.g.	 Correia	 2010;	 Kroedel	 and	 Schulz	 2016)	
hold	that	all	mental	 facts	are	grounded	 in	physical	ones.	Now,	grounding-based	formulations	
of	 physicalism	 take	 the	 relation	 between	mental	 and	 physical	 facts	 to	 exhibit	 exactly	 those	
properties	that	you	said	that	the	E’-relation	and	mystery	relation	exhibit.17	Thus:	
(b) All	mental	 facts	stand	 in	a	particular	explanatory	 relation	 to	some	physical	 facts	
and	that	explanatory	relation	exhibits	grounding-like	properties.	
Thus,	 from	 (a)	 and	 (b),	 together	with	 your	 claim	 that	 the	 E’-relation	 exhibits	 grounding-like	
properties,	 we	 infer	 that	 the	 explanatory	 relation	 between	 the	 mental	 and	 the	 physical	 is	
transitive	with	the	E’-relation.	
																																								 																				
17	For	instance:	The	relation	is	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation.	It	can	be	characterised	by	the	‘in	virtue	
of’	locution.	Etc.	
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So,	some	physical	fact	(e.g.	the	fact	that	Sally’s	brain	is	in	state	B)	non-causally	explains	the	fact	
she	believes	that	it	is	rational	for	her	to	run.	And	since	that	is	transitive	with	the	E’-relation,	we	
can	conclude	that	the	fact	that	Sally’s	brain	is	in	state	B	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	
her	to	run.	But	that	is	absurd!	
Response I	agree	that	it	is	absurd	to	say	that	facts	about	Sally’s	brain	state	explain	why	it	
was	pro	tanto	rational	for	her	to	run.	So,	to	preserve	my	theory	in	the	face	of	this	conclusion	I	
must	reject	either	(a)	or	(b).	18	
As	it	is,	I’m	not	convinced	that	(b)	is	true	–	in	particular,	it’s	not	clear	to	me	that	facts	about	an	
agent’s	brain	state	explain	their	mental	state.	However,	the	claim	that	reduction	relations	are	
explanatory	 relations	 is	 true	 in	 a	 number	 of	 popular	 construals	 of	 physicalism	 beyond	 just	
grounding-based	formulations19		–	so	rejecting	it	is	not	without	its	costs.	
Is	there	a	way	to	render	my	theory	consistent	with	such	construals	of	physicalism,	by	rejecting	
(a),	that	doesn’t	also	undermine	my	argument	for	(M5)?	I	suggest	that	there	is.	
Recall	 that	 in	my	argument	 for	 (M5),	 I	 considered	 the	possibility	 that	 the	E’-relation	and	 the	
mystery	 relation	 involve	 different	 species	 of	 a	 genus	 of	 non-causal	 explanatory	 relations,	 E-
relations,	and	that	it	is	their	belonging	to	that	genus	that	accounts	for	the	properties	they	have	
in	 common.	 The	 argument	was	 that	 E’-relations	 and	mystery	 relations	 need	 not	 involve	 the	
same	relation	to	exhibit	the	same	properties	–	being	members	of	the	same	family	is	sufficient.	
My	response	to	that	possibility	was	Audi’s:	that	the	burden	of	proof	is	on	those	who	take	the	
relations	to	be	different	to	show	that	they	are	different.20	
With	 respect	 to	mystery	 relations,	 I	 can	 think	of	no	 compelling	 reason	as	 to	why	we	 should	
think	 that	 the	 sort	 of	 explanation	 involved	 is	 entirely	 different	 to	 the	 sort	 involved	 in	 the	
E’-relation.	However,	unlike	the	mystery	relation,	to	the	extent	that	the	relation	between	the	
mental	and	the	physical	really	 is	a	non-causal	explanatory	relation	(i.e.	given	that	we	assume	
(b)),	I	think	that	we	have	reason	to	think	that	it	does	not	involve	the	same	sort	of	non-causal	
explanatory	relation	as	the	E’-relation.	That	is,	I	think	that	in	this	case	we	do	have	a	reason	for	
thinking	they	involve	different	sorts	of	explanation,	but	in	the	case	of	the	mystery	relation,	we	
don’t.	
What	is	the	reason	we	have?	I	argue	that	the	sort	of	explanatory	relation	that	is	meant	to	exist	
between	 the	 mental	 and	 the	 physical	 is	 not	 transitive	 with	 the	 sort	 of	 explanation	 the	
																																								 																				
18	At	least	so	long	as	we	assume	that,	on	any	grounding-based	version	of	physicalism,	Sally’s	brain	state	
is	the	‘ground’	of	her	mental	state.	
19	This	is	what	Crane	(2000)	calls	‘conceptual	reduction’	(as	opposed	to	‘ontological	reduction’).	
20	Schaffer	(2009,	377)	makes	similar	remarks.	
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E’-relation	 involves	–	and	that	this	 is	a	reason	for	thinking	that	they	do	not	 involve	the	same	
relation.	
Let	us	introduce	a	distinction	(which	is	meant	to	be	intuitive,	but	which	will	be	substantiated	
with	 examples)	 between	 two	 sorts	 of	 non-causal	 explanation:	 vertical	 and	 horizontal.21	Say	
that	vertical	explanatory	relations,	Ev-relations,	are	explanatory	reduction	relations	(if	there	are	
such	things),	 like	those	between	the	mental	and	the	physical.	Say	that	horizontal	explanatory	
relations,	Eh-relations,	are	like	those	involved	in	E’-relations	and	mystery	relations.	What	I	will	
need	 to	 demonstrate	 is	 that	 horizontal	 explanatory	 relations	 are	 not	 transitive	with	 vertical	
explanatory	relations	(i.e.	that	(a)	is	false).	
To	start:	consider	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 slice	of	cake	 is	 the	biggest	explains	why	 it	would	be	
impolite	to	take	it.	This,	I	submit,	is	a	horizontal	explanatory	relation	–	the	fact	that	the	cake	is	
biggest	makes	taking	 it	 impolite	 in	the	same	way	that	a	belief	that	 it’s	cold	explains	why	it	 is	
rational	to	turn	on	the	heating.	
Now	given	that	reduction	 is	an	explanatory	relation,	as	the	 ‘conceptual	reduction’	physicalist	
supposes,	 facts	about	 the	microphysical	properties	of	 the	 slice	 (and	 the	other	 slices)	explain	
why	it	is	the	largest	slice.	I	suggest	that	this	explanatory	relation,	qua	reduction	relation,	is	the	
same	sort	of	vertical	explanatory	relation,	i.e.	the	Ev-relation,	as	the	relation	between	mental	
and	physical	facts.	
But,	I	suggest,	it	is	odd	to	say	that	facts	about	the	microphysical	structure	of	the	slice	of	cake	
are	a	part	of	the	explanation	of	why	it’s	impolite	to	take	it.	That	is,	we	cannot	infer	from	(i)	the	
fact	 that	 facts	 about	 the	 microphysical	 structure	 of	 the	 cake	 (partly)	 explain	 why	 it	 is	 the	
largest	slice;	and	(ii)	 the	fact	that	the	fact	that	 it	 is	the	 largest	slice	(partly)	explains	why	 it	 is	
impolite	 to	 take	 it;	 to	 (iii)	 the	 conclusion	 that	 facts	 about	 the	microphysical	 structure	of	 the	
cake	(partly)	explain	why	it	is	impolite	to	take	it.	In	other	words,	the	transitivity	of	explanation	
breaks	down.	Now,	since	the	Eh-relation	is	a	transitive	relation,	we	have	a	reason	to	think	that	
the	Ev-relation	 is	 not	 transitive	with	 the	Eh-relation,	 so	 they	 are	distinct	 sorts	of	 explanatory	
relation.	
This	 particular	 argument	 relies	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 macro-physical	 to	 micro-physical	 facts	
being	 relevantly	 analogous	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	 mental	 facts	 to	 physical	 ones.	 However,	 I	
																																								 																				
21	I	have	appropriated	and	re-purposed	this	terminology	from	Jaegwon	Kim	(2003).	Kim	talks	in	terms	of	
‘vertical	determination’	and	‘horizontal	determination’	–	whilst	vertical	determination	is	close	to	what	I	
characterise	 as	 ‘vertical	 explanation’,	 Kim’s	 notion	of	 horizontal	 determination	 is	 explicitly	 causal.	 For	
that	reason	I	distinguish	between	vertical	explanation	and	horizontal	explanation.	
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cannot	see	how	transitivity	with	Eh-relations	could	fail	for	the	former,	(as	I	have	argued	that	it	
does)	but	succeed	with	the	latter,	so	I	have	inferred	that	it	doesn’t.22	
In	 contrast,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	 above,	 the	 transition	 from	 a	mystery	 relation	 to	 an	E’-relation	
seemingly	does	 involve	a	 transitive	 form	of	 explanation:	 the	 claims	we	end	up	making	 if	we	
take	the	relation	to	be	transitive	there	(e.g.	the	fact	that	it	is	cold	explains	why	it’s	rational	for	
me	to	put	the	heating	on)	seem	commonplace	in	comparison	to	the	preposterousness	of	the	
claims	we	make	if	we	assume	that	vertical	explanations	are	continuous	with	horizontal	ones.	
My	point	is	just	that	while	Ev-relations	are	‘transitive	with’	each	other,	they	are	not	‘transitive	
with’	Eh-relations.	
Thus,	I	think	that	there	is	a	credible	way	of	rejecting	(a)	that	does	not	undermine	my	argument	
for	 (M5),	 so	 that	 the	 proponent	 of	 grounding-based	 formulations	 of	 physicalism	 (and	
conceptual	 reduction	 more	 generally)	 can	 accept	 my	 theory	 without	 arriving	 at	 the	 absurd	
conclusion	 that	 Sally’s	 brain	 state	 explains	why	 it	 is	 rational	 for	her	 to	 run.	 The	only	 cost	 to	
such	 a	 physicalist	 is	 that	 they	 must	 admit	 that	 there	 are	 at	 least	 two	 kinds	 of	 grounding	
relation	 that,	 despite	 sharing	 a	 host	 of	 properties,	 are	 not	 transitive	 with	 one	 another.	
However,	this	 is	not	a	cost	 I	need	pay	since	I	anyway	don’t	think	that	reduction	relations	are	
explanatory	(that	is,	my	preferred	response	to	this	objection	is	to	reject	(b)).	
Objection	3 Deviant	causal	chains	affect	many	other	analyses	of	causation,	for	instance:	
It	would	not	work	to	say	that	the	heat	of	the	oven	cooks	the	chicken	if	and	only	if	the	heat	of	
the	oven	causes	the	chicken	to	be	in	a	cooked	state.	The	heat	of	the	oven	might	trigger	some	
microwave	activity	elsewhere	which	causes	the	chicken	to	be	in	that	state;	in	this	case	the	heat	
would	not	have	cooked	the	chicken.	(Stout	2010,	161)	
That	 being	 so,	 the	 mystery	 relation	 is	 presumably	 not	 only	 restricted	 to	 the	 cases	 you’ve	
considered.	Supposing	that	the	mystery	relation	differentiates	deviant	from	non-deviant	cases,	
we	might	say	this:	if	the	oven	cooks	the	chicken	then	the	fact	that	the	oven	cooked	the	chicken	
is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	the	chicken	reached	a	cooked	state.	
So,	let’s	imagine	a	twice	deviant	carbon	monoxide	case.	Instead	of	causing	you	to	hallucinate	
in	 the	 ‘normal’	way,	 the	carbon	monoxide	causes	a	 creature	 in	 the	 room	to	hallucinate	 that	
you	are	attacking	 it,	 and,	unbeknownst	 to	you,	 it	 injects	you	with	hallucinatory	venom.	That	
then	makes	you	hallucinate	that	your	friend	is	warning	you	about	the	carbon	monoxide	and	so	
on.	
																																								 																				
22	Indeed,	the	fact	that	it	is	absurd	to	claim	that	the	fact	that	Sally’s	brain	is	in	state	B	explains	why	it	is	
pro	 tanto	 rational	 for	 her	 to	 run	 is	 clear	 evidence	 that	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 involved	 are	 not	
transitive.		
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In	 the	original	example	 the	carbon	monoxide	made	you	hallucinate	 in	a	non-deviant	way.	 In	
this	new	case	it	made	you	hallucinate	in	a	deviant	way.	But	if	what	differentiates	deviant	cases	
from	non-deviant	ones	is	the	mystery	relation,	then	that	must	meant	that,	in	the	non-deviant	
case,	the	fact	that	there	was	carbon	monoxide	in	the	room	 is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	
that	 it	appeared	to	you	as	 though	your	 friend	was	warning	you	about	 the	carbon	monoxide.	
That	 being	 so,	 given	 the	 transitivity	 of	 the	mystery	 relation,	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	 carbon	
monoxide	in	the	room	ought	to	explain	why	it	was	rational	for	you	to	leave	it.	
Response First,	I	never	offered	the	mystery	relation	as	an	analysis	of	what	differentiates	
deviant	causal	chains	from	non-deviant	ones	in	any	context.	It	was	specifically	restricted	to	the	
cases	considered.	
Second,	I	do	not	think	it	should	be	extended	to	other	cases.	What	distinguishes	deviant	causal	
chains	from	non-deviant	ones	is	mysterious	in	the	mental	case	because	it	involves	the	mental	
(or,	at	 least,	 the	representational).	 In	 the	case	of	cooking	the	chicken,	while	 I	don’t	have	the	
solution	to	the	problem,	I	don’t	think	there	is	the	same	fundamentally	mysterious	problem	at	
work.	Whatever	 the	mystery	 relation	 is,	 it	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 to	 do	 with	 the	 rational	 faculties	 of	
agents,	whereas,	it	seems	to	me,	the	question	of	deviant	causal	chains	in	mere	causal	cases	is	a	
mere	question	of	mechanism.	
Perhaps	 you	 don’t	 find	 this	 response	 very	 compelling.	 I’m	 afraid	 I	 don’t	 have	 a	 more	
compelling	one;	should	this	prove	to	be	an	insuperable	difficulty	then	I	should	have	to	look	for	
some	other	analysis	as	to	why	facts	about	the	world	can	explain	why	our	actions	are	rational.	
However,	I	struggle	to	find	this	objection	insuperable.	
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(XVI)		A	new	theory	of	reasons	
In	which	I	set	out	my	theory	of	reasons.	I	discuss	what	explanatory	rationalism	
says	about	 the	application	of	each	reason	expression	to	the	case	where	 I	 take	
my	umbrella	having	seen	that	it	is	raining.	I	show	how	explanatory	rationalism	
solves	 the	problems	 faced	by	other	 theories.	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	best	 theory	of	
reasons	 is	 a	 pluralist	 theory	 of	 reason	 that	 combines	 explanatory	 rationalism	
and	 favourism;	 I	 call	 this	 theory	 ‘new	 pluralism’.	 I	 show	 how	 explanatory	
rationalism	 enables	 new	 pluralism	 to	 meet	 the	 main	 challenge	 to	 pluralist	
theories.	
In	 §	(V),	 I	 argued	 that	 if	we	are	 to	 solve	all	 of	 the	problems	discussed	 in	§§	(II)-(VI)	 then	we	
need	a	new	family	of	claims	about	reasons.	In	§	(VI),	I	suggested	that	explanatory	rationalism	
was	 the	 new	 family	 of	 claims	 that	we	 needed,	 however,	 I	 noted,	 The	 Explanatory	 Exclusion	
Problem	presented	a	significant	challenge	for	it.	The	intermediating	chapters	have	argued	that	
The	Explanatory	Exclusion	Problem	is	not	the	problem	it	seems	to	be,	and	that	it	 is	therefore	
no	obstacle	to	explanatory	rationalism’s	solving	the	problems	discussed	in	§§	(II)-(V).	
Now	 it	 is	 time	 to	 discuss	 how	explanatory	 rationalism	 solves	 these	problems.	 The	 answer	 is	
perhaps	obvious:	explanatory	rationalism	solves	these	problems	by	rejecting	the	troublesome	
views	that	gave	rise	to	them;	that	is,	explanatory	rationalism	rejects	favourism,	psychologism	
and	deliberativism.	More	generally,	explanatory	rationalism	is	not	susceptible	to	similar	sorts	
of	problems	because	it	is	consistent	both	with	the	idea	that	agents	always	act	for	psychological	
reasons,	 and	with	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 sometimes	 also	 act	 for	 normative	 reasons.	 Because	 of	
this,	I	argue,	explanatory	rationalism	is	the	best	univocal	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason.	
However,	you	will	recall	from	§	(V)	that	I	think	that	our	theory	of	reasons	ought	to	be	pluralist	
because	I	share	the	two	senses	 intuition.	To	that	end,	 I	present	new	pluralism:	 I	suggest	that	
one	sense	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	reason	is	explanatory	rationalist	and	the	other	sense	is	favourist.	
That	is	my	theory	of	reasons.	
In	 what	 follows	 I	 revisit	 explanatory	 rationalism,	 and	 consider	 what	 it	 says	 about	 what	 my	
reasons	were	when	I	saw	that	it	was	raining,	and	consequently	took	my	umbrella.	I	then	show	
how	explanatory	 rationalism	solves	 the	problems	that	affect	other	 theories.	Finally,	 I	 set	out	
new	pluralism	and	show	how	it	addresses	the	main	challenge	to	pluralist	theories.	
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1 Explanatory	Rationalism:	Revisited	
Recall	what	explanatory	rationalism	has	to	say	about	each	reason	expression:	
Reason	expression	 Explanatory	rationalism	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	p	makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	A	has	to	φ…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
For	any	p,	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing…	 …if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	explains	(in	the	right	way)	why	A	φ’d.	
Table	XVI-1:	Explanatory	rationalism	
It	may	help	put	this	theory	into	context	if	we	consider	an	example.	Before	doing	so,	however,	
there	is	something	that	perhaps	still	needs	to	be	made	explicit:	what	it	means	to	explain	in	the	
right	way	why	someone	acted.	For	the	purpose	of	this	discussion	I	will	assume	that	if	some	fact	
is	mysteriously	 related	to	the	 fact	 that	 the	agent	did	what	 they	did,	 then	 it	explains	 it	 in	 the	
right	way.	I	discuss	this	assumption	further	in	§	A.2	of	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.1		
That	clarification	having	been	made,	let	us	re-consider	the	following	example:	I	look	out	of	the	
window	and	see	rain.	I	know	that	it’s	raining,	so	I	take	my	umbrella	when	I	leave	the	house.		1.1 The	explanatory	relations	involved	
What	 are	 the	 explanatory	 relations	 in	 this	 example?	 Well,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 is	
mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 appeared	 to	 me	 as	 though	 it	 was	 raining,	 which	 is	
mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining,	which	is	mysteriously	related	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 took	my	umbrella.	 Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	 that	 it	was	 raining	
explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella.	Diagrammatically:	
																																								 																				
1	As	an	aside:	it	is	worth	also	noting	that	this	assumption	does	not	preclude	the	possibility	that	a	causal	
explanatory	relation	is	also	necessary	for	a	reason	to	explain	an	action	in	the	right	way:	in	particular,	it	
might	be	that	(at	least	when	it	comes	to	action)	a	causal	explanatory	relation	between	a	reason	and	an	
action	is	a	necessary	(but	not	sufficient)	condition	for	a	mystery	relation.	In	which	case	explaining	why	
someone	did	what	they	did	 in	the	right	way	 involves	both	a	causal	explanatory	relation	and	a	mystery	
relation.		
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Figure	XVI-1:	The	explanatory	relations	involved	when	it	was	raining	
So,	 given	 the	 transitivity	 of	 the	mystery	 relation	with	 the	 E’-relation,	 the	 following	 facts	 all	
(partially)	explain	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella:	the	fact	that	it	was	
raining,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	appeared	 to	me	as	 though	 it	was	 raining	and	 the	 fact	 that	 I	believed	
that	it	was	raining.	And,	given	the	transitivity	of	the	mystery	relation,	these	same	facts	are	all	
also	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	I	took	my	umbrella.	1.2 The	reasons	there	were	and	the	reasons	I	had	to	take	my	umbrella	
According	to	explanatory	rationalism,	explaining	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	someone	to	do	
some	action	is	both	necessary	and	sufficient	for	being	a	reason	for	them	to	act	and	for	being	a	
reason	that	they	have	to	act.2	So,	the	fact	that	it	was	raining,	the	fact	that	it	appeared	to	me	as	
though	it	was	raining	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining	were	all	reasons	for	me	to	
take	my	umbrella	and	reasons	that	I	had	to	take	my	umbrella.	1.3 The	reasons	for	taking	my	umbrella	
According	to	explanatory	rationalism,	the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	for	(or	against)	doing	
something	 are	 different	 from	 the	 conditions	 for	 being	 a	 reason	 to	 (or	 not	 to)	 do	 it.	 In	
particular,	explanatory	rationalism	maintains	that	a	reason	for	doing	something	must	both	be	
a	reason	to	do	it	and	make	it,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
The	fact	that	it	is	raining	is	a	reason	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	and	it	makes	taking	it,	in	some	
respect,	worth	 doing,	 so	 it	 is	 a	 reason	 for	my	 taking	my	umbrella.	However,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
appeared	to	me	as	though	it	was	raining,	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining	do	not	
make	 taking	my	umbrella,	 in	 any	 respect,	worth	doing,3	so,	 despite	 being	 reasons	 for	me	 to	
take	my	umbrella,	they	aren’t	reasons	for	taking	my	umbrella.	
																																								 																				
2	Note	that	since,	according	to	explanatory	rationalism,	the	conditions	for	being	a	reason	there	is	to	act	
are	the	same	as	being	a	reason	that	one	has	to	act,	explanatory	rationalism	takes	these	two	expressions	
to	be	coextensive	–	that	is,	to	pick	out	the	same	kind	of	reason.	Thus	explanatory	rationalism	entails	(F8)	
(reasons	agents	have	to	act	area	reasons	for	them	to	act).	
3	Recall	the	discussion	of	this	point	in	§	(I)4.2	in	particular.	
		
It	appeared	to	
me	as	though	
it	was	raining	
It	was	
raining	
I	believed	that	
it	was	raining	explains	
I	took	my	
umbrella	explains	 explains	
⇝		 ⇝		 ⇝		
		
It	appeared	to	
me	as	though	
it	was	raining	
It	was	
raining	
I	believed	that	
it	was	raining	explains	
Taking	my	
umbrella	was	pro	
tanto	rational	explains	 explains	
⇝		 ⇝		 E’		
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If	you	are	concerned	that	it	sounds	odd	to	say	that	something	is	a	reason	to	do	something	but	
not	a	reason	for	doing	it,	please	refer	to	the	discussion	of	§	A.3	of	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.	1.4 My	reason	for	taking	my	umbrella	
Finally,	explanatory	rationalism	holds	that	the	reason	for	which	an	agent	acts	is	anything	that	
both	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	act4	and	explains	why	they	acted	(in	the	
right	way),	which	is	to	say	that	any	reason	for	an	agent	to	act	that	explains	why	they	acted	(in	
the	right	way)	is	their	reason	for	acting.5	
I	have	assumed	that	the	mystery	relation	is	sufficient	for	explaining	why	someone	acted	in	the	
right	way.	This	means	that	any	reason	for	some	agent	to	do	some	action	that	is	mysteriously	
related	to	the	fact	that	they	did	it	is	amongst	their	reasons	for	doing	it.	
I	have	noted	that	the	following	facts	were	all	both	reasons	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	and	are	
mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 took	 it:	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
appeared	to	me	as	though	it	was	raining,	and	the	fact	that	I	believed	that	it	was	raining.	Thus	
these	were	all	reasons	for	which	I	took	my	umbrella.	
I	have	said	that	the	fact	that	 it	was	raining	was	amongst	my	reasons	for	taking	my	umbrella.	
Consider	 also	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 raining	 was	 a	 normative	 reason	 for	 me	 to	 take	 my	
umbrella:	so,	I	acted	for	a	normative	reason.	Some	theorists	hold	that	one	acts	for	a	normative	
reason	only	 if	 one	 knows	 it	 (as	 I	 did	 in	 this	 case);	 in	 §	A.5	 of	 the	Appendix	 to	 this	 chapter	 I	
consider	how	explanatory	rationalism	could	explain	why	that	should	be	so.		1.5 A	summary	
Table	XVI-2	provides	a	 summary	of	what	explanatory	 realism	has	 to	 say	about	which	 reason	
expressions	apply	to	which	fact	in	this	example.	
																																								 																				
4	An	implication	of	this	formulation	is	that	an	agent	could	do	something	for	a	reason	that	was	pro	tanto	
but	not	 all	 things	 considered	 rational	 for	 them	 to	do.	 I	 discuss	 this	 implication	 further	 in	 §	A.4	of	 the	
Appendix	to	this	chapter.	
5 	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 formulation	 of	 explanatory	 rationalism	 thus	 entails	 the	 prima	 facie	
reasonable	claims	(F7)	and	(F9)	(the	claims	that	connect	acting	for	a	reason	with	there	being	a	reason	to	
act)	as	well	as	(D2)	(the	claim	that	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	always	explains	their	action).	
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The	putative	reasons	
A	reason	
for	me	to	
take	my	
umbrella	
A	reason	
for	my	
taking	my	
umbrella	
A	reason	I	
had	to	take	
my	
umbrella	
A	reason	for	
which	I	took	my	
umbrella	
It	was	raining	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	
It	 appeared	 to	me	 as	 though	
it	was	raining	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
I	believed	that	it	was	raining	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
Table	XVI-2:	An	application	of	explanatory	rationalism	
The	 facts	 considered	 above	 do	 not	 exhaust	 the	 reasons	 that	 there	 are	 in	 this	 example,6	
however	they	should	hopefully	be	indicative	of	the	sorts	of	claims	that	explanatory	rationalism	
makes.	 For	 reference,	 I	 provide	 the	 same	 table	 for	 several	 of	 the	 examples	 considered	 in	
previous	chapters	in	§	A.1	of	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter.		
2 Solving	the	problems	
Explanatory	 rationalism	 solves	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 §§	(II)-(VI)	 by	 rejecting	 the	
problematic	 theses	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 them.	 That	 is,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 rejects	 all	 of	 the	
following	claims:	
(FAV)	 For	any	p,	p	 is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	only	 if	A’s	φing,	 is	 in	some	respect,	worth	
doing.	
(PSY)	 For	any	p,	if	A	φs	for	the	reason	that	p	then	p	is	a	feature	of	A’s	psychology.	
(DEL1)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	φs	then	p	is	A’s	reason	for	
φing.	
(DEL2)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	A’s	reason	for	φing	then	p	is	a	consideration	in	light	of	which	A	
φs.	
Many	will	 find	 explanatory	 rationalism’s	 rejection	of	 these	 views	unpalatable.	 Indeed,	 it	will	
seem	to	many	that	at	least	some	of	these	claims	are	themselves	prima	facie	reasonable.	I	do	
not	take	that	to	be	the	case	–	rather	I	think	that	any	resistance	to	rejecting	these	claims	comes	
from	one’s	theoretical	commitment	to	them,	and	not	from	their	inherent	plausibility.	
Showing	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 can	 solve	 the	 problems	 considered	 in	 §§	(II)-(VI)	 is,	 of	
course,	not	a	demonstration	that	it	 is	consistent	with	all	of	the	prima	facie	reasonable	claims	
set	 out	 in	 those	 chapters.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 there	 are	 other	prima	 facie	 reasonable	
																																								 																				
6	For	instance,	the	fact	that	my	umbrella	would	keep	me	dry	is	also	a	reason	for	me	to	take	it	(given	that	
I	know	that	it	would),	and	a	reason	for	which	I	took	it.	
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claims	out	there	that,	when	combined	with	those	that	I	have	considered,	create	new	problems	
that	are	specific	to	explanatory	rationalism.		
Against	 that	 possibility	 I	 have	 two	 responses:	 firstly,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 sceptic	 to	 generate	 such	
claims,	not	for	me	to	prove	that	none	exist	(how	could	I	prove	that?).	Secondly,	and	perhaps	
more	 compellingly,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 inoculated	 from	 the	
conventional	form	of	these	problems	because	it	acknowledges	both	that	agents	always	act	for	
psychological	 reasons,	 and	 that	 agents	 also	 can,	 and	 often	 do,	 act	 for	 normative	 reasons.	
Because	it	can	reconcile	these	seemingly	competing	theses,	 it	 is	 immune	from	problems	that	
arise	from	denying	either,	and,	for	that	reason,	 I	suggest	that	 it	 is	the	best	available	univocal	
theory	of	reasons.	
3 New	pluralism	
Explanatory	rationalism	may	be	the	best	available	univocal	theory	of	reasons,	however,	I	think	
that	 our	 theory	 of	 reasons	 ought	 to	 be	 pluralist.	 Recall	 that	 in	 §	(V)	 I	 introduced	 the	 ‘two	
senses’	intuition:	I	suggested	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	Sally	ran	for	a	reason	and	a	sense	in	
which	she	didn’t;	similarly,	I	suggested	that	if	I	believe	that	there	is	milk	at	home	even	though	
there	 isn’t,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	 I	 don’t	 have	 a	 reason	 to	 buy	milk	 and	 a	 sense	 in	
which	 I	 do.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 observation	 I	 suggest	 that	we	 should	 not	 stop	with	 the	 univocal	
account	of	reasons	provided	by	explanatory	rationalism	on	its	own;	instead,	we	ought	to	adopt	
a	pluralist	theory	of	reasons.	
The	 sense	 in	 which	 Sally	 runs	 for	 a	 reason	 is	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 running	 intentionally,	
deliberately	and	purposefully	 is	 running	 for	a	 reason.	 Likewise,	 the	 sense	 in	which	 I	have	no	
reason	to	buy	milk	is	the	sense	in	which,	if	it	is	not	rational	for	me	to	do	something,	I	have	no	
reason	to	do	it.	Over	the	previous	chapters	I	have	argued	that	the	best	way	to	characterise	the	
sense	of	these	expressions	for	which	these	claims	are	true	is	explanatory	rationalism.	
In	contrast,	the	sense	in	which	Sally	does	not	run	for	a	reason	is	the	sense	in	which	there	is	no	
reason	for	her	 to	run	because	no	good	will	come	from	her	running;	 it	 is	 in	no	respect	worth	
doing.	Likewise,	the	sense	in	which	I	have	a	reason	to	buy	milk	is	the	sense	in	which	one	has	a	
reason	to	do	something	because	doing	that	thing	 is,	 in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	Thus,	the	
sense	in	which	Sally	does	not	run	for	a	reason,	and	the	sense	in	which	I	have	a	reason	to	buy	
milk	is	characterised	by	the	favourist	family	of	claims	about	reasons.	
So,	to	the	extent	that	one	shares	the	‘two	senses’	 intuition,	 I	suggest	that	the	best	theory	of	
reasons	takes	one	sense	of	each	reason	expression	to	be	explanatory	rationalist,	and	the	other	
sense	to	be	favourist.	This	is	the	new	pluralist	theory	of	reasons.	
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Reason	expression	
Sense	A	
(Explanatory	rationalism)	
Sense	B	
(Favourism)	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A	
to	φ…	
…if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	
is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	
in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	
φing…	
…if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	
is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	p	makes	A’s	φing,	in	some	
respect,	worth	doing.	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	
in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	reason	A	has	
to	φ…	
…if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	
is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ.	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	
in	some	respect,	worth	doing.	
For	any	p,	p	is	a	A’s	reason	for	
φing…	
…	if	and	only	if	p	explains	why	it	
is	pro	tanto	rational	for	A	to	φ	
and	explains	(in	the	right	way)	
why	A	φ’d.	
…if	and	only	if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	
all	things	considered,	worth	
doing	and	explains	(in	the	right	
way)	why	A	φ’d.	
Table	XVI-3:	New	Pluralism	
While	 I	 think	 that	 new	 pluralism	 is	 the	 best	 way	 to	 capture	 our	 myriad	 intuitions	 about	
reasons,	 I	 think	 that	 explanatory	 rationalism	 is	 the	 de	 facto	 sense	 of	 reason	 expressions	 in	
ordinary	language.	It	seems	to	me	to	be	more	of	a	strain	to	insist	that	I	have	a	reason	to	buy	
milk	even	if	I	believe	that	I	have	plenty,	than	to	insist	that	Sally	has	a	reason	to	run	although	no	
bear	is	chasing	her.	Indeed,	I	feel	more	inclined	to	qualify	the	former	–	I	might	say	that	there	is	
a	sense	in	which	I	have	a	reason	to	buy	milk	–	and	I	am	so	inclined,	I	think,	because	the	sense	in	
which	I	have	a	reason	to	buy	milk	is	not	the	conventional	sense	of	what	it	is	to	have	a	reason	
(mutatis	mutandis	for	Sally).7	
4 The	challenge	for	pluralism	
Recall	the	following	prima	facie	reasonable	claim:	
(S1)	 Whenever	 we	 give	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting,	whatever	 the	 sense	 of	 the	
expression	 used,	 we	 explain	 their	 action	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 them	 seem	
rational.	
In	 §	(V)7,	 I	 noted	 that	 (S1)	 creates	 a	 problem	 for	 pluralism.	 The	 problem	was	 as	 follows:	 a	
theory	of	reasons	that	is	pluralist	with	respect	to	the	reasons	for	which	an	agent	acts,	takes	the	
‘agent’s	reason	for	acting’	expression	to	have	two	different	senses.	In	particular,	such	a	theory	
holds	 that	 the	 reason-relation	 for	 each	 sense	 (i.e.	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 action	 and	 the	
																																								 																				
7	Of	course,	the	great	virtue	of	explanatory	rationalism	is	that	there	are	occasions	on	which	something	is	
a	 reason	 that	 I	 have	 to	do	 something	 in	both	 the	 favourist	 and	 the	explanatory	 rationalist	 sense.	 For	
instance,	when	I	know	that	it	is	raining,	the	fact	that	it	is	raining	is	a	reason	for	me	to	take	my	umbrella	
in	both	the	favourist	and	the	explanatory	rationalist	sense.	
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reason	in	virtue	of	which	it	is	a	reason)	is	different.	The	challenge	for	pluralist	theories	is	thus	
to	 explain	 how	 it	 is	 that,	 if	 the	 reason-relations	 are	 different	 for	 the	 different	 senses,	 it	 is	
nonetheless	 the	case	 that	when	we	give	an	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting,	whatever	 the	 sense	of	
the	expression	used,	we	explain	their	action	in	a	way	that	makes	them	seem	rational.	That	is,	if	
the	expression	‘the	agent’s	reason	for	acting’	has	two	different	senses,	how	is	(S1)	true?	
New	 pluralism’s	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 relies	 on	 the	 following	 observation:	 whenever	 an	
agent	acts	for	a	reason	in	the	favourist	sense,	they	act	for	the	same	reason	in	the	explanatory	
rationalist	sense.	To	see	why	this	is	so,	recall	what	favourism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	
act	claims:	- Favourism	about	the	reasons	for	which	we	act:	For	any	p,	p	 is	a	A’s	reason	for	φing	if	
and	only	 if	p	makes	A’s	φing,	all	 things	 considered,	worth	doing	and	explains	 (in	 the	
right	way)	why	A	φ’d.8	
If	something	makes	an	agent’s	action	all	things	considered	worth	doing	then	it	also	makes	it	in	
some	respect	worth	doing,	so	 it	 is	a	normative	reason	for	them	to	do	 it.	 I	have	suggested,	 in	
previous	chapters,	that	a	normative	reason	to	do	some	action	explains	what	the	agent	did	in	
the	right	way	only	 if	 it	 is	mysteriously	related	to	a	belief	that,	 in	turn,	both	explains	why	the	
agent’s	 action	 is	 pro	 tanto	 rational	 and	 is	 mysteriously	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	
(intentionally)	did	it.	Now	recall	that	a	belief	that	explains	both	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	
some	 agent	 to	 do	 something	 and	 why	 they	 did	 it	 is	 the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 in	 the	
explanatory	rationalist	sense.		
Thus,	a	normative	reason,	p,	is	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	in	the	favourist	sense	only	if	it	is	
mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	the	agent	believes	that	p,	where	the	fact	that	the	agent	
believes	 that	p	 is	 the	agent’s	 reason	 for	acting	 in	 the	explanatory	 rationalist	 sense.	But,	 as	 I	
have	argued,	if	p	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	the	agent	believes	that	p,	and	the	fact	
that	the	agent	believes	that	p	 is,	 in	the	explanatory	rationalist	sense,	 their	 reason	for	acting,	
then	 the	 fact	 that	p	 is	also	 their	 reason	 for	acting	 in	 the	explanatory	 rationalist	 sense.	Thus,	
whenever	an	agent	acts	for	a	reason	in	the	favourist	sense,	they	act	for	the	same	reason	in	the	
explanatory	rationalist	sense.	
																																								 																				
8	While	this	thesis	is	rarely,	 if	ever,	explicitly	advocated	by	favourists,	I	take	it	to	be	at	least	implied	by	
their	 views.	 For	 instance,	many	 favourists	hold	 that	an	agent	acts	 for	a	normative	 reason	only	 if	 they	
know	it	 (see	the	discussions	of	both	§	(X)4	and	§	A.5	of	the	Appendix	to	this	chapter	for	some	related	
discussion	of	these	accounts).	Now,	whether	or	not	they	accept	my	indirect	theory	of	normative	reason	
explanation,	such	favourists	still	want	to	hold	that	a	normative	reason	must	explain	the	agent’s	action	in	
the	right	way	 if	 it	 is	to	explain	their	action	–	and	that	 is	all	that	 is	required	for	them	to	agree	with	my	
characterisation.	
	 225	
And	 when	 an	 agent	 acts	 for	 a	 reason	 in	 the	 explanatory	 rationalist	 sense,	 their	 reason	 for	
acting	explains	both	why	they	acted	and	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	act.	So	this	is	
why	giving	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	always	explains	their	action	in	a	way	that	makes	them	
seem	rational	 (or	at	 least	pro	tanto	 rational):	because	their	reason	for	acting	always	explains	
why	they	did	what	they	did	and	why	it	was	(at	least	pro	tanto)	rational	for	them	to	do	it.	
New	pluralism	thus	meets	the	challenge	that	(S1)	creates	for	all	pluralist	theories	by	insisting	
that	 whenever	 something	 is	 an	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting,	 it	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 acting	 in	 the	
explanatory	 rationalist	 sense,	 but	 sometimes	 it	 is	 also	 the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 in	 the	
favourist	 sense.	 New	 pluralism	 thus	 provides	 a	 plausible	 account	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 (S1)	whilst	
maintaining	its	pluralist	credentials.	
5 Conclusion	
Explanatory	 rationalism	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 univocal	 account	 of	 what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	 practical	
reason	that	does	not	suffer	the	failings	of	most	contemporary	theories	of	reasons.	The	great	
virtue	of	explanatory	rationalism	 is	 thus	that	 it	does	not	generally	compel	us	 to	make	claims	
about	 reasons	 that	 are	 strange,	 counterintuitive	 or	 prima	 facie	 paradoxical,	 unlike	 most	
contemporary	 theories	 of	 reasons.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is,	 I	 suggest,	 superior	 to	 favourism,	
deliberativism,	and	psychologism.	
Moreover,	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 new	 pluralism,	 a	 theory	 that	 combines	 explanatory	
rationalism	 and	 favourism,	 is	 the	 best	 theory	 of	 reasons;	 it	 combines	 all	 the	 virtues	 of	
explanatory	rationalism	with	a	way	to	satisfy	 the	 ‘two	senses’	 intuition,	and	 it	happily	meets	
the	major	challenge	to	pluralist	theories.	
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Appendix	
A.1 Some	more	examples	
For	reference,	Table	XVI-4	shows	what	explanatory	rationalism	has	to	say	about	which	reason	
expressions	 apply	 to	which	 facts/propositions	 in	 some	of	 the	examples	 considered	 in	 earlier	
chapters.	
Example	 The	putative	reasons	 A	reason	for	A	to	φ	
A	reason	
for	A’s	φing	
A	reason	A	
had	to	φ	
A’s	reason	
for	φing	
Award	
My	friend	won	an	award	 ü	 ü	 ü	 ü	
I	read	that	she	had	won	an	
award	in	the	newspaper	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
I	believed	that	she	had	won	an	
award	 ü	 û	 ü	 ü	
Sally	
A	bear	was	chasing	Sally	 û û û û 
She	heard	a	bear-like	sound	 ü û ü ü 
She	believed	that	a	bear	was	
chasing	her	 ü û ü ü 
Eva	
Her	husband	was	unfaithful	 û û û û 
It	 appeared	 to	 her	 as	 though	
her	 husband	 was	 kissing	
another	woman	
û û û û 
She	 believed	 that	 he	 had	 been	
unfaithful	 ü û ü ü 
Climber	
Loosening	 his	 grip	 would	 rid	
him	of	danger	 ü ü ü û 
It	 appeared	 as	 though	
loosening	his	grip	would	rid	him	
of	danger	
ü û ü û 
He	 believed	 that	 loosening	 his	
grip	would	rid	him	of	danger	 ü û ü û 
Table	XVI-4:	Other	examples	for	explanatory	rationalism	
A.2 Explaining	in	the	right	way	
Throughout	this	chapter,	I	assumed	that	if	some	fact	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	the	
agent	did	what	they	did,	then	it	explains	it	in	the	right	way.	This	section	provides	more	context	
to	that	assumption.	
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According	to	explanatory	rationalism,	something	is	the	reason	for	which	an	agent	does	some	
action	only	if	it	is	a	reason	for	them	to	do	it9	and	it	explains	why	they	did	it	in	the	right	way.	But	
what	does	it	mean	to	say	that	it	explains	it	in	the	right	way?		
Well,	recall	the	case	of	the	climber	who	was	so	unnerved	by	his	resolution	to	drop	his	friend,	
that	 he	 loosened	 his	 grip	 on	 his	 friend	 unintentionally	 (i.e.	 not	 for	 a	 reason).10	According	 to	
explanatory	rationalism	there	was	a	reason	for	him	to	loosen	his	grip,	which	was,	inter	alia,	the	
fact	that	he	believed	that	doing	so	would	rid	him	of	danger.	11	Moreover,	given	that	 it	causes	
him	to	loosen	his	grip,	there	is	perhaps	a	(causal)	sense	in	which	the	fact	that	he	believed	that	
loosening	his	grip	would	rid	him	of	danger	explains	why	he	loosened	his	grip.	That	being	so,	a	
reason	for	him	to	loosen	his	grip	explains	why	he	loosened	his	grip,	but	it	was	nonetheless	not	
his	reason	for	loosening	his	grip.12	Why	not?	Because	it	does	not	explain	why	he	loosened	his	
grip	in	the	right	way.13	
What	is	the	‘right	way’	of	explaining?	As	I	suggested	in	§	(XIV),	the	right	way	of	explaining	an	
agent’s	action	is	not	merely	causal.	To	elaborate:	while	the	right	way	might	be	partly	causal	(I	
will	take	no	view	on	that),	 it	 is	not	merely	causal.	In	particular,	I	have	suggested	that	if	a	fact	
explains	why	an	agent	acted	in	the	right	way	then	it	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	the	
agent	acted	as	they	did.14	
What	these	remarks	establish	is	that	a	mystery	relation	between	a	reason	there	is	to	act	and	
the	fact	that	the	agent	acted	as	they	did	is	necessary	for	the	reason	to	explain	their	action	in	
the	 right	way.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 discussion,	 I	 assumed	 that	 it	 is	 sufficient;	 so	 that	 if	 a	
reason	that	an	agent	has	to	act	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	they	acted	as	they	did,	
then	 it	 is	 their	 reason	 for	 acting.	 This	 assumption	 does	 not	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	my	
argument;	it	just	makes	the	exposition	less	involved.	
																																								 																				
9	I.e.	it	explains	why	it	is	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	do	it.		
10	See	§	(XIV)4.	
11	It	was	a	reason	for	him	to	loosen	his	grip	because	it	explains	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	him	to	
loosen	his	grip.	
12	This	is	clearly	implied	by	the	fact	that	he	does	not	loosen	his	grip	for	a	reason.	
13	Cf.	 ‘What	 distinguishes	 actions	which	 are	 intentional	 from	 those	which	 are	 not?	 The	 answer	 that	 I	
shall	 suggest	 is	 that	 they	 are	 the	 actions	 to	 which	 a	 certain	 sense	 of	 the	 question	 ‘Why?’	 is	 given	
application;	 the	 sense	 is	 of	 course	 that	 in	 which	 the	 answer,	 if	 positive,	 gives	 a	 reason	 for	 acting.’	
(Anscombe	1957,	§	5)	
14	That	is,	I	have	suggested	that	the	difference	between	a	fact	that	merely	causally	explains	why	an	agent	
acted	and	one	that	explains	why	they	acted	in	the	right	way	 is	that	it	is	only	in	the	latter	case	that	the	
fact	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	the	agent	did	what	they	did.	
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A.3 The	problem	of	reasons	for	acting	
Unlike	 any	 other	 theory	 of	 reasons	 (to	my	 knowledge)	 explanatory	 rationalism	distinguishes	
between	the	kind	of	reason	picked	out	by	the	expressions	‘a	reason	to	act’	and	‘a	reason	for	
acting’.	It	insists	that	while	a	reason	to	act	is	just	anything	that	explains	why	an	agent’s	action	
is	pro	tanto	rational,	a	reason	for	acting	is	something	that	is	both	a	reason	to	act	and	counts	in	
favour	of	the	agent’s	doing	it.		A	consequence	of	this	view	is	that	something	could	be	a	reason	
for	an	agent	to	do	some	action	without	being	a	reason	for	their	doing	it.	
While	 this	may	 sound	 paradoxical,	 in	what	 follows	 I	will	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 actually	 the	 least	
worst	response	to	a	problem	that	affects	all	theories	of	reasons.	A.3.1 What	reason	there	was	for	Sally	to	run	
To	the	extent	that	we	accept	that	 it	 is	prima	facie	 reasonable	to	claim	that	Sally’s	reason	for	
running	is	that	she	heard	a	bear-like	sound	(i.e.	(F6))	and	that	an	agent’s	reason	for	acting	must	
be	a	reason	there	was	for	them	to	so	act	(i.e.	(F9)),	 it	 follows	that	the	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	
bear-like	 sound	 (in	 a	 wood	 that	 she	 knew	 to	 contain	 bears)	 was	 a	 reason	 for	 her	 to	 run.	
Indeed,	it	seems	to	me,	if	you	hear	something	that	sounds	like	a	bear	in	a	wood	that	you	know	
to	contain	bears,	then	that	is	a	good	reason	for	you	to	run.	Thus,	I	suggest:	
(R5) The	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound	is	a	reason	for	her	to	run.	A.3.2 Reasons	to	act	and	reasons	for	acting	
As	I	have	already	noted,	 it	seems	reasonable	to	say	that	 if	something	is	a	reason	to	do	some	
action	then	it	is	a	reason	for	doing	it,	thus:	
(R6) For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	then	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing.	A.3.3 Reasons	for	acting	count	in	favour	of	actions	
In	§	(I)1.3,	I	noted	that	all	reasons	for	acting	count	in	favour	of	the	actions	for	which	they	are	
reasons	and	that	all	reasons	against	some	action	count	against	doing	that	action.	In	§	(I)4.4,	I	
argued	 further	 that	 a	 reason	 for	 some	 action	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	 that	 action	 in	 virtue	 of	 its	
being	a	reason	for	it;	that	is,	I	argued	that	the	‘for’	preposition	on	its	own	is	enough	to	give	it	
that	meaning.15	Thus:	
(R7) For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing	then	p	counts	in	favour	of	A’s	φing.	
																																								 																				
15	In	§	(I)4.4,	I	argued	further	that	a	reason	for	some	action	counts	in	favour	of	that	action	in	virtue	of	its	
being	 a	 reason	 for	 it;	 that	 is,	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 ‘for’	 preposition	 on	 its	 own	 is	 enough	 to	 give	 it	 that	
meaning	–	I	left	it	open	whether	or	not	a	reason	for	acting	also	counts	in	favour	of	an	action	in	virtue	of	
its	being	a	reason.	Similar	remarks	apply	to	reasons	against	some	action.	
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A.3.4 Counting	in	favour	of		
As	I	have	already	argued,	16	the	most	natural	 interpretation	of	what	it	 is	to	count	in	favour	of	
some	action	is	to	make	it,	in	some	respect,	worth	doing.17	Thus:	
(R8) For	 any	p,	 p	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	A’s	φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	p	makes	 A’s	φing,	 in	
some	respect,	worth	doing.	A.3.5 What	make’s	Sally’s	running	worth	doing	
As	 I	 established	 in	 §	(II)4,	 Sally’s	 running	 is,	 in	 no	 respect,	worth	 doing,	 so	 nothing	makes	 it	
worth	doing.	And,	in	particular:	
(R9) The	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound	does	not	make	her	running,	in	any	
respect,	worth	doing.	A.3.6 The	Reasons	for	Acting	Problem	
The	Reasons	for	Acting	Problem	is	this:	the	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound	is	a	reason	
for	her	to	run,	so	it	is	a	reason	for	her	running,	so	it	counts	in	favour	of	her	running,	so	it	makes	
her	 running,	 in	 some	 respect,	 worth	 doing,	 but	 it	 doesn’t	make	 her	 running	 in	 any	 respect	
worth	doing!	Explicitly,	the	following	claims	are	mutually	inconsistent:	
(R5)	 The	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound	is	a	reason	for	her	to	run.		
(R6)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A	to	φ	then	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing.	
(R7)	 For	any	p,	if	p	is	a	reason	for	A’s	φing	then	p	counts	in	favour	of	A’s	φing.	
(R8)	 For	 any	p,	 p	 counts	 in	 favour	 of	A’s	φing	 if	 and	 only	 if	p	makes	 A’s	φing,	 in	
some	respect,	worth	doing.	
(R9)	 The	fact	that	Sally	heard	a	bear-like	sound	does	not	make	her	running,	in	any	
respect,	worth	doing.	
This	is	a	problem	that	all	theories	of	reasons	face	(note	how	all	of	these	claims	are	prima	facie	
reasonable,	 although	 they	 are	 mutually	 inconsistent).	 The	 response	 of	 favourists	 and	
deliberativists	to	this	problem	is	to	reject	(R5).	Psychologism	about	reasons	for	acting	rejects	
(R7).	18	Kearns	 and	 Star	 (2008)	 interpret	 what	 it	 is	 to	 ‘count	 in	 favour	 of	 acting’	 as	 ‘being	
evidence	 that	one	ought	 to	 so	act,’	 so	 they	would	presumably	 reject	 (R8).	 I	 know	of	no	one	
																																								 																				
16	Recall	the	discussion	of	this	point	in	§	(I)4.2	in	particular.	
17	Where	 what	 it	 is	 for	 an	 action	 to	 be	 worth	 doing	 is	 to	 be	 determined,	 except	 for	 the	 claim	 that	
whether	or	not	some	action	is	worth	doing	for	some	agent	is	independent	of	an	their	cognitive	states.	
18	Psychologists	would	probably	also	reject	(R5).	
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who	 would	 reject	 (R9).	 For	 reasons	 that	 I	 have	 set	 out	 at	 various	 points	 over	 the	 previous	
chapters,	I	don’t	find	any	of	these	options	palatable.		
In	contrast,	explanatory	rationalism	rejects	(R6).	I	take	this	to	be	the	least	worst	of	the	options	
available.	Does	 it	 sound	odd	to	say	 that	something	could	be	a	 reason	to	act	without	being	a	
reason	for	acting?	Somewhat.	However,	I	think	that	the	oddness	of	saying	this	dissipates	when	
particular	 examples	 are	 considered:	 it	 does	 not	 sound	odd	 to	me	 to	 say	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 I	
believe	that	it	is	raining	is	a	reason	for	me	to	take	an	umbrella	but	not	a	reason	for	taking	an	
umbrella.		
A.4 Acting	pro	tanto	rationally		
According	 to	explanatory	 rationalism,	 it	 is	possible	 that	an	agent	could	do	some	action	 for	a	
reason	even	 though	 that	action	was	merely	pro	 tanto	 rational,	and	not	all	 things	considered	
rational.	 That	 is,	 explanatory	 rationalism	 suggests	 that	 even	when	 an	 agent	 does	 one	 thing,	
despite	 judging	 something	else	 to	be	all	 things	 considered	worth	doing	 instead,	 they	 still	 do	
what	they	do	for	a	reason.	Is	this	right?		
Well,	consider	the	following	example:	
A	man	walking	in	a	park	stumbles	on	a	branch	in	the	path.	Thinking	the	branch	may	endanger	
others,	he	picks	 it	up	and	throws	it	 in	a	hedge	beside	the	path.	On	his	way	home	it	occurs	to	
him	 that	 the	 branch	 may	 be	 projecting	 from	 the	 hedge	 and	 so	 still	 be	 a	 threat	 to	 unwary	
walkers.	 He	 gets	 off	 the	 tram	 he	 is	 on,	 returns	 to	 the	 park,	 and	 restores	 the	 branch	 to	 its	
original	position…	It	 is	easy	to	 imagine	that	the	man	who	returned	to	the	park	to	restore	the	
branch	to	its	original	position	in	the	path	realizes	that	his	action	is	not	sensible.	He	has	a	motive	
for	moving	the	stick,	namely,	that	it	may	endanger	a	passer-by.	But	he	also	has	a	motive	for	not	
returning,	which	is	the	time	and	trouble	it	costs.	In	his	own	judgement,	the	latter	consideration	
outweighs	 the	 former;	 yet	 he	 acts	 on	 the	 former.	 In	 short,	 he	 goes	 against	 his	 own	 best	
judgement.	(Davidson	2004,	172	&	174)	
The	man	in	Davidson’s	example	does	act	for	a	reason:	he	thinks	that	the	stick	may	endanger	a	
passer-by.	 It	 seems	to	me	that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	action	 is	 ‘less	 than	 fully	 rational’,19	does	not	
impinge	upon	 its	having	been	done	 for	a	 reason.20	But	 this	means	 that	we	should	be	careful	
about	saying	that	if	one	acts	for	a	reason	then	they	act	rationally.	Here	is	what	I	suggest:	- An	agent	acts	pro	tanto	rationally	if	and	only	if	their	reason	for	doing	it	is	a	pro	tanto	
reason	to	do	it	(i.e.	something	that	explains	why	their	action	is	pro	tanto	rational).	
																																								 																				
19	To	use	Parfit’s	(2011,	34)	term.	
20	Others	are	also	of	this	view,	for	 instance:	 ‘The	incontinent	man	holds	one	course	to	be	better	(for	a	
reason)	and	yet	does	something	else	(also	for	a	reason).’	(Davidson	2001b,	34);	‘Akrasia,	or	weakness	of	
the	will,	 occurs	when,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 conflicting	 reasons	 for	 and	 against	X-ing	 someone	makes	 an	 all-
things-considered	judgement	that	he	ought	not	to	X,	but	X’s	anyway	and	does	so	for	a	reason,	namely,	
for	 whatever	 the	 reason	 in	 favour	 of	 X-ing	 was	 (which	 was	 included	 in	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 all-things-
considered	judgement).’	(Hurley	1992,	130)		
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- An	agent	acts	all	things	considered	rationally	if	and	only	if	their	reason	for	doing	it	is	an	
all	things	considered	reason	to	do	it	(i.e.	something	that	explains	why	their	action	is	all	
things	considered	rational).	
A.5 Acting	for	a	normative	reason	and	knowledge	
Several	 theorists	 hold	 that	 an	 agent	 acts	 for	 a	 normative	 reason	 only	 if	 they	 know	 it.21	In	
§	(XIV)2,	 I	argued	that	a	mystery	relation	between	the	 fact	 that	p	and	the	 fact	 that	an	agent	
believes	that	p	 is	a	necessary	condition	on	the	agent’s	knowing	that	p.	Now,	suppose	further	
that	it	is	also	a	sufficient	condition	(i.e.	if	the	fact	that	p	is	mysteriously	related	to	the	fact	that	
an	agent	believes	that	p	then	the	agent	knows	that	p).		
If	 that	 were	 true,	 then	 explanatory	 rationalism	 would	 provide	 us	 with	 an	 account	 of	why	
knowing	a	normative	reason	should	be	necessary	for	acting	on	it:	because	it	is	only	if	an	agent	
knows	a	normative	 reason	 that	 it	 can	mysteriously	 explain	 their	 action	–	 and	 it	 is	 only	 their	
reason	for	acting	if	it	mysteriously	explains	their	action.	Let	me	elaborate.	
A	normative	reason	to	do	some	action	must	be	mysteriously	related	to	the	agent’s	belief	in	it	if	
it	 is	to	explain	either	why	 it	was	pro	tanto	 rational	 for	the	agent	to	do	that	action,	or	(in	the	
right	 way)	 why	 they	 did	 it 22 ;	 that	 is,	 a	 normative	 reason	 to	 do	 some	 action	 must	 be	
mysteriously	related	to	the	agent’s	belief	in	it	if	it	is	to	be	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting.	And	if	
we	suppose	that	the	mystery	relation	is	sufficient	for	knowledge,	then	a	normative	reason	will	
only	be	mysteriously	related	to	an	agent’s	belief	in	it	if	the	agent	knows	that	normative	reason.	
So	 this	 is	why	an	agent	 can	only	 act	 for	 a	normative	 reason	 if	 they	 know	 it:	 because	 if	 they	
don’t	 know	 it	 then,	 inter	alia,	 it	won’t	explain	why	 they	did	 it	 in	 the	 right	way,	 and	 it	won’t	
explain	why	it	was	pro	tanto	rational	for	them	to	do	it.	
																																								 																				
21	(E.g.	Unger	1978;	Hyman	1999,	2015;	Hornsby	2008;	McDowell	2013)	
22	Excluding	weird	cases	(e.g.	where	a	normative	reason	to	do	some	action	also	happens	to	be	a	feature	
of	the	agent’s	psychology,	which	anyway	explains	why	the	agent’s	action	is	pro	tanto	rational).		
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